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For, loyally observing the behests of Arcadius, he [Yazdgard I] adopted and continued without 
interruption a policy of profound peace with the Romans… When this treaty had been 
executed, both sovereigns then continued to administer the affairs of their respective 
countries as seemed best to them.1 
What the sixth century Roman historian Procopius describes here, in relatively inconspicuous 
and understated terms, is the beginning of an unprecedented period of peace between the 
previously hostile and antagonistic Roman and Sasanian Empires in the fifth century A.D. 
Priscus also informs us that the fifth-century Roman-Sasanian relationship was so peaceful 
that Constantinople’s magister militum per Orientem, usually one of the most-hard pressed 
Roman generals, responsible for defending the empire against the Sasanians, was able to turn 
to ‘self-indulgence and effeminate leisure’ but says little else to expand on this. 2  Like 
Procopius and Priscus, modern scholarship has also largely ignored the fifth-century peace 
between these two empires, limiting it merely to footnotes or passing mentions in its analysis 
of the more prevalent military conflicts and confrontations. 3  Although there is general 
acknowledgement that the fifth century was an unprecedentedly peaceful period in Roman-
Sasanian relations there has so far been scant research into how and why this peace was 
established and maintained.4 Scholars have seemed satisfied to place the motivation of the 
peace on the increased threats faced by both the Roman and Sasanian Empires on their other 
frontiers in this period and to quickly move on, otherwise paying little, or rather no attention, 
to the development and continuation of the peace throughout the fifth century.5    
                                                          
1 Proc. BP. 1.2. 
2 fr. 19. 
3 Greatrex (1993: 1) ‘The fifth century was in general a peaceful period for Rome’s eastern frontier’. Drijvers 
(2009: 447-448) ‘[Only] Two short wars were fought’. Equally, in their otherwise exhaustive and meticulous 
annotated sourcebook, Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity, Dignas & Winter dedicate only five pages to the period 
of peace in the fifth century.  
4 On the recognition of this see above (n.2) and also: Millar (2006: 70), Luther (2014: 183) and Blockley (1992: 
47). It has recently been argued that there was perhaps a third, even shorter, conflict; however, this has not 
been conclusively proved or agreed upon as of yet (Luther, 2014). 
5 Wiesehöfer (2007: 60) ‘Over the next [fifth] century the Hephthalites (‘White Huns’) gave the Sasanians much 
more trouble than the Romans, with whom the kings of Iran came to a mutual agreement around 440’. Rubin 
(2000: 641-2) ‘A Plausible explanation for the change from persistent warfare in the third and fourth century to 
2 
  
The wider fifth century was a turbulent and tumultuous period. It witnessed the collapse and 
fragmentation of the Western Roman Empire into various barbarian kingdoms, and the 
establishment of new power groups such as the Huns, Vandals and Hephthalites, who 
although they did not last the test of time, played a fundamentally important role in shaping 
the course of events in this period.6 As such, the stability of Roman-Sasanian relations in this 
period is even more note-worthy. Traditionally however, scholarly attention on the fifth 
century has overwhelmingly focused on the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. Only 
recently has this trend been answered, with studies that pay more attention to the survival 
and subsequent development of the Eastern Empire.7  
What work has been done on Roman-Sasanian relations in the fifth century has focused on 
specific and localised events, predominantly military in nature, such as the two short-lived 
conflicts that erupted in 421 and 441, rather than the nature or development of the peace 
itself.8 Indeed, although there is a rising awareness that the Roman-Sasanian relationship was 
more nuanced than one simply dominated by warfare, and that other forms of interactions 
did take place, this ironically has not yet reached scholarship of the peaceful fifth century.9 
                                                          
the peaceful relations in the fifth century is provided by the other external problems’. Drijvers (2009: 448) ‘Until 
the beginning of the sixth century tranquillity dominated the relations between Rome and Persia. Both powers 
were occupied with other foes: the Sasanians with the Hephthalite Huns on their north-eastern border, and the 
Romans with the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Isaurians.’ Rubin, (1986: 678) ‘These two great powers, whose main 
concern was primarily the defence of their territories against barbarian inroads from the east and from the 
north’. 
6 Whereas plenty of research has been conducted on Attila and the Huns in the fifth century, for example Gordon 
(1966) and Thompson (1996), the Vandals, who played just as an important role in this period, have received 
less scholarly attention. Indeed, only one comprehensive modern study has been done on the Vandal kingdom 
of North Africa; the seminal work of Merrills and Miles, The Vandals (2010). While the most important 
neighbours of the Sasanian Empire in this century, the Hephthalites, have received even less individual study. 
Although it must be noted this is largely due to a lack of currently available evidence. 
7 The main examples of this growing awareness of the important developments in the Eastern Empire include; 
Millar A Greek Empire: Power and Belief under Theodosius II (2006), Kelly Theodosius II: Rethinking the Roman 
Empire in Late Antiquity (2014) and Williams & Friell The Rome that Did Not Fall: The Survival of the East in the 
Fifth Century (1998). 
8 Greatrex’s ‘The Two Fifth Century Wars between Rome and Persia’ (1993), Rubin’s ‘Diplomacy and War in the 
Relations between Byzantium and the Sassanids in the Fifth Century A.D’ (1986), Luther’s ‘Ein ,übersehener’ 
römisch-persischer Krieg um 416/417?’ (2014) and Bullough’s ‘The Roman Empire vs. Persia’ (1963). Although 
Bullough’s piece does seek to answer the nature of the peace he addresses this from a strictly military 
perspective and his research is largely conducted by seeking parallels between modern military relationships 
between different states.  
9 For the growing scholarly attention on the more peaceful and cooperative interactions between the Roman 
and Sasanian Empires see, among others: Dignas & Winter Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: Neighbours and 
Rivals (2007), Drijvers ‘Rome and the Sasanid Empire: Confrontation and Coexistence’ (2009) and Canepa The 
Two Eyes of the Earth (2009). 
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Consequently, no systematic study of the nature and long-term development of the Roman-
Sasanian relations in the fifth century has been conducted. 
As stated above, current scholarship has tended to focus on individual events in the fifth-
century Roman-Sasanian relationship and, in this regard, it has provided valuable insights that 
have improved our knowledge and understanding of a traditionally under-researched area 
and period, particularly from an eastern perspective. Works produced by Greatrex, Blockley 
and Rubin have illuminated some of the main treaties and conflicts that took place during this 
period and have proved instructive to this research. However, these individual events are too 
often viewed in isolation, as largely independent of one another, and as such they are 
frequently granted too much importance in the development of Roman-Sasanian relations in 
the fifth century.  
In this regard, both Greatrex and Blockley have analysed the background and importance of 
the partition of Armenia in 387 and correctly stated, and explained, its importance in the 
establishment of the fifth-century détente. They argue that the Armenian solution was the 
defining event in the establishment of the peace.10 For instance, Greatrex states that; ‘the 
partition of Armenia was the critical event which permitted the two powers to bury their 
differences.’11 However, although the resolution of the Armenian problem was undoubtedly 
important, on its own it could not have cemented peace between two fierce rivals who 
competed in a variety of locations and for a variety of different reasons. Indeed, it must be 
remembered that the shared imperial border stretched from Armenia in the north to Arabia 
in the south and that, therefore, although the Armenian partition helped to solve tensions in 
the north, it could not have, and did not, prevent conflicts from breaking out elsewhere, such 
as in Mesopotamia and Arabia. More correctly then, the 387 treaty should be seen as one 
part of a wider development and process towards peace that took place throughout the fifth 
century, not as its ultimate instigator and enforcer. Furthermore, although Greatrex has 
previously acknowledged the importance of the new Hunnic threats and the rising importance 
of the Danube frontier at the expense of the eastern frontier, in forcing the imperial 
                                                          
10 Greatrex ‘Background and Aftermath of the Partition of Armenia in A.D. 387’ (2000) & Blockley ‘The Division 
of Armenia between the Romans and Persians at the end of the 4th Century’ (1987). Rubin (1986: 678) also puts 
substantial importance on the partition in cementing peace. 
11 2000: 35. 
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neighbours to reach an accord, he does not connect this to the 387 treaty.12  It is these 
connections, between the different important individual events and changes in the fifth 
century, which motivated and enabled imperial détente. As such, they should not be viewed 
separately or as independent of each other but rather as interconnected and interdependent. 
As such, this investigation will seek to highlight and explain these connections between events 
such as the 387 treaty, to show how they all affected the development of other important 
events in the Roman-Sasanian relationship during the fifth century, such as those signed in 
421 and 442, that dealt with similar issues. 
 
Additionally, it is not surprising that in a field traditionally dominated by the study of military 
interactions and conflicts, research on Roman-Sasanian relations even in the peaceful fifth 
century has thus far been dominated by a focus on conflict and competition.13 The short 
imperial conflicts of 421 and 442 have received the majority of scholarly attention, rather 
than the treaties that ended them, despite their rather limited importance and strategic 
consequence. Indeed, Procopius states that during the 421 war the Sasanians did ‘no damage’ 
and quickly retreated ‘without accomplishing anything’.14 While, similarly, the war of 440 was 
less a war and more a brief and insubstantial incursion.15 As such, it was the treaties that 
ended these conflicts, not the military campaigns, that provide more insight into the 
development of the fifth-century relationship. For instance, although Greatrex, Luther and 
Holum provide strong analysis on when these wars started, who started them, what tactics 
and strategies were employed, who led the armies, when they ended and who can be 
regarded as the victor, all of which helps to understand the ways in which the empires 
competed in the fifth century, they are not seen in the context of the wider development of 
the fifth-century relationship.16 Consequently, more important issues are left unanswered: 
why these conflicts were not prevented by earlier treaties that had been thought to have 
established peace in the first place, what impact they had on the continuation of peace 
                                                          
12 2000: 44. 
13 See n. 3 above. 
14 BP. 1.2.11-25. 
15 Greatrex & Lieu, 2002: 44. 
16 Greatrex ‘The Two Fifth Century Wars Between Rome and Persia’ (1993), Luther ‘Ein ,übersehener’ römisch-




afterwards and what unresolved issues needed to be overcome in order for a stronger and 
more stable peace to be established.  
Importantly, Rubin was the first to discuss and analyse the nature of the Roman-Sasanian 
peace, and as such his work provides useful frameworks for this investigation. Rubin correctly 
recognised that the peace was not an abstract affair that could be linked to one specific event 
or incident and that it was, therefore, not quickly and instantly implemented, but was rather 
an adaptive and on-going process.  The underlying premise of his work is to ‘show that over 
the fifth century AD it was the Persian monarchs who were mainly interested in peace’.17 As 
such, although he does analyse the treaties that ended the 421 and 441 conflicts, he does so 
from a strictly imperial level, and not in relation to the changing geopolitical conditions and 
circumstances of the fifth century.18 Consequently, Rubin does not take into account other 
issues, both internal and external, that affected Roman and Sasanian attitudes and their 
political needs in relation to other concerns and threats facing them when negotiating and 
adhering to these treaties. For example, the changed circumstances that saw the Hunnic 
threat to Constantinople coming from Attila’s powerbase beyond the Danube in the middle 
of the fifth century rather than from beyond the Caucasus as it did at the start of the century 
are not brought into consideration.  
In short, events in the fifth century, although now understood in great detail, are too often 
viewed in isolation; as largely independent from one another, and not as part of the wider 
interconnected late antique world.  As a result current scholarship has thus far lacked a more 
holistic approach to the development and nature of the fifth-century détente as part of the 
wider late antique world. In contrast, this investigation will seek to analyse these individual 
events as interconnected and part of the wider developments and changes that took place in 
the fifth century and Roman-Sasanian relations in this period. It will argue that the fifth-
century peace was the result of an adaptive and reactive on-going process throughout the 
century, and not of any one event or incident. As such, this thesis will analyse the peaceful 
Roman-Sasanian relationship in the fifth century not as a self-contained entity, isolated and 
separate from the rest of the late antique world but as just another part of the wider 
                                                          
17 Rubin ‘Diplomacy and War in the Relations between Byzantium and the Sassanids in the Fifth Century A.D’ 
(1986). 
18 1986: 677. 
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geopolitical changes that took place in the fifth century. This approach will be achieved 
through the utilisation of a range of modern theories about international relations that will 
allow a nuanced understanding of the motivations of both empires in establishing and 
maintaining peace throughout this period. 
 
Methodology 
The Fifth-Century Roman-Sasanian Relationship and Political Realism 
In the field of international relations there are a variety of competing theories on how 
interstate relations should be understood. However, the one that seems most suited to the 
nature and characteristics of the late antique world is political realism.19 The core ideal of 
political realism is that all interstate relations and behaviour can be explained by the 
overriding need each self-interested state has to pursue its own security and survival above 
all else, and that result of this competing need between states is an anarchic world system 
that is permanently permeated with violence and the potential for violence.20 As such, realist 
theory argues that war and the preparation of war forms the basis for all interstate relations, 
and that international order is based ultimately on power and military force alone. In such an 
unrelenting anarchic world it is believed there is little or no international law and that the 
                                                          
19 For more discussion about other international relations theories, such as liberalism and constructivism see: 
Smith, Hadfield & Dunne (2008) and Dunne, Kurki & Smith (2006). Liberalism argues that individuals and private 
groups were the motivating factors in the development of international relations, and that the needs and desires 
of these individuals and groups dictated how their state interacts with its neighbours (Moravcsik, 1997). 
Although on the surface this may seem suitable for the Roman and Sasanian Empires wherein individuals, 
primarily the emperors and the Shahs, and dominant groups such as the nobility had an impact of foreign 
relations. However, liberalism seems to argue for a degree of separation between these elites and the state, and 
this was not so clear cut in the two empires where the emperors and shahs were inexorable tied up with the 
running and apparatus of the state itself. Constructivism, in contrast, views international relations as social 
constructs, in that they were affected by the social pressures and actions within each individual state (Fierke, 
2013: 187-190). As such, constructivism goes against the materialistic approach advanced by realism and 
liberalism in highlighting these social dimensions as the primary motivations behind interstate relations. Yet, the 
Roman and Sasanian Empires were absolutist states with little scope for social pressures or ideas to affect the 
foreign policies of the emperors and Shahs, who were primarily interested in maintaining their own position, 
and the best way to do this was to secure the security of their empires. Political realism has already been used 
to help explain interstate relations in Classical Greece (Low, 2009) and in Rome’s initial rise to supremacy 
(Eckstein, 2006).  
20 Doyle, 1997: 18; Eckstein, 2006: 12; Waltz, 1979: 102-4, 2008: 137; Mearsheimer, 1994: 10-13. 
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establishment of long-term peace between two rival states is possible only in extremely rare 
circumstances.21  
Certainly, all the major powers in the late antique world, including the Romans and Sasanians, 
held the same aggressive, belligerent and expansionist aims in their relations with other 
states, peoples or tribes. Political realism therefore fits with many of the defining 
characteristics of late antiquity, which was a period dominated by a constant and unrelenting 
military competition for dominance and supremacy, wherein each state thought only of their 
own safety, security and position above all else. Thus, realist theory implies that the anarchic 
nature of interstate relations necessitated Constantinople, Ctesiphon, and their other 
neighbours, to act violently against one another; they could not do otherwise and expect to 
survive.22 Thus: 
States do not live in isolation, but in systems: that is, groups of states where the behaviour of 
each state is a necessary factor in the calculations of all the others.23 
This statement reinforces the underlying notion of political realism that all individual states 
act in a similar manner in the pursuit of their own security, and also that one relationship in 
this interstate system cannot be seen in isolation and independently from all the others. 
Therefore, political realism, once again, fits with the aim of this thesis to view Roman-
Sasanian relations as just another part of the late antique world that was affected by 
developments elsewhere in this world. Likewise, using political realism to investigate the 
Roman-Sasanian relationship permits a long-term view of the processes that affected the 
relationship and also encourages us not to focus overwhelmingly on the Roman point-of-view.  
 
In understanding international relations political realism places importance on the idea of the 
balance of power between states.24 Realists argue that if states cannot achieve superiority 
through the direct military domination of their neighbours they will aim to achieve it through 
the creation of a balance of power that puts them in an advantageous position over their 
                                                          
21 Doyle, 1997: 43. 
22 Eckstein, 2006: 3. 
23 Eckstein, 2006: 13. 
24 Waltz, 2008: 138. 
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rivals. 25  This facet of political realism again fits closely to the overall nature of Roman-
Sasanian relations, as the balance of power played an important role in the imperial 
competition. Certainly, scholars have frequently commented about the existence of a balance 
of power when discussing the Roman-Sasanian relationship. 26  Many Roman-Sasanian 
conflicts were believed to have been undertaken in an effort, not to conquer or destroy the 
other but, to gain an advantageous position in the imperial balance of power.27  Competing 
for supremacy and advantage in the balance of power between them became the main 
concern of both empires, especially at the end of the third century when it became 
increasingly clear that neither was fully capable of destroying the other. This then reinforces 
the importance of using political realism to understand the relationship between the Roman 
and Sasanian Empires, as it was only in the fifth century that their relationship witnessed a 
stable and long-term balance of power. Indeed, as shall be shown throughout this work, the 
creation of a different type of balance of power, one based on mutual acceptability and not 
military advantage, was central to the fifth-century peace between the Romans and 
Sasanians. 
As already made clear, the harsh reality of the realist late antique world meant that the 
attention of states was focused on short-term survival and success, and this made long-term 
peace difficult to both establish and maintain.28 However, it did not necessarily make peace 
between two rival states an impossibility; it merely meant that it would take a unique set of 
circumstances for it to become a reality. In this regard, it was the centrality of the balance of 
power in realist theories, and also in the Roman-Sasanian relationship itself, that played an 
important role in the development of peace in the fifth century. Balances of power are fragile, 
and any sudden or dramatic shifts in the distribution of power can create situations of special 
crisis and special circumstances; as happened in the fifth century.29      
                                                          
25 Doyle, 1997: 161. 
26 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 28; Blockley, 1992: 138. 
27 Lee (2007: 4) highlights Galerius’ campaign in 297 as one such attempt to militarily redress the balance of 
power. 
28 Millar (1982: 1, 23) reinforces this idea in the foreign relations and imperial strategy of the Roman Empire, 
which he claims responded to situations in a rather ad-hoc and reactionary manner. He uses these arguments 
to discredit the idea of any long-term grand strategy of the Roman Empire that was propagated by Luttwak 
(1976). Millar’s arguments are also furthered and attested for in the strategy of the Later Roman Empire by 
Errington (2006). 
29 Doyle, 1997: 52; Eckstein, 2006: 23; Lebow, 2013: 87. Whittaker (1994: 195) says this was especially true for 
the Roman Empire. 
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A major part of this thesis will therefore focus on explaining what these changes were and 
analysing the effect they had on Roman-Sasanian relations. The first of these changed 
conditions was the division of the Roman Empire into distinct eastern and western halves 
after 395. This division ensured even greater parity between the Eastern Roman and Sasanian 
Empire, and accordingly large-scale Roman attacks against the Sasanian Empire decreased, 
which in turn stabilised the balance of power between them. The next important change in 
the fifth century that affected the Roman-Sasanian balance of power will be shown to have 
been the emergence of new powers, namely the Huns, Vandals and Hephthalites, that 
threatened the dominant position of the Roman and Sasanian Empires in the late antique 
world. The growth of these new powers, and the threat they posed to both empires, forced 
the Romans and Sasanians to carefully manage their relationship with one another in order 
to guarantee their security and position.  
As shall be shown below, these new threats forced the Romans and Sasanians to adapt how 
the balance of power between them was maintained. Previously, in the third and fourth 
centuries it had been both maintained and challenged exclusively through the use of military 
power, as each empire tried to establish and maintain themselves as the dominant power 
over the other. However, in the fifth century this was no longer an option for both empires as 
their military attention and resources were shifted to concentrate on containing the threat 
posed by the new barbarian powers. Consequently, diplomacy and negotiation began to play 
a more prominent primary role in the balance of power compared to the secondary role it 
had previously fulfilled.  
It will thus be argued that it was the unique conditions of the fifth century, which developed 
in response to the changed geopolitical situation in this period, that overcame the traditional 
Roman-Sasanian conflict and made peace a pragmatic necessity for both empires. Indeed, as 
seen above, realist theory argues that any contact between states will inevitably cause friction 
and conflict, due to the fact that the separate interest and competing interests of individual 
states are rarely compatible with each other. However, in the fifth century this was not true 
as both the Romans and Sasanians had a shared interest in peace with one another, in order 
to combat the new threats posed by the Huns, Hephthalites and Vandals. Thus, the peaceful 
fifth century ironically confirms realist paradigms as the Romans and Sasanians were chiefly 
interested in peace with their traditional rival in this period strictly in order to ensure their 
10 
  
own survival and security in the face of the new threats in the fifth century. Correspondingly, 
it was only at the start of the sixth century, after the threats on their other frontiers had 
disappeared or least diminished, that the two empires once again reverted to their traditional 
hostility, thus reinforcing the idea that this peace was based primarily on short-term 
survival.30  
 
By analysing the fifth-century relationship through the prism of political realism it will be 
shown that peace was not a simple choice or sudden desire for imperial harmony and 
reconciliation on behalf of the Roman and Sasanian Empires, but was forced on them by the 
anarchic nature of the ancient world, as other events and forces elsewhere pushed them into 
an uneasy yet pragmatically necessary ceasefire. Equally, it allows us to see that peace was 
not an immediately acknowledged or implemented solution to the instantly recognised threat 
of the rising barbarian powers but a policy that developed steadily, in an adaptive and flexible 
manner to problems as and when they arose, and as imperial attention was correspondingly 
increasingly forced elsewhere. Indeed, that it was not a coherent policy pursued consistent 
throughout the fifth century without exception, as seen by the outbreaks of war between 
them in 421 and 442. 
 
Structure 
Although this thesis agrees with the general consensus that it was the new external threats 
that the Roman and Sasanian Empires faced which provided the initial impetus for peace, it 
will seek to expand on this by, not just investigating the need for peace but, taking a more 
holistic approach and also investigating the nature and development of both the 
establishment and maintenance of peace throughout the fifth century. In this regard, all 
aspects of the fifth-century imperial relationship, both competitive and cooperative, will be 
analysed. To do this, the structure of this thesis will roughly be split into two halves. The first 
half will investigate the traditional casus belli between the two empires to show why military 
                                                          
30 The fifth century peace therefore accords with Eckstein’s (2006: 19) assessment of peace in the confines of 
the realist interstate system: ‘International affairs, then, are essentially competitive and conflictual, and it is 
difficult for states to exist harmoniously with each other for long periods.’ 
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conflict was the prevalent form of imperial interaction in the third and fourth centuries. This 
will then move on to explain exactly how the Huns, Vandal and Hephthalites enforced a 
mutual and simultaneous shifting of priorities in the fifth century for empires that resulted in 
the traditional imperial rivalry becoming of secondary strategic importance to both empires. 
The second half of the thesis will analyse the arguably more important question of how this 
peace was established and maintained for a century in a relationship that had traditionally 
been characterised by mistrust, suspicion and resentment. This will be done by investigating 
the development of diplomacy in the fifth century, and how it enabled the Romans and 
Sasanians to find innovative and mutually acceptable solutions to traditional grievances. 
Current scholarship has often taken for granted the role the new barbarian threats played in 
forcing the Romans and Sasanians to reach an accord, without fully explaining what made 
them more dangerous than previous threats in causing this shifting of imperial priorities. 
Therefore, this thesis will seek to address this overlooked question by highlighting not only 
what made them different to the other barbarian threats the empires had faced before and 
had to face elsewhere in this period, but also why they were a much more immediate threat 
than the empires posed to each other in the fifth century. In this regard, the territorial and 
political ambitions of these new barbarian powers, that were much more ambitious and 
potentially damaging to the survival and prosperity of the Roman and Sasanian Empires, will 
be contrasted with the ambitions the two empires held towards one another, which by the 
end of the fourth century had stagnated into little more than the desire to control individual 
frontier cities and fortifications. Alongside this focus on the Vandals, Huns and Hephthalites, 
it will also be shown that the East Roman Empire, especially after the 395 division, and the 
Sasanian Empire alike did not have the necessary military and economic resources to fight 
multiple wars on different frontiers and that, consequently, they had to shift their attention 
away from the traditional imperial rivalry to focus on these new threats.  
Yet, the reason why this peace was necessary is only the first, and arguably the easiest step, 
in understanding the Roman-Sasanian peace in the fifth century. Therefore, this thesis will 
also analyse how peace was established and maintained throughout the fifth century. It will 
show how those aspects of the relationship that will be identified as traditionally been deep-
rooted grievances between the two imperial neighbours were overcome. These most 
frequent casus belli will be identified as the contested frontier in Mesopotamia, the frontier 
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zones of Armenia and Arabia and religious concerns, while other ideological differences also 
played a part. In all of these things, especially in regards to the contested frontier regions, the 
need to create a balance of power that was acceptable to the strategic needs and concerns 
of both sides will be highlighted as being central to the overall successful establishment and 
maintenance of peace.  
 
Sources 
The limitations inherent in the available primary sources that deal with the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship, especially in the fifth century, will need to be overcome if a nuanced 
understanding of the peace is to be achieved. In this regard, and in relation to the stated 
methodology of ensuring the fifth century is not investigated in isolation but as part of the 
wider late antique world, it is essential to utilise and analyse all available sources regardless 
of period or perspective.  
There are relatively few contemporary historians from the fifth century that have survived, 
and those that have, such as Priscus, Eunapius and Olympiodorus, have done so only in 
fragmentary form. Although these sources are highly informative in relation to specific events 
that took place in the fifth century and will be used throughout this study, on their own they 
do not provide the comprehensive narrative that is needed.31 Consequently, the fragmentary 
nature of the fifth-century historians must be supported from elsewhere in order to gain a 
full understanding of the period; this will be achieved in two ways. 
First, the use of third, fourth and sixth-century Roman historians, such as Herodian, Cassius 
Dio, Ammianus Marcellinus, Procopius and Agathias, will be used to evaluate the different 
stages and periods of the Roman-Sasanian relationship in the longue durée.32 The use of 
sources dating from the preceding and succeeding centuries is essential in understanding the 
                                                          
31 For a detailed conclusive study on the nature and usefulness of these fragmentary historians see: Blockley 
(1981) and Treadgold (2007). For specific detail on Priscus of Panium see: Gordon (1964). 
32 For various discussions on the value of these Roman historians, especially towards our understanding of the 
Roman-Sasanian relationship see, on Ammianus Marcellinus: Matthews (1989b); Kelly (2009); Drijvers & Hunt 
(1999); Brock (1975); Austin (1973); Teitler (1999); Cameron (1964). On Procopius see: Kaldellis (2004), Börm 
(2007) and Cameron (1996). On Cassius Dio see: Millar (1964); Alfödy (1971). On Herodian see Alfödy (1971).  
On Agathias see: Soward (2013), Cameron (1969) and Kaldellis (1999). For general insights on the nature of 
Roman historians and history writing see: Mellor (1999), Feldherr (2009) and Rohrbacher (2002). 
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wider development of the imperial relationship, and many of its common and recurring 
characteristics and institutions. Using earlier and later sources in this way, will allow us to 
highlight any differences or changes that can be found to have existed uniquely in the 
peaceful fifth century.  
For example, through the use of the fourth-century Ammianus Marcellinus we know that 
during the reign of Shapur II the Sasanian Empire was challenged on its north-eastern frontier 
by the Chionitae. Yet, unlike the threat of the Hephthalites on the same frontier in the fifth 
century, the Chionitae did not force the Sasanians to seek a long-term or wider détente with 
the Romans and they were eventually able to supress the Chionitae, and even utilise them as 
federate troops.33 Thus, this shows us that there was a major difference in the impact these 
different Hunnic enemies had on the Sasanian Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries, and 
that, therefore, the nature and reason of this difference needs to be investigated in order to 
understand the underlying motivations for peace.  
The second solution to overcoming the fragmentary nature of fifth-century sources is to make 
use of eastern Sasanian sources when and where they are available.34 However, the use of 
Sasanian sources presents its own problems as literary sources originating from the Sasanian 
Empire are exceedingly rare. Therefore, in order to ascertain Sasanian perspectives we are 
more reliant on archaeological remains, primarily rock reliefs and coinage. During the early 
period of Sasanian rule, in the third century in particular, the Sasanian Shahs were 
enthusiastic patrons of rock reliefs and inscriptions that celebrated and recorded their 
achievements. Ardashir I, Shapur I, Narseh and even the Magian Kerdir, all left extensive and 
informative rock carvings.35 These archaeological remains grant us good understanding of 
how individual Shahs wished to be seen and remembered by their internal audience. 
Alongside these rock reliefs, later neo-Persian and early Islamic writers are also important to 
this research. Writers such as Tabarī, and works like the Chronicle of Seert and the Shahnama 
(Book of Kings), although written at a much later date, are vitally important and will play a 
                                                          
33 15.13.4; 16.9.4; 17.5.1. 
34 For a useful round up of the available sources both archaeological, literary, contemporary and otherwise see: 
Wiesehöfer (2001: 153-165). 
35 For a general discussion of Sasanian rock reliefs and inscriptions see: Herrmann & Curtis (2002); Herrmann et 
al (1989); Herrman (2000) and Canepa (2013).  
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central role in enhancing our knowledge of how the Sasanians acted and reacted to the 
changing conditions of the fifth century.36   
The difficulty of using Roman and Sasanians sources side by side, each of which come with 
their own traditions and expectations, is that they often contradict one another when 
discussing the same event. Roman writers may well ignore or gloss over a defeat suffered at 
the hands of the Sasanian rival, while Sasanian sources might equally ignore certain clauses 
in a treaty which conceded territory to the Romans. One such example of this is the differing 
accounts given by Roman and Sasanian sources on the death of the emperor Gordian III in 
244. In this example, the Roman histories state that Gordian was killed due to the 
machinations of the treacherous Philip the Arab, whereas the Sasanian sources claim that 
Gordian was killed in battle with Shapur I. In this instance, the historical background of the 
Roman sources, which betray a deep distaste for Philip the Arab, as well as other evidence 
that supports the fact that the battle at Mišīk, where Shapur I states Gordian was defeated, 
did actually take place, indicates that the Sasanian sources are likely more reliable. 37 
However, it is important to note that it is not always possible, and indeed not always wise, to 
focus on whether Roman or Sasanian sources were the most correct in a study such as this. 
In fact, such contradictions between Roman and Sasanian recordings on the same event are 
often more useful in showing that the two empires had similar aims and vested interests in 
the way they wished certain events to be portrayed and remembered. Thus, despite the 
evident difficulty in using Roman and Sasanian sources side-by-side, as described above, it is 
essential to take this widely inclusive approach in using all available sources in order to attain 
a holistic understanding of this period.  
The use of third-party sources will also help to add further depth to our understanding of this 
period, and help navigate the often partisan perspectives inherent in Roman and Sasanian 
sources. The development of the Armenian alphabet and the subsequent growth of written 
Armenian histories in the fifth century was a major development in granting new perspectives 
                                                          
36 For illuminating analyses of Tabarī’s work and reliability, as well as the Chronicle of Seert and Book of Lords 
see: Howard-Johnson (2010a: 324-331; 341-353; 366-370). Also on Tabarī see: Conrad (1993). 
37 For the Roman sources blaming Gordian’s death on internal intrigue see: Eutropius (9.2-3), Festus (22) and 
Zosimus (1.18-19). For the Sasanian sources which describe his death in battle with Shapur I see: SKZ (§3-4). For 
more details of this differences see: Dignas & Winter (2007: 77-80); MacDonald (1981), and also Daryaee (2008a: 
7) who argues that Gordian was more likely to have been killed by his own followers, after his defeat rather than 
at the battle itself. See n.65 from Chapter 1.1 for more discussion on this. 
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on the Roman-Sasanian relationship in this period. Trapped as they were between the two 
imperial powers Armenian historians, such as Sebeos, Agathangelos, Elishé and Lazar 
P’arpets’I, provide valuable, and often unique, insights into the imperial relationship. 38 
Equally, the use of Syriac writers such as Joshua Stylites, who lived in the constantly 
fluctuating Mesopotamian frontier region, will also be essential in negotiating the strict 
imperial perspective prevalent in Roman and Sasanian sources by showing the fluidity and 
interconnectedness of the political-cultural environment within which the two empires 
coexisted.39 These third-party sources once again provide a more holistic understanding of 
the fifth-century imperial relationship allowing us to view it from multiple perspectives and 
reinforcing that it did not act as an isolated entity in itself.  Importantly, the use of Armenian 
and Syriac sources will therefore help to cement the underlying methodology of this thesis by 
investigating the relationship as part of the wider interconnected late antique world, and 
show that the aspirations of different peoples, states and polities all had an effect on one 
another. 
Therefore, although individually each of these sets of sources comes with their own problems, 
by using them in conjunction with each other such limitations can be overcome. Each can be 
compared and corroborated against the other in the process of identifying why and the how 
the fifth-century peace came about. Only by this methodology, through a willingness to utilise 
all available sources, can we gain a wider appreciated of the imperial relationship and analyse 
the peace from multiple perspective.
                                                          
38 On the general usefulness of Armenian histories for our understanding of the Sasanian Empire see Greenwood 
(2013). For brief but useful discussions on the origins, dating and veracity of the individual Armenian historians 
see: Thomson (2009: 156-7); Dignas & Winter (2007: 179; 181). For a more exhaustive study on the historical 
veracity of Sebeos see Thomson, Howard-Johnson & Greenwood (1999: xl-lxxiv). 







1.1) The Third and Fourth Century Imperial Competition 
 
The third- and fourth-century Roman-Sasanian relationship was dominated by military 
competition and antagonism. The first Roman-Sasanian war, instigated by Ardashir, the 
founder of the Sasanian Empire, in 230, which saw the Sasanians quickly overrun Roman 
territory and capture a number of important cities, was to be only the beginning of an almost 
unending series of military campaigns and counter-campaigns in this early period of the 
imperial relationship, as each side strove for supremacy. Shapur I, Ardashir’s successor, 
quickly carried on his father’s legacy by campaigning against the Romans almost continually 
between 244 and 260. Roman attacks against the Sasanian Empire took place in 240/1, 260, 
283 and 363, led by a succession of emperors including Gordian III, Carus and Julian. 
Constantine would also have been among this list except for his untimely death in 337 in the 
middle of preparing a new eastern campaign against the Sasanians. Further Sasanian attacks 
against their western neighbour were launched by Narseh in 296 and Shapur II in 338, 350 
and 359. In these wars, a number of Roman emperors suffered disastrous defeats at the hands 
of the Sasanians. Gordian III and Julian were killed in battle, and Valerian was infamously 
captured and taken prisoner by Shapur I. Likewise, Roman dreams of the conquest and 
humiliation of the new imperial rival resulted in the capture of Shah Narseh’s family and 
harem, and the siege of the Sasanian capital of Ctesiphon. 
The prevalence and ubiquity of conflict throughout this period was the result of a variety of 
political, ideological and strategic reasons. Mistrust, suspicion and resentment were the 
foundations of the early Roman-Sasanian relationship, as Romans regarded the Sasanians as 
‘treacherous and deceitful’ and, likewise, the Sasanians considered Roman words and actions 
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to be clouded by ‘deceit’ and lies.1 Therefore, in attempting to understand both the need for 
peace in the fifth century and how this peace was maintained it is important to first recognise 
and analyse the ideological, political and strategic causes of conflict between the two imperial 
neighbours in the first two centuries of their relationship. This chapter will therefore focus on 
the political-military nature of the Roman-Sasanian relationship in the third and fourth 
centuries to analyse why competition and warfare were so fierce, and even necessary to both 
empires, in this period.        
 
 
Roman and Sasanian World Views: The Imperial Other and Conflicting Ideologies 
All states express their own identity and place in the world by categorising and labelling those 
around them.2 As such, a state’s ideology inherently silhouettes itself against its neighbours 
and the outside world.3 In the same regard, a state’s foreign policy shapes, and is shaped by, 
its ideology and wider world view. Both the Romans and Sasanians viewed themselves as the 
supreme state in their world, with an innate, and pre-destined, right to rule and dominate 
those around them. Such similar, yet directly opposing, ideologies affected how the Romans 
                                                          
1 Themistius Or. 11.148d; Amm. Marc. 17.5.2-4; SKZ § 4. 
2 Corbery & Leerssen, 1991. Miles (1990: 10) takes this idea further, arguing that perception and representation 
of foreign peoples was even more important than the reality. On the importance and implication of the ‘other’ 
in the ancient world see: Gruen (2010). 
3 Definitions of ideology, and other terms that regularly come up in the study of the ancient world, such as 
society, group, power and polity, are generally inadequate (Van Dijk, 1998: 1), or highly dependent on what the 
historian is trying to say and or what they are talking about, whether a state, a people, or a specific section of 
society, predominately the elites. Indeed, there are many different notions or ideas of what ideology means or 
represents, whether as ‘the basis of the social representations shared by members of a group’ (Van Dijk, 1998: 
8), ‘the systems of representation’ (Hall, 1996: 26) or, as the Oxford dictionary puts it a ‘system of ideas and 
ideals’. As such, it could even be stated that the term itself has become obsolete or anachronistic in that it 
suggests such things were too neat and easy to control, which in the ancient world especially, without the means 
of fast effective communication, is patently false. All of these different understanding seem to agree on a certain 
underlying principle of ideology however, that different ideologies are used predominately in the discourse of 
power, whether in the form of legitimation or manipulation. Therefore, throughout this study the term ideology 
will be used when discussing how a state or its leaders viewed themselves in relation to their world, both 
internally and externally, and how they legitimised this position within that world. 
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and Sasanians regarded and acted towards one another, predominantly forcing them into 
political, ideological and military conflicts. 
 
Roman imperial ideology and cultural identity developed in response to their expansion as an 
imperial power, reinforcing and justifying their own superiority and domination over their 
neighbours. As such, the Roman worldview was fundamentally shaped by the ideas of 
universal rule and their rightful place as a world empire. Roman literary ideals consistently 
promoted the idea of Rome as ‘imperium sine fine’ (empire without end) and ‘lord over kings, 
victor and ruler over all nations’.4 Such strong claims for universal rule prevented the Roman 
Empire from coexisting peacefully with its neighbours. Accordingly, from an early stage the 
Romans viewed the regions beyond their own borders as the barbaricum, an area inhabited 
by unrestrained and uncivilised savages.5 This allowed the Romans to promote the image of 
their neighbours, especially the Germanic tribes across the Rhine and Danube, in an extremely 
negative light, as little more than animals; as unruly, unpredictable and uncivilised 
barbarians.6 This was a complete contrast with their ideological view of their own lands, which 
they believed existed in perfect civilised order.7 Although one must be careful in utilising 
literary traditions to comment on a Roman ideology, as what a state or people truly thought 
is usually most evident in their actions, the fact that the Romans predominantly interacted 
with their neighbours in the form of military conquest and domination does suggest they 
would have developed an inherent sense of superiority over their neighbours.8 Indeed, as 
such, the Romans often justified their imperial conquests and aggressive relations with their 
barbarian neighbours, especially during the Early Empire, as a civilising mission; the 
introduction of Roman civilisation through the sword.9 
                                                          
4 Vergil Aen. 1.279; Cicero. Dom. 90. Diodorus (11.4) also expresses this Roman ideal as he states that their 
empire extended to the end of the earth. 
5 Halsall, 2007: 45-57. 
6 Prudentius, Contra Symmachum 2.807-819. Drake, Violence in Late Antiquity (2006) explains through different 
contributions the negative representation of these barbarians. 
7 Mathisen (2006: 32) and (Heather, 1999: 235) state it was in this promoted opposition between the civilised 
Romans and their barbaric neighbours that the imperial government created a feel-good factor among the 
population about belonging to the Roman Empire.  
8 In this awareness of the difficulty of discussing ideology Ando (2000: 20) and Brunt (1978: 159) are important. 
9 Habinek, 1998: 151-169. In his study of Ovid’s Tristia poem Habinek argues that it shows the Romans saw 
themselves and their imperial expansion as a civilising mission. 
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Although the initial impetus for the Romans’ negative image of the barbarian was older than 
the Roman Empire itself it did not diminished over time. The persistence and prevalence of 
this ideology in the Later Roman Empire is attested by contemporary sources: 
At that time, as if the trumpets were sounding the war note throughout the Roman world, the 
most savage people roused themselves and poured across the nearest frontier.10 
As highlighted here by Ammianus, a ‘soldier and a Greek’ with great experience in the Roman 
army and the dangers facing the empire at this time, the larger barbarian tribal federations 
of the third and fourth centuries, such as the Goths, Franks and Alemanni, were a direct threat 
to the Roman Empire, and as such, despite centuries of deepened interactions, the Romans 
still considered them as ‘the most savage people’.11  The increased threat the barbarians 
posed to the empire in this period ensured that the negative and hostile representation of 
the barbarians only strengthened further in late antiquity. As their dominant position in the 
world was increasingly challenged by these tribes the Romans were ever more eager to 
present their enemies as destructive and uncivilised savages, in order reaffirm their own 
superiority and position in the world.12 Ammianus Marcellinus was certainly typical of this 
Roman attitude towards their barbarian neighbours. For instance, apart from his comment 
above, he later argues that deceiving and slaughtering barbarians was perfectly acceptable 
simply because they were barbarians.13 Likewise, his ethnographic discussions on both the 
Huns and the Arabs presents them in the most stereotypical and negative light.14 Similarly, 
Symmachus informs us how Valentinian II  (375-392) sought to reassure the Romans that the 
empire was still superior to their barbarian neighbours by feeding captured Sarmatians to 
wild animals in the arena; clearly these captured barbarians were not considered worthy of 
either mercy or clemency.15 The persistence of this ideology across all periods of Roman 
history, despite the other numerous political, religious and strategic changes that continually 
                                                          
10 Amm. Marc. 26.4.5. 
11  31.16.19. In his role in the Protectores Domesticii Ammianus personally took part in many battles and 
campaigns, such as at the siege of Amida and Julian’s eastern campaign in 363 (18.6). 
12 Heather, 1999:234-258; Mathisen 27-35. 
13 Amm. Marc. 28.5.1-7. For this interpretation of this passage see: Heather (1999: 234). 
14 On the Arab digression see: Amm. Marc. 29.36.4. On the Hunnic digression see: Amm. Marc. 31.1-2. For more 
general discussion on Amminaus’ description of Rome’s neighbours, which is argued to be overwhelmingly 
stereotypical see: Teitler (1999) den Boeft (1999), Hopwood (1999) and Drijvers (1999), and also Wiedemann 
(1986), who argues this stereotypical approach was due to the his audiences’ expectations, which Ammianus did 
not want to disappoint.  
15 Amm. Marc. 28.5.7, 31.16.8; Symm. Rel. 47. 
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altered and transformed the empire and its society, shows how intrinsically important the 
idea of the difference between civilised Romans and their barbaric neighbours was to the 
Roman ideological worldview and their place within it.  
 
However, Rome’s ideology of the savage barbarian was harder to enforce and perpetuate in 
relations with the civilised powers of the east, especially the Sasanian Empire.16 The difficulty 
in continuing this chauvinistic ideology towards the Sasanians was not merely a result of the 
military might of the imperial rival (by the mid-third century even the German tribes could 
boast of many military victories over Roman armies), but was due rather to the cultural and 
political sophistication of the Sasanian Empire. 17  Unlike the Germanic tribes across the 
northern frontiers the Sasanian Empire was a highly developed and cultured state. This 
ensured that they did not fit neatly into the traditional Roman worldview that saw all those 
beyond its own frontiers as savage and uncivilised.18 The sophisticated nature of the Sasanian 
Empire forced an adaption of the Roman understanding of the regions outside of their own 
empire. Thus, the Romans instead viewed the Sasanians as the extreme other, as an inversion 
of Roman culture and cultural norms; a strange and dangerous alter orbis.19 This is indicative 
in the exclamation from the sixth century historian Agathias; ‘How different are the ways of 
                                                          
16 On this same difficulty with the earlier Parthians see: Campbell (1993). 
17 In this regard, Isaac (2004) and Walbank (1983: 66) argue that Roman racism was based on culture rather than 
race. Scipio’s discussion with Laelius about the barbarity of Romulus in Cicero’s Republic (1.37.58) is evidence of 
this. Correspondingly, contrary to the deeply entrenched thoughts of the twentieth century, ethnicity is now 
increasingly believed to be increasingly linked to culture rather than race or biological descent. For more 
discussion on the role of ethnicity and the understanding of ethnicity in Rome’s relations with the northern 
barbarians see Halsall (2007: 35-45). 
18 On the ambiguity and difficulty of the Sasanians fitting into the traditional and stereotypical Roman view of 
non-Romans see: McDonough (2011) and Drijvers (2011). Although Roman portrayal of their neighbours could 
sometimes be more nuanced then this and show them in a good light this always depended ultimately on what 
the Roman writer was trying to do. In this regard, there was a clear distinction between the image and use of 
barbarians in an internal sense, where they were used to criticise Roman society or politics, and the image and 
use of barbarians in an external sense, where they were used to reinforce Roman superiority and create a 
disdained other to act as a counter to Roman civilisation (Dench, 1995: 68, 101; Woolf, 2011: 92). For example, 
it is often stated that Procopius’ positive image of the Hephthalites was merely an attempt to criticise the 
corruption and decline of Roman leaders and political institutions (Kaldellis, 2007: 69-75). Dench (1995: 85-94) 
uses the example of the Romans’ portrayal of the Sabines to show how this worked. However, the fact even 
regions that had been effected by Roman influence for a long period and even became Roman provinces, such 
as Britain, were still always considered somewhat savage reveals how enduring this idea of the barbarians as 
uncivilised and unruly truly was (Woolf, 2011: 93). 
19 Drijvers (2011: 67). 
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the Persians!’ 20  Indeed, of all the Roman historians who wrote on the Sasanian Empire 
Agathias was arguably best placed to comment on the customs and culture of the imperial 
neighbour, due to his use of translated extracts from the Sasanian royal annals.21 However, 
this information was interspersed with the traditional moralising and anecdotes prevalent in 
all Roman historiography, while Agathias himself was writing during the renewed imperial 
conflict in the sixth century and was quite hostile towards the Sasanians.22 Therefore, caution 
must be used when deciding, what information was true, and derived from these useful 
sources, and what was mere literary effect. The effect that the existence of such a 
dangerously different and strange neighbour had on the Roman perception of, and 
relationship with, the Sasanian Empire is again confirmed by Agathias:  
It is quite obvious that each of the various nations of mankind considers that any custom 
whatsoever which is both universally accepted in their society and deeply rooted in their past 
cannot fail to be perfect and sacrosanct, whereas whatever runs counter to it is deemed 
deplorable, contemptible and unworthy of serious consideration.23 
As the Roman historian highlights here, there could be no trust or even peaceful coexistence 
with a state or culture that would have been considered so ‘deplorable, contemptible and 
unworthy’, as there was nothing more dangerous or threatening to one’s place in the world 
than something that was the direct opposite to it. Thus, the development of the idea of the 
Sasanian alter orbis had a direct consequence on the Romans ‘real’ relationship with their 
eastern neighbour. Indeed, Roman writers were fiercely hostile to any blending of Roman and 
Sasanian culture or traditions. 24  For example, Diocletian was heavily criticised for the 
introduction of Sasanian-style court ceremonies into the Roman Empire25 while Julian was 
condemned ‘for being wedded to Asiatic manners’.26 Additionally, Diocletian’s persecution of 
Manichaeism which was seen, wrongly, as a Sasanian religion and part of their ‘scandalous 
                                                          
20 3.9.8. Canepa (2009: 38) believes that this strangeness was further reinforced by the disappearance from 
imperial imagery of the more romantic ideas of the wealthy, beautiful and exotic ‘Easterner’, which coincided 
with the rise of the Sasanian Empire and decline of the Parthian regna.  
21 4.30. This information was translated for him by Sergius, a leading interpreter in Roman diplomatic missions 
to Ctesiphon (Cameron, 1969-70: 69). 
22 For more general information on the veracity, usefulness and context of Agathias see: Cameron (1969-70); 
Chaumont (1984). 
23 2.23.8. 
24 Livy 38.17.5-11. 
25 Eutr. Brev. 1.9.26; Aurelius Victory, Historia Augusta 39.2-4. 
26 Amm. Marc. 16.7.6. 
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customs’, resulted from a fear that it would ‘inflict harm’ on and ‘infect the people’ of Rome.27 
Thus, although not presented as barbarians in the same way as Rome’s western and northern 
neighbours, the idea of the Sasanian other, as a state and people fundamentally different to 
Rome and the Romans, ensured that the imperial rival was viewed with fearful suspicion and 
was regarded as Rome’s most dangerous enemy.28   
 
This perception of the Sasanian alter orbis also undoubtedly affected, and was affected by, 
the corresponding Roman understanding of the Sasanians as the self-proclaimed heirs to the 
ancient Achaemenid Empire. To Roman elites and emperors, who considered themselves the 
heirs of Alexander the Great, there could be no further evidence that the Sasanian Empire 
was inherently different and intrinsically opposed to the Roman Empire.29 The existence of 
such opposing ideologies ensured that Roman-Sasanian relations were bound to be turbulent; 
there could be no middle ground between the heirs of Alexander and the heirs of Darius. 
From their earliest interactions the Romans viewed Sasanian military aggression as a logical 
and natural result of their Achaemenid heritage. Hence, both Herodian and Cassius Dio attest 
that: 
[Severus Alexander] was suddenly sent reports by the governors in Syria and Mesopotamia 
informing him of the following: the Persian king Ardashir had defeated the Parthians and had 
dissolved their rule in the East. He had put to death Artabanos, who used to be called Great 
King and had worn two diadems. Moreover, Ardashir had conquered all of the barbaric areas 
around and was forcing them to pay tribute. He was still not satisfied and was not staying 
within the borderline of the river Tigris but crossing its banks and thus the borders of the 
Roman Empire. He was overrunning Mesopotamia and threatening Syria. He was determined 
to re-conquer for Persia the whole territory across from Europe and cut off by the Aegean Sea 
and the Sea of Marmara, which as a whole is called Asia, because he viewed this as his 
inheritance, arguing that the whole area, as far as Ionia and Caria, had been administered by 
Persian satraps from the time of Cyrus, who was the first to transfer power from the Medes 
                                                          
27 Diocletian’s Edict against the Manichaeans, 297: Collatio legume Mosaicarum et Romanarum 15.3.1-8. For 
more detailed discussion on Diocletian’s policy of persecution towards Manichaeism see: Brown (1969). 
28 For example, Julian calls the Sasanians the ‘most pernicious people’ (Amm. Marc. 23.5.19) 
29 Spencer, 2002; Dignas & Winter, 2007:1. 
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to the Persians, to the time of Darius, the last of the Persian kings, who’s power the 
Macedonian Alexander had destroyed. He claimed that it was now his task to renew his 
empire for the Persians just as they had possessed it in the past.30 
He [Ardashir] accordingly became a source of fear to us; for he was encamped with a large 
army over and against not Mesopotamia only but Syria also and boasted that he would win 
back everything that the ancient Persians had once held as far as the Grecian Sea. It was, he 
said, his rightful inheritance from his forefathers.31 
Unlike Herodian, Cassius Dio does not make it explicitly clear who these ‘forefathers’ are; 
however, it is obvious enough that he means the Achaemenids, and the Roman elites 
themselves, who were well versed in Greek history and literature, would have readily 
identified them as such. Writing their histories in the third century, both Cassius Dio and 
Herodian were near contemporaries to the events they describe above and, therefore, likely 
had a true understanding of how this new eastern menace was perceived by Rome at that 
time. Although Herodian’s reliability is often criticised, due to his preference for rhetorical 
and literary techniques over historical accuracy, Cassius Dio is usually acknowledged as a 
dependable and trustworthy historian. 32  Therefore, these two accounts taken together, 
alongside Ammianus Marcellinus’ reminder that the idea of Sasanian Achaemenid heritage 
still existed in the later fourth century, should leave no doubt that this was indeed how the 
Romans perceived the Sasanians, and how they understood their aggressive actions 
throughout the third and fourth centuries.33 This dangerous Sasanian ideology was evidently 
a deep cause for concern and fear in the Roman Empire; it made their new eastern neighbour 
innately more dangerous than the previous Parthian regna had ever been. Achaemenid 
heritage gave the Sasanians a direct claim to Roman territories and, as both Herodian and 
Cassius Dio make clear, Ardashir, and his successors, were not afraid to embark on campaigns 
of ‘re-conquest’ to reclaim what they considered their ‘rightful inheritance’.  
                                                          
30 Herodian 6.2.1-2. 
31 Dio 80.4.1. 
32 For the unreliability of Herodian see: Alföldy (1974: 89-111), Zimmermann (1999: 119-43); Dignas & Winter 
(2007: 54-55). For the reliability of Cassius Dio see: Dignas & Winter, (2007: 55), Alfödy (1971); Millar (1964: 28-
46). Indeed, it has been claimed that Cassius Dio played an official role in imperial diplomacy, had access to 
diplomatic communications and therefore may have encountered Ardashir’s demands first hand (Dignas & 
Winter, 2007: 55). 
33 Ammianus Marcellinus (17.5.5.6) informs us that Shapur II demanded Constantius return all territories which 




Although it is readily accepted that the Romans viewed the Sasanians as the self-proclaimed 
heirs to the Achaemenid Empire, whether the Sasanians actually held this ideology 
themselves has been hotly debated. Certainly, some scholars have argued that this was 
strictly a Roman invention, resulting from their need to rationalise and understand Sasanian 
actions through their own Greco-Roman tradition and historic view of the world, and that this 
was a tradition the Sasanians knew, or even cared, little about.34  
However, non-Roman sources show that the Sasanians were more than aware of Achaemenid 
history, and that the early Shahs utilised their memory for their own purposes. Indeed, both 
al-Tabarī and the Letter of Tansar reveal that Sasanian knowledge of the Achaemenid past 
formed an important part of their early ideology, foreign policy and worldview: 
[Ardashir] has devoted all his thoughts to attacking the Greeks [Romans] and pursuing his 
quarrel against that people; and he will not rest until he has avenged Darius against the 
successors of Alexander, and has replenished his coffers and the treasury of the state.35 
[Ardashir] [arose] in Fars seeking, as he alleged, to avenge the blood of his paternal cousin 
Dārā [Darius III], son of Bahman, son of Isfandiyāy, on whom Alexander had made war and 
had killed two of the latter’s chief commanders. As he said, he wished to recover the kingdom 
for its rightful holders and for those who had held it continuously in the previous time of his 
predecessors and forefathers, before the “Party Kings” [Seleucids and Parthians] and [wished] 
to gather it together again under one head and one monarch.36 
Although the Letter of Tansar was supposedly written during the reign of Ardashir himself, as 
a royal dispatch to a loyal governor, it is more likely that it was created during the reign of 
                                                          
34 On the influence of Greco-Roman historical knowledge effecting Rome’s understanding and perception of the 
Sasanians see: Blockley (1992: 114). Scholars who claim this was a Roman invention include; Kettenhofen (1984: 
183-4), Potter (1990:370-80; 2006: 222-4) and Huyse (2002). In contrast, Blockley (1992: 104) argues that 
although this Achaemenid heritage was unlikely to be merely a Roman invention, it does not indicate a Sasanian 
will to world domination as later Christian universalism did for the Romans. Scholars who argue for the 
importance of Achaemenid heritage to the Sasanians themselves include: Fowden, (1993: 22), Dignas & Winter 
(2007: 55), Daryaee (2006: 493), Shahbazi (2001: 61) and Walker (2007: 795). Pourshariati (2008: 33) indicates 
that such emulation or claim to Achaemenid heritage would not have been beyond the Sasanians always tried 
to ‘connect their humble origins to remote antiquity’. For the most conclusive analysis of this important question 
see Shayegan (2011). 
35 Letter of Tansar p.42 (tr. Boyce 65). 
36 Tabarī 814. 
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Khusro I (531-579). 37  Nevertheless, whichever Shah commissioned it, the significance of 
Achaemenid heritage to Sasanian ideology, especially towards the Roman Empire, is revealed 
to be highly important by this letter. Similarly, although Tabarī, a Muslim writer from the tenth 
century A.D, was far removed from the events described here he is generally thought to be a 
reliable and accurate source.38 Indeed, it is believed that Tabarī incorporated the classical 
traditions of the X’adāy-Nāmag (Book of Kings), an official historiography sanctioned by the 
Sasanians themselves, in his own work and therefore it could be suggested that Tabarī would 
have, intentionally or unintentionally, presented important ideals, such as Achaemenid 
heritage, to his audience that the Sasanians themselves had wished to present to their 
audience when patronising the Book of Kings.39 Thus, there is no reason to doubt that these 
two eastern sources show that Sasanian Shahs, especially early Shahs, actively presented 
themselves as the direct successors to the Achaemenid kings, with an innate duty to win back 
lost territories and take revenge upon the heirs of Alexander, who had destroyed the older 
Iranian empire, the Romans. That this ideology had a direct effect on Roman-Sasanian 
relations is evident in both these passages, which make it clear that Ardashir would not 
contemplate peace until he had taken revenge against the heirs of the man who had 
destroyed his ancestors’ empire.  
Those who argue that the Achaemenid past played no part in Sasanian ideology point out 
that, from Ardashir onwards no Shah made direct reference to their Achaemenid 
predecessors. The Res Gestae Divi Saporis, an officially sanctioned inscription that records the 
achievements and successes of Shapur I, especially those against Rome, is often regarded as 
the quintessential evidence of this failure to specifically mention Sasanian claims to 
Achaemenid heritage.40 However, just as Augustus did not record his failures in his Res Gestae 
Divi Augusti, Shapur would have had no interest in recording the fact that he did not actually 
manage to fully re-conquer his ‘rightful inheritance’ and restore the borders of the 
Achaemenid Empire.41 This royal inscription was, after all, a piece of official and personal 
                                                          
37 Whitby, 1994: 235; Fowden, 1993: 29. For general surveys on the Letter of Tansar see Boyce (1968). 
38 Conrad, 1993. For an informative study on different aspects of Tabarī’s history see the edited volume by 
Kennedy (2008). 
39 Pourshariati, 2008: 9-13; Yarshater, 1983: 360-363. 
40 Kettonhofen, 1984: 184-5. 




aggrandisement, it was designed to celebrate Shapur’s greatness; not highlight his failures. 
Nevertheless, despite this lack of explicit reference to the Achaemenids there are still hints 
that Shapur was keen to highlight his connection with his illustrious forebears. The most 
readily apparent of these is Shapur’s use of the title Shahanshah (King of Kings), which had 
been used previously by Achaemenid kings.42 Furthermore, the accompanying title of ‘King of 
Iran and non-Iran’ attests to Sasanian claims of universal rule and further justified Shapur’s 
aggressive military campaigns in the west.43 The location of the inscription, Naqš-i Rustam, is 
also suggestive. This was the site where the majority of former Achaemenid kings were buried 
in rock tombs, and had consequently developed into an important place of Achaemenid 
memory. 44  Moreover, the inscription itself was carved into the Ka’ba-i Zardušt, a fire 
sanctuary built during the reign of Darius I, the Achaemenid king the Sasanian Shahs were so 
eager to avenge.45 Thus, that Shapur’s Res Gestae, a monument constructed primarily to 
celebrate his victories over the Roman rival, was specifically located at such a historically 
meaningful site seems unlikely to have been a mere accident or coincidence. It was done for 
a specific purpose; to justify Sasanian foreign policy towards the Roman Empire by linking it 
with the Achaemenid past. Lastly, just like the famous Achaemenid inscriptions, such as that 
at Behistun, Shapur’s Res Gestae was trilingual.46 Such consistent similarities and allusions to 
Shapur’s illustrious predecessors were no accident but were rather subtle hints and claims to 
Achaemenid heritage. 
Indeed, although direct reference to this Achaemenid heritage may be absent from Sasanian 
royal proclamations the Achaemenid past was an intrinsic part of Sasanian culture. Iranian 
literary and oral tradition ensured that Alexander the Great was long remembered as the 
destroyer of the Achaemenid Empire.47 Therefore, it is not surprising that the new Sasanian 
dynasty was eager to utilise and exploit this tradition by fitting themselves into the ancient 
battle between east and west. It granted them complete ideological justification for their 
aggressive policy against their western rival. The widespread success of this ideological use of 
                                                          
42 SKZ §1. 
43 Ibid. Canepa (2009: 54) and Börm (2008: 426) both agree this title was used to express Sasanian aspirations, 
or at least ideology, towards universal rule.  
44 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 58. 
45 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 57. 
46 For the use of trilingual inscriptions during the Achaemenid Empire see: Koch (1992: 13-28) 
47 Yarshater, 1983: 377-91, 472-72; Börm, 2008b: 426. 
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the past is further evident in a Christian ecclesiastical document produced by the Church of 
the East in the fifth century that refers to Khusro I as the ‘new Cryus’.48 
As such, to suggest that the Sasanians had no knowledge of their Achaemenid predecessors 
seems misplaced.49  Likewise, the belief that the Achaemenid past played no part in the 
ideological formation of the early Sasanian state seems Roman-centric. The fact that both 
eastern and western sources indicate the importance it did have in the formation and 
development of the Sasanian worldview and imperial ideology speaks for itself; Sasanian 
claims to Achaemenid heritage was not just a Roman idea. 
The importance of Achaemenid heritage to Sasanian ideology, their imperial worldview and 
claims to universal rule, played a fundamental role in shaping their relations with the Romans 
in the third and fourth centuries.50 It fulfilled the same role as the Roman idea of the savage 
barbarian and strange Persian did in justifying their ideology of superiority, and subsequent 
aggressive foreign policy.51 Thus, the Sasanians utilised their claims to Achaemenid heritage 
to create an image of Rome as a powerful and dangerous other.52 The repeated desire for 
revenge against the Romans, as the heirs of Alexander the Great, did not permit peaceful 
coexistence between the two imperial neighbours. Together, these two opposing Roman and 
Sasanian ideologies resulted in the continuation and intensification of military competition as 
it allowed for only aggression and antagonism. Hence, conflict, not peace, was to be to main 
form of Roman-Sasanian interaction.  
 
 
For the early Shahs this need to legitimise their actions was intensified because, as a new 
dynasty that had come to power through the military overthrow of the previous Parthian 
                                                          
48 Syn. Or. p.69-70. 
49 Fowden (1993: 29) and Whitby (1994: 234) both agree that the Sasanians had knowledge of the Achaemenid 
past. For further details of the argument for Sasanian knowledge of the Achaemenids see Frye (1983: 293) and 
Brown (1971b: 160-163). 
50 Also acknowledged by Shayegan (2013: 806). Indeed, Canepa (2009: 51) even suggests that the Sasanian use 
of Achaemenid heritage was done in direct response to the traditional tradition of imitatio Alexandri amongst 
the Roman emperors. 
51 Drijvers, 2009:452; Wiesehöfer, 2005. As is seen in the Book of Lords. 
52 Wiesehöfer, 2005. 
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Arsacids rulers, they quickly needed to assert their legitimacy to their new subjects and 
internal audience.53 Indeed, as Herodotus informs us, ancient Iranian tradition, a tradition 
which was fundamentally important to the Sasanians, disapproved of changes in leadership 
simply for the sake of power.54 Consequently, Achaemenid heritage played a central role in 
the early years of the Sasanian dynasty as it allowed them to declare that they, not the 
Arsacids, were the rightful rulers, and that therefore their rebellion and takeover of the 
empire was entirely legitimate. Furthermore, during the final years of the Parthian regna the 
Romans had been able to successfully launch devastating invasions into Parthian territory 
without any real or substantial defence and without any prospect of a counter-attack, most 
famously under Trajan in 115 and Septimius Severus in 197. 55  This failure undermined 
confidence in the Arsacids and led directly to the internal turmoil that eventually resulted in 
their overthrow by Ardashir in 224.56 Therefore, by claiming Achaemenid heritage, which 
guaranteed the Romans would be regarded as their natural enemies, the Sasanians were able 
to win the support and backing of their new subjects by showing that they, unlike the Arsacids 
before them, would not be cowed by the might of Rome. Hence, this ideological claim to 
Achaemenid heritage allowed the Sasanians to present the Romans as their ancestral enemies 
and, therefore, cement their internal legitimacy by showing they would be stronger and 
better rulers than the Arsacids, whom they had usurped. 
 
These opposing ideologies both provoked, and were provoked by, the fierce antagonism 
which existed between the Roman and Sasanian Empires in the third and fourth centuries. 
How an enemy or neighbour is perceived has a direct effect on a state’s relationship with 
them.57 Hence, the Roman view of the Sasanian Empire as a strange and suspicious alter orbis 
ensured that they were treated with distrust and enmity. While, in casting themselves as the 
heirs of the Achaemenids the Sasanians equally ensured the Romans were viewed as their 
                                                          
53 Sundermann, 1963; Rubin, 2000: 645. On the importance legitimacy and legitimate rule had for the Sasanians 
see: Dignas & Winter (2007: 232-241) and Winter (1989). 
54 As shown by the fact Cyrus the Great was legitimised by being portrayed as the grandson of the last Median 
King and the fact Darius was described to have been fighting against an illegitimate imposter rather than the 
real heir (Hdt. 1.107-8). 
55 For the conquest of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene by Septimus Severus see: Hirt (2008). 
56 Lee, 2007: 4. 
57 This was especially true for the Roman and Sasanian Empires (Blockley, 1992: 113). 
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natural enemy. Furthermore, for the first time in their history the Roman’s ideology of 
imperium sine fine and universal rule was matched and opposed by a rival state; a state with 
the means to pursue to own similar claims to universal rule. Nothing could have been seen as 
a more direct threat to the very existence and prosperity of the Roman Empire than this. 
Likewise, for the Sasanians, Achaemenid heritage played an important role in both their 
internal legitimacy and external aspirations and justifications. Accordingly, in this ideology, 
the Romans were portrayed as the ultimate enemy. Thus, the historical ideologies and 
universal claims of both sides permitted only conflict and antagonism, not peaceful 
coexistence. The major consequence of these two diametrically opposed and conflicting 
ideologies was the seemingly unending Roman-Sasanian conflict.  
 
Political Necessities and Internal Expectations 
It is neither nature nor justice which gives monarchies to men, but the ability to command an 
army and to handle affairs competently.58 
War and the royal office are agreed to be the greatest of all things among mankind.59 
Despite the gap in centuries between these two statements, the first being a Byzantine 
lexicon thought to date from an earlier Hellenistic source and the second coming from the 
sixth century Roman historian Procopius, they both show the realities of ancient kingship. 
They underline that, in the ancient world, military success and reputation was the central 
prerequisite of a ruler’s legitimacy, and this was no different for the rulers of the sophisticated 
Roman and Sasanian Empires. Indeed, that Ardashir had initially overthrown the Parthians 
militarily indicates that the early Shahs were first and foremost men of war.60 Likewise, the 
Cult of Victory had always been a fundamental part of Roman society and this did not change 
throughout the history of the Roman Empire.61 The military nature of ancient leadership, 
together with the ideological competition that erupted between the two states, meant that 
                                                          
58 Suda s.v. ‘Basileia’ (Austin 37). 
59 Proc. BP. 2.24.26. 
60 Blockley (1992: 101) goes as far to state that the Sasanian Empire could be seen primarily as a ‘heroic warrior 
kingdom’. 
61 Evident in the poetic verses of Claudian (III cos. Hon. 201-11, cos. Stil. 3.130-73), that the altar of Victory was 
the last pagan artefact to be removed from the Senate House in Rome (Symm. Rel. 3.3) and Vegetius’ (1.1) 
remembrance of the glorious military victories in Rome’s past. 
30 
  
military successes against the neighbouring empire were highly sought after and valued as 
indicators of a ruler’s legitimacy and ability to defend the dignity and prestige of their empire.  
 
Sasanian Necessities62  
An ideology that depicted the Roman Empire as the natural enemy of themselves and their 
people ensured that military successes against Rome were essential to the internal position 
of the early Sasanian Shahs. The special place that the Roman Empire held in the foreign policy 
and military objectives of the Sasanian Empire, especially in the third and fourth centuries, is 
evident in the way it was portrayed by the Shahs during this period. For instance, in his Res 
Gestae Shapur I lists all the lands he had campaigned in but only his Roman campaigns were 
described in great detail.63 Furthermore, the nature of the Res Gestae divi Saporis as a piece 
of royal and personal aggrandisement is most readily apparent in the Shah’s celebration of 
his victories over successive Roman emperors.64 Shapur informs his audience that in a pitched 
battle ‘Gordian Caesar was killed and the Roman force was destroyed’, that he had made 
Philip the Arab a ‘tributary’, that he had ‘annihilated at Barbalissos a Roman force of 60,000’ 
and finally, and perhaps most significantly, that he ‘made prisoner ourselves with our own 
hands Valerian Caesar’.65 Shapur was also eager to reveal that he renamed the site of his great 
victory over Gordian, Mišīk, Peroz-Shapur (Victorious Shapur) and that during his campaigns 
he captured innumerable Roman cities, including, Zeugma, Seleucia, Antioch and Dura.66 To 
his internal audience reading this inscription there could be no doubt that Shapur was master 
                                                          
62 The foremost study on the political history of the Sasanian Empire is that by Schippmann (1990).  
63 SKZ. 
64 On the nature and purpose of Shapur’s Res Gestae see: Kettenhoffen (1982). 
65  SKZ §3-4, 11. Despite Shapur’s claim to have defeated and killed Gordian in battle, there is a major 
contradiction between Roman and Sasanian sources on the fate the emperor. In opposition to Shapur’s account 
Roman sources state that Gordian was killed by some of his own men, led by Philip the Arab (SHA Gord. 29.30; 
Eutr. 9.2-3; Fest. 22 Zos. 1.18-19). However, in this debate it should be noted that the Roman defeat at Mišīk did 
indeed take place (Gignoux, 1991: 9-22) and that Shapur’s credibility and legitimacy may well have been harmed 
by lying about such a success. Furthermore, whereas the Res Gestae divi Saporis was constructed only thirty 
years after the event, the Roman sources which portray Gordian’s’ death as a result of treachery were written 
much later. As such, Shapur’s account was much more contemporary. For more on the reliability of Shapur’s Res 
Gestae in this regard see: Stolte (1971). These Roman sources also all show a clear distaste for Philip the Arab, 
likely due to the peace he was forced to accept by Shapur and therefore may well have been attempting to cover 
up a military humiliation by the Sasanian enemy by blaming Gordian’s death instead on the much maligned Philip 
(Zos. 3.32.4; Dignas & Winter, 2007: 80). For more detailed discussion on the divergent accounts and events of 
Gordian’s death see: Körner (2002: 84-87) and Edwell (2008: 171-2). 
66 SKZ §4. 
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over the Roman enemy and that he was therefore unquestionably a strong and fit ruler. He 
reinforced the celebration of these victories by commissioning rock reliefs and other visual 
artefacts, such as the Bishapur relief, all of which displayed the defeated emperors in forms 
of submission, to further broadcast his humiliation of the Roman Empire.67 Shapur also had a 
double gold dinar issued to celebrate his most famous triumph; the capture of the emperor 
Valerian.68  
As such, it is no exaggeration to state that Shapur’s victories over the Roman Empire became 
the cornerstone of his royal and personal standing and played a vital role in securing his 
internal legitimacy and position. Shapur I was not the only ruler to utilise victories over the 
Roman rival in this way. Narseh’s Paikuli inscription, which was intended to stress his 
legitimacy and right to rule after his turbulent succession, uses a different phrase to describe 
the Roman Empire compared to the other neighbours of the Sasanian Empire. According to 
Narseh in this inscription, in contrast to all other local powers, who revealed their allegiance 
to the Sasanian Empire by ‘standing by Narseh in advice and counsel’, the Romans were said 
to have ‘stood in supplication’.69 Likewise, Shapur II commissioned a rock relief to celebrate 
his defeat of the emperor Julian in 363, located at Taq-ī Bustan.70 The lengths that the Shahs 
of the third century in particular went to celebrate and promote their military supremacy and 
mastery of the Roman rival underlines that such military successes were an integral part of 
their internal legitimacy and right to rule.71  
 
The political constitution of the Sasanian state meant that the Shahs’ relationship with the 
powerful nobility in their empire also dictated military aggression and success against the 
Roman rival was a necessity.72 One of the many assumptions made about the Sasanian state 
was that it was much more centralised, and controlled by the direct power and authority of 
                                                          
67 Ghirshman, 1962: fig.197. 
68 Canepa, 2009: 55. The impression the capture of a Roman emperor had on contemporaries and later observers 
is also apparent in the continuation of depictions of this event, such as with the Paris Cameo and illustrations 
from the Shahnama (Ghirshman, 1962: fig.195; Enderlein & Sundermann, 1988: 190). 
69 NPi 91-2. 
70 Ghirshman, 1962:fig.233. 
71 On the overall importance of military victory and reputation to Sasanian kingship see: Daryaee (2008b), 
McDonough (2013); Choksty (1988). 
72 Blockley, 1992: 101; Whitby, 1994: 234. 
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the Shahs, compared to the supposedly more ‘lethargic’ and indirectly ruled Parthian regna 
that it replaced. 73  However, this idea contradicts the fact, and a fact that is regularly 
acknowledged, that the Shahs needed to appease the noble families who held power in 
virtually every corner of the empire.74  
In this regard, as well as being a homage to their Achaemenid predecessors, the title 
Shahanshah or King of kings underscores the nature of Sasanian kingship within the wider 
state, as the Shahs’ position was secured through winning the loyalty and support of the other 
powerful magnates and families in the empire. The principal groups of nobility with which the 
Shahs had to contend with, and win the support of, were the Shahrdaran, virtually 
independent kings of their own territories, and the Vuzurgan, who were made up of the great 
noble families of the Suren, Karin and the Lords of Undigan, who although also nominally 
owed loyalty to the Shahs equally retained much independence in their own homelands.75 
That these powerful nobles were almost autonomous in their own lands is evident in the fact 
that the Shahs never founded new cities in any territory belonging to any of these families in 
fear of angering them.76 Likewise, the quasi-feudal, personal and hereditary composition of 
the Sasanian Empire ensured that all major offices of state were held hereditarily by these 
various, but exclusive, noble families.77 Consequently, Shahs could not even raise or levy new 
taxes without agreement from the nobility, while their military power was also largely 
dependent on the loyalty of the powerful noble families. Even more important than this, 
however, was the traditional role the nobility performed in choosing and legitimising their 
Shahs.78 This traditional right fulfilled a crucial role in internal Sasanian politics as, if a ruling 
Shah angered them, the nobles could remove their support in favour of another royal 
candidate, so long as he was from the Sasanian family of course.79  Thus, although they were 
absolute rulers, the Sasanians Shahs could not rule their empire without the consent and 
cooperation of the nobility.  
                                                          
73 As first argued by Christensen (1944: 97). Rubin (2000: 652) also notes this tendency in scholarship concerning 
comparisons between the Sasanian and Parthian Empires.  
74 Brosius, 2006: 151-179; Pourshariati, 2008. For more on the importance of the nobility to both Roman and 
Sasanians rulers in general during this period see: Börm (2010) 
75 Rubin, 2000: 652; Blockley, 1992: 101; Wiesehöfer, 1996: 171-5. 
76 Rubin, 2004: 245. 
77 Proc. BP. 1.6.13-14. 
78 Proc. BP. 1.5, 1.11.31-33; Börm, 2007:113, 2008b: 433; Wiesehöfer, 1996: 169-171. 
79 John of Antioch fr. 178; FHG 4: 165; Letter of Tansar; NPi. Brosius, 2006: 151. 
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The early career of Shah Narseh presents a prime example of the need to gain the support of 
the nobility in holding onto the Sasanian throne. After the death of the Shapur I in 272 the 
Sasanian Empire was plunged into a period of internal turmoil and civil war during which 
successive Shahs including Hormizd I, Bahrām I, II and III ruled for only very short periods.80 
The internal stability and dominance of Ardashir and Shapur I had been achieved primarily 
through their military achievements, however, their three immediate successors, especially 
Bahrām I and III, were too young to be able to create their own legitimacy through military 
victory.81 The two competing candidates for the throne after Shapur I, Hormizd and his cousin 
Bahrām I, both lacked military reputations, which ensured that neither could garner enough 
support from the nobility to guarantee their internal supremacy and smooth succession to 
the throne. This resulted in a civil war between these two rivals for the throne, which Bahrām 
I was finally able to win. However, his son and heir, Bahrām II, was to suffer the same troubles 
in his own reign, as he was also unable to achieve the necessary military reputation to win 
the support and loyalty of the nobility. As a result of this, Bahrām II was only able to maintain 
his internal position by winning the support of the powerful Zoroastrian priest Kerdir.82 In 
return for this support Bahrām II was forced to grant many concessions to Kerdir and the 
Zoroastrian Magians which allowed them to pursue Zoroastrian aggrandisement in the 
Sasanian Empire, predominantly through the form of persecutions against the empires 
religious minorities, such as Christians and Manichaens.83 However, although his support was 
instrumental in propping up the throne of Bahrām II it is likely that Kerdir’s pre-eminence 
caused dissatisfaction amongst the nobility during the reign of his successor, Bahrām III, as 
they saw their own influence wane in the face of Kerdir’s ascendancy.84 As a result, the nobles 
turned their support to the only other remaining candidate for the throne, Narseh, who, with 
their support, was subsequently able to win the Sasanian throne. The importance of noble 
                                                          
80 Hormizd ruled for two years (270-272/3), Bahrām I ruled for merely three years (273-6), Bahrām II ruled for a 
more stable period of seventeen years (276-293) and Bahrām III was only able to hold on to power for less than 
a year (293). 
81 Potter, 2009: 290. 
82 KKZ § 8-9. 
83 KKZ § 9-10. 
84 Although Daryaee (2008a: 12) states that this is no definitive evidence for this competition between the 
nobility and Kerdir, it does seem that after Narseh’s successful rebellion, which was supported by the nobility, 
against Bahrām III, who was supported by Kerdir, the power of the Zoroastrian Magians was curtailed. This then 
would suggest that this was one of the expectations of Narseh from the nobility once he had gained the throne. 
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support in Narseh’s eventual succession to the throne was highlighted by the Shah himself, 
who justifies his rebellion against Bahrām III by stating that the nobles asked him to do this.85 
As emphasised by the failed reigns of Hormizd and Bahrām I, as described above, military skill 
and success were central to winning the support and cooperation of the nobility. Indeed, 
Joshua Stylites underlined its importance by stating that Balāš lost his throne because ‘the 
military thought nothing of him’.86 Military success and a strong military reputation could be 
used to mollify, placate and overawe the influential and ambitious nobles. Successfully 
military campaigns not only won Shahs the much needed military prestige and legitimacy their 
position demanded, it also provided them with material advantages, such as foreign wealth, 
land and captives, all of which could be distributed amongst the noble families in order to 
win, or retain, their support.87 Indeed, despite the ideological and propagandist exhortations 
of Ardashir and Shapur I in their inscriptions that celebrate their victories over the Roman 
Empire they both betray the overriding practical aim of their military campaigns against the 
Romans in the west; material and economic gain. For instance, Ardashir is said to have refused 
peace with Rome until he had ‘replenished his coffers and the treasury of the state’ and, 
likewise, Shapur stated that he ‘burned, ruined and pillaged’ his way through Roman 
territory.88 The Romans themselves were also seemingly aware of the overwhelming Sasanian 
desire for plunder and booty, with Libanius stating that they were interested predominantly 
in plundering Roman territory for wealth and material resources. 89  This view is also 
maintained by Zosimus, who records the Sasanian prevalence for ‘ravaging the cities of the 
East’.90 The importance of material gains from military campaigns therefore helps to explain 
why Roman Empire was so important to the foreign policy of the Shahs, as, compared to the 
vast majority of the Sasanians’ other neighbours, the Romans were vastly wealthy and, as 
such, a lucrative source of income that the Shahs needed to secure their internal position.91 
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87 Indeed, Lee (2007: 102) highlights that the main economic and material gains from late antique warfare came 
from wealth and human resources. 
88 Letter of Tansar p.42 (tr. Boyce 65); SKZ §11. 
89 Orations 18.207. 
90 Zos. 2.43.7-8. 
91  On the economically lucrative nature of successful Sasanian campaigns against the Roman Empire see: 
Procopius (BP. 1.7.3-4, 1.13.1-2) with Lee (2007: 102). Although it must be noted these two sources focus on the 




However, military successes against the Romans were not used solely to retain the support 
of the nobility, no matter how important this was. The Shahs also needed the material 
resources won from successful western campaigns to improve the infrastructure of their 
empire, and in building up their own personal powerbase, independent from the influence 
and interference of the nobility.92 As the supreme commander of the army, anything a Shah 
won on campaign, whether booty or captives, belonged solely to him. Thus, even after 
necessarily dividing a portion of this among the nobility, the Shah would still be left with 
substantial material and economic rewards. The Shahs were quick to utilise these hard-won 
resources to improve their own internal position and the prosperity of their empire. In the 
course of their military campaigns in Roman territory the Shahs took considerable amounts 
of Roman citizens captive and forcibly deported them into the Sasanian Empire. The capture 
and large-scale deportation of Roman citizens gave the Sasanians the chance to exploit 
Roman technical skills and expertise to develop the infrastructure of their own empire, 
through the construction of roads, bridges and palaces.93 This is confirmed by Tabarī, who 
informs us that Roman captives, once resettled in Sasanian lands, were used to stimulate and 
sustain the urbanisation and irrigation projects undertaken by the Shahs in improving the 
economic prosperity of their empire.94 Furthermore, the technical skills and expertise of the 
Roman captives, even the imprisoned Valerian, were used in sophisticated construction 
projects such as the Sostar dam.95 Thus, the improvement of the infrastructure and prosperity 
of the Sasanian Empire that successive Shahs achieved throughout their reigns was itself 
                                                          
92 For the steady improvement of the infrastructure of Sasanian lands under the early Shahs see: Tabarī (898). 
93 For more detailed discussion on the large-scale Sasanian deportations of Roman populations see: Dignas & 
Winter (2007: 254-263) and Lieu (1986: 475-505). The Martyrology of Pusai (Acta martyrum et sanctorum 2.208-
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94  826-827. Ammianus Marcellinus (24.3.10) mentions numerous cities within the Sasanian Empire which 
indicate an increase in urbanisation under the Shahs did take place. Heather (2006: 61-2) remarks that this 
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Mesopotamia. 
95 Ghirshman, 1962: fig.174; Tabarī 827-8. 
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largely dependent on the influx of forcibly resettling foreign populations, which was the result 
of successful foreign military campaigns against the Roman Empire. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of these resettled Roman citizens was that they were 
subordinate only to the Shahs themselves. 96  This was an important development in the 
advancement of royal power as it ensured that, unlike other citizens of the Sasanian Empire, 
these resettled Romans had no obligation to any of the noble families and owed their loyalty 
solely to the Shahs. Hence, in the case of civil war or a lack of noble support for a foreign 
campaign the Shahs would have had their own personal pool of manpower to call upon. 
Similarly, any taxes levelled against these new citizens of the Sasanian state went directly to 
the Shahs themselves. 
Evidently, the acquisition of wealth increased the Shahs’ personal fortune, while the 
deportation of Roman citizens allowed them to develop their own reserve of royal manpower 
away from the influence and interference of the noble families, as well as helping to improve 
the economy and infrastructure of the state as a whole.97 Importantly then, military success 
allowed the Shahs to distance themselves from total dependence upon the unpredictable 
nobility and granted them an increased level of independent action and sustainability.    
 
Therefore, Sasanian military aggression against the Roman Empire in the third and fourth 
centuries was not undertaken strictly for territorial expansion but rather for the honours, 
reputation and wealth it bestowed upon a successful Shah.98 The Shahs needed such things 
to support and enhance their internal position and domination. Thus military success, 
particularly against the wealthy Roman Empire, was vital in appeasing the powerful and 
influential noble families, by providing them with steady distribution of prestige and plunder, 
and cowing them by reminding them of the Shahs’ superior might and the military force he 
could muster. Furthermore, it also allowed the Shahs to develop and expand their own 
                                                          
96 Proc. BP. 2.14.3. Although the example from Procopius focuses on captives taken from Antioch in 540, the 
deportation of large numbers of Roman captives across the imperial frontier to be settled in Sasanian lands was 
a recurring theme of Sasanian military campaigns against the Roman Empire. Therefore, it can be argued that 
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97 Isaac, 1992:266. 
98 Blockley (1992: 102) also agrees with this assumption. 
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powerbase which was independent from the machinations of the nobility. The importance of 
military successes against the Roman Empire is clearly evident in the number of invasions 
launched across the western frontier during reigns of the third and fourth century Shahs, 
Ardashir I, Shapur I, Narseh and Shapur II.  
 
Roman Necessities  
Military achievement was equally important to the Roman emperors, it had always been a 
major factor in Roman history, both in internal politics and foreign policy.99 Certainly, it was 
a central expectation of the imperial office that emperors would both defend and expand the 
borders of the empire. A Roman leader could not expect a long or successful career if he did 
not possess the necessary military credentials. This was especially true during the third 
century crisis, when emperors were increasingly proclaimed by regional armies rather than 
by the Senate and People of Rome as was traditional in previous centuries.100 During the third 
century the Roman Empire was beleaguered by threats on all of its frontiers, from the 
Germanic tribes in the west and north to the Sasanian Empire in the east. Therefore, it was 
increasingly expected that emperors would be military experienced and skilled in order to 
defend the empire against these increased threats. In the same way, unlike their 
predecessors, the citizen-emperors of the Principate, the so-called soldier-emperors of the 
third and fourth centuries were even more so expected to personally lead armies against the 
enemies of Rome.101 Emperors who did not have the necessary military reputations or that 
did not achieve military successes shortly after their proclamation were quickly killed and 
replaced. 102  Consequently, emperors found it necessary to promote and celebrate their 
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emperors see: McCormack (1990). 
100 Pan. Lat.  8/5.14.1-3; Loewenstein, 1973: 335. Indeed, it was this development that led to the break-away 
empires such as the Gallic and Palmyrene Empires see Drinkwater (1987) and Smith (2013: 175-181). 
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Whitby (2004: 179-181), Johne (2008) and Körner (2002). The Porphyry Statue of the Tetrarchs also emphasises 
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102 The career and short reign of the emperor Maximinus, the first of the soldier-emperors at the start of the 
third century in 235-238, is testament to the new involvement of the army and increased importance of military 
reputation in the election of new emperors during this period (Herodian 6.8).  
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military successes in order to cement their legitimacy and internal position.103 Indeed, even 
emperors who favoured a more defensive imperial strategy, especially towards the Sasanian 
Empire, such as Constantius still felt obligated to promote their military skill and expansionist 
ambitions.104  Thus, Synesius’ comment that the military was the ‘one solid safeguard of 
kingship’ was apt for the Roman emperors, to whom military reputation, prestige and 
achievement was a central aspect of their legitimacy and right to rule.105 
The rise of the Sasanian Empire in 224, which played a leading role in fomenting the third 
century crisis, had a lasting effect on the character of the Roman Empire.106 The pressure to 
achieve military renown, in order to secure the throne and internal dominance, led numerous 
emperors to instigate wars against the Sasanian Empire. 107  That such eastern victories 
became an increasingly important expectation for emperors in the third and fourth centuries 
is most evident in the fact that Carus was proclaimed emperor in 282 with the explicit goal of 
destroying the rival empire.108 Indeed, Julian’s comment that he sought ‘a worthier foe’ than 
the Goths once he became sole ruler of the Roman Empire and his subsequent campaign 
against the Sasanians in 363, indicates that a victory over the Sasanians were more valuable 
and won Roman emperors more military glory than any other.109  
Roman imperial and foreign policy was based largely on the deep reverence for, and need to 
preserve, the empire’s decus and maiestas (imperial prestige).110 In terms of their relationship 
with foreign peoples this meant that any who challenged or did injury to this imperial prestige 
were considered irrefutable enemies of the Roman Empire and Roman emperors. In this 
regard, there can be no doubt that during the reigns of Ardashir and Shapur I the Sasanians, 
                                                          
103 Orators always focused on the military qualities of the emperor when lauding their virtues (Themis. Or. 1.2a-
b; Jul. Or. 1.37c; Gregory of Nazianus 4.80). Officially sanctioned and organised panegyrics always described 
military victories and successes above all else (Pan. Lat. 10.8, 11.3, 8.2-5, 9.18). 
104 Themis. Or. 2.18c. 
105 De Regno 21. Indeed, the premise of Mattern’s (1999) study on Roman foreign relations is that gaining 
military reputation and legitimacy was more important to the emperors that the material benefits or strategic 
advantage of any military campaign. 
106 Heather, 2006:58-67. 
107 For this pressure for renown and glory see Lendon (1997). 
108 Dionem fr. 12 (FHG 4.198). 
109 Amm. Marc. 22.7.8 
110 Potter, 2004: 229. This need to protect Rome’s imperial prestige is evident in the attempts to persuade 
Commodus after the death of his father in 180 that to abandon the war against the Marcomanni and Quadi 
would be ‘dishonourable’ (Herodian 1.6.5). On the general importance of honour and prestige in the running of 
the Roman Empire see Lendon (1997). 
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by capturing numerous Roman cities and humiliating a succession of Roman emperors 
through either defeat, death or capture, had done serious injury to Rome’s decus and 
maiestas. Accordingly, the Sasanians were viewed with bitter enmity, as enemies and rivals 
who demanded swift and decisive Roman vengeance. This determination for retaliation 
against the Sasanian Empire ensured that victories against it were particularly celebrated and 
sought after by Roman emperors. By defeating the Sasanian enemy emperors could show not 
only that they were skilled military leaders but also that they would defend the prestige of 
the empire. Such impetus for military confrontations was strengthened by the belief that only 
Sasanian Empire could truly challenge and threaten Rome.111 Likewise, defeats suffered at the 
hands of the Sasanians were met with derision and contempt.112 For example, after Galerius’ 
initial defeat to Narseh in 297 he was publically humiliated by his Augustus, Diocletian, who 
forced him to walk behind the imperial cart in full regalia for a mile.113 This was a fitting 
punishment for one who had allowed Rome’s imperial prestige to be trampled upon by the 
hated Sasanians. Thus, it was considered not just desirable, but politically necessary, to defeat 
the Sasanians in war.  
Roman emperors went to great lengths to assure their subjects, supporters, and even rivals, 
that they were capable of defending against, and defeating, the dangerous eastern 
neighbour. Severus Alexander (222-235), the first Roman emperor to be challenged by the 
new Sasanian power, started the precedent for promoting, and indeed overemphasising, any 
victory against the imperial rival. He celebrated Ardashir’s eventual retreat as a tremendous 
victory, despite the fact that the Shah was forced to withdraw due to exhaustion among his 
troops, who had been fighting since his initial rebellion against the Arsacids that had begun in 
208, rather than any defeat suffered at the hands of the Roman emperor and his army.114  
Henceforth, successive emperors, from Carus in 282 to Julian in 363, were keen to win and 
make use of the titles Parthicus maximus and Persicus maximus, which celebrated military 
victories over the rival, in order to promote their supremacy over the eastern neighbour, 
                                                          
111 Pan.Lat. 8(5) 10.4. Although we must be aware that this panegyric was officially sanctioned by Diocletian to 
celebrate his victory over Narseh in 298 and therefore he was likely to want to boost the perceived threat of the 
Sasanians to make his victory seem even more impressive. 
112 For instance, Philip the Arab gained a bad press for his acceptance of Shapur I’s peace demands in 244, which 
were described as a ‘most dishonourable peace’ (Zos. 3.32.4). 
113 Amm. Marc. 14.11.10; Eutr. 9.24. 
114 On the reasons for Ardashir’s retreat from Roman territory see Herodian (6.6.4-6). On Alexander Severus’ 
celebration of this as a great victory see: Dignas & Winter (2007: 75-6); Historia Augusta (Sev. Alex. 56-7). 
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whether they had actually defeated the Sasanians in battle or not.115 This overriding desire to 
celebrate and reinforce the idea of Roman military ascendancy and victory over the Sasanian 
Empire among Roman emperors was arguably best exemplified during the reign of 
Constantius II, however.116 In 343 Constantius conducted a modestly successful incursion into 
the Sasanian Empire which, after returning to Constantinople, the emperor celebrated as if it 
were a major victory. He organised a grandiose entrance and subsequent procession through 
the city that was said to have outstripped even the most lavish triumphs of the past.117 
The importance that military victories over the Sasanians’ had for Roman emperors was again 
evident in Tetrarchy. That the legitimacy and authority of the Tetrarchy was largely 
dependent on their ability to defend the Roman Empire, especially against the previously all-
conquering Sasanians, is readily apparent in the celebrations following its defeat of Narseh in 
298. All four members of the Tetrarchy were awarded the titles Persicus maximus, 
Armeniacus maximus, Medicus maximus and Adiabenicus maximus, which promoted their 
joint-mastery over the eastern rival.118 Likewise, similarly to Shapur I, Galerius, the Tetrarch 
who led the army against Narseh had a special bronze medallion minted to promote his 
success. This celebratory coin featured the legend Victoria Persica, and on the obverse it 
depicted his capture of the Narseh’s family and harem. 119  However, it is arguably the 
unrivalled triumphal Arch of Galerius in Thessaloniki which most reveals the importance this 
victory over the Sasanians had for the Tetrarchy.120  
However, it was not just the emperors themselves who celebrated victories over the 
Sasanians to the full. Roman writers and historians also reserved extra praise and admiration 
for emperors who achieved military success over the imperial rival. Diocletian’s victory over 
Narseh in 298, which completely altered the balance of power between the two empires in 
Rome’s favour, was widely celebrated by Roman writers and historians alike. For this success 
Diocletian was lauded by the Historia Augusta as the ‘father of a new golden age’, by Aurelius 
Victor as the emperor who did most to protect his people and by Julian as the ‘ruler of the 
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116 McCormack, 1990:39. 
117 Athanasius, Historia Arianorum 16.2; Polemius Silvius, Laterculus 31. 
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entire world’ who had instilled fear into the Sasanians.121 Furthermore, the fact that the 
majority of the criticism towards Hadrian’s surrender of Trajan’s conquered eastern 
territories in 117 comes from the third and fourth centuries indicates that victory over the 
eastern rival was now more important than it had ever been.122   
The political necessity for eastern conquests quickly became an ideological obsession for 
some emperors.123 In this regard, parallel to the growing fear and hostility felt towards the 
Sasanian Empire in the third and fourth century, the imitatio Alexandri ideal amongst Roman 
emperors also became more prevalent. This was the desire to emulate the military success of 
Alexander the Great, and of even more recent Roman exemplars, such as Trajan, who had 
enjoyed spectacular military successes over the eastern Achaemeninds and Parthians, 
respectively. Thus, the Itinerarium Alexandri exhorted to Roman emperors: 
You have a hereditary duty towards the Persians, insomuch as they have trembled for so long 
at Roman arms.124 
The resurgence of this politico-cultural aspiration for eastern conquests was undoubtedly 
shaped by the increasing political importance victories over the Sasanian Empire had, and also 
the increased danger the Sasanians presented to the Roman Empire.125 The most famous, and 
debated, example of this drive to emulate Alexander was Julian, whose 363 campaign was 
presented by many contemporary and later Roman writers as an attempt to emulate 
Alexander’s conquest of the Achaemenid Empire.126 Regardless of the debate surrounding 
whether Julian, or any other emperor, actively sought to emulate Alexander by attacking the 
Sasanian Empire in 363, that later Roman writers sought to compare Roman leaders who 
marched east to Alexander and that Alexander-comparisons became a major topos of Roman 
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124 Imitatio Alexandri 5. 
125 The connection between the resurgence of imitatio Alexandri and the rise of the Sasanian Empire is evident 
in the evocations of Alexander’s legends by Roman emperors, or at least Roman writers writing about Roman 
emperors, from 224 onwards (Diocletian: Malalas 12.39; Constantine: Euseb. VC. 4.15.1; Julian: Amm. Marc. 
24.4.26-7; Honorius: Claud. IV Cons. Hon. 257-8, 379). This connection has also been acknowledged by Smith 
(2011: 50). 
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literature and historiography reinforces how important the memory of Alexander the Great 
was in the cultural and historical milieu in which the Romans viewed themselves.127  
This array of interconnected political realities and necessities underlines the primacy the 
Sasanian Empire had in the fear, ambitions and enmity of the Romans in the third and fourth 
centuries; they were considered Rome’s most dangerous enemy, and therefore, most 
deserving of defeat and humiliation. Consequently, for emperors to defend the decus and 
maiestas of the Roman Empire, and to ensure their own reputation and legacy, it became 
fundamentally necessary for them to defeat the Sasanian rival.  
 
Religious Motivations 
The religious relationship between the Roman and Sasanian Empires was highly important 
and set many precedents for future inter-state relations, as, for the first time in history, two 
intolerant and jealous monotheistic religions came into contact.  The existence of two official 
state religions, or at least state sponsored religions, Roman Christianity and Sasanian 
Zoroastrianism, further added to the political demands and internal expectations that 
encouraged aggressive relations between the imperial neighbours.  
From Constantine’s conversion in 312, and the subsequent promotion of Christianity as the 
favoured religion of the emperors, Roman emperors increasingly regarded themselves as the 
champions and protectors of Christianity. 128  As God’s divinely chosen ruler the Roman 
emperor was compelled to both protect and help spread Christianity all across the late 
antique world. This Roman sponsorship and protection of Christianity frequently had an 
adverse effect on how the Sasanians viewed Christians in their own realm, and beyond, 
throughout the third and fourth centuries. The Shahs increasingly thought of Christians within 
their empire as a potential Roman ‘fifth-column’ and they were treated accordingly, especially 
during times of conflict with Rome, when this perceived disloyalty could potentially do the 
most harm to the Sasanian Shahs and their empire.129 Such persecution of Christians provided 
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extra impetus to Roman aggression and eagerness for war, as they felt morally compelled to 
protect and avenge their fellow Christians. 
Equally, alongside their Achaemenid heritage and military prestige, the early Sasanian Shahs 
utilised Zoroastrianism to justify and legitimise their right to rule.130 Sasanian rock reliefs from 
the third century depict Shahs receiving their investiture from Ahura Mazda, in order to 
promote the idea that they were divinely chosen to rule the Sasanian Empire. 131 
Consequently, similarly to the Roman emperors, the early Sasanian Shahs could not be seen 
as Ahura Mazda’s chosen rulers if they did not adequately defend and promote 
Zoroastrianism itself. One of the most effective ways, in the ancient monotheistic mind at 
least, to promote one’s own religion was to persecute the religion of others.132 This led to the 
frequent religious persecutions of Jews, Christians, and Manicheans in the Sasanian 
Empire.133 Although the persecution of the Jewish and Manichean religions had no adverse 
political consequences in foreign relations, the persecution of Christians was an entirely 
different matter. Persecuting the Roman emperors’ fellow Christians brought the indignation 
and righteous anger of the Roman Empire upon the Zoroastrian Sasanian Shahs. In response 
to this direct challenge and threat to their position as protector of Christianity successive 
Roman emperors launched military campaigns to help protect God’s worshippers who were 
being mistreated in the Sasanian Empire.134  
For these reasons, religion and religious considerations quickly became yet another source of 
tension and conflict throughout the Roman-Sasanian relationship. Religion as a casus belli 
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Strategic Concerns and Realities 
This endemic cycle of military conflict, as well as being inspired and stimulated by ideological 
and political motivations, was caused by the strategic concerns and realities of the 
geopolitical situation and the constantly fluctuating balance of power the two empires found 
themselves confronted with. It has been claimed that the world empire ideal in antiquity 
presupposed control of both the Mediterranean basin and the Iranian plateaux.135 In this 
regard, the most strategically important region in the imperial competition was the contested 
Fertile Crescent in Mesopotamia that connected the Roman controlled Mediterranean basin 
to the Sasanian dominated Iranian plateaux. The fact that the Fertile Crescent straddled both 
empires ensured it was a vitally important strategic battleground, forming, as it did, the main 
frontier between the two rivals. Indeed, its contentious military and political division between 
the two rivals was arguably the fundamental geopolitical casus belli in the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship. Moreover, Mesopotamia quickly developed into the agricultural, administrative 
and political heartland of the Sasanian Empire. Therefore, the proximity of the Roman 
frontier, which was heavily militarised and fortified, especially after the reign of Diocletian, 
made the Sasanians extremely wary. Thus, either the Roman or Sasanian Empire had to 
dominate and control the Fertile Crescent or they would have to learn to coexist peacefully.136 
Yet, try as they might, neither the Romans nor the Sasanians were ever able to fully control 
the important Fertile Crescent, and during the third and fourth centuries they were 
completely unwilling, and unable, to coexist peacefully. This strategic and diplomatic 
deadlock destined the early Roman-Sasanian relationship to one of perpetual conflict. 
Due to their aggressive imperial ideology and internal needs the Sasanian Shahs proved a 
much more belligerent, zealous and energetic rival than the Parthian Arsacids had been 
before them. In the third century this aggressive energy took the Romans, who had perhaps 
been lulled into a false sense of security by the military inactivity of the Parthians, by surprise 
and allowed the early Sasanians to raid deep into Roman territory and raze important frontier 
cities. Accordingly, in attempting to counter the new ascendant Sasanian power in the east, 
Roman imperial and strategic attention at the end of the third and fourth centuries focused 
predominantly on containing and countering the new eastern threat, which necessitated an 
                                                          




increased Roman military presence in Mesopotamia, on their eastern frontier.137 Indeed, it 
has been argued that this need to match Sasanian power on the eastern frontier was the 
overriding impetus behind Diocletian’s military, economic and political reforms at the end of 
third century.138  
Consequently, after the rise of the Sasanian Empire Roman imperial and military strategy 
underwent a pivot to the east, which was a clear shift compared to previous centuries when 
imperial defence had been focused on the western frontiers along the Rhine and Danube. 139 
The founding of Constantinople in 330 as the new imperial capital of the empire, and the fact 
that from Diocletian onwards the principal Augustus in any political division or collegial rule 
of the empire always stationed themselves in the eastern provinces both further underline 
that such a shifting of imperial attention towards the east took place. Similarly, the fact that 
Sasanian controlled Mesopotamia formed the agricultural and political heartland of their 
empire, highlighted by the decision to make Ctesiphon the imperial capital, dictated that 
Sasanian military and imperial focus in the third and fourth centuries was also necessarily 
focused on the dangerously close imperial frontier with Rome in Mesopotamia.140  
 
Such a joint strategic focus and desire to dominate the contested imperial frontier quickly 
ensured that military conflict and competition became the underlying status quo of Roman-
Sasanian interactions. The quintessential indicator of this was Ardashir’s scathing reply to 
Severus Alexander’s diplomatic overtures that war, not negotiation, would settle their 
disputes.141 This declaration from the founder of the Sasanian Empire set the tone for the 
next two centuries of imperial interactions, and Ardashir was quick to put this boast into 
practice. After launching his first campaign against the Romans in 235/6 he rapidly besieged 
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Sasanians remained the priority in the third and fourth centuries. On Diocletian’s reforms see: Kuhoff (2001) and 
Barnes (1982). 
139 Heather, 2006: 66.  
140 Daryaee, 2008a: 15. 
141 Dio. 80.4.1; Herodian 6.2.4, 6.4.5 
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and captured Nisibis, Carrhae, Dura and Hatra, invading as far as Syria and Cappadocia.142 This 
was not a swift and decisive knock-out blow to the Roman Empire, however, rather it was 
only the first round of a seemingly never-ending cycle of attack and counter attack that 
plagued, and defined, the Roman-Sasanian relationship for the next two centuries. 
The competition for supremacy in the imperial frontier was intensified early on by the 
elimination, and assimilation, of the semi-independent states which had previously acted as 
buffer zones between the Romans and the Parthians.143 After overthrowing the Arsacids, 
Ardashir’s first move was to consolidate his power on the fringes of his newly won empire. 
For border cities such as Hatra this meant conquest and complete annexation into the 
Sasanian Empire.144 Likewise, from the start of the third century the Romans themselves 
pursued a strategy of fully integrating allied cities and frontier kingdoms under imperial 
control. For example, Oshroene was integrated into the empire by Severus Alexander in 214 
and, later, the break-away border city of Palmyra suffered the same fate during the reign of 
Aurelian in 272.145 Whereas, previously, such buffer zones had helped to mollify potential 
conflict between the Romans and Parthians by keeping them apart, the Roman and Sasanian 
Empires were now in direct and uninterrupted contact along a vast frontier which stretched 
from northern Arabia in the south to mountainous Armenia in the north. The potential for 
conflict and aggression was greatly amplified by this dangerous proximity. 
Arguably the primary method in the competition for supremacy and domination of the 
frontier was the construction of new, and the reinforcement of existing, fortifications. Indeed, 
one of Diocletian’s first moves in his efforts to counter Sasanian ascendency on Rome’s 
eastern frontier was the creation of a vast fortified zone; the strata Diocletiana. 146  The 
Sasanians equally attempted to entrench their position in the region through the construction 
of extensive fortifications, such as Pirisabora, the fortified city of Veh-Ardashir and 
Maozamalcha, on their side of the frontier, while the Nahrmalcha (royal canal), that ran from 
                                                          
142 Herodian 6.2.1; Dio. 80.3.4; Zon.12.15; Tabarī 820. 
143 Trimingham, 1979: 21; Potter, 2004: 217. 
144 Dio. 80.3.1-2; Wiesehöfer, 1982. 
145 Potter, 2004: 217; Zos. 1.61. 
146 Amm. Marc. 23.5.2; Mal. Chron. 12.17-22; Zos.1.34.1. On the archaeological evidence of the forts that made 
up the Strata Diocletiana see: Kennedy & Riley (1990), Mouterde (1930), Dunand (1933) and Poidebard (1934). 
For a general discussions of this fortified line see Konrad (2011) and Millar (1993:174-190). 
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the Tigris to Ctesiphon, provided the innermost line of defence.147 Likewise, islands in the 
Euphrates were also reinforced to act as a bulwark against Roman and Sasanian invasion, 
respectively.148 Fortifications were used for a variety of reason in the context of the Roman-
Sasanian competition, to consolidate Roman or Sasanian control of a region, to defend from 
attacks across the frontier and to act as staging posts for larger military campaigns. By the 
end of the fourth century Mesopotamia bristled with Roman and Sasanian fortifications that 
faced each other across the frontier.149  
This rapid consolidation of the imperial frontier not only brought the two empires into direct 
contact with one another in Mesopotamia, but it also made those areas, such as Armenia, the 
Caucasus and Arabia, which remained outside of direct imperial control, even more 
important. Both empires competed with one another to bring these regions into their own 
sphere of influence and control. That these frontier zones had avoided direct assimilation by 
either empire was rare, and this meant that they quickly became unanswered questions and 
bones of contention in the Roman-Sasanian competition. If the balance of power was to be 
tipped conclusively in the favour of either side, gaining supremacy in these frontier zones, 
especially strategically important Armenia and economically important Arabia, was vital. This 
was especially true after the competition for control of the Mesopotamian frontier reached a 
stalemate in the fourth century. Yet, just as complete domination of the Fertile Crescent 
proved elusive, so too did the empires experience great difficulty in achieving mastery over 
these frontier zones. Neither side had the military capability or capacity to keep their rival out 
for long. Consequently, the attention of the two imperial powers, especially in the fourth 
century increasingly focused on winning the loyalty and support of the local native elites in 
these frontier zones, rather than on strict military conquest, in an effort to increase their own 
influence and to harm the ambitions of their rival.150 This policy instigated the promotion of 
indirect rule in Armenia and Arabia, which was anomalous with the increasing drive towards 
centralisation and direct control of the Mesopotamian frontier. This irregularity only 
                                                          
147 Amm.Marc. 24, 25.1.10; Matthews, 1989a: 145-55. 
148 Ibid. 24. Island fortifications in the Euphrates have been uncovered at Anatha (Edwell, 2008:72, 86) and Bijan 
(Gawlikowksi, 1985). 
149 Archaeological evidence and papyri from Dura-Europos shows that numerous smaller fortifications also 
existed in the vicinity of the larger forts (Edwell, 2008: 64, 172), further emphasising how fortified the frontier 
between the two empires was. 
150 Blockley, 1992: 18. 
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furthered the ambiguity, uncertainty and suspicion which pervaded the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship in these regions, which in turn only served to foster their position as a cause of 
conflict between the two empires.  
 
The evidence that such a relentless, yet inconclusive, battle for military supremacy between 
the two empires took place was in the constantly fluctuating balance of power between them. 
The parity and equality of military resources and power between the two powers ensured 
that neither empire was ever able achieve full domination of the other or cement their 
superiority for long.151 This resulted in a cycle of transitory and short-lived military supremacy 
to the advantage of one side or the other, which set the tone for the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship throughout the third and fourth centuries. Each side continually sought to regain, 
or cement, ascendancy in the frontier and the overall balance of power through military 
victory. The establishment of such a distorted and one-sided settlement of the frontier was 
always deeply resented by the other side, and was consequently destined to be challenged 
whenever the opportunity arose. Hence, such militarily enforced settlement of the imperial 
frontier was conductive only to further conflict and bloodshed. This was borne out in the 
campaigns of Gordian III, Galerius and Shapur II all of which were attempts to enforce a 
change in the balance of power which saw them in an inferior and more vulnerable position 
on the imperial frontier.  
These strategic concerns and realities ensured that each empire viewed the other as the 
overwhelming threat to their own imperial security and prosperity. Certainly, Libanius viewed 
the Sasanians as the only foreign power that could truly threaten the very existence of the 
Roman Empire.152 The geopolitical circumstances the two empires found themselves in in the 
third and fourth centuries left little opportunity for compromise, mediation or common 
ground. Every success the opposing empire achieved was viewed with alarm and suspicion by 
their imperial neighbour. As such, almost every aspect of the Roman-Sasanian relationship in 
the third and fourth centuries was expressed by a pervasive sense of rivalry which only ever 
resulted in violent military conflict and antagonism. 
                                                          
151 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 70. 




This endemic imperial rivalry, which was inspired by competing ideologies, political needs and 
strategic realities, meant that military conflict between the Romans and Sasanians in the third 
and fourth centuries was not just an option, but a necessary inevitability. The political, 
ideological and strategic casus belli which beset Roman-Sasanian relations in this period were 
all interconnected, they did not occur in isolation but rather they intensified and strengthened 
one another; ultimately resulting in the pervasive hostility and suspicion that plagued imperial 
relations. For this reason the nature of the third and fourth century relationship was wholly 
incompatible with the establishment of peaceful coexistence.  
Therefore, in order for a more peaceful Roman-Sasanian relationship to develop a major 
change was needed. A shifting of imperial priorities towards different, and more threatening, 
enemies needed to take place simultaneously in both the Roman and Sasanian Empires; the 





1.2) The Fifth Century: New Threats and Shifting Priorities 
 
The greatest difference between the fifth century and those that had preceded it, from the 
Roman perspective at least, was the permanent split of the Roman Empire into two distinct 
western and eastern halves after the death of Theodosius I in 395. This split was to have a 
dramatic impact on the history, internal character and imperial strategy of both halves of the 
Roman world. It affected not only their respective military strength, but also their strategic 
position and priorities. 
Throughout the fifth century both the Eastern and Western Roman Empires faced barbarian 
threats that far surpassed those of the third century.1 The anonymous treatise De Rebus 
Bellicis highlights the danger the Roman world faced on all its frontiers: 
We must recognise that the madness of tribes baying all about hemming in the Roman Empire 
and treacherous barbarians…menace every stretch of our frontiers.2 
Although the anonymity of De Rebus Bellicis’ author prevents any insight into his background, 
this passage does nevertheless reveal the truth of the Roman’s situation in the fifth century, 
when they faced increased threats across all their frontiers.3 Indeed, that the De Rebus Bellicis 
was written during the later fourth and fifth century made it contemporary to the events it 
described above.4 Therefore, its assessment of the situation facing both halves of the Roman 
Empire at this time must be taken seriously. The Western Empire had to contend with a large 
variety of aggressive and competing tribal federations, such as the Franks, Alemanni, Goths, 
Vandals, Suevi and the Burgundians. In contrast, the main threat to the Eastern Empire now 
came from the encroachment of the Huns into Europe and the Vandal challenge to Roman 
domination of the Mediterranean, rather than the Sasanian Empire. After 395, however, the 
ability of both halves of the Roman world to counter these threats was hindered by the fact 
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that neither could call upon the unrivalled resources of a united Roman Empire, which had 
been available to them in the previous centuries. Therefore, they had to be more flexible and 
adaptive in their foreign policies. For a variety of reasons the Eastern Empire proved to be 
more capable of this than their western counterpart.5 The failure of the Western Empire to 
adapt to these new circumstances, both internally and externally, resulted in its steady 
fragmentation and eventual collapse in the fifth century.6 
For the foreign policy of the Eastern Empire the changed strategic circumstances of the fifth 
century resulted in the eastern frontier, which faced the Sasanian Empire, losing the 
overwhelming importance it had at the end of the third and fourth centuries.7 Consequently, 
throughout the fifth century successive Eastern emperors, from Arcadius onwards, pursued a 
continuation and extension of Constantius II’s cautious policy towards the Sasanian Empire. 
This was a defensive policy that was unwilling to risk unnecessarily military engagement in 
the east, in order to allow Constantinople to focus its military attention on the new Hunnic 
and Vandal threats. Thus, it is no exaggeration to state that, during the fifth century a shifting 
of priorities took place in the defence of the East Roman Empire. The construction of the 
Theodosian and Sea Walls in the fifth century, which protected Constantinople in all 
directions, was illustrative of the new strategic reality facing the Eastern Roman Empire; it 
could no longer focus overwhelmingly or predominantly on the Sasanian frontier. 
 
An analogous shifting of priorities also took place in the Sasanian Empire in the fifth century. 
Upon their ascent to power the Sasanians operated in relatively benign circumstances that 
allowed them to freely concentrate their energy and military resources in the profitable wars 
in the west, against Rome.8 However, towards the end of the fourth century and throughout 
the fifth century the Sasanians’ north-eastern frontier was threatened by successive Hunnic 
                                                          
5 For more information on the differing fortunes of the east and west after the final division of 395 see 
Williams & Friell (1998). 
6 For a detailed analysis of the fall of the West Roman Empire see Halsall (2007) and Heather (2006). There is 
certainly much more literature of the fall of the West, which can be found within the bibliographies of these two 
works. 
7 This previous importance is seen in Julian’s dismissal of a campaign against the Goths in favour of ‘a worthier 
foe’, which turned out to be the Sasanians (Amm. Marc. 22.7.8). 
8  Howard-Johnson, 2010b: 41. This focus on Rome is revealed by the successive large-scale campaigns of 
Ardashir and Shapur I in the early third century (Herodian 6.2.2; SKZ).  
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invaders and hostile tribes, principally the Hephthalite Huns, which reduced the importance 
and immediate priority of the Roman frontier.9  The sustained threat of the Hephthalites on 
their north-eastern frontier was the catalyst for many calamities that beset the Sasanian 
Empire during the turbulent fifth century including, raids, invasions, internal instability, 
famine and the capture and death of a Shah. Thus, it is also no exaggeration to suggest that 
for the Sasanians the fifth century represented their very own third century crisis. The Roman 
frontier was no longer the overwhelming priority it had previously been in the ambitions and 
strategic considerations of the Shahs.  
 
It was the Hunnic raid, or invasion, of 395, and to a lesser extant those that followed it in 397 
and 398, through the Caucasus that did most to precipitate this shifting of priorities in the 
strategic considerations and priorities of both empires. This invasion was a unique event in 
Roman-Sasanian relations in that, for the first time, both empires were attacked by the same 
foe.10 After bursting through the Caucasian Gates the Huns rampaged through the territories 
of both empires, causing destruction and death, and carrying off much plunder and many 
captives. A  Sasanian Syriac source, the Chronicon miscellaneum ad annum domini 724 
pertinens, is illustrative of the damage wrought by the Huns in 395: 
And in this year [395], the accursed people of the Huns came into the lands of the Romans 
and passed over Sophene, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Cappadocia, as far as Galatia; they 
took a great number of captives and turned back so that they might return to their country. 
But they went down to the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris, in the province of the Persians, 
and reached the Persians’ royal city [Ctesiphon]; they did no damage there, but laid waste 
many villages by the Euphrates and the Tigris, and killed and took a great number of captives. 
But when the Huns heard that the Persians were marching against them, they prepared to 
flee, and [the Persians] pursued them and killed one of their detachments, and took back from 
them all the spoils they had they had seized and freed males captives from them 18,000 in 
number.11   
                                                          
9 Amm. Marc. 15.13.4; 16.9.4, 17.5.1. The ‘Chionitae’ are indentified as the first of these different waves of 
invaders. These were later followed by the Kidarites and Hephthalites. 
10 Priscus, fr. 11; Liber Caliphorum (Chron. 3.4) with Greatrex & Lieu, 2002: 17-19. 
11 136.20-137.9 (trans. M. Greatrex). See Greatrex (1999: 66-68) and Palmer (1993: 5-12) for further information 
and discussion on the nature and origin of this useful source. 
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Although Roman sources do not provide as much detail as their Sasanian counter-part above, 
it was still nevertheless mentioned by Claudian, Jerome, Sozomen and Socrates. 12  That 
Roman and Sasanian sources both recorded this invasion shows how important it was, and 
the effect it had on both empires. Indeed, despite the fact that the Sasanians eventually beat 
the Huns back, the effect the invasion had on the strategic concerns and fears of both 
empires, in terms of where they now considered the true threat to their survival to be, cannot 
be underestimated. Both empires had suffered badly at the hands of these aggressive 
newcomers; many Roman citizens had been captured and lands razed, while the invading 
Huns had also, however fleetingly, threatened Ctesiphon itself. Moreover, the fact that 
Yazdgard I returned many of the Roman captives he recovered from the Huns, as the source 
later tells us, suggests that the Shah quickly realised the need to establish better relations 
with the Romans in the face of this new threat.13 Similarly, the diplomatic manoeuvres of 
Anthemius in the same period, as we shall see below, reveals the Romans also becoming 
aware of the need for an imperial détente as a result of this invasion, and its wider 
repercussions. The effect this invasion had on the Roman-Sasanian relationship is further 
evident in the fact that the Sasanians often made reference to it when attempting to persuade 
the Romans to make contributions for the defence of the Caucasus.14 Evidently, it can be 
suggested that this experience of the new Hunnic threat made the need for imperial stability, 
even peace, between the two traditional rivals clear, as their military and defensive priorities 
necessarily shifted to counter these new dangers.15 
 
 
Military Resources and Limitations 
In order to understand why this shifting of priorities took place in the fifth century, and why 
both empires could not simply conduct military campaigns on two frontiers simultaneously it 
                                                          
12 Claudian, In Rufinum 2.28-35; In Eutropium 1.245-51, Jerome Ep. 60.16, 77.8; Soz. HE 8.1.2-3; Soc. HE 6.1.5-8; 
Priscus (fr.11). 
13 137.9-22.  
14 Josh. Styl. 9. 




is vital to analyse the military resources of the two imperial armies.16 Only by gaining an 
insight into the size of both imperial armies during the fifth century can we comment on the 
military capabilities and strategies employed by the empires in this period.  
 
When thinking about the strength and size of the Roman army in the fifth century it is 
important to remember that the division of the empire in 395 meant that the emperors in 
Constantinople did not have access to the manpower resources of the western provinces as 
their predecessors once did. 17  Indeed, in this regard, even the less permanent collegial 
tripartite division of the Roman Empire amongst the sons of Constantine in 337 curtailed 
Roman strategic capabilities towards the Sasanian Empire in the fourth century.18 During this 
division Constantius did not have the necessary military resources or manpower to conduct 
large-scale aggressive campaigns against the Sasanians, and was therefore forced to adopt a 
more defensive strategy. Indeed, the increasing trend for the division in late antiquity and the 
subsequent existence of multiple emperors, each with their own separate regional armies, 
increasingly limited both the offensive and defensive capabilities of the Roman Empire, and 
its divided parts. Therefore, it is not surprising that the permanent split of the Roman Empire 
in 395 resulted in a similar change of strategy and policy towards the Sasanian Empire in the 
fifth century. 
The great difficulty in deciphering the size of the Roman army in the fifth century is that most 
of the available sources come with their own problems of credibility and reliability, and those 
accounts that do existed tend to contradict one another.19 Furthermore, these sources also 
predominantly describe the army of the third and fourth centuries, and even then most of 
the numbers given seem exaggerated.20 For example, Lactantius stated that, under Diocletian 
                                                          
16 For more detailed and extensive discussions on the size of Later Roman army see: Jones (1986: 679-89), 
Luttwak, (1979: 188-90), Treadgold (1995: 43-64), Potter (2004: 455-9); Whitby (2004: 159-60). 
17 A similar situation also existed in the west at the start of the century when Stilicho lacked the resources and 
manpower to simultaneously defend Italy, combat Alaric, carry battle to the east and protect the Gallic frontier.  
18 Blockley, 1992: 13. There are many useful studies on the nature and development of the Later Roman army 
of which Le Bohec (2006) and Southern & Dixon (1996), Tomlin (1987) are important. While Sarantis & Christies 
(2013) provide an up-to-date account of the nature of research on the Later Roman army.   
19 For some insight on Later Roman troop numbers see: Coello (1996). 
20  For the problems facing scholars using the ancient sources to deduce the size of the Roman army see 
Treadgold (1995: 43-87). 
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the army of the united empire quadrupled in size at the end of the third century,21 John Lydus 
that military strength was divided between 389,704 soldiers and 45,562 naval troops, 22 
Zosimus described the might of western half of the empire as 286,000 soldiers23 and finally 
Agathias, referring rather vaguely to ‘earlier emperors’, relates that they commanded an 
army 645,000 strong while then criticising Justinian for allowing it to dwindled to a mere 
150,000 troops.24 However, Agathias’ criticism must be tempered by the fact that the larger 
armies of the earlier emperors were the armies of the united Roman Empire, whereas the 
smaller number of 150,000 would have been the number of troops in the Eastern army 
alone.25  
Alongside the testimonies of these writers we also have the records of the Notitia Dignitatum, 
which has been used to estimate the size of the eastern mobile field army to around that of 
104,000 troops, which was supported by 248,000 troops of the limitanei. 26  The Notitia 
Dignitatum was an official military register kept by a senior notary, the primicerius 
notariorum, and just like the surviving narrative accounts mentioned above it too comes with 
its own problems.27 This document, dating from the early fifth century, gives a paper total for 
the overall strength of the Roman army and its individual units, or at least what they were 
officially supposed to be, rather than an accurate number for troops that were actually still in 
active service at the time. As such, its unreliability has long been recognised, with claims that 
it was out of date, subject to periodic revision and that it listed units that were known to have 
been destroyed in battle as still in active service, and as a result it is considered to be full of 
errors or misinformation, whether intentional or unintentional. 28  Indeed, Synesius, 
unintentionally perhaps, highlights the problem of this document with his statement that, 
‘For a war we need hands, not a list of names’.29 Although the Notitia Dignitatum is no doubt 
                                                          
21 On the Death of the Persecutors 7.2. 
22 On the Months 1.27. Harries (2012) is particularly cautious of John Lydus’ estimations as she believes that such 
precise figures suggest they come from official lists which were usually wrong themselves; as will be shown was 
the case with the Notitia Dignitatum (below).  
23 2.15.1-2. 
24 5.13.7. It is believed that Agathias omitted the limitanei from his calculation of the size of Justinian’s army 
(Jones, 1964: 679-89; Haldon 1999: 99-10; Potter, 2004: 455-9) 
25 Treadgold, 1995: 46. 
26 This number of limitanei is cited from Jones (1964: 1450). 
27 For a general overview of the benefits and limitations of the Notitia Dignitatum see: Lee (2007:17), Elton 
(1996b:271-72, 2007:271), Bury (1920), Treadgold (1995: 43-49), Hoffman (1969-70) and Kulikowski (2000). 
28 Harries, 2012: 211; Lee, 1998: 211; Tomlin, 1972: 255; Jones; 1964: 1420. 
29 Letters 78. 
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at times inaccurate and often in a confused state it nonetheless remains an important 
document. This importance comes from the insights it can provide about the deployment, 
disposition and location of individual units, and therefore the priorities of Roman army and 
empire as a whole.30 Importantly, unlike its records of the western army, which were more 
frequently tampered with, the Notitia’s description of the eastern army comes from a fairly 
fixed point, the start of Arcadius’ reign. Therefore, compared to most of the other sources on 
the size of the Roman army this record comes directly from the fifth century itself. That it 
recorded the composition and disposition of the Eastern army at the turn of the fifth century 
is significant as it can thus make clear the shift of Constantinople’s military attention to 
northern frontier, as shall be seen below. 
From such a comparison of the available sources on the size of the later Roman army it seems 
much more likely that the smaller numbers for the eastern army given by Agathias and the 
Notitia Dignitatum are more accurate, as rather than focus on the army of the united Roman 
Empire they give us details on the East Roman army. In this regard, it is generally believed 
that fourth century campaign armies numbered between 15,000-30,000 men.31 In fact, the 
largest army assembled during this period, when the empire was united, was Julian’s in 363 
which totalled 65,000.32 This relatively modest number is at odds with the supposed size of 
the united Roman army given by Lactantius and John Lydus. Furthermore, using the accounts 
of Procopius and Joshua Stylites in conjunction, we can determine that the largest army 
assembled in the early sixth century, which was used to fight the Sasanians in 502, contained 
52,000 troops.33 Therefore, although we lack direct evidence for the size of the East Roman 
army in the fifth century itself, it is seems evident that a decrease from those available in the 
third and fourth centuries did take place.   
Additionally, throughout the latter half of the fourth century, the Roman army suffered many 
damaging defeats which drained its strength. For instance, Shapur II’s conquest of Amida in 
359 resulted in the loss of a full seven legions34 while Julian’s unsuccessful 363 campaign 
                                                          
30 Millar, 2006:45. 
31 Lee, 2007: 76. As seen in the Battle of Strasbourg (Amm. Marc. 16.12). 
32 Zos. 3.12. Although there is some ambiguity in Zosimus’ account, as it is unclear if he included Procopius’ 
smaller force of 18,000 in his total of Julian’s campaign army. 
33 BP. 1.8.4; Chron. 54. The veracity of these accounts is much more reliable given that Procopius was well versed 
in Roman-Sasanian warfare and that Joshua Stylites is generally held as a reliable historian. 
34 Amm. Marc. 18.9; Lee, 1998: 221. 
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resulted in the loss of an estimated 15,000 Roman soldiers35 and the infamous debacle at the 
Battle of Adrianople in 378 resulted in the complete loss of 10,000-26,000 men: two-thirds of 
Valens’ army, which likely comprised a majority of the field army units from the eastern half 
of the empire.36 That the majority, and arguably the most serious, of the military defeats 
suffered at the hands of external foes throughout the fourth century were suffered by the 
eastern army further reduced its size, capability and flexibility at the start of the fifth century. 
The numerous civil wars that erupted between different Roman factions and generals in the 
fourth century likewise affected the strength of the Eastern Roman army at the start of the 
fifth century. Eutropius informs us that the civil war between Constantius II and Magnentius 
in 351 ‘destroyed forces which were sufficient for many foreign wars and which might have 
provided many a triumph and much security.’37 Hence, a much reduced and demoralised 
Eastern Roman army would logically find it increasingly difficult to defend all the frontiers of 
the empire effectively, especially if two of these frontiers were threatened simultaneously.38 
As a result, great care was taken to avoid becoming embroiled in war on two fronts. 
Conservation of military manpower and the avoidance of military overstretch became a key 
imperial policy of East Roman Empire in the fifth century.  
Compounding the decreased size of the army, and further curtailing Constantinople’s ability 
to fight multiple wars simultaneously, was the reluctance of Roman citizens to join its ranks. 
Indeed, Ammianus Marcellinus informs us that men were so keen to avoid serving in the army 
that they would cut off their ‘thumb to escape military service’, this became so common that 
those who undertook this drastic action were given a ‘special name’, murci.39 That Roman 
emperors were forced to pass numerous laws which attempted to stop desertion and 
encourage recruitment in this period reinforce the fact that they experienced great difficulty 
in recruiting troops from among citizens of the empire. One such law dictated that new 
recruits were to be branded upon joining the army to prevent desertion, while another made 
it a legal hereditary obligation for the sons of soldiers to enlist when they came of age.40 That 
these laws were repeatedly imposed and re-issued by successive emperors underlines how 
                                                          
35 Lee, 2007: 78 (citing Hoffmann, 1969/70: I.444). 
36 Amm. Marc. 31.13.18. 
37 10.12. 
38 On the damage to morale suffered by these defeats see: Ferrill (1988: 64-68). 
39 Amm. Marc. 15.12.3. 
40 CTh. 7.22.4-10, 10.22.4, 7.1.14. 
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serious they were about trying to solving this problem.41 However, the immediately available 
solution to this immediate problem was to increase recruitment amongst barbarian peoples, 
as Theodosius I did to a great extent north of the Danube after Adrianople.42 In contrast to 
the recruitment of Roman troops, barbarian foederatii proved much cheaper and much more 
eager. Although this solved the immediate manpower shortage such dependence on federate 
troops, it has been argued, had harmful consequences on the discipline and effectiveness of 
the Roman army.43 In order to have access to these allied troops Roman emperors logically 
needed to maintain friendly relations with at least some of their barbarian neighbours. If the 
availability of barbarian troops was closed to the empire, as happened in the 440s when Attila 
established Hunnic supremacy over the Ostrogoths and Gepids in the Danube region, it could 
prove highly damaging. The potential loss of barbarian recruiting ground was especially 
dangerous for East Roman army in the fifth century, which, as already stated, was rebuilt in 
part with troops from beyond the Danube frontier, that were needed to complement Roman 
recruits.44 Thus, this recruitment difficulty and reliance on barbarian troops further restricted 
the strategic capability of the East Roman Empire to conduct military campaigns on two 
fronts.  
 
The reduced size and strategic flexibility of the Roman army resulted in the avoidance of 
multiple wars on different fronts becoming a central tenet in Roman imperial strategy in late 
antiquity; the risk of overstretching the already limited military resources was simply too 
great.45 Indeed, the Roman focus on the avoidance of becoming embroiled in different wars 
on different frontiers at the same time was recognised by several Roman historians, including 
Priscus and Menander Protector.46 This new strategic reality forced the early abandonment 
                                                          
41 Harries (2004: 82-87) suggests that the repetition of laws in the Roman Empire was indicative, not of their 
failure as is traditionally believed, but of their importance to the emperors. 
42 Zos. 4.30.1; Lee, 1998: 223. Heather (1998: 160-4) takes this further as the states that Theodosius signed a 
general compromise settlement with the Goths in 382 under which they were obligated to do military service 
for the empire. 
43 This process is usually called the barbarisation of the Roman army. For a more detailed discussion on the 
theories and arguments surrounding the barbarisation of the Roman army in Late Antiquity see Williams & Friell 
(1998: 83-5) and Le Bohec (1996). 
44 Williams & Friell, 1998: 96. 
45 Blockley, 1992: 139; Kaegi, 1983. Although Williams & Friell (1998: 98) doubts the limited size of the Roman 
army at the start of the fifth century they do concede that the ‘flexibility to meet urgent needs did not exist’. 
Heather (2006: 62) makes a similar argument. 
46 Priscus, fr. 10; Men. Prot. fr. 26.1 
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of successive campaigns against the Vandals in North Africa in the fifth century whenever the 
Balkan frontier was threatened or overrun by the Huns. Although the Roman army had some 
early successes at the start of the fifth century, when it was able to concentrate its forces on 
a singular threat or frontier, such as against the Huns in 408 and the Sasanians in 421/2, the 
abandonment of the Vandal campaigns proved conclusively it was unable to face war on two 
frontiers at once. Indeed, by the sixth century even the enemies of the Roman Empire were 
aware that dividing its military attention and resources was the key to their own success, as 
revealed by the Ostrogothic king Witigis advising the Sasanians to attack the Romans at the 
same time as himself.47 
 
Investigating the size of the Sasanian army and its overall military capabilities is an even more 
difficult task than analysing the Later Roman army.48 The only literary evidence we have about 
the size of Sasanian armies come predominantly from Roman sources. For example, Joshua 
Stylites informs us that in 502, after Kavād had captured Amida, he put 20,000 troops into 
winter quarters49 and Procopius and Malalas both state that in 530 40,000 troops marched 
against Dara and that at the same time 30,000 marched against Satala, with a further 10,000 
in reserve.50 However, caution must be used when using Roman sources for information on 
the size of the Sasanian army as Roman historians may well have inflated their numbers in 
order to make Roman victory seem even greater or to explain away an unavoidable defeat. 
As such, we are more reliant on archaeological evidence, particularly the investigation of the 
size of Sasanian forts and tents, from which we can gain important insights on Sasanian troop 
numbers, especially for specific units and frontier garrisons. Through such investigations it 
has been estimated that the size of the late Sasanian army was around the 320,000 mark;51 
however, this number is largely conjectural. Despite lack of clear knowledge about the size of 
the Sasanian army it seems clear that Ctesiphon had to act under the same strategic 
restrictions as Constantinople, due to a lack of financial and manpower resources.52 This was 
                                                          
47 Proc. BG. 2.22.15-16. 
48 On this difficulty see: Howard-Johnson, 2006: Study I, 165-69. For an insightful overview of the Sasanian 
military see: McDonough (2013). 
49 Chron. 55. 
50 Proc. BP. 1.13.23-41; Malalas. 18.4, 26. 
51 Howard-Johnson, 2012: 109-10.  
52 Blockley, 1992: 106.  
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made clear during the reign of Shapur II who initially sacrificed  a peace with Rome so as to 
‘be secure on one front and free to deal with his permanent enemies’, the Chionitae on the 
other, and then only once he had pacified that threat was he able to turn his attention back 
to the Roman frontier.53 Furthermore, the feudal nature of the Sasanian Empire meant that 
the Shahs did not have a fully professional standing army always ready at their command, and 
were instead reliant upon the cooperation of the nobles, from whom the Shahs drew much 
of their military manpower.54 Consequently, due to geography and politics, mustering of an 
army was both slow and uncertain. Such uncertainty severely hindered the ability of the 
Sasanians to fight multiple wars simultaneously and limited the flexibility and speed at which 
they could respond to new threats on different frontiers. Sasanian military inflexibility was 
further compounded by the fact that major campaigns required the personal leadership of 
the Shah, who could obviously not be in two places at once, again severely limiting the scope 
of potential Sasanian military action across two frontiers simultaneously.55 As a result of these 
inherent limitations, the Sasanians preferred to avoid direct war and conflict whenever 
possible, this suggests they too were concerned about conserving their military resources and 
manpower as much as possible.56  
 
The scope for military action for both empires was much more restricted in the fifth century 
than ever before. Both the Roman and Sasanian Empires alike had to carefully decide where 
and when to deploy their relatively limited military resources. Accordingly, during this period 
they predominantly decided to use them not against each other, but against the mounting 
threats of the Huns, Vandals, and Hephthalites.57 The shifting of Roman military focus away 
from the eastern frontier to the northern frontier to defend against the new Hunnic threat is 
confirmed by the difference in the number of troops stationed on these two frontiers in the 
fifth centuries. During the fifth century the Notitia Dignitatum reveals that in 400 42,000 
troops of the comitanses were stationed in the Balkan provinces to defend against the Huns 
                                                          
53 Amm. Marc. 16.9.2. 
54 On the lack of a Sasanian standing army see: John Lydus (De. Mag. 3.34.1-4). On the dependency on troops 
from the nobility see McDonough (2013: 603-4). 
55 Whitby, 1994: 234-40. 
56 Livre de la couronne 193; Blockley, 1992: 139. 
57 Blockley (1992:90) also supports this view: ‘Both the Romans and Persians, when faced with unrest on their 
northern frontier, tended now to be cautious in their dealings with each other along their common frontier.’ 
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whereas only 20,000 were deployed in the previously all-important eastern provinces.58 
Evidently, even at the beginning of the fifth century, the main threat to the Eastern Empire 
was now understood to come from Huns across the Danube, not the Sasanians on the eastern 
frontier, and the Romans re-orientated and shifted their military focus to accommodate this. 
This difference seemingly changes dramatically when the numbers of limitanei of the east and 
north are compared, with 88,500 stationed throughout the east and 45,500 in the Balkans.   
However, the fact that it was the comitanses who were largely expected to meet large 
invasions and enemy raids still suggests that it was in the north that such incursions were 
more expected and feared.59 Furthermore, the fact that the empires signed a treaty in 442 
wherein they agreed not to construct any new fortifications on the joint Mesopotamian 
frontier could suggest that the number of eastern limitanei would have diminished 
throughout the fifth century.60 This is arguably given more credence with another comparison 
with the Danube frontier where new fortifications were constructed and existing fortifications 
rebuilt in the Roman Balkans throughout the same period, which would have required 




The Roman Empire had faced many barbarian threats throughout its history, even during the 
initial rise of the Sasanian Empire in the third century the Rhine and Danube frontiers were 
consistently under pressure from Germanic tribes; yet even still, the eastern frontier which 
was threatened by the Sasanian rival always remained the main ideological, political and 
military priority. However, this changed dramatically in the fifth century with the rise of 
Hunnic power beyond the Danube frontier under Attila and the establishment of the Vandal 
kingdom in North Africa. Yet, what made these threats so uniquely dangerous to the Roman 
Empire that they forced a shifting of priorities that reduced the mighty Sasanian Empire to 
                                                          
58 Williams & Friell, 1998: 103. This shows that although the Notitia Dignitatum may well be misleading on the 
actual numbers of the Roman army it is a more reliable document it terms of strategic deployment. 
59 Williams & Friell (1998: 104) also agree with this statement. 
60 Proc. BP. 1.2.15. 
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secondary importance. It is to this important question that we must now turn our attention 
to. 
Attila and the Huns 
The people of the Scythians [Huns] were great and many, and formerly divided into people 
and into kingdoms and were treated as robbers. They used to not to do much except through 
rapidity and through speed. Yet later they surpassed in their greatness all the forces of the 
Romans.61  
This passage from Nestorius neatly and succinctly illustrates the development of Hunnic 
power and their relationship with those around them in late antiquity. As Nestorius points 
out above, when they first moved into Europe and came to the attention of the Roman Empire 
the Huns were divided amongst themselves and were viewed as little more than an occasional 
nuisance, due to the small scale raids against Roman provinces, and as merely another group 
of barbarians whom the Romans could use for their own purposes. The Romans were eager 
to utilise the military skill and prowess of the Huns for their own benefit, making extensive 
use of Hunnic foederati troops.62 For example, Hunnic soldiers were used by Theodosius I in 
his victory over Maximus in 38863 and by Bauto in his defeat of the Juthungi.64 Indeed, even 
Alaric was forced to abandon his march on Rome in 409 when news reached him that the 
Romans were bringing Hunnic allies against him. 65  Likewise, many Roman generals and 
officials hired Huns as personal bodyguards.66  Despite this early Roman exploitation, the 
potential for Hunnic ambition and power was never far from the surface, and in an ominous 
sign of things to come, the first Hunnic chief to be recorded in Roman sources, Uldin, declared 
that he and his people were capable of ‘[subduing] every part of the earth’.67 Yet, despite 
their ferocity, for so long the division and internal instability among individual Hunnic groups 
prevented them from becoming a major force or threat to the Roman Empire, and as always 
the Romans were eager to keep them divided. The career of Uldin illustrates this as, despite 
                                                          
61 Nestorius 366. 
62 Thompson, 1996: 36-41; Maenchen-Helfen, 1973: 50. 
63 Pan. Lat. 12(2).32.4. 
64 In further evidence of their divisions at this point Thompson (1996: 36) highlights that at the same time 
Valentinian II was battling a different group of Huns near Gaul. 
65 Zos. 5.50.1 
66 Both Rufinus and Stilicho made use of Huns for their personal protection (Claudian, In. Rufin. 3.76; Chron. Min. 
1. p.650). 
67 Soz. HE  9.5.  
63 
  
his successful raid into Thrace in 404, the Romans were easily able to convince his 
subordinates to betray and desert their chief through bribery, thus destroying his power and 
threat to the empire.68 This diplomatic manipulation set the precedent for Roman policy 
towards the Huns and proved highly successfully yet again against a successor of Uldin, 
Donatus.69 
Unfortunately for the Romans however, as Nestorius so rightly pointed out, they would not 
always find it so easy to manipulate and defeat their Hunnic neighbours through such 
clandestine diplomacy and intrigue. As time went on the Romans found it increasingly difficult 
to contain the growing power of the Huns. For example, in 422 the East Romans were forced 
to conclude a treaty with the then Hunnic leader, Rua, after he had invaded the province of 
Thrace wherein they agreed to make annual payments to him of 350 pounds of gold.70 
However, the true turning point in the history of the Huns, when they did manage to surpass 
the ‘forces of the Romans’, came during the reign of Attila the Hun, the so-called Scourge of 
God, who was finally able to unite the different Hunnic groups under his own authority. It was 
through this Hunnic unity that Attila was able to create a vast and formidable empire centred 
on the Hungarian Plain in the 440s that presented a formidable challenge to the Romans.71  
 
The Hunnic threat in the fifth century posed a more sustained danger to both Constantinople 
and Rome alike than any of their other neighbours. Indeed, the Huns achieved remarkable 
military and diplomatic successes against the two halves of the Roman world that dwarfed 
those of most of their neighbouring tribal federations. Even more so than the Franks, Goths 
and Arabs, who continuously raided across the frontier, whenever the Huns, particularly 
under Attila in 440s, rampaged into the empire across the Danube and into the Balkans it 
resulted in unprecedented damage. Ammianus Marcellinus’ fear that the Gothic ‘host might 
suddenly burst through [the Danube] river’ seems rather a more apt description of the Hunnic 
                                                          
68 Proc. De Aed. 4.6.33. Soz. HE 9.5; Soc. HE 6.1; Thompson, 1996: 33. 
69 Olympiodorus fr. 18. 
70 Croke, 1977. 
71 Indeed, as Gordon (1996: 57) stated; ‘The chief threat to the empire in the first half of the [fifth] century came 
from the Huns’. For more detailed information on the emergence and growth of Hunnic power beyond the 
frontiers of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries see Heather (1995). 
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danger in this regard.72 As such, it is worth quoting at length Jerome and Callinicus, both of 
whom relate in detail the full horror and devastation Hunnic invasions caused in this period: 
Behold, the wolves, not of Arabia, but of the North, were let loose upon us last year from the 
far-off rocks of Caucasus, and in a little while overran great provinces. How many monasteries 
were captured, how many streams were reddened with human blood! Antioch was besieged, 
and other cities washed by the Halys, Cyndus, Orontes and Euphrates. Flocks of captives were 
dragged away; Arabia, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Egypt were taken captive by their terror. Not 
even if I had a thousand tongues, and a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron could I recount 
the name of every catastrophe.73 
The barbarian nation of the Huns which was in Thrace, became so great that more than a 
hundred cities were captured and Constantinople almost came to danger and most men fled 
from it…And there were so many murders and blood-lettings that the dead could not be 
numbered. Ay, for they took captive the churches and monasteries and slew monks and maids 
in great numbers.74 
These two accounts, of the 395 raid and Attila’s in 447, vividly recall the threat the Huns posed 
to the empire in all its ferocity. In comparison, the accounts of even the great Sasanian 
invasions of the third, fourth and sixth centuries do not compare to the horror and damage 
caused by these Hunnic invasions.75 It could be stated that both Callinicus and Jerome wished 
to portray the Huns as exceptionally destructive barbarians as a means to show that non-
Christian barbarians were even more of an enemy to the Romans and Christianity than other 
threats. Indeed, in both accounts there is a focus on the damage the Huns wrought on 
monasteries and churches. However, as shall be shown below, such devastation of Roman 
territory at the hands of the Huns was not exaggerated and was to such an extent that it 
forced Constantinople to focus increasingly on the defence of the northern frontier at the 
expense of the eastern defences.  
 
                                                          
72 Amm. Marc. 31.8.5. 
73 Jerome, Epp. 60.16.77.  
74 Callinicus, Vita S. Hypatii p.139. 21.  
75 Such as, Shapur II’s invasion of Mesopotamia (Amm. Marc. 18.7). Even during his capture and burning of 
Antioch Khusro spared the churches (Proc. BP.2.9). 
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Previously, Roman strategy in the fourth century when dealing with Gothic invaders into the 
Balkan provinces was relatively simple, cheap and effective:    
This gave our forces the opportunity to build high barriers to confine the other huge hordes 
of barbarians in the defiles of the Balkan range, hoping, of course, that this destructive enemy 
host, penned between the Danube and the wilderness and unable to find a way out, would 
perish from lack of food, all the necessities of life having been removed to the fortified towns, 
none of which the barbarians even then attempted to besiege owing to their total ignorance 
of operations of this kind.76 
Ammianus Marcellinus’ account here of the strategy used by the Romans after the Goths had 
overrun the Danube and Balkan provinces in 377 shows that traditional Roman tactics once 
the frontier had been breached was to simply seek sanctuary behind the fortified walls of 
their cities and fortresses and out-wait their enemies. However, in the 440s the East Romans 
could not rely on such easy defensive strategies to defeat Attila, as, unlike other barbarian 
invaders, the Huns were skilled in siege-craft and were able to capture even the most heavily 
fortified Roman cities and military installations. Accordingly, the Hunnic threat during this 
period forced the Romans to spend vast amounts of resources preparing improved defences; 
constructing new and strengthening old fortifications around towns, cities and military 
installations.  
At the start of the fifth century the Praetorian Prefect, Anthemius, recognising the steadily 
increasing threat of the Huns, initiated a number of new policies and strategies to defend 
against this new threat. First, he organised a non-aggression pact with the Sasanian Empire in 
408 that ensured peace on the eastern frontier and allowed Constantinople to redeploy more 
resources and manpower to the defence of the Balkan provinces.77 Secondly, he began an 
extensive rebuilding and refortification programme of the Danubian frontier defences and 
the Balkan provinces. Anthemius scrutinised and reinforced ‘all naval bases, harbours, shores, 
all points of departure from the provinces even remote places and islands’.78 A similar order 
                                                          
76 Amm. Marc. 31.8.1-2. This also corroborates Maenchen-Helfen’s (1973: 94) claim that before Attila the Huns 
only presented the same sort of threat as the Isaurians and Arabs, in that although they could occasionally make 
inroads into Roman territory they could always be pushed back or paid off. 
77  Soz. HE 7.8; Soc. HE 9.4. For detailed discussions on this treaty see: Kelly (2008: 58) and Blockley (1992: 53).  
78 CTh. 7.16.2. This was an official order given by Anthemius himself.  
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was repeated by the magister officiorum Nomus in 443.79 This refortification of the Danube 
frontier also involved a seven year ship-building programme that restored the Danubian river 
fleet80 and the reinforcing of frontier forts by ensuring they were once again manned by 
sufficient troops. 81  Yet, it was the construction of a second line of walls around 
Constantinople, the imposing Theodosian Walls, which was the most effective in the long-
term defence of the Eastern Roman Empire.82 This huge defensive structure enclosed the city 
and the peninsula it rested on within highly defendable walls. The Theodosian Walls ensured 
that, even if the Danube frontier, or indeed any other frontier, was overrun the capital itself 
would still be more than adequately protected. The Theodosian Walls certainly proved their 
worth throughout the fifth century, thwarting Attila’s invasions in 441/3 and then again in 
447, forcing him to turn back without even making an attempt on the city.83 Thus, it is clear 
that as the fifth century progressed the Romans recognised that the greatest threat came not 
from the Sasanian Empire but from the Huns. 
 
Despite such extensive preparations and refortification projects, throughout the 440s Attila 
and his Huns were able to overrun the Roman frontier defences along the Danube and raid 
deep into the Balkan provinces in both 441 and 447. The great strength of the Hun armies 
was their skill as mounted archers, which granted them unmatched manoeuvrability and 
‘incredible swiftness’84 that allowed the Huns to completely outmanoeuvre Roman armies, as 
revealed in the campaign of 447 when Attila managed to corner and trap their army in the 
Chersonese. 85  Indeed, Ammianus Marcellinus and Zosimus both comment on the 
unparalleled mobility of the Huns, stating that it gave Hunnic forces a dangerous capacity for 
tactical and strategic unpredictability.86 Likewise, the martial skill of the Huns was so feared 
                                                          
79 Nov. Theod. 24. ‘We command that each dux…shall restore the soldiers to ancient number…and shall devote 
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80 CTh. 7.17.1. Kelly, 2008: 59; Blockley, 1992: 53. 
81 Priscus fr. 9.2. 
82 CTh. 15.1.51; Soc. HE 7.1.3. 
83 Kelly, 2008:106; Heather, 2005: 309. 
84 Claudian, 330. On the skilled archery of the Huns see: Olympiodorus (fr. 18), Sidonius (Carm. 2.266) and 
Procopius (BG. 1.27.27).  
85 Priscus fr. 9.1; Theoph. Chron. a.m. 5942. 
86 Amm. Marc. 31.2.7-9; Zos. 4.20.4. For more on this speed and tactical unpredictability see Jerome (Ep. 77.8, 
60.16.77) and Agathias (1.22).  
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that Jerome reluctantly admitted that ‘[t]he Roman army is terrified of them’. 87  
Consequently, the Eastern Romans suffered numerous losses at the hands of the Hunnic king 
without ever achieving any clear victory,88 although the general Arnegisclus did manage to 
inflict heavy losses on the invaders before he was killed in battle during Attila’s 447 
campaign.89 These successive and damaging losses on the Danube frontier consequently had 
a direct effect on the ability and willingness of the Romans to pursue military campaigns 
against the Sasanians in the same period.        
Although the ability of barbarian forces to defeat Roman field armies was not particularly 
unique in this period it was the Huns’ skill at siege warfare that truly distinguished them from 
other barbarian threats.90 Various sources recount cities besieged by the Huns, describing 
towers that could be wheeled up to the ramparts, battering rams and assault ladders.91 
Hunnic knowledge of siege-craft ensured that in all of his invasions Attila was able to capture 
and destroy a large number of Roman cities. This long list of devastated cities included 
Margus,92 Constantia,93 Viminacium,94 Singidunum, Naissus, Ratiaria and Arcadiopolis;95 the 
only cities that avoided capture were Adrianople and Heraclea. 96  Yet, perhaps the most 
damaging was the destruction of Sirmium, the keystone of Roman defence on the Danube 
frontier. In terms of damage to imperial prestige and reputation its capture was as significant 
as the loss of Carthage to the Western Empire in 439.97 The level of destruction following the 
capture of these cities was exceptional. For example, Procopius states that the city of 
Viminacium was destroyed to its ‘uttermost foundations’, and although his comment that this 
had been done ‘long before’ does not pointedly identify the Huns as its destroyers, it does 
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1.18.17), thus indicating the pyschological effect this had on the Roman army. 
88 Theoph. Chron. a.m. 5941-2. 
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reveal the devastation that was visitied on the Balkans throughout the wider period that 
served to slowly turn Roman attentions north.98 Indeed, even Antioch, after its fall to the 
Sasanians in 540, did not suffer such wanton destruction and was able to rise again relatively 
quickly. Such destruction of Roman cities and territory would have undoubtedly even further 
limited the empire’s ability to fight wars on multiple fronts simultaneously during the fifth 
century. The loss of so many cities, their wealth, resources and populations, in such a small 
span of time had huge repercussions on the wealth and power of the Eastern Roman Empire. 
Count Marcellinus underlined this as he related that ‘Attila ground almost the whole of 
Europe into dust’.99 This again therefore reinforces how necessary it was for the Romans to 
switch their focus away from the Sasanian Empire in order to be able to fully defend 
themselves against the more ruthless and destructive Hunnic threat in the north. 
 
Yet, despite the military skill of the Huns generally, it was Attila himself who made the defining 
difference in the conflicts between the Hunnic and Roman Empires. In this regard, Attila’s 
decision to attack the East Roman Empire only when it was distracted elsewhere was of vital 
importance to his success.100 This tactic ensured he only attacked when the empire was most 
vulnerable and he had the greatest chance of success.101 For example, before his first major 
invasion in 441 the Roman Danubian frontier was heavily defended and too strong to attack 
directly, therefore, it was not until thousands of Roman troops had been redeployed for the 
expedition against the Vandals in North Africa that Attila decided to attack.102 This patient 
decision ensured that throughout this campaign Attila met with no significant opposition from 
the Roman field army.103  
The military supremacy of the Huns was subsequently felt in the peace treaties signed 
between the Huns and Romans in the 440s, as Attila was able to force humiliating and 
damaging clauses on the Eastern emperor, who had no other choice but to concede. It was 
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the Romans’ grudging acceptance of these treaties that the supremacy of Hunnic Empire, and 
danger this posed to Constantinople’s own position in the Danube region, is most evident. As 
was tersely acknowledged by Priscus:  
Because of the overwhelming terror that gripped their generals, the Romans were compelled 
to accept cheerfully every injunction, no matter how harsh, in their eagerness for peace…This 
was the disaster that happened to the Romans after the war, and the result was that many 
killed themselves either by starvation or hanging. The imperial treasuries were also empty.104 
Although the historical works of Priscus only survive in fragments they are an extremely useful 
source of information on Roman-Hunnic relations in the fifth century. As a Roman diplomat 
Priscus was dispatched to Attila’s court in 449 to negotiate with the Hunnic king on behalf of 
Theodosius II and, therefore, he was well placed to comment on the effectiveness and power 
of the Huns under Attila.105 In the above passage he highlights that Constantinople’s inability 
to counter Attila’s military incursions meant they had no choice but to glumly accept any and 
all of the Hunnic King’s demands. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Priscus shows 
that the Huns of the fifth century were not only able to inflict military defeats upon the empire 
but also diplomatic ones. This Hunnic capability further entrenched their supremacy over 
Constantinople. It was the enforcement of these uncompromising treaties that revealed 
Attila’s talent as both a gifted military leader and a shrewd diplomat; he was a leader who 
could wield diplomacy as dangerously as the sword. Thus, it became increasingly important 
to send skilled diplomats to negotiate with Attila, as was evident in the fact that the 
negotiations that took place in 450 were conducted by the magister militum praesentalis, 
Anatolius, and the magister officiorum, Nomus. The dispatch of Anatolius and Nomus was a 
clear statement of how seriously Constantinople took the Hunnic threat, as previously the 
sending of such high-ranking officials as envoys was a dignity usually reserved only for the 
Sasanian Empire.106  
                                                          
104 fr. 9.3, 2.1. It can be argued however that Priscus’ anger resulted mainly from the fact that the senatorial 
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The Treaty of Margus (435), the first signed between the East Roman Empire and Attila, set 
the precedent for the majority of the issues and clauses that would recur, with increased 
severity, in the succeeding treaties of 443 and 448, therefore, it is worthwhile to make note 
of the main points of this treaty. Fortunately, Pricus’s discussion of the Treaty of Margus has 
survived intact and therefore our information on the different clauses of the treaty is 
relatively complete. In this treaty Attila dictated that Constantinople was prohibited from 
providing sanctuary to fugitives or exiles from Hunnic territories and had to return all those 
already living in or serving the empire, the Romans were forbidden from making alliances with 
enemies of the Hunnic Empire, Hunnic merchants were permitted to trade on equal terms 
with their Roman counterparts and the Roman Empire was to pay an annual subsidy of 700 
pounds of gold.107 Ratifying this treaty at the start of his reign was important for Attila as it 
allowed him to expand his empire in the east and north, free from the threat of Roman 
aggression or interference.108 In contrast, Constantinople’s willingness to sign such a treaty, 
which was designed to limit Roman power and influence in and around the Danube, 
underlines the fear they had of the rising power of the Huns. Throughout his reign Attila 
further entrenched his supremacy over Constantinople by forcing the Romans to sign 
increasingly damaging and humiliating treaties, all of which largely increased the severity of 
the clauses described above.  
Arguably the most important, and revealing, clause of the Treaty of Margus was the  doubling 
of the annual subsidy paid to the Hunnic king that had previously been only 350 pounds of 
gold under Attila’s predecessor, Rua, in the treaty of 422.109 Such a substantial increase in 
Roman payments was a clear example of the more belligerent and exploitative policy that 
Attila pursued throughout his reign compared to his predecessors. Certainly, it became the 
cornerstone of Attila’s policy towards Constantinople to demand an increase in payments in 
every treaty he forced upon the Romans. In the Peace of Anatolius (443) the annual subsidy 
rose to 2,100 pounds of gold with the empire also forced to pay a single payment of 6,000 
pounds of gold in arrears.110 The payment of these subsidies was a double edged-sword. Not 
                                                          
107 fr. 1. 
108 Bury, 1958:273; Blockley, 1992: 60; Gordon, 1966: 69. 
109 For the treaty signed between Rua and Constantinople see: Croke (1977). 
110 Priscus fr. 5. In contrast, Theophanes (Chron. a.m. 5942) gives the annual tribute as 1,000, even though Priscus 
was his source. Bayless (1976: 176) informs us that immediate payment of arrears was unprecedented, and this 
therefore again reinforces the notion that the Huns were a uniquely dangerous threat. 
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only did it further entrench Attila’s own internal position within the Hunnic Empire but it was 
also a constant drain on Roman resources and damaged Roman imperial prestige.111 The 
damaging effect this had on Roman prestige is evident in Nestorius’ statement that the Huns 
were now ‘the masters, and the Romans, slaves’, and Priscus’ criticism that the Romans 
‘obeyed every instruction of Attila, and considered what he commanded as the orders of a 
master’.112 Likewise, after the signing of the 447 treaty Attila himself began to proclaim that 
Theodosius II was now his slave, due to the fact he paid him what Attila regarded as tribute.113  
Besides the payments of these large tributes, or subsidies (depending on whether you were 
Attila or Theodosius II), the second most important recurring clause of Roman-Hunnic treaties 
was the sending back of, and Constantinople’s prohibition to grant sanctuary to, fugitives 
from Attila’s realm. This clause made it impossible for the Romans to disrupt the internal 
stability of the Hunnic Empire through political and diplomatic machination, as they had done 
in the past against Uldin and Donatus, as they could not support any of Attila’s rivals against 
him. This, therefore, further limited Constantinople’s scope of action in trying to counter or 
break up the Hunnic Empire. From Attila’s perspective this clause was likely designed to 
cement his control over the subject tribes, such as the Ostrogoths, Gepids and Sorosgi, of his 
realm.114 Likewise, for Attila it was equally a matter of pride and prestige; tribes that he 
considered his subjects should not be allowed to serve in the Roman army.115 For the Romans, 
adherence to this clause would have been a cause for deep concern as it restricted their 
access to barbarian foederati troops, which were an essential component in the Roman army 
during this period. This is especially true in the defence of the Danube frontier, in which Gothic 
troops played an important role.116 Indeed, part of the reason Theodosius II did not abide by 
the Treaty of Margus for long after its signing was that he believed the fugitive tribes were 
                                                          
111 Although the economic impact these payments had on the Roman Empire has frequently been downplayed, 
Whitby (2000: 711) is keen to stress that the consequences were serious. 
112 Nestorius 368; Priscus fr. 5. 
113 Priscus fr. 15.2; Chron. Pasch. p.587. Bury (1923: 277) suggests that Attila now thought of himself as the 
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116 Theoph. Chron.  a.m. 5931. 
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too useful as soldiers to let go of without a fight.117 Thus, this clause further entrenched 
Hunnic supremacy over Romans and subject barbarians alike.118  
The treaty of 448, wherein Attila demanded that the Romans abandon a wide belt of land 
south of the Danube, all the way to Naissus saw this policy reach its zenith.119 The subsequent 
Roman withdrawal from these territories had severe repercussions on their ability to recruit 
barbarian foederati from this lucrative region of available manpower, not to mention the 
damage it would have done to the already weakened frontier defences in the Balkan 
provinces.120 Thus, Attila struck a major blow to the Eastern Roman Empire that surpassed 
anything that even the Sasanian Empire had achieved. He had cut right to the heart of the 
Eastern Empire’s military capability and infrastructure, and this more than anything made him 
a more immediate priority than the Sasanian Shahs. 
 
As hinted at above, these continued military and diplomatic successes allowed Attila to 
further cement his position as the uncontested leader of the Hunnic Empire, which 
subsequently made it even more difficult for the Romans to defeat him either militarily or 
diplomatically. The failed assassination attempt of Attila in 449, orchestrated by Theodosius 
II’s advisor, the eunuch Chrysaphius, made this clear.121 The strength, power and prosperity 
of the Hunnic Empire were based entirely on the personal charisma, skill and ability of 
Attila.122 As such, throughout his reign the king did everything he could to cement his position 
of authority and leadership. The assassination of his brother and co-ruler, Bleda, epitomised 
                                                          
117 Thompson, 1996: 85. 
118 The importance of this is evident in Priscus’ (fr. 14.) comment that the Romans attempted to send spies 
amongst Attila’s subject peoples, particularly the Ostrogoths, in order to undermine and weaken his authority. 
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119 Priscus, fr. 9.3; 11; Nov. Theod. 24.5. Naissus formed the new limit of the Roman northern frontier. 
120 Luckily for the Romans they were able to convince Attila to reverse his demand for this abandonment of the 
Danube territories relatively quickly, in 450. 
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this ruthlessness.123 As already seen, Attila used his demands for large sums of gold from 
Constantinople to simultaneously weaken the Eastern Empire and strengthen his own 
position.124 Certainly, the extraction of Roman gold was instrumental in securing his internal 
dominance, as it allowed the king to lavish large rewards upon his followers to secure their 
continued loyalty. A unified Hunnic political entity, such as Attila’s empire, depended entirely 
on the constant supply of wealth and luxuries, usually through the form of plunder won in 
warfare. This meant that as long as Attila was in control of a unified Hunnic Empire the Roman 
Empire would be plagued by persistent and devastating raids. 125  Consequently, 
Constantinople’s failure to resolve the threat posed by Attila through either diplomatic 
manipulation or subterfuge ensured that military action was the only possibility to protect 
the northern frontier, and this was only possible while peace was maintained on the eastern 
frontier.  
Yet, ironically, it was Attila’s unending success against the Eastern Empire, and their inability 
to repel him that actually saved them in the end. In 450 the attention of the Hunnic king 
moved towards the Western Roman Empire. Attila viewed the west as a more lucrative target 
compared to the Eastern Empire, which he had already preyed on extensively and exhausted 
throughout the 440s. Therefore, in preparation for this western campaign Attila was keen to 
arrange a peace with Theodosius II in order to secure his eastern flank; this was achieved in 
the treaty of 450.126 In this treaty Attila also swore not to trouble Theodosius with charges of 
receiving fugitives, gave the Danubian territories that he had forced Constantinople to 
withdraw from in 448 back and returned Roman prisoners, without requesting ransoms. 
These staggering concessions reveal how eager Attila was to leave the Eastern Empire behind, 
in a secure peace, in favour of his western campaign.127 
Unfortunately for Attila however, this campaign ended in disaster when he was decisively 
defeated at the hands of Aetius at the Battle of the Catalaunian Fields in 451. This defeat 
                                                          
123 Marcellinus 445.1. ‘Bleda, king of the Huns, was assassinated as a result of the plots of his brother.’ Also; 
Jordanes (Get. 181) and Chron. Gall. (452.131). 
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precipitated a far worse disaster for the Hunnic Empire, the death of Attila himself during his 
own wedding party in 453.128 Following Attila’s death the central element of the Hunnic 
Empire, Attila’s personal charisma, skill and authority, was extinguished and with it the Hunnic 
unity that had made them such a force to be reckoned with. Soon after, ‘a struggle broke out 
among Attila’s heirs…and together they destroyed their father’s empire’,129 none of the dead 
king’s sons could fill the void he left, despite attempted invasions of the Roman Empire across 
the Danube in the 460s. The Huns, after fighting amongst themselves and against their former 
subject peoples, eventually dissolved back into their former lives as minor raiders and 
mercenaries. However, this did not mean the end to turmoil on the northern frontier. Indeed, 
the Romans spent the reminder of the fifth century dealing with the fallout of the Hunnic 
Empire’s collapse, as they attempted to orchestrate and organise the regions beyond the 
Danube, which had erupted into conflict between the Huns’ former subjects, to their own 
benefit. The emperors Leo (457-474) and Zeno (474-475) alike found it difficult to resolve the 
power-vacuum that was created in the Danube regions after the collapse of the Hunnic 
Empire, and they both faced rebellions and revolts from the now-free and dangerous 
Ostrogoths.130 Consequently, the northern frontier remained a priority until the migration of 
the Ostrogoths, under Theodoric, to Italy towards the end of the century. The fact that Attila 
turned his attention away from the east reveals just how much its resources had been 
exhausted by his campaigns, the Hunnic king believed the Eastern Roman Empire had nothing 
left to plunder. Ironically, this reinforces the claim that during the fifth century Constantinople 
did not have the resources available to pursue a hostile and antagonistic relationship with the 
Sasanian Empire at the same time as trying to contain the threat posed by Attila and the Huns.  
   
Evidently, Attila the Hun, and the empire he forged in the 440s, was largely responsible for 
the shifting of Roman priorities away from the Sasanian Empire in the fifth century. The rise 
of Hunnic power, centred on the Hungarian Plain, during this period threatened the very core 
of the Eastern Roman Empire. This was only compounded by the ability of the Huns to 
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successfully besiege and capture large fortified cities, which represented a dramatic change 
in the balance of military power in Europe.131 Before Attila, the Sasanians were the only 
unified force that could realistically launch coherent and effective attacks against the Roman 
Empire.132 Thus, during the reign of Attila the Romans were now faced with two powerful and 
organised neighbours. Yet, unlike the Sasanians, the Huns were regarded as unpredictable, 
completely disinterested in peaceful coexistence and not trusted to abide by truces or 
treaties,133 and this made them a more dangerous threat, and explains why the Romans chose 
to prioritise them above the traditional imperial rivalry.134 Moreover, the battle for control 
over, and access to, the important recruiting grounds of the Balkans between the Romans 
and Huns, also explains the shifting priorities from the east to the northern frontier in the fifth 
century. The Balkans were central to Roman military strength, in terms of recruitment and 
manpower, therefore, focusing military attention on this frontier was fundamentally more 
important to the empire than fighting over isolated forts on the eastern frontier against the 
Sasanians.  
 
Geiseric and the Vandals 
Even the hostile critic of Theodosius II’s foreign policy, Priscus, was aware of the 
circumstances that conditioned the Roman response to the Huns in the 440s, informing us 
that ‘having been humbled by Attila, [the Romans] paid him court while they tried to organise 
themselves to face other people’.135 These ‘other people’ were predominantly the Vandals, 
led by their king, Geiseric. Throughout the fifth century the Vandals proved just as dangerous 
a threat to the Eastern Roman Empire as the Huns were.136 Priscus’s comment here also 
reinforces the notion that the Romans themselves were aware of their military restrictions 
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and actively worked to avoid becoming embroiled in wars on two fronts. However, there was 
a crucial difference between the Huns and Vandals that made them arguably an even more 
assiduous threat; the latter’s desire to conquer and occupy Roman territory. Unlike the Huns, 
the Vandals were not merely interested in extracting Roman plunder and wealth, but in 
establishing a territorial kingdom for themselves on Roman soil. The ambition and power of 
the Vandals was evident in Geiseric’s ability to coerce the Western Emperor, Valentinian III, 
to license a legitimate marriage proposal between his son, Hunneric, and Eudocia, the 
emperor’s own daughter.137 The Vandal takeover of North Africa in the 420s and 430s played 
a decisive role in the eventual disintegration of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century 
and, more importantly for this study, the shifting of East Roman Empire’s attention away from 
the Sasanian frontier.  
 
Although the Huns, quite rightly, earned the reputation as the most destructive and barbaric 
enemies of the Roman Empire in late antiquity, the Vandals were equally effective and 
fierce.138 Indeed, even the combined forces of the East and West Roman Empires under 
Boniface and Aspar could not save North Africa from the Vandal onslaught in 431/2.139 
Furthermore, during the reign of Marcian (450-457) in the East and Valentinian III (425-455) 
in the West the Vandals were even able to sack the city of Rome and take the imperial family, 
including Valentian’s wife Eudoxia and his two daughters, Eudocia and Placidia, hostage.140 
Accordingly, in order to combat this threat the Romans needed to commit vast financial 
resources and military manpower. Once again, this would come at the expense of the 
resources previously used against the Sasanian Empire in previous centuries.  
Just like the Huns, the seemingly innate ferocity and military prowess of the Vandals was 
augmented by the skills of their leader. Alongside Attila, Geiseric proved himself to be one of 
the most skilful barbarian leaders of the fifth century, able to couple diplomatic expertise with 
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military talent.141 The calculating nature of the Vandal king was epitomised in his exploitation 
of the Western Empire’s eagerness for peace in 435 to sign a treaty that granted him 
uncontested control of Mauretania and part of Numidia, which he used to consolidate his 
power and replenish his forces, safe from the threat of Roman retaliation, before completing 
his conquest of North Africa in 439 that culminated in the capture of the important maritime 
and commercial city of Carthage. The exploitation of this first treaty and subsequent conquest 
of North Africa granted Geiseric enough leverage to force Rome to agree to an even more 
humiliating treaty in 442 that recognised full Vandal dominion over the wealthiest province 
in the Western Empire. 142  The details of the 442 treaty further reveal the political and 
diplomatic skill of Geiseric. Not only did it grant him full suzerainty and recognition over the 
territories of Proconsular Africa, Byzacena, Tripolitania and part of Numidia but also laid plans 
to marry the emperor’s daughter to Hunneric, Geiseric’s son. 143  The acceptance of this 
marriage arrangement was a tremendous victory for the Vandal king, it made him a player in 
internal imperial politics itself, thus granting him prestige and influence that he could utilise 
in both external and internal battles. It was this political ambition and desire to become a key 
player in imperial politics that marked Geiseric out from being merely a simple raider and 
military leader. He had long-term ambitions on the imperial throne itself, not for himself but 
rather for his descendants, and it was this ambition that made him more dangerous than most 
other barbarian warlords in this period. The Vandal king’s involvement in imperial politics was 
most apparent and divisive in the 460s when he came into conflict with the Eastern emperor 
Leo, over who should sit on the western throne. Leo supported Anthemius, a skilled general 
and grandson of the Anthemius who had done so much to prepare the Eastern Empire against 
the Huns during the reign of Theodosius II, who eventually became Western Roman Emperor 
in 467, while the Vandals put their considerable support behind Olybrius, who Gesieric had 
thrown his patronage behind and married to his captive, Placidia, the second daughter of 
Valentinian III.144  
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The loss of North Africa was a disaster for the Western Roman Empire, it was its most 
economically prosperous and largest grain-producing province.145 Although superficially this 
may have seemed a problem for the Western Roman Empire alone, the Vandal conquest of 
North Africa also had important and dangerous implications for the Eastern Empire. With the 
fall of Carthage and the loss of North Africa the Mediterranean Sea was no longer the Roman 
mare nostrum, dominated solely by Roman sea power. The loss of such uncontested control 
over the Mediterranean meant that the Constantinople’s provinces and maritime trade 
routes were now also open to naval attack and raids by the Vandals. 146  Indeed, one of 
Geiseric’s first actions as ruler of the new Vandal kingdom in North Africa was to construct a 
powerful fleet with which he could attack coastlines all across the Mediterranean and disrupt 
commerce. 147 The biggest fear for the Eastern emperors was that Geiseric would use his 
position in North Africa as a staging post to attack the vital province of Egypt, the economic 
heartland and breadbasket of the Eastern Empire.148 As has been stated elsewhere, ‘Vandal 
sea-power throughout Geiseric’s reign was based as much on the threat of action as it was on 
its execution’.149 Thus, even the idea that Egypt could be endangered was reason enough for 
Constantinople to focus on the Vandal threat. Indeed, it was stated that this threat caused 
panic in both the imperial court in Constantinople and Alexandria, the provincial capital of 
Egypt.150 This fear was partly realised in 439 when the Vandals launched a Mediterranean-
wide offensive, focused on the capture of Sicily, which forced the Eastern Empire to respond 
with direct military intervention in 440. 151  Geiseric’s actions were such a deep cause of 
concern for the East Romans that they now thought it prudent to improve and fortify the 
harbour defences of Constantinople.152 Thus, just as the Hunnic threat had motivated the 
construction of the Theodosian Walls, the Vandal threat was the catalyst for the building of 
the Sea Walls around the capital, which protected it from naval attack and blockade.153 The 
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construction of fortifications was costly and the fact that the Romans were willing to sanction 
such military building programmes to protect against the distant Vandals while letting their 
defences in the east deteriorate further indicates a shifting of priorities.154 Evidently, despite 
the power of the Sasanians to rival Roman military power and the ability of the Huns, and 
later, the Ostrogoths, to deploy considerable forces against Constantinople it was the naval 
power of the Vandals that was regarded as the principal threat.155  
 
Underlining the importance Constantinople placed on this new Vandal threat was the East 
Roman reaction to it. Following an appeal by the Western Roman Emperor, Valentinian III, 
the East Romans sent successive naval expeditions to try and dislodge the Vandals from North 
Africa and Carthage in 434, 441 and 468.156 Certainly, Constantinople showed its concern 
about the growth of Vandal power and responded to this plea vigorously, gathering troops 
and naval forces from all over the empire for these expeditions. 157  The largest of these 
campaigns was prepared and conducted under Leo in 468: 
Because Leo embarked upon ten thousand ships called liburnae a host such as time for all its 
length had never yet wondered at, he brought the [praetorian] prefecture to uttermost 
penury, by putting it under strain and compelling it to meet the expenses of four hundred 
thousand fighting men engaged upon a war…there was expended upon that ill-fated 
war…sixty thousand pounds of gold and seven hundred thousand of silver; and of horses, 
weapons and men as many as you might well estimate to have died across time known to 
man. After all this, the entire staff suffered shipwreck. For since the money in the treasury and 
the emperor’s private resources, were not enough to meet the requirements, the entire 
reserves of the campaign forces were destroyed in the failures of the war. Not to make a long 
story of it, as a result of this dreadful debacle the treasury was no longer able to meet the 
demands it had to meet.158          
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Although John Lydus is not always the most reliable source, for instance his information on 
the number of troops, ships and horses are thought to be exaggerated here, his figures for 
the financial cost of the campaign seem accurate, which is perhaps no surprise from a sixth 
century imperial bureaucrat. 159  Indeed, the tremendous cost of the 468 expedition is 
supported by Candidus, who informs us that ‘The official in charge of [financial] matters 
revealed that 47,000 pounds of gold came through the Prefects and through the Count of the 
Treasuries an additional 17,000 pounds of gold and 700,000 pounds of silver, as well as 
monies raised through confiscation’.160 Thus, this account, makes it clear that this campaign, 
and its ignominious defeat, was hugely costly to the Eastern Empire, resulting in the 
devastating loss of financial and military resources that almost bankrupted the imperial 
treasury.161  The huge cost of this campaign therefore highlights how much of a priority 
dislodging the Vandals from North Africa was for the Eastern Empire in the fifth century. Leo 
had stretched every financial and military sinew of the empire in organising this campaign. Its 
importance was also underlined by the fact the emperor’s own brother-in-law, Basiliscus, a 
man who would later fight for the imperial throne itself, was placed in command. The 
catastrophic defeat of this force had lasting repercussions in Constantinople, the most 
damaging of which was Theoderic Strabo’s rebellion in Thrace in 478. 162  Although Leo’s 
expedition was by far the largest and suffered the most damaging defeat, the earlier Vandal 
campaigns were also immense undertakings. For example, the 440 naval expedition sent by 
Theodosius II consisted of 1,100 ships. 163  The utilisation of such vast resources in these 
campaigns reveal that the main priority of the Roman Empire was no longer the Sasanian 
Empire and that the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa, together with the Hunnic Empire, was 
now considered the more important. Unquestionably, the only way Constantinople was able 
to bring this sort of military power to bear against the Vandals was if their eastern frontier 
was secure and free from the threat of attack, which would allow them to divert and redeploy 
troops to North Africa. Indeed, the principal Roman Arab allies of the fifth century, the 
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Salihids, were almost wiped out by the Vandals at the Battle of Cape Bon when they had been 
redeployed to take part in the naval expedition. 164  Such military endeavour, focus, and 
ultimately failure, obviously had a drastic effect on the subsequent resources and strategies 
of the East Roman Empire. The resultant factor being the need for peace with the Sasanian 
Empire, both during and after these expeditions.  
The fact that Constantinople was willing to spend such extensive resources to combat the 
Vandal threat, which necessitated the weakening of the frontier defence elsewhere, 
predominantly the frontier with the Sasanian Empire, is even more indicative of the priority 
given to them when it is compared to the cautious policy of Constantius II who strove to avoid 
similar large-scale military campaigns due to the sheer amount of resources they required.165 
The repeated attempts to re-conquer North Africa required the long-term commitment of 
resources and military manpower from successive emperors, a commitment which stretched 
the empire to its limit. The cost of such re-conquest campaigns is acknowledged in the 
criticism of Justinian’s later re-conquest of the west, the renovatio imperii, which is frequently 
blamed for crippling the resources of the empire.166 Evidently, therefore, the availability and 
ability to utilise such resources necessitated the maintenance of peace with the Sasanian 
Empire throughout the fifth century.  
 
Despite the arduous preparations and massive manpower and financial resources that went 
into these naval expeditions they all ended in failure, in 431/34, 442 and once again in 468 
due to Vandal resistance or abandonment due to Hunnic invasions across the Danube frontier 
respectively.167 The effect of the Hunnic invasions in compelling Constantinople to recall the 
expensively assembled Vandal expedition in 442 shows conclusively that the East Roman 
Empire did not have the capability to fight military campaigns on two separate frontiers 
simultaneously. Geiseric, it would seem, was more than aware of this strategic limitation, as 
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Jordanes informs us that Geiseric sought an alliance with Attila and frequently, by the sending 
of gifts, tried to induce him to attack the west.168 Although this tactic was designed to divert 
and stretch the military resources of the Western Roman Empire, the same restrictions and 
limitations were also felt in Constantinople. It seems a remarkable coincidence that the two 
peoples so instrumental in forcing Roman accord with the Sasanians were on good terms 
themselves. Indeed, in 450 when Attila did finally turn his attention towards the west he did 
so due to the fact he was ‘laying up a store of favour with Geiseric’.169 This close connection 
between the threats in North Africa and the Balkans would have only further reduced the 
eastern frontier and the Sasanian Empire to secondary importance.  
The rise of Vandal power in the fifth century challenged Roman dominance of the 
Mediterranean Sea and threatened, in the minds of the Romans at least, the loss of the vital 
imperial province of Egypt in a way the Sasanian Empire no longer did. Thus, the fact that 
Constantinople’s primary motivation in launching its campaigns against the Vandals in this 
period was fear and the desire to protect their own lands and position reinforces the 
importance of political realism in understanding the changing priorities in the fifth century; 
they were launched first and foremost for Constantinople’s own security not that of the 
Western Empire. For the eastern emperors the Vandals were a relatively unknown threat, 
whereas they had ample experience of the military ambitions of the Sasanians, which by the 
end of the fourth century rarely extended beyond the capture of individual forts or cities in 
the Mesopotamian frontier. In contrast, the Vandals had shown both the willingness and 
capability to conquer and occupy Roman territory. Hence, the potential loss of Egypt to the 
Vandals was a more urgent and pressing concern than that posed by the Sasanian Empire. 
Yet, perhaps the most conclusive piece of evidence for the priority of Vandal campaigns over 
any focus on the Sasanian Empire comes from the year 441. Even at this point in time, when 
Sasanians attacked Armenia, Roman troops were not repositioned to combat this; North 
Africa remained the priority.170  
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Since Ardashir’s overthrow of the Parthians in 224 the Sasanian Empire had been in a stable 
position, internal disruptions and civil wars were relatively rare, while the steady expansion 
of Sasanian power and dominion ensured, apart from the Roman challenge, the empire was 
never truly threatened by outside powers. 171 This all changed in the fifth century however, 
as the presence of successive Hunnic powers, principally the Hephthalites, on the northern 
frontiers drastically altered the balance of power in this region away from the Sasanian 
Empire. Corresponding to this shifting balance of power the Sasanian Empire faced a period 
of unparalleled internal unrest and civil strife. These changed circumstances had a direct 
effected on the Sasanians’ relationship with the traditional Roman rival. 
 
Hephthalites 
From the mid-fourth century onwards the Sasanian Empire was threatened by successive 
waves of Hunnic invaders, the Chionites, Kidarites and eventually the Hephthalites.172 The 
threat and pressure of these Hunnic invaders was felt on the north-eastern frontier as early 
as 350 when the Sasanians were forced to abandon their war with Rome in order to combat 
the Chionite in the east.173 The fact that it took eight seasons of concerted military effort to 
subdue the Chionite, arguably the weakest of the ‘Hunnic’ threats to the Sasanian Empire, 
reveals just how dangerous these new threats were and serves to justify the claim for a 
shifting of Sasanian military priorities in this period.174  
However, it was not until the mid-fifth century that the empire’s north-eastern frontier, and 
the empire as a whole, became truly threatened. This threat came from the so-called White 
Huns or Hephthalites, who created a powerful empire in ‘Scythian Mesopotamia’, Central 
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Asia.175 The unique threat the Hephthalites posed to the Sasanian Empire was recognised by 
the Roman historian Procopius: 
The Hephthalite are a stock of Huns in face as well as in name; however they do not mingle 
with any of the Huns known to us, for they occupy a land neither adjoining nor even very near 
to them; but their territory lies immediately to the north of Persia; indeed their city, called 
Gorgo, is located over against the Persian frontier, and is consequently the centre of frequent 
contests concerning boundary lines between the two peoples. For they are not nomads like 
other Hunnic peoples, but for a long period have been established in a goodly land. As a result 
of this they have never made any incursions into Roman territory except in the company of 
the Median army. They are the only ones among the Huns who have white bodies and 
countenances which are not ugly. It is also true that their manner of living is unlike that of 
their kinsmen, nor do they live a savage life at they do, but they are ruled by one king, and 
since they possess a lawful constitution, they observe right and justice in their dealings with 
both one another and their neighbours, in no degree less than the Romans and Persians.176  
This account comes from Procopius’ ethnographic digression on the Hephthalites as a 
precursor to his narrative of Peroz’s campaigns against them. The most striking aspect of this 
passage is Procopius’ presentation of the Hephthalites as territorially and politically stable 
and diplomatically sophisticated as the two imperial powers themselves. Although the 
veracity of this portrayal of the Hephthalites has been debated, in terms of whether it was 
historically true or whether a mere literary motif to symbolise the Romans own barbarisation, 
it is nonetheless important for our study of the threat these Huns posed to the Sasanian 
Empire in the fifth century.177 The truth of this assessment is likely somewhere in the middle 
as, although the Hephthalites were not as politically sophisticated as either of the two 
empires, they were nevertheless able to inflict humiliating military, political and diplomatic 
defeats on the Sasanians. Certainly, Procopius’ account shows that he was aware the 
Hephthalites were more of a threat to the Sasanian Empire than their predecessors, the 
Chionite and Kidarite, had been, and this comparison with the Roman and Sasanian Empires 
                                                          
175 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 97. Dignas & Winter also believe that the Hephthalites were the Sasanians’ most 
important enemy in the fifth century. 
176 BP. 1.3.1-6. 
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may well have been an attempt to explain to his Roman audience why this was so; as well as 
subtly making his own point about the Roman state and constitution.  
As also alluded to by Procopius above, the Hephthalites were militarily formidable, and more 
than able to rival Sasanian armies. Indeed, the military skill and reputation of the Hephthalites 
so terrified the Sasanian army that they were frequently completely ‘unwilling to encounter’ 
the enemy in battle. The Armenian historian Lazar P’arpets’i confirms the Sasanian fear of the 
Hephthalites: 
Even in times of peace the mere sight or mention of a Hephthalite terrified everybody, and 
there was no question of going to war openly against one, for everybody remembered all too 
well the calamities and defeats inflicted by the Hephthalites on the king of the Aryans and on 
the Persians.  
The fear their military prowess instilled in the Sasanians allowed the Hephthalites to defeat 
the forces of successive Shahs in numerous confrontations, which in turn enabled them to 
enforce humiliating and damaging treaties on the Sasanian Empire. The severe nature of the 
Hephthalite demands in these militarily enforced treaties even forced the Sasanians to 
approach their traditional Roman rival for assistance. The fact that the Sasanians requested 
both financial and military aid from the Romans, no matter how they were portrayed 
internally, is indicative of threat the Hephthalites posed, and how stretched Sasanian military 
and economic resources had become in their attempts to counter them. Roman assistance 
was especially sought after for the construction of defensive installations in the Caucasus; a 
potential invasion route into both the Roman and Sasanian Empires. The defence of the 
Caucasian Gates became a recurring feature of imperial diplomacy, especially after the Hunnic 
raid of 395, which damaged both empires alike. Afterwards the Sasanians believed they were 
entitled to Roman assistance, as it was their troops who were defending the Caucasian Gates, 
and thus that they were defending the Roman Empire as well as their own. However, as the 
Hephthalite threat increased further the Shahs later also sought Roman financial 
contributions directly for their military campaigns against the Hephthalites even beyond the 
distant north-eastern frontier.178  Peroz, for example, made repeated demands for either 
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Roman troops or money to help defend the north-eastern frontier throughout his reign.179  
The Roman Emperor at the time, Zeno, fortunately for the Sasanians, and Peroz himself, was 
willing to provide this financial assistance; providing money for the ransom of the Shah and 
subsequent payments for further military campaigns.180 The unique danger the Hephthalites 
posed, and their effect on Roman-Sasanian relations, is once again underlined in this regard 
as it was only aggressive campaigns against this barbarian threat, not the Chionite or Kidarites, 
which were partly funded by Constantinople.  
Although the Sasanians, under Bahrām V Gor (420-439), were initially victorious against the 
Hephthalites, the balance of power soon began to shift away from the Sasanians.181 Indeed, 
Bahrām’s successor, Yazdgard II (438-457), who suffered numerous defeats to the 
Hephthalites throughout his reign, soon found it necessary to station himself permanently in 
Khurasan after 442, so that he could focus on defending his vulnerable north-eastern frontier 
against their incursions.182 In the reign of Peroz (459-484) the Sasanians launched three large, 
yet unsuccessful, campaigns across the northern frontier in an attempt to destroy the 
Hephthalite threat. The failure of these campaigns resulted in the complete opposite 
however, as the military supremacy of the Hephthalites was ruthlessly established. The first 
two of these campaigns ended in defeat and humiliation for the Sasanians, in 469 their Shah 
was captured and forced to prostrate himself before the enemy king,183 territory was ceded 
and a damaging peace was forced on the empire. To complete this humiliation the 
Hephthalites forced Peroz to hand over the chief priest (mowbed), the heir to throne, Kavād, 
and his sister as hostages and assurance that the Shah would abide by its clauses. However, 
Peroz once again tried to re-assert Sasanian dominance in 484. It was this final campaign that 
resulted in Peroz’s death and the destruction of the Sasanian army, and saw Hephthalite 
power truly reach its zenith as made clear by Procopius: 
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Thus Peroz was destroyed and the whole Persian army with him. For the few who by chance 
did not fall into the ditch found themselves at the mercy of the enemy…At that time, then, 
the Persians became subject and tributary to the Hephthalites…the time these barbarians 
ruled over the Persians was two years.184 
Similar accounts from Lazar P’arpets’i, Theophanes, Seboes and Joshua Stylites confirm that 
Peroz’s defeat against the Hephthalites in 484 was a major military and political disaster for 
the Sasanian Empire, arguably one of the worst in its history.185 Indeed, the fact that such a 
variety of sources agree on this is itself telling. With its Shah killed and army utterly destroyed 
the empire was forced to cede even more territory in Central Asia, Khusaran and Afghanistan, 
and pay even greater annual subsidies to the Hephthalites.186  Indeed, it has even been 
claimed that after this disaster the Sasanians became tributaries of the Hephthalites.187 The 
success these treaties had in reinforcing and cementing the Hephthalites’ hard-won military 
supremacy over the Sasanian Empire reveals their diplomatic sophistication and underlined 
the existential threat they posed; just like Attila and Geiseric, they were able to follow military 
victories with even more impressive diplomatic ones.188  
The Hephthalite threat was further compounded towards the end of the fifth century when 
they wrestled control over the economically vital Silk Road.189 In previous centuries Sasanian 
control and monopoly of the Silk Road cemented their ability to profit from east-west trade 
which was central to their economic prosperity. Consequently, the loss of such a valuable 
trade route and its vital revenues was a major blow to the empire that would have 
undoubtedly had a detrimental effect on the empire’s overal economic strength, and 
therefore also on its military capabilities. Moreover, if the economic power of the Sasanians 
was already stretched in combating the Hephthalite threat in the north-east they would surely 
be unwilling, and arguably unable, to risk war with the Romans in the west. 
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The afforementioned need for Roman assistance in combatting the Hephthalites further 
underlined how stretched Sasanian resources were in this period. As such, this same need for 
Roman money in the defence of the north-eastern frontier logically necessitated peaceful 
relations with the Romans themselves, as the Romans were unlikely to provide financial 
assistance if they were at war with the Sasanians. Likewise, if the Sasanian Empire already 
lacked the necessary economic resources to defend one frontier they would surely strive to 
avoid becoming embroiled in a second costly war on another front. Whilst the Roman, albeit 
sporadic, willingness to provide this financial assistance clearly reveals that they too were 
equally in need of peace and that they were willing to pay for it.190      
 
The threat of the Hephthalites, and the Sasanians’ inability to defeat them in the fifth century 
was intensified by the relatively weak strategic and geographic position of the empire’s 
frontiers. Whereas the Romans were able to utilise the Danube, Rhine and Alps in its frontier 
defence, to control the movement of foreign peoples, the Sasanian Empire had no such 
natural barriers and was far more permeable and open to invasion. In the north the Caucasus 
was breached by the Caucasian Gates, the large Gurgan grasslands acted as a convenient 
assembly point for advances further westward and Khusaran provided easy access to the 
Iranian Plateaux.191 
In response to this dearth of natural protection the Sasanians engaged in large-scale building 
projects along their frontiers throughout the fifth century to protect against Hephthalite 
attacks. Indeed, fifth-century Sasanian frontier defence, especially in the northeast, was 
characterised by linear defensive walls.192 The Darband Wall,193 the Alan Gates,194 the Wall of 
Tammishe and the Wall of the Arabs and the impressive Gorgan Wall (Sadd-e Iskandar) were 
all constructed in this period.195 The fact that all but the Wall of the Arabs were constructed 
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on the northern frontiers reinforces the notion that Sasanian military attention in the fifth 
century was focused on the Hephthalite threat in this region, not on the West against the 
Romans.  
Arguably the most important of these defensive walls was the Gorgan Wall, the largest 
continual defensive structure ever constructed in antiquity, which was designed to defend 
the vulnerable north-eastern frontier near the Gorgan Plain against Hephthalite invasion.196 
The Gorgan Wall, constructed on the orders of Peroz, the Shah who was so determined to 
destroy Hephthalite power, stretched for 195km from the Caspian Sea to the Turkmen Steppe 
and provided a continuous barrier between the Sasanian Empire and the Hephthalite realm 
across the north-eastern frontier. 197 Thirty-three forts were constructed at regular intervals 
to house the thirty thousand troops it took to man and defend the wall permanently, with 
extra protection added by a ditch.198 That the wall was actually manned to such a large extent 
for a large time-period is borne out by archaeological evidence which has identified large 
quantities of dense refuse in ditches near the forts themselves were the soldiers would have 
been stationed and lived, while there is also evidence of some form of man-made reservoir 
that would have been essential in keeping the garrison supplied with water.199 Therefore, the 
fact that such an enormous fortification project was undertaken on the northern frontier 
further underlines that military attention was now primarily focused on protecting the empire 
against its northern enemies. Likewise, the construction of so many defensive walls in a 
relatively short space of time, especially the unrivalled Gorgan Wall, would undoubtedly have 
been a significant drain on resources.200 Indeed, as already stated the expense involved in 
undertaking such building projects was evident in the fact that the Sasanians often demanded 
financial help from the Romans for their construction.201  
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Therefore, that the Sasanians were willing to expend huge amounts of financial resources on 
constructing these defensive walls and equally large military manpower on manning it 
suggests that the military and strategic priority of this period was the frontier with the 
Hephthalites, and not the Roman frontier.202 The sheer amount of resources required for the 
creation, maintenance and garrisoning of the Gorgan Wall alone would undoubtedly have had 
a direct correlating effect on the military capabilities of the Sasanians Empire on its other 
frontiers. Certainly, for large defensive walls such as the Gorgan Wall to be manned 
permanently in the fifth century, as the archaeological evidence suggests it was, a 
redeployment of troops from elsewhere was necessary. In this regard, the fact that in the fifth 
century the Sasanians pursued a policy of peace with Constantinople, and did not invest in 
any new fortifications on their western frontier, suggests that these troops likely came from 
the previously all-important imperial frontier. 
 
The Hephthalites’ ability to defeat Sasanian armies, enforce the payment of tribute and annex 
territory forced the empire to shift its focus away from the traditional Roman rival to combat 
this new danger. Certainly, the fact that in 442 Yazdgard II’s moved his permanent residence 
to the north-eastern frontier in 442 in response to the rising Hephthalite threat, shows that 
this frontier, rather than the one with Constantinople, was now regarded as the primary 
priority.203 Due to how hard-pressed they were to defend this frontier against Hephthalite 
incursion and the vast resources expended in doing so the Sasanians necessarily needed a 
stable frontier with the Roman Empire which would allow them to focus fully on the north-
east. This need for peace with the Roman Empire is attested by Elishé who suggests that the 
Sasanian attack against the Romans in 441 was designed only to intimidate the western 
neighbour into peace in preparation for a new Hephthalite campaign. 204  
Once more, the signing of the Roman-Sasanian treaty in 442 in which both sides agreed not 
to build any new fortifications on the Mesopotamian frontier must be seen in relation, and as 
connected, to the Sasanian fortification of the Caucasus and the Gorgan Plain; thus reinforcing 
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that a shifting of priorities took place at this time. Similarly, Peroz was eager to conclude a 
new treaty with the Romans before launching his campaigns against the northern enemy. 205 
Such eagerness to pacify the western frontier before launching a campaign in the north shows 
that the Sasanians were concerned about overstretching their military resources and actively 
sought to avoid war on two fronts.206 It took the arrival of the Turks and their subsequent 
alliance with the Sasanians to once again alter the balance of power back in the favour of the 
empire.207  
 
Internal Unrest and Civil Wars 
Alongside its struggles against the Hephthalites, and also because of them, the Sasanian 
Empire was wracked by internal unrest, dynastic struggles and civil war on an unprecedented 
scale in the fifth century.208 During the late fourth and fifth century the internal position of 
the Shahs was weaker and more vulnerable than ever before. This weakness allowed the 
nobility and Zoroastrian Magians, as well as dynastic rivals, to challenge the Shahs.209 Ardashir 
II (379-383), Shapur III (383-388), Bahrām IV (388-399), Shapur ‘IV’ (414), Hormizd III (457-
459) Balāš (484-488) and Ğāmāsp (497-499) were all deposed as a result of this internal 
instability. 
 
Although the Shahs that ruled the Sasanian Empire were among the most powerful monarchs 
in the ancient world they nevertheless still had to appease and negotiate with other powerful 
elements within the empire, principally the powerful Zoroastrian clergy and the influential 
nobility. The internal balance of power within the empire and between these groups was 
never static, with each group always vying for advantage, it was constantly in a state of flux. 
The very need for partnership between Shahs, nobility and Magians shows the delicate, and 
often vulnerable situation, of the Sasanian monarchy.210 Shahs could not rule without the 
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consent and cooperation of the nobility and this therefore made the nobles a powerful and 
influential force within the empire, one that could, and did, act against the Shahs’ wishes and 
interests. In this regard, one of the many assumptions made about the Sasanian state was 
that it was much more centralised and controlled by the direct power and authority of the 
Shahs compared to the more ‘lethargic’ and indirectly ruled Parthian regna that it replaced.211 
Yet, this idea contradicts the fact, and a fact that is also regularly acknowledged, that the 
Shahs had to contend with the powerful noble families who held power in virtually every 
corner of the vast empire.212 Zoroastrianism, and powerful religious officials, such as the 
third-century Magian Kerdir, arguably played an even more important role in Sasanian society 
than they did in the Roman world, and could equally put pressure on the Shahs.  
The principal groups of nobility with which the Shahs had to contend with and win the support 
of were the Shahrdaran, the virtually independent kings of their own territories, and the 
Vuzurgan, who were made up of the great noble families of the Suren, Karin and the Lords of 
Undigan, who also nominally owed loyalty to the Shahs but equally retained much 
independence in their own homelands.213 Shahs could not raise or levy new taxes without the 
agreement of these nobles, while, as already explained, their military power was also largely 
dependent on the loyalty of the powerful noble families. Thus, to an undesirable extent a 
Shah’s power was beholden to, and dependent upon his relationship with, the powerful 
shahrdaran and vuzurgan nobles. Furthermore, by tradition, the nobility played a vital role in 
choosing and legitimising their Shahs, therefore, if a ruling Shah angered them the nobles 
could, and did, remove their support in favour of another royal candidate.214 This was perhaps 
best exemplified by a council of leading Sasanian aristocrats deciding the fate of the former 
Shah, Kavād, in 496.215   
Parallel to pressure Shahs were always potentially open to from the dissatisfied nobility, the 
end of the fourth century also witnessed the beginnings of an independent Zoroastrian church 
hierarchy that would develop throughout the fifth century. In the early years of the Sasanian 
Empire the fortunes of the Zoroastrian religion and the young Sasanian dynasty were 
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intricately interwoven, each depended on the other for strength and protection. This 
closeness ensured that the Zoroastrian Magians played a fundamental role in the running of 
the state from the outset, they controlled the judicial processes and could even exert control 
on the selection of the Shahs. 216  Yet, in the later half of the fourth century the close 
relationship between altar and throne diminished, as shall be seen in more detail later. The 
ambitions and intolerance of the Magians increasingly came into conflict with the more 
pragmatically driven Shahs who had to rule an ethnically and religiously diverse realm. The 
main consequence of this divergence was the aforementioned strengthening of an 
independent Zoroastrian church. This development gave the Magians greater independence 
from the Sasanian dynasty and therefore much greater scope for autonomous political 
manoeuvring.217 This development had a negative effect on internal stability and unity of the 
Sasanian Empire in the fifth century, not only did the Shahs have to appease the ambitions of 
the nobility but they now also had to placate the wishes of the Magians.  The crystallisation 
of the Zoroastrian hierarchy and the subsequent bureaucratic apparatus now available to the 
priests ensured that the administration and running of the empire could relatively easily 
survive the death of a Shah.218 This therefore worked to the advantage of the ambitious clergy 
and their allies in the aristocracy as they could rid themselves of an unwanted ruler without 
endangering the safety of the empire itself.  
Indeed, the initial outbreak of internal instability in the fifth century began with Yazdgard I’s 
toleration of Christians, which the Magians saw as a direct challenge to their own power and 
position within the empire. Indeed, we are told that ‘The Magi hate Yazdgard, because he 
mistreated them upon his rise to the throne, decreased the power of their leaders’.219                                                                                                                                               
Balancing the ambitions and expectations of these two groups with their own needs was a 
particularly challenging aspect of rule for the Shahs. The external pressure created by the 
sustained threat of the Hephthalites only made this balancing act even more fraught with 
difficulty and danger. As the military power of the Sasanian army was increasingly challenged 
and overcome, so too was the military legitimacy of the Shahs, which led to a weakening in 
their internal position. Consequently, fifth century rulers were especially vulnerable to 
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internal intrigues and plots as the internal balance of power shifted away from them in favour 
of the nobility and clergy who took advantage of successive Shahs’ struggles in conflicts with 
the Hephthalites to boost their own power and position within the internal balance of power 
within the Sasanian Empire.220  Further damaging to the strength of the empire was the fact 
that in these civil wars and dynastic struggles the Hephthalites were once more able to assert 
their power over the Sasanians, by frequently acting as kingmakers. They intervened in 
Sasanian civil wars on two occasions. First, during the reign of their eventual enemy, Peroz, 
they helped him to defeat his brother Hormizd III and gain the throne in 459.221 Likewise, 
Kavād, Peroz’s son, also owed his throne to Hephthalites military support, who in exchange 
for their assistance were granted financial and territorial concessions from the new Shah upon 
his ascension in 489/9.222     
 
The precedent for the internal troubles that destabilised the empire began early in the 
century, with the murder of Yazdgard I’s heir, Shapur, in 414 after the death of the old Shah.223 
The nobility and Zoroastrian priests, angered by Yazdgard’s tolerant religious policy and his 
favouring of the Arab Nasrids, which saw their own influence within the empire marginalised, 
did not want his son to continue the same policies. Therefore, they chose to rebel against 
Shapur and promoted their own choice, Khusro ‘I’, to the throne instead. However, this 
Khusro was not able to hold onto power for long, even with the support of the nobles and 
Magians as Bahrām, later Bahrām V Gor, another son of Yazdgard, recruited an army from 
among the allied Arab Nasrids, marched agaisnt Khusro and forced him to abdicate, taking 
the throne himself. Although Bahrām soon followed the example of his father and signed a 
new treaty of religious tolerance with the Roman Empire in 422 the nobility and priests were 
unable to attack the new Shah in the same way they did his brother because of the 
overwhelming successes he enjoyed against the Hephthalites.224 However, the ability of the 
nobility, priests and rival family members to resist and dethrone ruling Shahs only increased 
throughout the fifth century as other Shahs could not match Bahrām’s military success and 
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failed to defeat the Hephthalites. For example, Balāš, who was unfortunate enough to 
succeed the defeated Peroz inherited the humiliating treaty with the Hephthalites was quickly 
considered a weak figure and was just as quickly dethroned by the nobility and Magians.225   
Yet, it was the reign of Yazdgard II that best exemplifies the internal instability that troubled 
the Sasanian Empire in the fifth century. Prior to his ascension, three of Yazdgard II’s 
predecessors had fallen victim to internal strife caused by the plots of the influential 
Zoroastrian clergy and nobility. His grandfather Yazdgard I and his grandfather’s rightful heir 
Shapur both met with suspicious deaths that were celebrated by their enemies in the 
Zoroastrian clergy and nobility.226 Therefore, Yazdgard II was justifiably anxious about his 
internal position and the loyalty of the different factions within his realm. In response 
Yazdgard II pursued a number of controversial policies in attempting to cement his power. 
The History of Karka informs us that one of his first acts as Shah was to initiate a purge of the 
royal court, executing many nobles with suspected loyalty, and even his own daughter.227 
Next, he had eight thousand Magians castrated to serve as his personal servants, as 
traditionally eunuchs were believed to be more loyal than other ambitious advisors might be, 
and presumably also as a warning to other Magians thinking of acting against him. 228 
Persecution of religious minorities, particularly Christians, who were tainted by their 
connection to Constantinople, was a traditional policy thought to improve internal unity by 
appeasing the influential reach of the Zoroastrian hierarchy and also fulfilling the Shah’s 
traditional role as a patron of the Zoroastrianism.229 Yazdgard II therefore also made use of 
this, with his reign witnessing the most violent and large-scale religious persecutions of the 
fifth century.230 Although these policies superficially suggest Yazdgard II was little more than 
a bloodthirsty tyrant, the political realities of the fifth century meant that these were 
necessary in order for the Shah to overawe his enemies and unite the powerful factions in his 
empire under his rule. Hence, the reign of Yazgard II shows how important securing internal 
stability was for those wishing to rule and the lengths they would go to achieve it.   
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In relation to the Roman-Sasanian fifth-century peace the major consequence of these civil 
wars was that they distracted the Shahs, and the empire as a whole, from the imperial rivalry 
with Constantinople. Certainly, even to the most warlike Shah securing their internal position 
and authority was always more important than launching an attack against the Roman 
Empire. For example, earlier, in the third century, Bahrām II’s (276-293) eagerness to establish 
peaceful relations with the Roman Empire during the reign of Diocletian was a result of his 
preoccupation with domestic affairs.231  A vulnerable north-eastern frontier coupled with 
unpredictable internal concerns necessitated peace on the western frontier. Interestingly 
however, the very weakness of the Shahs during this period was also paradoxically caused by 
this necessary peace with the Romans. The legitimacy of the Shahs was based on their military 
reputation and ability to gain glory and plunder through foreign conquests. Therefore, the 
successive defeats suffered at the hands of the Hephthalites and the détente with 
Constantinople meant that such glory and plunder was in short supply throughout the fifth 
century. Similarly, a traditional method of winning the loyalty and support of the nobility was 
to shower them with gifts from the royal treasury, a treasury that was previously enriched 
through foreign conquests, and that was now stretched.232 Therefore, when trying to secure 
their internal dominance within the empire Shahs of the fifth century did not, for the most 
part, possess the necessary martial reputation to promote or fall back on. This internal 
weakness and vulnerability was not addressed until the reigns of Kavād I and Khusro at the 
end of the fifth century and start of the fifth century who introduced many reforms to curb 
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Consequences of Shifting Priorities: Military Expenditure, Economic Loss and Strategic 
Limitations. 
For the Roman emperors and Sasanian Shahs alike combatting these new threats and internal 
conflicts took vast resources, the expenditure of which limited and restricted their ability and 
willingness to fight wars on multiple fronts. As such, an imperial détente was not only 
desirable in the fifth century but was strategically, militarily and economically necessary for 
the survival of both empires. 
 
Enormous expenditure on military matters which afflicts the financial system.234 
Shipbuilding, wall building and above all expenditure on the soldiers: for in this way each year 
most of the public revenues are consumed.235 
As made clear by these two military treatises the construction of military defensive 
installations, military infrastructure and the launching of military campaigns was hugely 
expensive. Indeed, the greatest expenditure of any ancient state was on the military. For the 
Roman Empire military expenditure was estimated to be anywhere between one to eight 
million solidi per year.236 Importantly in this regard, as shown above, in the fifth century 
shipbuilding, fortification building and the launching of military campaigns took place at an 
exceptional rate in both empires, as they attempted to counter the new Hunnic, Vandal and 
Hephthalite threats. Therefore, it is unsurprising that, as John Lydus informed us, Leo’s hugely 
expensive, and ultimately unsuccessful, Vandal campaign in 468 almost completely 
bankrupted the Roman treasury. 237  Likewise, the construction of numerous large-scale 
defensive structures, especially the Gorgan Wall, meant the fifth century was equally as 
expensive for the Sasanians. Indeed, after Peroz’s humiliating defeats against the 
Hephthalites it was said that his successor, Balāš, ‘found the Persian treasury empty’.238 
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Sasanian economic resources would have been further stretched and impaired by the drought 
and resulting famine that struck the empire in this period.239  The devastating economic 
consequences this natural disaster had on the Sasanian Empire is recorded by Tabarī: 
During his [Peroz’s] reign a great famine came over the land for seven years continuously. 
Streams, qanats, and springs dried up; trees and reed beds became desiccated; the major part 
of all tillage and thickets of vegetation were reduced to dust in the plains and the mountains 
of his land alike; bringing about the deaths there of birds and wild beasts; cattle and horses 
grew so hungry that they could hardly draw any loads; and water in the Tigris became very 
sparse. Dearth, hunger, hardship, various calamities became general for the people of his land. 
He accordingly wrote to all his subjects, informing them that the land and capitation taxes 
were suspended, and extraordinary levies and corvées were abolished, and that he had given 
them complete control over their own affairs, commending them to take all possible measures 
in finding food and sustenance to keep them going.240  
Thus, coupled with the cost of fortifying their north-eastern frontier and campaigns against 
the Hephthalites, the loss of tax revenues and damage to the Sasanian population caused by 
this famine further ensured that the Shahs were in no position to risk wars on multiple 
fronts.241 Indeed, from Tabarī’s portrayal, who as previously stated was generally reliable, it 
could even be suggested that the Sasanian Empire was even more stretched then the Romans 
in the fifth century. As such, it is no exaggeration to suggest that the fifth century was one of 
the most expensive and costly centuries in the history of both the Eastern Roman and 
Sasanian Empires, both military and economically. 
Another substantial expenditure of ancient states, especially imperial powers, was the 
payment of subsidies to foreign powers or allies.242 Importantly, once again it was during the 
fifth century that Roman and Sasanian payments to their neighbours reached their zenith, in 
both amount and regularity. The Romans made payments to Attila, eventually rising to 2,100 
pounds of gold per year, and peace with the Sasanian Empire was also partly maintained 
through smaller payments. The unique danger of Attila is again underlined in this regard as 
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he was the only foreign ruler to have directly demanded, and then received, increased 
payments from the Roman Empire.243 Likewise, the Sasanians also had to pay vast amounts 
of money to the Hephthalites. 244  Indeed, the damaging effect of the payment of these 
subsidies forced the Sasanians to replace gold dinars with the cheaper silver drachm as the 
principal currency of the empire.245 
Arguably even more expensive than the recruitment of armies, naval forces and the 
construction and upkeep of fortresses however was the cost of being invaded: 
See how death suddenly bore down on the whole world and the force of war struck so many 
people. The rough terrain of thick forest and high mountain, strong rivers with their fast 
currents, forts protected by their positions and cities by their walls, places made inaccessible 
by the sea, harsh locations in the wilderness, caves and caverns beneath gloomy cliffs – none 
of these was able to provide a safe refuge from the hands of the barbarians…Those not 
overcome by force succumbed to hunger. The unfortunate mother fell with her child and 
husband, the master submitted to servitude along with his slaves. Some lay as food for dogs, 
and blazing houses snatched life from many and provided their funeral pyre. Throughout 
settlements and estates, throughout fields and cross-sorrow, destruction, burning, 
lamentation.246 
This account from Orientius underlines the devastating effect invasions and raids had on the 
infrastructure, wealth and population of a territory. Although it has been noted that Orientius’ 
work was ‘self-conciously’ literary and heavily interested by poetic works, such as Ovid, it does 
nevertheless underline the wider effects invasions could have on a population and 
provinces. 247  Hence, the fact that both the Romans and Sasanians suffered numerous 
invasions at the hands of the Huns and Hephthalites who rampaged through their lands, 
plundering their wealth, killing and capturing their people, throughout the fifth century meant 
that imperial provinces near the threatened frontiers regularly agonised under similar 
economic devastation as is related by Orientius above. Furthermore, invaded provinces took 
a long time to recover from such destruction and, therefore, the economic consequences of 
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invasions usually long out-lasted the more immediate and obvious strictly military or strategic 
effects. The plight of the Balkans, particularly Thrace and Illyricum, during this century was 
almost unbearable, with it being stated that Attila ‘ground almost the whole of Europe into 
dust’. 248  While, similarly, Sasanian lands were also said to have been ‘ravaged by the 
[Hephthalites]’.249   
Archaeology provides us with direct evidence for the tremendous levels of destruction caused 
by invasions. It confirms that Hunnic invasions of Roman territories in the fifth century were 
especially disruptive to the economic prosperity of the Balkans. Cities such as Nicopolis 
suffered almost total ruin and devastation to both its urban centre and hinterland.250 This 
level of destruction is further confirmed by the fact that Theodosius II, and even the later 
Anastasius (491-518), did not levy any taxes against Thrace, ‘on account of the peasantry 
being diminished in number by barbarian inroads’.251 The loss of an entire provinces’ taxation 
would have undoubtedly been a huge blow to the already stretched revenues of the East 
Romans during this period. Therefore, the fact that Thrace was only one specific region out 
of many in both empires that suffered regular invasion in the fifth century provides an insight 
into the overall economic devastation imperial territories would have experienced due to 
their leaders’ inability to adequately defend them against the new Hunnic and Hephthalite 
powers. 
 
The economic difficulties both empires faced in the fifth century, together with their military 
and manpower limitations, which were of course linked, hindered their ability to fight wars 
on multiple fronts; they simply could not afford it either economically or militarily. The main 
consequence of this was the need to prioritise different threats over others. It was in these 
circumstances that the need for a Roman-Sasanian détente, that would allow them to 
concentrate on the new barbarian threats on their other frontiers. Neither Constantinople 
nor Ctesiphon could afford a long protracted war, or series of wars, against one another. An 
imperial ceasefire would allow them to concentrate their resources against the Huns, Vandals 
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and Hephthalites, who were a much more pressing and immediate concern. A Roman-
Sasanian peace also ensured that both sides could afford to spend less money on the 
previously all-important fortifications in the imperial frontier in Mesopotamia and Armenia. 
Certainly, such a deterioration of Roman fortifications on this frontier with the Sasanian 
Empire did take place in the fifth century.252 Most insightful and conclusive in the idea that 
economic and military restrictions played a defining role in the need and formation of imperial 
peace in the fifth century was the fact that the economic situation of both empires did not 
improve until the beginning of the sixth century and it was it this period in which Roman-
Sasanian conflicts were renewed.253 
 
 
Conclusion: The Stimulus for Peace 
The ability of the Huns to capture and destroy Roman cities seemingly at will in the Balkan 
provinces, and to force the Romans to abandon a large swath of land south of the Danube, 
was a more dangerous threat than that posed by the Sasanians in the east. Likewise, although 
with hindsight we know the Vandals had no real ambitions to conquer Egypt, the potential of 
losing the economic heartland and breadbasket of their empire was a real and pressing threat 
to the East Romans. This fear dwarfed any concerns Constantinople may have had about the 
territorial ambitions of the Sasanian Empire in this period. The Hephthalites equally presented 
a fundamental threat to the position of the Sasanian Empire in their north-eastern territories. 
Certainly, even during the height of the imperial competition the Romans had never been 
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able to kill a Shah in battle, force the giving of the heir to the Sasanian throne as a hostage,254 
or win large swathes of Sasanian territory, all of which the Hephthalites achieved relatively 
quickly. This difference in threat-level undoubtedly made the Hephthalites a more pressing 
concern than the Romans, whose major long-term ambition against the Sasanian Empire, the 
reclamation of Nisibis, was much less dangerous in comparison. 
As such, the stimulus for the fifth-century Roman-Sasanian peace came from the tremendous 
threats posed by Attila, the Vandals, the Hephthalites and Sasanian internal instability that 
forced a shifting of priorities away from the traditional imperial rivalry and competition.255 
Therefore, as has been repeated throughout, in order to combat these new threats the two 
empires both needed stability and détente on the joint Mesopotamian frontier.  
In this regard, the construction of large-scale fortifications and refortification projects 
undertaken by the Romans along the Danube frontier to counter the Huns and the Sasanians 
along their north-eastern frontier to defend against the Hephthalites throughout the fifth 
century must be seen in relation to the signing of the Roman-Sasanian treaty in 442. As shall 
be seen in more detail below, in this treaty the imperial powers agreed not to construct new 
fortifications and military installations or to improve existing ones on the shared frontier in 
Mesopotamia.256 The signing of this treaty thus underlines that the military priorities of the 
two empires in the fifth century had shifted away from the traditional imperial competition 
in response to the pressure of the new barbarian powers that threatened their other 
frontiers.  
From the Roman perspective, this shift is further confirmed by the Notitia Dignitatum which 
shows that in the fifth century more field army troops were deployed to the Danube frontier 
than on the eastern frontier for the first time. Such a drastic redeployment of comitanses 
troops from the eastern frontier the northern frontier makes clear that Constantinople now 
saw the Huns in the Danube region as the main threat, not the traditional Sasanian rival. 
Similarly, the unparalleled prevalence of civil war and contests for control of the throne and 
internal supremacy meant that Sasanian leaders were now more concerned with securing 
their own internal position, that was intrinsically linked with the rising power and influence 
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of the Hephthalites, than in launching military campaigns in attempt to try and gain a few 
extra forts or cities in the Mesopotamian frontier. 
 
Thus, in the fifth century the immediate threats posed by the Huns, Hephthalites and Vandals 
were now rightly regarded as the true threats to the survival and success of both the Roman 
and Sasanian Empires alike. This shift in military priorities therefore underlines the fact that 
international relations were shaped first and foremost by the need for security and survival, 
as espoused by political realism. Importantly, for the justification of understanding the fifth-
century Roman-Sasanian relationship through the prism of realist theory, realists argue that 
states were rational actors in the pursuit of security, and such a shifting of priorities to face 
more dangerous threats was a rational decision.257 Likewise, this shifting of priorities towards 
the respective northern frontiers mediated the intrinsic need both Roman emperor and 
Sasanian Shah had for military glory and conquest, which they had traditionally gained from 
launching military campaigns against one another, by providing a new enemies and arenas 
from which these could be gained.  
However, as mentioned earlier, the Roman-Sasanian relationship was plagued by resentment 
and suspicion that was caused by the existence of various bones of contention and long-held 
grievances between them. 258 Consequently, even the rise of new threats did not immediately 
solve all the inherent problems and casus belli between the two empires. In order for the now 
necessary peace to be established these other issues too needed to be fully addressed and 
overcome. A solution to the constantly fluctuating and bitterly contested balance of power 
on the Mesopotamian frontier and Fertile Crescent, that was acceptable to the strategic 
needs and concerns of both sides, had to be found. Similarly, the ambiguity of, and extension 
of the imperial conflict into the frontier zones, especially in Armenia and Arabia, had to be 
solved peacefully. Likewise, the ideology of the two empires, which was so antagonistic and 
directly opposed to the existence of the other had to be replaced, or at least modified, to 
allow for a change in the nature of the relationship itself. That these ideological differences 
were only exasperated further by the existence of two rival religions, Roman Christianity and 
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Sasanian Zoroastrianism, each of which heightened suspicions and even frequently motivated 







Diplomacy: The Protocols of Peace 
 
Diplomacy is generally understood as the direct dialogue, or negotiation, between different 
states, principally with the aim of maintaining stable international relations.1 Indeed, the 
Oxford Dictionary defines diplomacy as the ‘management of international relations by 
negotiation’. However, this understanding of diplomacy is based on the modern ideal of 
diplomatic contact that is controlled and regulated by international law, and entrenched 
protocols and traditions, all of which are designed to help stimulate peace-making and peace-
maintenance. In contrast, ancient diplomacy, especially in the Roman era, was less a dialogue 
or negotiation between states and more the direct dictation of one side to the other, usually 
at the conclusion of a military campaign. For example, in the third and fourth centuries 
Roman-Sasanian peace treaties were always used by one side or the other to enforce their 
superiority and domination. 2  Roman diplomacy, and ancient diplomacy in general, was 
intrinsically interwoven into military conflict; as just another aspect of warfare.3 
In relation to the idea of diplomacy as simply an adjunct to war, the Romans traditionally 
viewed military victory as the only means of achieving peace, not negotiation. Thus, Polybius 
states that, ‘[t]he Romans rely on force in all their undertakings, and consider that having set 
themselves a task they are bound to carry it through’,4 while in his treatise on reestablishing 
Roman military supremacy in the fourth century Vegetius advises that, ‘[t]hose who seek 
peace must prepare for war’.5 Indeed, even the Latin word for peace, pax, in the form of the 
Pax Romana or Pax Augustus, came to denote Roman domination. 6  As such, diplomacy 
traditionally took a back seat to military force in the establishment of peace. However, as we 
have seen, throughout their relationship neither the Romans nor the Sasanians were capable 
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of gaining the upper-hand over the other to such an extent that they could military impose 
peace for an extended period.      
Equally, in relation to the nature of the traditional Roman diplomacy, realist theory argues 
that peace between states in an anarchic world, as late antiquity was, could never be achieved 
as there was an inherent absence of international or interstate laws able to regulate relations 
between different states. Logically, these limitations and level of diplomacy was wholly 
incompatible with the need for peace the two empires had in this period.  However, as shall 
be shown, Roman-Sasanian diplomacy did develop towards this modern understanding of 
diplomacy in the fifth century, with the establishment of some ‘aspects of international law’ 
and the advancement of diplomatic contact, such as the sanctity of envoys and the need for 
a bellum iustum, the increased specialisation of diplomats and the establishment of 
diplomatic protocols and expectations, all of which helped to regulate imperial diplomacy.7 
Importantly in this regard, insofar as realism is concerned, war under heavily militarised 
conditions, and the Roman and Sasanian Empires were two exceptionally militarised states, 
could only be avoided with the careful regulation of the balance of power, which was itself 
dependent on strong and effective diplomacy, and as we shall see the creation of a mutually 
acceptable balance of power along the imperial frontier was central to the establishment and 
maintenance of peace in the fifth century. Importantly, in this regard, as shall be seen below, 
the main aim of the fifth-century treaties was the creation of a mutually acceptable balance 
of power that would mediate the traditional casus belli in the imperial relationship and allow 
both empires to focus their military attention and resources on the new dangers that 
threatened them.8 
 
Interstate diplomacy and international relations are always a product of their time and 
develop in relation to new conditions and circumstances.9 As such, whereas the perennial 
military conflicts of the third and fourth centuries ensured that imperial diplomacy did not 
need to move beyond the limited scope as an adjunct of warfare, the changed conditions of 
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the fifth century necessitated true diplomatic negotiation and relations between the two 
empires. 10  In this regard, the two underlying factors that provided the impetus for the 
advancement of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy in this period was the rise of the new external 
threats and the diminished resources which limited their ability to conduct military campaigns 
on multiple frontiers.  
The connection between the creation of improved diplomacy and the emergence of the new 
threats that endangered the two empires in the fifth century is evident by the fact that a lot 
of diplomatic debate focused on the defence of the vulnerable Caucasus, a shared imperial 
frontier that was increasingly threatened by the Huns.11 This correlation is further evident in 
the clear difference in the number of major treaties signed in the third and fourth centuries 
compared with those signed in the fifth century when the Vandals, Huns and Hephthalites 
had begun to pressure the empires. In the third century only two major treaties were signed, 
in 244 and 299, and likewise in the fourth century only two were signed again, in 363 and 387. 
This stands in stark contrast to the fifth century when four important treaties were signed, in 
400, 408/9, 422 and 442.  
 
In order to establish and maintain the peace that would allow them to defend against these 
new threats the Romans and Sasanians needed to create stronger diplomatic practices that 
was able to create a mutually beneficial balance of power, by responding to, and containing, 
a variety of deep-rooted grievances and tensions. These tensions and pressures included 
internal considerations and concerns, antagonistic imperial and national ideologies, religious 
competition, cultural competition, economic interests and strategic concerns. The absence of 
such diplomacy in the third and fourth centuries ensured that Roman-Sasanian relations were 
heavily militaristic; there was simply no other alternative to renegotiate peace treaties or 
overcome problems peacefully. However, in the fifth century, largely through a process of 
trial and error, that constantly adapted and adjusted to overcome new concerns and 
problems as and when they arose they managed to create strong diplomatic practices that 
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were able to act as a real alternative to war.12 Indeed, the advancement of Roman-Sasanian 
diplomacy in the fifth century has led to imperial diplomacy often being regarded as the 
precursor of modern diplomacy.13  
This chapter will therefore investigate the process that resulted in the development of 
Roman-Sasanian diplomacy that moved it away from being simply another form of warfare to 
one that was capable of maintaining a peace for a century. To do this we will examine the 
developments that imperial diplomacy underwent in this period and the ways in which it 




It is perhaps prudent to first analyse the individual treaties that worked to establish and 
maintain peace between the two empires in the fifth century, the most important of which 
were those signed in 363, 387, 400, 408/9, 422 and 442. 
The first treaty that had important consequences for the peace was that of 363, which was 
signed following the death and defeat of Julian.14 This treaty was signed amidst the milieu in 
which both empires began to realise that they were not capable of fully conquering or 
militarily dominating the other. This ensured that the treaty signed between Jovian (363-364), 
Julian’s successor, and Shapur II was of a different nature to that signed between the two 
empires in 299, which was forced upon Narseh after he was defeated by Galerius. These two 
treaties are often viewed as juxtapositions of one another, insofar as in 299 the Romans, who 
had just won a decisive victory against the Sasanians, negotiated from a dominant position 
from which they forced many humiliating concessions from their defeated rival.15 Similarily, 
but in contrast, in 363 the roles were reversed and it was the Sasanians who were able to use 
their new-found military dominance after Shapur’s victory over Julian to reverse the treaty of 
299 in the own favour. Like the Romans before them in 299, the Sasanians forced humiliating 
                                                          
12 Blockley, 1992: 151, 166; Drijvers, 2009: 450; Whitby, 2008: 123 
13 Verosta, 1964: 496. 
14 Amm. Marc. 25.7.9-14. 
15 Blockley, 1984. 
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concessions from the Romans, primarily the surrender of the strategically important frontier 
cities of Nisibis and Singara.16 These two treaties have thus been viewed as evidence of the 
constant toing and froing of the Roman-Sasanian balance of power, which was consistently 
dominated by military competition. However, there was one major difference between these 
two treaties that reveals that rather than being two-sides of the same coin the treaty of 363 
began the transition away from the limited diplomacy of the third century, that the 299 treaty 
epitomised, to the more sophisticated and pragmatic diplomacy of the fifth century.  
After Galerius’ victory in 299 Diocletian was eager to entrench Roman superiority by 
completely restructuring the frontier between them. To do this the emperor sent the 
magister memoriae, Probus, to present the defeated Narseh with a set of non-negotiable 
demands, forcing him to cede large swathes of territory beyond the Tigris, the so-called 
regiones Transtigritanae, such as Sophene, Ingilene, Corduene and Arzanene.17  This pushed 
the Roman frontier far beyond the Tigris, the previous limit of Roman territory. Diocletian 
awarded the regiones Transtigritanae to Rome’s allied Armenians; a situation that 
foreshadowed the importance Armenian allies were to play throughout the fourth and fifth 
century.18 This completely altered the balance-of-power in the Mesopotamian frontier to 
Rome’s advantage.19 Furthermore, Roman-Sasanian trade was restricted solely to Roman 
controlled Nisibis, which created a Roman monopoly on the profits from custom dues, at least 
from official trade.20  As advantageous as this treaty was to Rome it was major blow to 
Sasanian power and prestige, one that would not be forgotten quickly, and one that festered 
as a cause of resentment and hostility over the next half century.21 Indeed, the Sasanian 
resentment of this treaty is evident in Shapur II’s assertion to Constantius in 358 that he would 
take back all the lands that had been stolen from Narseh by Diocletian’s ‘deliberate deceit’.22 
                                                          
16 CJ. 4.63.4; Amm. Marc. 25.7.9-14.  
17 Amm. Marc. 25.7.9; Fest. 14.25.; Pet. Pat. fr. 13-14. See also Blockley (1992: 5). 
18 Amm. Marc. 18.5.3; Jul. Or. 1.22 b-c.  
19 For more detailed discussion and debate on the territorial settlement of the 299 treaty see: Luttwak, (1979: 
154-5), Blockley (1984) and Dignas & Winter (2007: 122-131). 
20 Pet. Pat. fr. 14. FHG 4.189. 
21 This view of the 299 treaty is supported by Barceló (1981: 74), Klein (1977: 185) and Wirth (1980: 336-7). 
However, this view is countered by Dignas & Winter (2007: 130) who argue that given the decisive nature of the 
Roman victory the demands imposed by Diocletian were relatively modest and restrained. 
22 Amm. Marc. 17.5.2-4. 
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In contrast, when the Sasanians had the upper hand in 363, after their victory over Julian, and 
negotiated from the position of power they pursued a more pragmatic settlement. Indeed, 
from the Sasanian point-of-view, Tabarī highlights the more conciliatory tone of this treaty 
and its negotiation between Shapur II and the new Roman emperor Jovian.23 Undoubtedly, 
their primary aim was to win back the territories they had lost in 299 and readdress the 
imperial balance-of-power, and they certainly wished to extract the most advantageous 
position they could from this treaty; however, rather than follow Diocletian’s heavy-handed 
example Shapur II proved to be a much shrewder diplomat. For example, rather than take 
back all the territories the Sasanians had lost in 299, and more, which he undoubtedly had 
the power to do, Shapur instead chose to restore only the five most strategically important 
regiones Transtigritanae to his empire, along with Nisibis and Singara, but allowed the 
Romans to retain control of all territory beyond the Nymphius River, primarily Sophene and 
Ingilene.24 In allowing the Romans to hold onto Sophene and Ingilene Shapur can be seen to 
have been trying to establish and cement a new balance-of-power in Mesopotamia that was 
also acceptable to the Roman Empire in the hopes that this would secure the treaty, and the 
territorial division of Mesopotamia that provided greater strategic defence to the Sasanian 
Empire, in the long term. Indeed, as Ammianus Marcellinus highlights, another major aspect 
of this treaty that underlines Shapur’s wish for it to be adhered to long-term was the inclusion, 
for the first time in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy, of an agreed time-period for which the treaty 
would hold; thirty years.25  
For these reasons, the treaty of 363 marked an important change in the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship and imperial diplomacy. Shapur II’s pragmatic decision to allow Rome to retain 
the territories beyond the Nymphius River ensured that both empires were now relatively 
satisfied with the balance-of-power and territorial division in Mesopotamia. 26  Indeed, 
although the more warlike Roman writers and historians regarded this treaty as the most 
humiliating in their history, Roman recognition of the treaty as generally acceptable was 
seemingly acknowledged by the Roman sources themselves, with the majority taking, if not a 
positive attitude to the 363 peace treaty, at least a balanced and understanding view of its 
                                                          
23 843. 
24 Zon. 13.14.4-6; Zos. 3.31; Amm. Marc. 25.7.9-11. 
25 25.7.14. ‘Thus a peace of thirty years was concluded’. 
26 Lee, 1993: 22. This is shown by the fact that neither attempted to alter it again for over one hundred years. 
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outcome.27 Roman acquiescence with the treaty was further ensured by the decision to allow 
the Roman populations of Nisibis and Singara to evacuate before the Sasanian takeover.28 
Thus, the 363 treaty was the first example of either empire taking a more pragmatic and long-
term approach to diplomacy, rather than utilising it simply as a means to enforce their military 
domination upon the other. Such a diplomatic settlement was more likely to succeed long 
term than its predecessors as it did not push the balance of power to the overwhelming 
advantage of the Sasanian Empire, but instead created an equilibrium that was also more 
acceptable to the Romans. The success of this pragmatism was evident in the fact that from 
this time onwards both empires sought only economic and political, not military or territorial 
gains against one another and neither tried to conquer new land in the Mesopotamian 
frontier until the sixth century.29 
Despite these important developments the 363 treaty nevertheless still left many of the 
entrenched problems and casus belli of the Roman-Sasanian relationship unanswered, such 
as the position of Armenia and the nature of trade restrictions. Although there was a clause 
that attempted to deal with Armenia it was rather ambiguous, the wording unclear and the 
bounds of Sasanian authority and influence in the region left vague and ill-defined, all which 
soon caused trouble between the rivals, each of who perceived the Armenian clause 
differetly. The Sasanians believed the treaty awarded them a free hand in Armenia, to 
conquer and incorporate it as and when they were able. In contrast, the Romans argued that 
they had only agreed to withdraw their troops from Armenia and not to support the Armenian 
king, Arsak, militarily, not that they had granted the Sasanians full suzerainty over the 
region.30 The second limitation of the 363 treaty concerned trade and commerce. As in 299, 
                                                          
27  Libanius (Or. 1.134, 18.277-8), Eutropius (10.17), Eunapius (fr. 29.1.3-6,10-15), Festus (29) and Agathias 
(4.26.6-7) all regarded the treaty in this negative light. Likewise, although Ammianus Marcellinus (25.7.9-14) saw 
this treaty as a reversal of Diocletian’s gains, he takes a less hostile view of it than most other Roman writers. 
Other Romans who took a similar attitude to Ammianus Marcellinus in acknowledging the necessity of the peace 
include Cedrenus (1.539.16-21), Joshua Stylites (242.28), Orosius (7.31.1-2) Rufinus (HE 11.1), Socrates (HE 
3.22.5-7), Sozomen (HE. 6.3.2), Zonaras (13.14.4-6) and Zosimus (3.31.1-2). While those who saw the treaty itself 
in a positive light include, Gregory Nazianzenus (Or. 5.15), Jerome (Chron. 364), Malalas (13.27), Philostorgius 
(HE. 8.1), Themistius (Or. 5.66a) and Theodoret (HE. 4.2.2-3). Although it must be noted that the Christian 
ecclesiastical historians amongst these likely took such a positive view as a way of criticising the disastrious 
circumstances the pagan Julian had left the Roman army in. 
28 Malalas 13.27; Amm. Marc. 25.9. 
29 Blockley, 1992: 240. 
30 Blockley (1984: 36, 1987: 225) and Greatrex (2000: 36) both comment on the ambiguities caused by the 
Armenian clause in this treaty. 
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Nisibis, now controlled by the Sasanians, was left as the only official trading-centre between 
the two empires, which meant that the Sasanians now had the monopoloy on custom dues 
from which the Romans could no longer profit; this was therefore a major blow to the Romans 
and soon became a source of grievance to them. 
Consequently, although this treaty was an important step in the development of stronger 
diplomatic practice and towards what would develop into the fifth-century peace it was not 
capable of maintaining a stable and long-term peace on its own.31 Indeed, during the reigns 
of Valens (364-378) and Shapur II Roman-Sasanian tensions were still evident and continued 
to simmer; although, Armenia, not Mesopotamia, was the source of this tension and the 
target of two empires’ military ambition.32 
 
The next major treaty on the road to peace was signed in 387. It was this agreement, signed 
between Shapur III and Theodosius I, that finally solved the Armenian problem.33 The failure 
of previous treaties to resolve Armenia as a casus bellus between the Romans and Sasanians 
was due to the political and cultural conditions within Armenia itself. As shown in 299 and 
363, Roman-Sasanians peace treaties predominantly focused on the territorial division of 
Armenia. However, the nature and traditions of Armenia and the Armenians made any 
settlement based on land and territorial division unfeasible and always doomed to fail. 
Throughout the Roman-Sasanian relationship the Armenian elites, the nakharars exploited, 
manipulated and instigated imperial conflict by persistently switching sides between the two 
competing empires, ignoring any territorial divisions the imperial powers had put in place. 
The constant switching of allegiance by the nakharars led to a fluctuating balance of power 
in Armenia that made any long-term stability in the region impossible. Therefore, in 387, after 
a growing realisation that the Armenians were a source of conflict between them, the empires 
devised a new type of settlement to solve their disputes in Armenia that was not based on 
                                                          
31 Indeed, Greatrex (2000: 44) claims that the only reason no major conflict erupted soon after was due to the 
‘intervention of events elsewhere’. This supports the main theory of this thesis that the emergence of new 
threats in the fifth century was the primary impetus behind the peace. 
32 For Roman-Sasanian conflict in and over Armenia in the period 363-387 see Ammianus Marcellinus (27, 29, 
30) and the Epic Histories (5.1, 34, 38) 
33 For more detail on why Armenia was such a source of conflict between the two empires see Chapter 3.1. 
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any land or strict territorial division, but rather on loyalty and cultural leanings; they 
partitioned and divided authority over the Armenian elites themselves.34 This new partition 
was entrenched by an agreement that neither side would accept the allegiance of an 
Armenian nakharar who belonged to the other.35 This led to the creation of two distinct 
Roman and Sasanian spheres of influence amongst the nakharars. This innovative diplomatic 
solution, which required a great deal of trust, stabilised the balance of power in the shared 
northern frontier.36  
Thus, this important treaty, with its subtle solution of the Armenian problem, was based on 
the awareness and appreciation of the need for true diplomatic cooperation. This then was a 
significant step in laying the foundations upon which the fifth-century peace was 
maintained.37 Importantly, from a realist perspective, once again, a willingness to establish 
more stable relations, through the creation of a mutually satisfactory status quo is evident in 
this treaty.  Also important, since this treaty was signed within the thirty-year time limit of 
the treaty of 363, there was no discussion about frontier territory in Mesopotamia in 387, 
evidently both empires were still satisfied with the Mesopotamian balance of power. 38 
However, as shall be seen below, just like the 363 treaty, the treaty of 387 still left a number 
of grievances unanswered that needed to be solved if peace was to be maintained, namely, 
religion, the southern frontier zone in Arabia and commercial interests. 
 
After the Hunnic invasion of 395, which wrought great damage on both empires, imperial 
peace treaties had an added sense of urgency. This reinforces that this invasion escalated the 
Roman-Sasanian realisation of the need for détente. Certainly, this new threat, and the 
subsequent shifting of imperial priorities, was an important factor in the continued adherence 
to the treaties of 363 and 387.39 This greater urgency to establish a détente is evident in the 
                                                          
34 Epic Histories 6.1; Proc. De. Aed. 3.1.12-15. 
35 Men. Prot. fr. 6.1. 
36 More detailed discussion on the nature, development and success of the 387 treaty can be found in Chapter 
3.1. 
37 Rubin, 1986:678; Greatrex, 2000. 
38 Blockley (1992: 139) has even argued that there was a tacit agreement between Shapur II and Valens to limit 
their fighting during the 370s to Armenia and Iberia. This would suggest that both sides accepted the territorial 
division of Mesopotamia and did not want to disrupt the status quo on that frontier. Blockley also argues that 
the Armenian solution of 387 was simply inserted alongside the main treaty clauses established in 363. 
39 Greatrex (2000: 44) agrees with this assessment. 
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fact that the next two treaties, in 400 and 408/9, were concluded while the two empires were 
already at peace, and not at the conclusion of war, for the first time in Roman-Sasanian 
relations, again reinforcing that in the fifth century Roman-Sasanian diplomacy had moved 
beyond being simply an adjunct to warfare. 
Arcadius and Yazdgard I, both quickly realising the threat the Huns posed to their empires, 
worked hurriedly to produce a treaty that would further stabilise imperial relations in order 
that they could focus on this new threat. The need to organise a new peace treaty, while they 
were still officially at peace, was likely also heightened by the fact that the thirty-year time 
limit imposed in the 363 treaty had now expired.40 Thus, in 400 Arcadius sent an embassy to 
Yazdgard, led by Anthemius, the man responsible for reinforcing Roman defence against the 
Huns in the Danube, to negotiate a new treaty.41 Significantly, Roman writers document only 
one aspect of the treaty of 400, the joint defence of the Caucasian frontier against the Huns, 
which suggests that it was predominantly concerned with the reconfirmation of the wider 
status quo agreed upon in the previous treaties of 363 and 387. That joint frontier defence 
was the only new clause added to the older agreements furthers the claim that this treaty 
was signed in direct response to the increasing threat of the Huns to both empires after the 
Hunnic raid of 395.42 Although at this early stage no firm agreement was made, negotiations 
                                                          
40 Although Claudian (In Eutropium 2.474-84) informs us that at the start of his reign, and before the signing of 
the treaty, Yazdgard threatened war and began planning for skirmishes against the Roman Empire, given his 
earlier actions of first raising items of concern and potential dispute with the Romans and also his later peaceful 
policy towards the west this may be seen as a manoeuvre by the Shah to force Arcadius to realise the need for 
a new peace treaty. Especially after that of 363 had now officially expired.  
41 There is much debate about when this initial treaty between Arcadius and Yazdgard took place. This debate 
focuses on whether it took place in 400, as stated here, or earlier. The argument for the treaty taking place in 
400 makes use of Theodoret’s (HR 8) note that while travelling in the Sasanian Empire in 400 he passed 
Anthemius, who was travelling back fron the court of the Shah. Unfortunately, however, Theodoret does not 
provide precise details that would make this certain. Indeed, it is only from this passage in Theodoret that 
Anthemius’ embassy in 400 is known. Yet, that Marutha, who played an important role in these negotiations, 
was known to be in the Sasanian Empire in 400 also adds weight to the treaty taking place in the same year 
(Blockley, 1992: 48). Furthermore, it could also be argued that Arcadius would have been too distracted by the 
threat of Gainas to organise a treaty with the Sasanian Empire before 400. 
42 As Blockley (1992: 51) makes clear, there is no direct evidence of this. However, he makes two pertinent points 
that are important and deserve consideration here. First, he states that if John Lydus (De. Mag. 3.52-3) is to be 
believed, negotiations about the joint defence of the Caucasian Gates had been going on since Theodosius I and, 
therefore, since no agreement had been made then it is likely that negotiations also continued during the reign 
of Arcadius. Secondly, Blockley points out the passage of Cedrenus (1.586) where it is stated that in these same 
negotiations Arcadius sent one thousand pounds of silver to the Sasanian Shah, which was clearly a payment of 
some sort, and one that Yazdgard could well have put to use in the defence of the Caucasus. 
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over shared frontier defence were to become a recurring theme of fifth-century Roman-
Sasanian diplomacy.  
Central to the success of this embassy, at least in reinstating the agreements of 363 and 387, 
was the bishop Marutha, a member of Anthemius’ delegation, who used his personal 
reputation with Yazdgard to help the two sides reach an accommodation.43 Such utilisation 
of envoys and ambassadors with a personal connection, or at least familiarity, with the others’ 
court was to become a regular aspect of diplomacy, and was important for increasing levels 
of trust and reliability between them. 
The imperial détente was reasserted again in 408/9 at the start of Theodosius II’s reign with 
the signing of a new treaty.44  Anthemius, now the leading political figure in the Eastern 
Empire, was once again involved. This treaty again reconfirmed the agreements put in place 
with the treaties of 363, 387 and 400 and sought to further reinforce the status quo that had 
now existed for half a century. Importantly, Anthemius also managed to persuade the 
Sasanians to accept the insertion of a new trade clause that made the wider agreement even 
more acceptable to the Romans.  
Since 363 Nisibis was the only officially sanctioned trade hub between the two empires and 
with the city still in the hands of the Sasanians the Romans were unable to profit from official 
customs dues. The 408/9 treaty solved this by widening the circle of official trade centres to 
include Callinicum and Artaxata, as well as Nisibis.45  The fact that this new trade clause 
included a city in Roman territory (Callinicum), Sasanian territory (Nisibis) and Armenia 
(Artaxata) shows a more pragmatic approach to commercial relations and an awareness of 
the resentment caused from one side holding an economic monopoly over the other. The 
Sasanians were likely aware that granting this concession to the imperial neighbour would 
                                                          
43 Marutha’s personal friendship and trust with the Shah was cemented when the bishop used his medical skills 
to help cure Yazdgard’s son and relieve the Shah himself of a chronic headache (Soc. HE 7.8.1-3). 
44 Socrates (HE 7.8) and Sozomen (HE 9.4) both date this treaty to 408/9. While the Codex Justinianus mentions 
a treaty signed in 408/9. 
45 CJ 4.63.4. The dating for this clause, like the treaty itself, has been debated, with claims (Lee, 1993: 62-63) 
that it was simply a reiteration of an early treaty, most likely 363 or 387. However, whatever the date this 
particular clause was first signed in, the argument that it was done so earlier nevertheless still fits into the overall 
theory that will be presented here, more detail below, that all of the treaties signed in the fifth century that 
played an important role in the establishment and maintenance of peace. That all of these treaties were part of 
a process towards the creation of a  more mutually acceptable status quo, of which 363 and 387 were an 
important part, each of which were largely reiterations of their earlier counterparts.   
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make the wider balance of power, that the Sasanians wished to preserve, more acceptable, 
and therefore it should be viewed as an attempt to further stabilise and cement the détente.46 
Indeed, it has also been claimed that this clause was an effort of mutual cooperation in 
attempting to regulate cross-frontier travel, and that therefore it was a strong example of the 
growing détente between the two empires.47 It was also in this treaty that the much debated 
adoption of Theodosius II by the Yazgard I was said to have been agreed; more discussion of 
this debate can be found below.48 
The most important aspect of this treaty however was the agreement that it should be 
enforced for one hundred years.49 The inclusion of such a long time-limit indicates how vital 
long-term stability and peace was for both empires in this century, due to the increasing 
threat of the Huns. Certainly, it is also important to view this treaty in the context of 
Anthemius’ wider strategy, which was aimed at defence against the Huns in the Danube. His 
desire to quickly reconfirm a lasting peace with the Sasanian Empire was necessary in order 
to be able to focus all of Constantinople’s military resources on defending the northern 
frontier.  
 
                                                          
46 Lee (1993: 64) views this differently and highlights the fact that the 408/9 treaty states that this was done to 
prevent trade being used as espionage. However, presumably it would be easier to prevent espionage if trade 
continued to be limited to the single city of Nisibis rather than widening the net to include Callinicum and 
Artaxata as well. Dignas & Winter (2007: 133) and Blockley (1984: 36) agree that the original clause handing over 
Nisibis to the Sasanian Empire in 363 was related to the Sasanians’ desire to break the previous Roman monopoly 
on trans-border trade. Therefore, this would also suggest that any further clause on this aspect was related to 
the nature of trans-border trade, not espionage. For the importance of trade agreements in Roman-Sasanian 
peace treaties generally see: Winter (1987). 
47 Greatrex & Lieu, 2002: 33. 
48 This discussion can be found on pp.141-144. However, once again, the dating here has also been debated with 
Greatrex & Bardill arguing for an early date. Greatrex & Bardill (1996) present three factors that they believe 
point to an early date for the adoption. First, they state that Malalas (349) states that Arcadius’ death was 
sudden, and that therefore, Procopius’ (BP. 1.2.1-10) claim that the agreement was reached on the emperor’s 
deathbed cannot have been true. Second, that Antiochus, the Sasanian emissary sent to negotiate the deal was 
sent arrived at Constantinople several years before Arcadius’ death (Priscus fr. 7). Thirdly, that Antiochus was 
dispatched to Constantinople on Arcadius’ request, and that by the time of the emperor’s he had become an 
important man of influence in the Roman court. Therefore, they argue that the Sasanian emissary must surely 
have been in Constantinople long before 408 if he was an influential man by the time of Arcadius’ death. As 
such, Greatrex & Bardill (1996: 173) suggest that this agreement took place in 402, rather than 408/9. These 
claims for an early date for the agreement over Yazgard’s adoption of Theodosius have therefore also been used 
to argue that the treaty of 408/9 must took place at a different time. Although, Procopius (BP.1.2.1-10), who 
first wrote about the adoption, alongside Theophanes (Chron. a.m. 5900) both say the agreement did indeed 
take place in 408/9. 
49 Soz HE. 9.4. 
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The next major Roman-Sasanian treaty that helped stabilise peace was signed in more 
traditional circumstances than its two immediate predecessors; after a military conflict. It was 
signed to end the short conflict that broke out between Theodosius II and Yazdgard I, and 
carried on under his successor, Bahrām V in 421.50 That a new treaty was needed to end this 
conflict reinforces that the fifth-century peace was the result of a gradual process that could, 
and did, hit obstacles that needed to be overcome throughout the century. The 421 conflict 
began due to the treatment of Christians in the Sasanian Empire and side-switching amongst 
Arabian allies.51 Despite some initial fighting in Mesopotamia and Armenia both sides soon 
realised their true priorities were still on their other frontiers.52 This realisation was helped 
by the fact the Huns had crossed the Danube shortly after the beginning of imperial hostilities, 
which forced to Romans to return their military focus to the northern frontier. Similarly, 
Bahrām also faced Hephthalite pressure at around the same time on his empires’ north-east 
frontier. Consequently, in 422 a general peace was signed based on the status quo ante 
bellum. However, the outbreak of this war had shown that, despite the relative success of the 
earlier treaties the détente was still vulnerable to traditional Roman-Sasanian casus belli and 
that further negotiation and compromise would be needed if the mutually necessary peace 
was to be maintained and other such imperial conflicts avoided in the future.  
The precedent set in the 387 settlement of Armenia proved useful in solving the problem 
caused by the switching of allegiance between the Roman and Sasanian Empires by Arabian 
allies in 422, as a similar solution was once more utilised. Both empires agreed that the 
switching of allegiance amongst the Arab tribes needed to be stopped if the status quo was 
to be stabilised across the whole frontier and, as such, they added a new clause to the general 
agree that forbade either side accepting the loyalty of a tribe that was already allied to the 
other.53 Thus, similar to the situation in Armenia after 387, two distinct spheres of influence 
and authority were created. Significantly, for understanding the nature of the fifth-century 
peace, it is important to note that the flow of Arabs switching sides was usually in 
Constantinople’s favour and that because Arabia was much more strategically important to 
                                                          
50 More detailed of the 421 war, its causes and consequences can be found in Chapter 2b and Chapter 3. 
51 Rubin, 1986: 681. 
52 For more information on the course and development of this conflict see: Socrates (HE 7.18), Malalas (14.23) 
and Theodoret (HE 5.37.6-10). 
53 Malchus fr. 1.4-7. 
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the Sasanians than it was to the Romans this was a major concession on behalf of the 
Romans.54  
Alongside addressing the Arab situation, the 422 treaty granted religious toleration for 
Christians in the Sasanian Empire and for Zoroastrians in the Roman Empire.55 It is important 
to note that this religious aspect was likely included in an annexe of the treaty, rather than as 
a full clause.56 The clause which restricted trade to the three cities of Artaxata, Callinicum and 
Nisibis was also reconfirmed in 422.57 While, the Romans once more seemed to have made 
some sort of agreement to continue contributions for Caucasian defence.58  
Decisively for the quick negotiation and implementation of the 422 treaty, Helion, a Roman 
ambassador, was granted plenipotentiary powers to end the conflict as quickly and effectively 
as possible.59 The granting of these powers, which gave Helion full negotiating powers and 
the full authority to act on behalf of the emperor as he saw fit, was unprecedented in Roman 
diplomacy and highlights how eager the emperor, Theodosius II, was to end the conflict with 
the Sasanian neighbour in order to refocus on defending against the Huns. Previously, Roman 
ambassadors were not allowed to act independently and had to refer all decisions to the 
emperor, or were given strict orders prior to their mission. Therefore, that Helion was granted 
these powers shows the urgency felt in Constantinople to end this distracting conflict quickly 
due to the more dangerous threats on other frontiers.  
 
The next important treaty, and test of the two states’ willingness to maintain peace, came in 
442 after the outbreak of the second, and last, fifth-century war in 441.60 The causes of this 
war were different than that of 421, the principle causes being Roman fortification of frontier 
                                                          
54 For more detailed discussion on this treaty and the overall importance of the Arab tribes in the Roman-
Sasanian relationship see Chapter 3:3. 
55 Soc. HE. 7.20; Theoph. Chron. a.m. 5921; Mich. Syr. 8.5; Priscus fr. 41.1. See also Schrier (1992). 
56 Blockley, 1992: 56. The importance of annexes in the flexibility and adaptability of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy 
are discussed in more detail below (pp. 137-140). 
57 CJ. 4.63.6. 
58 Tabarī (868, 872) states that yearly payments were made whereas al-Thaalibi (p.560) claims that the Romans 
purchased peace with a payment of two million dinars and other gifts. 
59 Soc. HE 7.20. 
60 It is important to note that both Greatrex (1993) and Croke (1984) have dated this war to 440, rather than 
441 as is suggested here. 
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towns and the lack of Roman contributions to the defence of the Caucasus. 61  That the 
Sasanians were willing to go to war over these contributions, or lack thereof, reveals how 
important they were to the Sasanian defence against the Hunnic threat in the fifth century. 
Tellingly, the temptation to coerce Constantinople to fulfil their financial promises in this way 
was amplified by the fact ‘the Romans were occupied elsewhere’ at this time. 62 As such, when 
Yazdgard II attacked, Constantinople’s military focus was on their other frontiers, against the 
Huns and Vandals; therefore, they were unlikely to refuse Sasanian demands in the fear this 
would lead to conflict on their eastern frontier at the same time that they could not afford.63 
As such, the irony of the outbreak of this war is that it reinforces the primacy of the threats 
the empires faced at this time had, and that each empire always looked first and foremost to 
their own needs.  
As was now becoming traditional, the treaty of 442 re-established the status quo that had 
been developing since 363, as the main clauses of the treaty of 422 and its predecessors were 
reconfirmed. The Romans also made a vague agreement about re-continuing their 
contributions to frontier defence in the Caucasus, although as before this agreement was 
never confirmed by an official clause and thus was, once again, not made an official obligation 
of the peace treaty.64 Procopius also states that in this treaty both sides agreed to forbid the 
construction of any new fortifcations along the frontier.65 Prohibiting the construction of any 
new fortifications on the frontier was a major step in guaranteeing the continuation of the 
status quo on the Mesopotamian frontier, it underlines that neither side was interested in 
attempting to alter it to their own advantage at the time of this treaty. Thus, the inclusion of 
                                                          
61 Luther, 2014: 185; Rubin, 1986: 683-4. Rubin argues that Roman failure, or even refusal, to pay contributions 
in this instance was a clear example that they did not value peace in the same way as the Sasanians. In that, they 
were willing to throw it away in order to save money on what was, in the grand scheme of things, an expenditure 
of little financial consequence. However, as will be made clear below, the payments of such contributions or 
subsidies was never a fully integrated clause of any treaty between the empires and therefore, by refusing the 
pay the Romans were not breaking any treaty or even the wider peace. 
62 Theodt. HE 5.37. The other threats that occupied the Romans were the Huns (Marcellinus, Chron. 441.1) and 
the Vandals, against whom the Romans were preparing their first major expedition against. 
63 For more on the development of this war see: Theodoret (HE 5.37.5-6), Moses of Chorene (3.67) and Elishé 
(7/61-2). There has been much debate on whether Theodoret was writing about this war or the earlier conflict 
of 421: with Lee (1987) arguing for 440 and Croke (1984) arguing for 421. 
64 Josh. Styl. Chron. 9-10; Malalas 18.449. 
65 BP 1.2.15. However, Procopius’ narrative is unclear here, as the historian confuses the two wars and treaties 
of 422 and 442. Yet even if this was agreed in 422 rather than 442 it still nevertheless reveals the same desire to 
strengthen the stable relations by seeking to further cement the well-established status quo between the two 
empires. Dignas & Winter (2007:137) state that this clause was agreed in 442, not 422.  
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this clause, in relation to the previous extensive fortification-building on this frontier in the 
third and fourth centuries and their extensive new fortification building on the Danube and 
the Gorgan Plain respectively in the fifth century underlined the shifting of priorities that took 
place at this time. Indeed, the fifth century was the only time in the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship that neither side attempted to alter, or bolster their position in the contested 
Mesopotamian frontier like they did constantly in the third, fourth and sixth centuries.66 
 
Analysing these treaties in chronological order shows they were all largely reconfirmations of 
one another and developed the status quo first established in 363 with new clauses added to 
help resolve new or unanswered problems as and when they arose.67 Although this may seem 
rather a simple and superficial conclusion it is nevertheless an important one, it granted the 
Roman-Sasanian relationship a stability and constancy that it had previously lacked. 
Furthermore, it is evident that throughout the fifth century the Romans and Sasanians were 
equally willing to try and resolve the traditional grievances and causes of war, with both 
granting concessions to the other when they were needed in order for them to be able to 
concentrate their military forces on other frontiers.  
However, despite the Roman-Sasanian need to create a stable and lasting détente there is 
often a major gap between the willingness to do something and the ability to achieve it. 
Certainly, the more primitive Roman-Sasanian diplomacy of the third century, that was 
predominantly another form of warfare and competition, was incapable of creating and 
maintaining a mutually acceptable balance of power, therefore, it is important to now 
investigate the developments that took place in diplomacy during in the late fourth and fifth 




                                                          
66 Howard-Johnson, 2012: 101-102. 




As evident in the description of the major treaties in this period, Roman-Sasanian diplomacy 
underwent a number of key developments in the fifth century that affected its ability to act 
as a real and viable alternative to war in addressing the problems between them. These key 
developments included regular diplomatic contact, the use of time limits in treaties, the 
increased importance and power of envoys and a shift in imperial ideology and diplomatic 
language.                                                                                                                               
 
Formalisation and Diplomatic Protocols 
Arguably the most prevalent development in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy in the fifth century 
was how rigid and ritualised its protocols and formalities became. It was this that marked 
Roman-Sasanian diplomacy out as unique from other diplomatic relationships in the ancient 
world, and different to both empires’ diplomatic relations with their other neighbours. 
Numerous accounts from both empires underline how ubiquitous and important diplomatic 
conventions became. The Shahnama (Book of Kings) informs us of the strict rituals that were 
expected to be performed when a Roman embassy was welcomed into the Sasanian Empire: 
Lodgings were prepared along the highway, a task which the governor [marzbān] performed. 
Clothing and food were prepared and there was no lack of carpets and bedding. When the 
prime minister [kardār] was informed of an arrival and ascertained why the ambassador came 
to the king a racing-camel and a scribe were dispatched to Shah Ardashir in order that an 
escort should be sent out to welcome the envoy.68 
Although this extract comes from an earlier period than the fifth century it is useful in 
highlighting some of the rituals and formalities that existed even in the early stages of Roman-
Sasanian diplomacy. It tells us that upon receiving an ambassador into their empire the 
Sasanians were expected to provide accommodation, cover the cost and expenditure of the 
ambassador’s travels in their territory and to provide an escort to ensure his safety. The 
Shahnama also emphasises the role played by high ranking officials, the marzbān and kardār, 




in ensuring these protocols were fulfilled, further emphasising the importance of making 
certain they were followed correctly and promptly. 
Similarly, the later Roman account given by Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, a ruler of the 
Byzantine Empire in the tenth century, of the sixth century Sasanian embassy to 
Constantinople, led by the ambassador Yazdgushnasp, reveals the diplomatic formalities and 
rituals upheld on the Roman side of the border.69 Although many of the same elements of 
diplomatic protocol were still practiced, such as providing an escort for the foreign embassy, 
covering its expenses, providing accommodation and the involvement of high ranking 
officials, there was evidently an expansion of such formalities in the intervening period; the 
late fourth and fifth centuries. This expansion is especially evident in the language used by 
Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, throughout his account the word ‘necessary’ features eight 
times, while ‘customary’ also makes regular appearances, when recording what was expected 
when receiving an embassy from the Sasanian Empire. Accordingly, every aspect of the 
embassy’s journey in Roman territory was carefully regulated by traditions and customs, from 
the amount of horses and pack animals they were provided with (five horses and thirty pack 
animals), to a customary time limit of one hundred and three days that they were expected 
to follow rigidly when travelling from the frontier in Mesopotamia to Constantinople. 
However, this is not to suggest that embassies and envoys were treated harshly, in fact they 
were afforded every respect by the host empire, all their expenses were paid for, just as they 
were in the third century, they were given gifts, and even a choice of travelling options when 
crossing from Helenopolis to Nicomedia, whether ‘on foot’ or ‘by light vessels’.   
To ensure these expectations were upheld every stage of the embassies’ journey was 
prepared, supervised, organised and hosted by a series of officials. In his passage 
Constantinus Porphyrogenitus mentions the magister, praefectus orbis, silentarius, comes 
privatorum, sacellarius, optio, magistrianus, ducici, labaresioi, ‘men from the workshop’ and 
‘men from the arsenal’ all with individual, and often highly specific, responsibilities. For 
example, the comes privatorum bore ‘the expense of the bed linen’ that was to be provided 
to the Sasanian envoy, whereas the silentarius ‘[received] him [at the frontier] and [guided] 
him safely through Roman territory.’ Thus, although not a straight comparison with the 
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Shahnama, this does suggest that the number of officials involved in maintaining the rituals 
inherent in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy had increased in the intervening century. 
Although not direct counterparts, viewing the Shahnama and Constantinus Porphyrogenitus’ 
account side-by-side in this way permits an insight into the evolution of diplomatic protocols 
between the third and sixth century, and highlights how important the late fourth and fifth 
century was in this development. Clearly, a huge amount of infrastructure, expenditure, 
expertise and imperial officials’ time was expended on ensuring diplomatic contact with the 
Sasanian Empire went as smoothly as possible and that all formalities and rituals were met in 
exemplary fashion. Furthermore, analysing the two sources side-by-side allows us to counter 
some of the inherent flaws in the Shahnama as a source of historical information. The 
Shahnama was composed by Ferdowsi in the eleventh century and was thus far removed 
from the Sasanian history it describes, while the fact that it was primarily a poem, designed 
to be performed orally, not a historical record, meant poetic technique and devices frequently 
took priority over historical accuracy.70 However, despite these concerns the Shahnama does 
still retain useful information, the veracity of which can be ascertained only through 
collaboration with other sources. Thus, in this regard, that Constantinus Porphyrogenitus’ 
work, which is usually regarded as well informed and reliable, relates similar protocols as 
those mentioned by the Shahnama reinforces that they did take place, and they were 
important, in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy. Indeed, that Porphyrogenitus’ work, the De 
ceremoniis aulae byzantine, was an encyclopaedia compiled from records gleaned from the 
imperial archive to act as practical advice to imperial agents further confirms the authenticity 
of these diplomatic practices as something that was expected to be adhered to.71 In this 
regard, the reliability of Porphyogenitus’ work on this embassy is further strengthened by the 
likelihood that his information came from Peter the Patrician.72  
 
 
                                                          
70 For the underlying poetic nature of the Shahnama see: Davidson (1994). 
71 For more on his work see: Dignas & Winter (2007: 247-48), Toynbee (1973) and Sevcenko (1992). 
72 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 248. 
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Failure to comply with these strict formalities and rituals could cause offence but also, on 
occasion, result in the failure of the embassy as a whole. 73  That these protocols were 
evidently so ubiquitous and important in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy suggest that the new 
diplomatic relationship between the two empires in the fifth century was based on building 
up trust that had previously been absent. 74  Trust not only to fulfil these ritualised 
expectations but also trust that neither would attempt to upset the fragile balance of power 
that maintained the peace. As such, all these formalities and rituals were all attempts to build 
up the trust, through ‘costly signalling’, in making small but significant gestures, that was 
necessary for diplomacy to work as a real substitute for war.75  
 
The Role of the Magister Officiorum 
Constantinus Porphyrogenitus’ account of Yazdgushnasp’s embassy to the Roman Empire also 
exposes another important aspect of Constantinople’s foreign policy in this period, 
particularly its relationship with the Sasanian Empire, the expanding influence and 
importance of the magister officiorum. The role and authority of the magistri expanded in the 
fifth century, especially in relation to diplomacy. Priscus, as previously stated, a man familiar 
with Roman diplomacy in this period, reinforces the importance of the magistri during the 
fifth century: 
[the emperor] of necessity confides in this official, for the magister is privy to all the emperor’s 
plans, since he is responsible for the sending of messengers, interpreters and soldiers of the 
imperial guard.76  
After this statement Priscus provides examples of emperors seeking the advice of their 
magister officiorum in shaping imperial responses to events beyond their own borders. For 
                                                          
73 Amm. Marc. 17.5.1-2; Proc. BP. 1.2.15; Theo.Sim. 3.9. 
74 This can be linked to Kydd’s (2005: 5) idea that ‘The key mechanism that makes reassurance [and trust] 
possible is ‘costly signalling’, that is, making small but significant gestures that serve to prove that one is 
trustworthy’. Whitby (2008: 123) argues that good faith and trustworthiness were especially important in 
international relations and diplomacy in Rome’s eastern frontier. Therefore the creation and execution of these 
rituals and protocols was important in maintaining such good faith and trust between the two empires. Lee 
(1991: 2009) also stresses that the lack of Roman ‘dirty tricks’ and difference in the use of hostages in Roman-
Sasanian diplomacy was a further sign of the building of trust between the two empires. 
75 Indeed, in relation to this idea of slowly building up trust in diplomacy, Menander Protector (fr. 26.1 2.80-132) 
criticised a Sasanian diplomat for negotiating in bad faith. 
76 fr. 2.1/59-66. 
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example, he states that Martialis gave Theodosius II advice on how to best deal with Attlia 
and likewise he tells us that Marcian was advised by Euphemius about events in the Caucasus 
in the 450s.77 Thus, viewed together with Constantinus’ description of their activities Priscus’ 
comment that the emperors routinely sought the advice of the magister underlines how 
important they had become; they were involved in almost every aspect of diplomacy and 
foreign relations. 78 Indeed, the magister officiorum were also regularly involved directly in 
negotiations: both Helion and Hermogenes, led embassies to Ctesiphon, in 422 and 505/6 
respectively. 79  They were also responsible for ensuring many of the aforementioned 
diplomatic protocols were conducted properly, such as sending an official to welcome 
Sasanian envoys and embassies at the frontier, sending other officials of various rank to greet 
and guide the embassy on the different legs of its journey in Roman territory, preparing 
official letters or mandata to be given to the envoy and more generally the housing, 
entertaining and monitoring the embassy.80 
However, despite the increased importance of the office there did not seem to be a 
corresponding rise in the expectation that those promoted to the magistri needed any 
qualifications or previous experience. Indeed, in the fifth and sixth centuries only two men 
had previous experience in foreign relations or diplomacy before they were promoted to the 
office of magister officiorum; Anthemius and Peter the Patrician.81 Kinship, friendship and 
patronage, as with most things in the Roman Empire, predominantly played the deciding 
factor in the selection of this official rather than experience or talent. 82  Yet, previous 
experience or not, the existence of an official in overall charge of the diplomatic relationship 
with the Sasanian Empire made imperial diplomacy much more coherent and structured than 
the ad hoc approach that had previously existed. 
Priscus also highlights that the magister officiorum was in command of a corps of interpreters, 
the interpretes diversarum gentium, whose existence is further confirmed by the Notitia 
                                                          
77 On Theodosius II and Martialis see Priscus (fr. 2.1/59-66). On Marcian and Euphemius see Priscus (fr. 33.2). 
78 Lee, 1993: 41. 
79 Lee, 2008: 110. 
80 Const. Porph. De. Caer. 89-90. 
81 Lee, 1993: 41. 
82  As evident in the careers of Paulinus and Valerius (Chron. Pasch. p.578-9). However, evidence for the 
background and past experience of the majority of the magistri is patchy and inconclusive, therefore it is 
impossible to say with any certainty whether past experience or any other qualifications were important or not 
(Lee, 1993: 43). 
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Dignitatum.83 A body of interpreters is central to successful diplomacy between any states, it 
would be virtually impossible to establish a firm, stable and reliable diplomatic relationship if 
mutual linguistic understanding was absent. Thus, their existence in fifth-century Roman-
Sasanian diplomacy was essential in creating the much-needed détente. They were utilised in 
the translation of documents, recording treaties, they also acted as translators for Sasanian 
envoys and they were sent on diplomatic missions and embassy when necessary.84 Alongside 
the creation of the corps of interpreters was the establishment of the scrinium barbarorum, 
which was responsible for preserving the records of diplomatic contact. 85 Together with the 
increased importance of the magistri as an overseeing official, these developments helped to 
cement diplomacy as an important and proficient body of Roman foreign policy. This new 
diplomatic proficiency undoubtedly played a leading role in the Constantinople’s ability to 
maintain such a delicate peace with the Sasanian Empire throughout the fifth century. 
That the magister officiorum gradually acquired more influence and responsibility in foreign 
relations has led some scholars to argue that during the fifth century a quasi-foreign legation 
now existed in the Roman Empire.86 This argument centres on the idea that since the magistri 
increasingly became responsible for important aspects of foreign relations, such as receiving 
foreign delegations, the corps of translators and archives, in which written treaties were 
presumably kept, that they therefore also had a certain degree of responsibility and control 
over the direction and pursuit of foreign relations more generally. 87  Although caution is 
needed in this regard, there is no doubt that magistri, and those under their control, became 
increasingly relevant to the empire’s foreign relations.88  As such, this could suggest that 
during the fifth century the Romans began to appreciate the need to better understand the 
world beyond their borders, if they were to able to react effectively to new threats and 
changing circumstances. Such a nuanced approach is evident in establishing peace with the 
Sasanians in order to combat the new threats of the Huns and Vandals in order to avoid over-
stretching their military resources.  
                                                          
83 Or. 9.46. These interpreters are also mentioned to have existed in the western Empire (Occ. 11.52). 
84 Garsoïan, 1983:574. 
85 Const. Porph. De. Caer. 89-90. 
86 For example Jones (1986: 369) described the magister as ‘a sort of minister of foreign affairs’. 
87 This argument is highlighted by Blockley (1992: 136-5), although he himself is not convinced. 
88 On the caution needed in this regard see Blockley (1992: 135-6). 
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The evolution of the magister from an official initially involved exclusively in palace 
administration to the most important official in foreign relations was surely connected to the 
new importance diplomacy had as an independent arm in imperial relations in the fifth 
century. This importance necessitated that the emperors had someone they could trust to 
conduct and oversee diplomacy, and who were they more likely to trust than the men in 
charge of the palace, where the emperors now spent the vast majority of their time. 89 
Furthermore, the importance of this development for the creation and maintenance of the 
fifth century détente with the Sasanian Empire is shown by the fact that the magister 
officiorum dealt mainly with the imperial neighbour. 90 Having an official in overall charge of 
diplomatic contact with the Sasanian Empire would have greatly aided the continuation of a 
policy of peace with the eastern neighbour throughout the fifth century. 
 
Embassies:  Regular Diplomatic Contact 
Unceasing embassies were sent to and fro between the sovereigns of Persia and the Roman 
Empire, for which there were continual occasions. 91 
It was a long-standing custom for both states that after major envoys lesser ones should be 
sent to give thanks for the reception and friendly treatment of the major envoys.92 
Menander Protector and Socrates here both confirm the regularity of diplomatic contact in 
the fifth century, and from their accounts it is no exaggeration to state that such regular 
contact had become another aspect of Roman-Sasanian diplomatic ritual and protocol. 
Socrates wrote his Ecclesiastical History in the fifth century itself and, therefore, his account 
is contemporary to this ‘continual’ diplomatic contact.93  Menander gives a more specific 
insight into the distinction and difference between the two main types of embassies that were 
                                                          
89 Ibid. This assessment of the magistri’s development is supported by Lee here. 
90 For instance, Lee (2008: 112-3) argues that the magister officiorum was not involved in treaty-making with 
barbarian neighbours. Although, he does admit the evidence for this is inconclusive. 
91 Soc. HE 7.8.2. 
92 Men. Prot. fr. 18.6. Menander also mentions this distinction between major and minor embassies again at 
20.1 and 23.8. 
93 Due to his access to the resolutions of church councils, imperials letters and church communications Socrates 
was generally a well-informed and reliable source. For more information on Socrates see Leppin (1996). 
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most regularly dispatched in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy. 94  Whereas ‘major’ envoys and 
embassies had the power to discuss and negotiate the wider peace treaties Menander states 
that the ‘lesser’ embassies merely carried out routine or preliminary diplomatic business.95 
Although Menander Protector was writing in the sixth century, the fact that he says this was 
a ‘long-standing custom’ suggests that this practice also existed in the fifth century. Indeed, 
the existence of both major and minor embassies in the fourth century is confirmed by an 
inscription on the seal ring of a Roman ambassador dispatched to the Sasanian Empire during 
the reign of Shapur III which reinforces Menander’s account above.96 Therefore, the fact that 
this practice existed in both the fourth and sixth centuries indicates that it also took place in 
the fifth century. This practice undeniably had a transformative effect on the regularity and 
frequency of official contact between the two empires. Certainly, such a delicate peace as 
that between the Roman and Sasanian Empires in the fifth century was dependent on regular 
diplomatic contact, and we have already seen that as many treaties were signed in the fifth 
century as that in the third and fourth centuries combined. 
 
As Socrates noted, regular diplomatic contact between the two empires was also upheld 
through the existence of ‘continual occasions’. These diplomatic occasions included the 
sending of a messenger to confirm the accession of any new Roman emperor or Sasanian 
Shah to either throne to their counterpart across the frontier,97 and also the sending of a 
messenger ahead of an embassy to state its general purpose and to request its reception.98 
Imperial messengers and diplomats were also dispatched regularly for a variety of more 
general missions including, delivering messages, gathering information, clarifying interests, 
negotiating treaties and paying respect. This new tradition of ‘unceasing embassies’ and 
exchanges of envoys provided a regular and direct point of contact between the two 
sovereigns, and created a framework to defuse any potential conflicts and settle disputes.99 
                                                          
94 Blockley (1992: 250) however, argues that this only shows that follow-up embassies were a long-standing 
custom, not the major and minor distinction. However, either way it reveals that diplomatic contact between 
the two empires increased in the previous century. 
95 Ibid, 1992: 152, Canepa, 2009: 129; Wiesehöfer (2006: 133). 
96 Stock, 1978; Lee, 1993: 170. 
97 John Eph. HE 6.22. Chyrsos, 1976; Whitby, 2008: 123; Canepa, 2009: 123. 
98 Lee, 1986: 458. 
99 Canepa, 2009:1 29. 
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Hence, when an envoy was sent on a mission with the task of being little more than a simple 
messenger and bearer of gifts, which often happened, it was still an important role, as it 
ensured regular contact between the two courts.  
Alongside the embassies that were sent directly ‘between the sovereigns of Persia and the 
Roman Empire’ local and frontier diplomacy was also important in the creation of diplomatic 
practices that were capable of maintaining peace between the two empires. Frontier 
diplomacy was instrumental in avoiding the outbreaks of local conflicts, which always had the 
potential to flare up into wider military entanglements.100 For example, in 485 when tensions 
were raised after Arab tribes allied to the Sasanians conducted raids against the Roman 
Empire, Shah Balāš, eager to avoid being dragged into a wider conflict, ordered local 
dignitaries, including a Christian bishop, the regional military commander and the Arab client 
leader himself to meet with the local Roman dux to resolve the dispute.101 The fact that they 
were able to arrange a satisfactory settlement to these hostilities quickly and efficiently shows 
the effectiveness of local diplomacy.102 What this incident also makes clear is that it was not 
just the major, or even the minor, embassies that were responsible for maintaining the fifth-
century peace but every aspect, no matter at what level, of the Roman-Sasanian diplomacy 
was utilised in maintaining peace throughout this century.103   
The existence of such capable and adaptive local frontier diplomacy added another layer of 
flexibility to Roman-Sasanian diplomacy. It ensured local dignitaries could deal with 
unexpected problems immediately without having to refer everything back to the emperor 
or Shah, which would have taken too long and risked smaller conflicts escalating into larger 
ones. Although some scholars have argued that direct central imperial involvement was 
largely absent from frontier diplomacy and that, by necessity, local dignitaries had to act on 
their own initiative, which was of course true, the incident above shows that emperors and 
                                                          
100 Proc. BP. 1.16.6; Theo. Sim. 3.9.2. 
101 Syn. Or. 532-4. 
102 Blockley (1992: 130) uses this incident to suggest that the fact all negotiations to end these raids took place 
at a local level and between local dignitaries shows there was no overall central government leadership in 
frontier policy. However, the fact that these negotiations were ordered by the Shah counters this in itself. While 
his motivations for becoming involved in this dispute, to avoid a wider war with Constantinople, suggest that 
Balāš, and the central government did have an aim; preserving the peace that had been carefully established 
and maintained by his predecessors. Therefore, surely the local dignitaries would have been informed of what 
was expected of them at the start of their negotiations. 
103 Other aspects of successful frontier diplomacy are recorded by Procopius (BP. 1.16.6), Theophanes (Chron. 
a.m. 6064) and Theophylact Simocatta (3.9.2).  
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Shahs did have direct influence and overall authority over them, and that the wider aims and 
policies the imperial rulers wished to pursue always retained a dictating influence on the 
decisions of local officials.104 Indeed, the fact Balāš ordered his subordinates to solve this 
problem confirms that. Local dignitaries and military commanders would have been informed 
of what was expected of them and what strategy the emperor or Shah wanted to pursue at 
the start of their commission, just as the leaders of major embassies were, and none would 
have been willing to go against the wishes of their emperor or Shah. 
 
Frequent diplomatic contact was essential in maintaining peace throughout the fifth century. 
The regularity of such interactions shows that the détente was not an easily implemented 
policy but was the result of an on-going diplomatic process; a process that required constant 
and consistent attention. Regular contact was yet another feature of the signalling of trust 
and good-faith between the two empires that was necessary in the maintenance of peace in 
the fifth century. Moreover, increasing regular diplomatic contact was fundamentally 
important in improving the ad-hoc and disjointed diplomacy of earlier centuries.  
 
Ambassadors and Envoys 
Although all diplomatic communication between the empires took place ruler-to-ruler, 
emperor and Shah never met face-to-face, even Jovian and Shapur II in 363 who were on the 
same battlefield did not met personally or conduct negotiations in person.105 Rather, the 
imperial rulers used intermediaries, usually high ranking officials, to represent them in 
negotiations. It could be argued that since the rulers never met or negotiated in person, but 
did so through proxies, this was a block to true trust or negotiation. 106  However, the 
avoidance of direct ruler-to-ruler negotiations served a purpose that, once again, separated 
                                                          
104 Those who argue this include Blockley (1992: 135) and Scholten (1998: 467). For more detailed discussion on 
the influence and authority of the Roman emperors over their foreign policies and frontiers see Millar (1982) 
and Sidebottom (2007: 8-11). 
105 Amm. Marc. 25.7.5-8. However, it is important to note that Tabarī (843) claims that Shapur II and Jovian did 
meet face-to-face, that they ‘both fell on the ground before each other’ and that Shapur ‘embraced [Jovian] for 
what he had done’ before negotiating the 363 peace treaty. 
106 Indeed, even Jovian and Shapur II were on the same battlefield after Julian’s death in 363 they did not 
negotiation in person but continued to use intermediaries (Amm. Marc. 25.7.5-8). 
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Roman-Sasanian diplomacy from imperial diplomatic relations with their other neighbours. 
When negotiating directly with barbarian rulers Roman emperors used these meetings as 
chance to overawe the leader and his subjects by demonstrating his, and by extension the 
Roman Empire’s, magnificence, wealth and power through ostentatious displays that the 
barbarians could not match.107 In this regard, Roman emperors used direct negotiations as 
another means of competition, to try and assert their supremacy over the barbarian leader. 
However, unlike barbarian rulers, the Roman emperor and Sasanian Shah could match or 
even surpass one another in ostentatious display.108  Therefore, face-to-face negotiations 
between the Roman and Sasanian rulers could lead to competition between the emperor and 
Shah that could actually hamper negotiations or, if one was outshone by the other could 
create internal trouble for the losing party. This Roman-Sasanian avoidance of direct meetings 
can therefore ironically be seen as further evidence of the development of diplomacy away 
from being simply an adjunct or different form of competition.109     
Consequently, the success of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy was always largely dependent on 
the skill of those chosen to be ambassadors and envoys. Their importance was recognised in 
the fifth century when ambassadors were granted full negotiating powers and authority. 
Helion, who led the embassy that negotiated the peace treaty of 422, was the first to be 
granted such plenipotentiary powers by a Roman emperor (it is not surprising to note that he 
held the position of magister officiorum). It is unsurprising, and also informative, that such 
plenipotentiary powers were granted to ambassadors in the fifth century, when the Romans 
needed peace with the Sasanian Empire.  
Accordingly, due to their importance, only officials of the highest rank, chosen from among 
the illustri, led diplomatic missions. The priority of the diplomatic relationship with the 
Sasanians is once more evident in the fact that envoys sent to the neighbouring empire were 
always of higher rank than those sent to negotiate with other neighbours. The only exceptions 
to this being the Huns under Attila and the Vandals under Geiseric who were both sent 
illustres to negotiate with, which reinforces the importance these two groups played in 
                                                          
107 Amm. Marc. 30.3.4-6; Eunap. 18.6. 
108 Lee. 2008b: 112. 
109 Although, when hosting an embassy from the neighbouring empire ostentatious displays of magnificence 
were still important (Const. Porph. De. Caer. 1.89). 
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Constantinople’s foreign policy in this period.110 Indeed, during and after the fifth century, it 
became common practice for the magister officiorum to lead Roman embassies. An official of 
equally high rank, the Shah’s personal chamberlain, led Sasanian embassies.111 Accordingly, 
sending an envoy to lead an embassy who was not considered to hold the appropriate rank 
could cause anger and resentment, as Constantius’ selection of an ex-pro-magistro equitum 
to lead an embassy to Shapur II did in 358.112 There are various reasons for the use of such 
high ranking individuals as ambassadors. First, it was undoubtedly a sign of respect to the 
neighbouring empire and its ruler. Secondly, it was connected to the aforementioned 
protocols and rituals of imperial diplomacy. Thirdly, given how important Roman-Sasanian 
diplomacy became in the fifth century, both emperor and Shah alike needed people they 
could trust to lead embassies on their behalf, and men of high rank and station were likely 
thought to be more reliable in this regard.  This would have been especially true during the 
fifth century when lead envoys were granted plenipotentiary powers by the Roman emperors, 
someone of lesser rank would simply have not been deemed worthy of acting with the full 
authority and consent of the emperors.  
 
Surprisingly, given the importance of ambassadors and envoys and the evolution of diplomacy 
in other areas, the Romans never established a specialist core of professional diplomats. Apart 
from the lead-envoy, embassies were made up of any number of officials from different 
sections of Roman society and politics that included civil officials, military officers, members 
of the imperial guard, clergy and physicians.113 The selection criterion for diplomats varied 
widely and was very individual in nature, as such, the reasons they were chosen equally varied 
widely, from status, present needs, personal desire and influence.114  
However, envoys and ambassadors did become more specialised in one important aspect; 
past experience. In the fifth century the practice of sending the same envoy on multiple 
missions, especially to the Sasanian Empire, became more prevalent. Marutha was sent twice 
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113 Lee, 1993: 46; Scholten, 1998: 454. 
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and rhetoric (Amm. Marc. 27.5.15; John Lydus De. Mag. 3.53). 
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to the Sasanian Empire under Theodosius II, Anatolius was sent on three occasions to 
negotiate with Attila while Phylarchus was sent to the ruler of Dalmatia in 462/3 and then to 
Geiseric in 467. 115   This increased again in the sixth century, Rufinius undertook seven 
missions to the Sasanian Empire, Hermogenes three, Zacharias of Sura four, Peter the 
Patrician three, while Constantianus and Sergius also both led two embassies each. 116 
Previously, in the fourth century there was only one example of the same envoy being sent 
on multiple embassies, Victor, the magister equitum, who was sent on a diplomatic mission 
to the Goths in the 360s and then to the Sasanian Empire in 377.117 Indeed, Marutha’s success 
in the treaty of 400 made clear how envoys with a personal connection or well-established 
reputation in the imperial or royal courts were especially adept at negotiating peace treaties, 
the bishop was described as ‘mediator of peace and concord between the East and West’.118  
The utilisation and sending of the same ambassadors and envoys on multiple missions to the 
same neighbouring power was likely stimulated by the increased diplomatic contact between 
the two empires in the same period. It would have become a necessity to use the same 
individuals numerous times when such contacts took place more regularly.  
Evidently, the fifth century was an important period of transition in the development of this 
aspect of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy. Although there is only one explicit example of an 
individual being sent on multiple embassies to the Sasanian Empire in the fifth century this 
does not mean it did not happen on other occasions, as, traditionally, Roman historiography 
and historians were primarily interested in recording wars with foreign powers, and to a lesser 
extent the major peace treaties that ended these wars.119 Therefore, the fact that there were 
only two short wars between the Roman and Sasanian Empires in the fifth century and that 
the vast majority of diplomatic contact between them would have been regular, but largely 
negligible, at least in the eyes of Roman historians, they would not have attracted much 
interest. Thus, the fact that there is more historical evidence of the same envoy being sent on 
                                                          
115 PLRE vol. 2; Anatolius 10; Phylarchus. Other examples of envoys being sent on multiple missions include, 
Pelagius, Censorius and Trygetius (Lee, 1993: 46). 
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multiple diplomatic missions to the Sasanian Empire in the sixth century is likely due to the 
increased interest Roman historians would have once again in this relationship, as the two 
empires were once again at war. 
Such past experience had many advantages for the potential success of an embassy: 
familiarity with the empire, court and personnel, greater experience in how to best solve any 
problems that arose and, perhaps most importantly, the chance to build up personal contacts 
and establish a good reputation.120 Certainly, the aforementioned success of Marutha who, 
through being dispatched on numerous missions to the Sasanian Empire, was able to use the 
contacts and knowledge of the Sasanian court that he built up on these missions, to negotiate 
flexible and mutually acceptable treaties is evidence of this.  Additionally, the fact that leading 
ambassadors were now of a higher rank is indicative of the new importance diplomatic 
contact with the neighbouring empire had in the fifth century. As with the role of the magistri, 
the use of the individual ambassadors in multiple missions to the Sasanian Empire would have 
benefited the continuity of the policy of peace that was the aim of imperial diplomacy in the 
fifth century. 
 
Nature of the Treaties 
Treaties were the foundation of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy. Indeed, signed treaties had 
formally ratified every major change in the imperial relationship since the third century. Thus, 
as the fifth century peace developed and the imperial neighbours sought solutions to long-
standing grievances the treaties themselves had to become more nuanced and durable than 
those of the third and fourth centuries.  
Menander Protector, who although not an eye-witness to the treaty he describes below had, 
as a member of the emperor Maurice’s entourage, access to reports from the ambassadors, 
provides a reliable insight into how later treaties became more sophisticated, long-lasting and 
robust: 
When matters had progressed to this stage of orderly development, those whose task it was 
took the texts of the two documents and polished their contents, using language of equivalent 
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force. They then made facsimiles of both. The originals were rolled up and secured by seals of 
wax and the other substance used by the Persians, and were impressed with the signets of 
the envoys and of the twelve interpreters, six Roman and six Persian. Then the two sides 
exchanged the treaty documents, the Zikh [Yazdgushnasp] handing to one in Persian to Peter, 
and Peter the one in Greek to the Zikh. Then the Zikh was given an unsealed Persian translation 
of the Greek original to be kept as reference for him, and Peter likewise was given a Greek 
translation of the Persian. After this the conference ended.121 
Although the treaty described here, signed in 562, comes from the sixth century many of the 
key aspects mentioned developed in the fifth century. Menander makes clear that writing 
down the individual clauses of treaties, making multiple copies of them, recording them in 
the language of both empires, securing them with official seals, the use of interpreters and 
high ranking officials were all important in the ratification of the 562 peace treaty.122 Zosimus 
and Joshua Stylites also reveal that Roman-Sasanian treaties were written down and recorded 
in detail.123 Other important elements of treaty-making not mentioned here by Menander 
Protector include, the inclusion of time limit to treaties, the fact that negotiations took place 
either on the frontier or in the courts of the emperor or Shah who was receiving the embassy 
and the necessary ratification of both rulers, through the use of ‘special letters’ which were 
dispatched to Constantinople and Ctesiphon. 124  All of these aspects were important in 
ensuring Roman-Sasanian treaties after the late fourth century were less ambiguous and open 
to interpretation than their predecessors in the third and fourth centuries. 
 
In the early stages of the Roman-Sasanian relationship negotiations took place exclusively on 
the battlefield, in a very ad-hoc and irregular manner.125 This was indicative of the early 
relationship itself, as one that was dominated simply by militaristic concerns, were strategic 
advantage was all that mattered and diplomacy was just another form of imperial warfare 
and competition. Negotiations that took place on the battlefield were, consequently, always 
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likely to be rushed and incomplete, as evident in the ambiguities that arose from the 
Armenian clause in the 363 treaty which was negotiated in the battle-chared lands of 
Mesopotamia. Importantly, however, as imperial diplomacy developed so too did the chosen 
sites of negotiations. From 387 onwards, treaties were predominantly negotiated on the 
neutral frontier zone or the Roman or Sasanian court respectively, where embassies would 
be afforded the greatest respect, rather than on a battlefield strewn with corpses. This was 
seemingly much more conductive to genuine diplomatic discussions and was much more 
likely, as was the case as seen by the treaties of 400 and 408/9, that took place independently 
of any military action and helped to address traditional Roman-Sasanian grievances, to result 
in peace settlements that truly tried to resolve recurring disputes and causes of conflict, 
rather than ones that simply attempted to reinforce the military supremacy that one side had 
won on the battlefield. Furthermore, the move away from battlefields as the principal 
negotiating ground furthered Roman-Sasanian diplomacy’s shift away from being just another 
part of military conflicts.    
 
The first example of a Roman-Sasanian treaty being written down and officially recorded was 
the treaty of 363. 126 This development was vitally important in the stability and reliability of 
imperial peace treaties and soon became a defining characteristic of imperial diplomacy.127 
Roman-Sasanian peace treaties, especially during the fifth century, contained a vast array of 
complicated and at times highly specific clauses, ranging from time limits, religious toleration 
and economic concerns. Thus, preserving treaties through multiple written copies, in the 
languages of both empires, was essential if they were to be successful and not to be 
misinterpretered as, ironically, the Armenian clause in the 363 treaty was. It was only through 
such written recording of treaties that such ambiguities could be solved. Unlike the more 
simplistic treaties with their western and northern neighbours, the Romans could not rely 
simply on memory to ensure that all these clauses were abided by. The creation of a corps of 
bilingual interpreters in the Roman Empire was central to this, while the fact the Sasanians 
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also recorded treaties in the same way could well suggest such a corresponding corps existed 
in the Sasanian Empire.          
Related to the tradition of keeping a written copy of treaties was the dispatching of letters of 
ratification to the Roman emperor and Sasanian Shah that were used to officially sanction any 
peace agreement. Likewise, given that the details of expenses incurred by Sasanian embassies 
while travelling in the Roman Empire were kept in the scrinium barbarorum, it is likely that 
the written record of individual treaties were also stored there, or some other place of 
importance.128 Furthermore, parallel to the sacrosanct nature of embassies and envoys, the 
fact that these letters were considered ‘sacred’ is further evidence of how seriously and 
inviolable the two empires considered any and all diplomacy contacts or agreements between 
them.129 The recording and archiving of peace treaties would have been a major step in 
creating more stable and durable peace-agreements. 
 
The most subtly adaptive aspect of Roman-Sasanian treaties was the use of annexes. As 
shown by Menander Protector, these were verbal agreements made between the two 
empires that were never fully integrated clauses, but were instead kept separate from the full 
treaty.130 Annexes were implemented for the most divisive, sensitive and difficult to control 
aspects of the imperial relationship, particularly, Roman contributions to frontier defence and 
religious concerns. Providing solutions for these divisive issues in annexes meant that strict 
adherence to them was not an essential requirement of peace in the same way as the main 
clauses. Annexes were used in this way for these concernes for two main reasons. First, to 
avoid domestic criticism that internal affairs were being dictated by a foreign power, due to 
the detrimental effect this claim could have on the internal standing of either signatory. 
Secondly, to ensure that failure to continuously adhere to these difficult to enforce 
agreements did not act as automatic casus belli.131 The implementation of annexes was thus 
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important in the adaptability and flexibility of Roman-Sasanian peace treaties and wider 
imperial diplomacy. It ensured that the carefully organised treaties were not subject to the 
most troublesome and hard to control aspects of the imperial relationship. As such, the 
utilisation of annexes shows that both sides were willing to try and solve, or at least contain, 
problems between them that could have even effected their internal politics in the search for 
a more stable relationship. 
 
In the third and early fourth centuries treaties were made solely between the two rulers in 
power at the time, not between the two states as a whole, and this meant the duration of 
treaties were limited to the lifetime of the two signatories, and once one died the treaty was 
considered void.132 This was not very conducive to the creation of long-term peace as treaties 
could quickly and unexpectedly become worthless. For that reason, towards the end of the 
fourth century, when the two states were actively seeking a more stable relationship, the two 
empires attempted to overcome this problem by introducing specific time limits for the 
duration of treaties. As previously noted, the first inclusion of time-limits took place in 363, 
in which a thirty year duration was agreed, and then the next came relatively quickly 
afterwards in the treaty of 408/9, which was given a time limit of one hundred years. The one 
hundred year time limit of 408/9 was especially important as it suggests that both states were 
interested, and actively seeking, long-term peace in the fifth century. The implementation of 
time limits ensured that treaties of 363 and 387 could always be added to with the 
introduction of new clauses throughout fifth century, as they were in 400, 408/9, 422 and 
442, without having to renegotiate the whole treaty upon the death of one of the original 
contracting rulers. This development was a fundamentally important innovation in improving 
the continuity and longevity of individual peace treaties and, thus, the overall success and 
sustainability of Roman-Sasanian diplomatic agreements.  
Comparing the development and use of time limits in the fifth and sixth centuries reinforces 
the uniqueness of the fifth century, and the fact that it was only in this period that the two 
empires, out of necessity, pursued long-term peace. This is evident in the thirty-year time 
limit of 363 and the even more enduring one hundred year time limit agreed in 408/9. In 
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contrast, during the sixth century when the Hunnic, Vandal and Hephthalite threats had either 
disappeared or receded and the two empires returned their military attention to one another, 
time durations for imperial treaties became less important. For example, the peace treaty of 
506 included only a seven-year time limit.133 This reduction shows the changing conditions of 
the sixth century in which peace was no longer necessary. Indeed, even when sixth century 
peace treaties were signed with larger time-limits, such as the famous ‘Eternal Peace’ that 
was signed between Justinian and Khusro in 532, which was meant to usher in an indefinite 
peace, ‘for the duration of both their [the Roman and Sasanian Empires’] lives’,134 they did 
not last the test of time.135 For example, the Eternal Peace lasted for less than a decade before 
the outbreak of war. Clearly, without the immediate threats on their other frontiers time-
limits became less important, and were therefore not as strictly adhered to as they were in 
the fifth century. 
Evidently the inclusion of time limits, especially long-term time limits, into imperial peace 
treaties was central to the establishment and maintenance of peace in the fifth century. While 
their adherence shows that it was only during the fifth century that peace was needed by 
both empires alike. Time limits were also essential in allowing the treaties to act as 
reconfirmations of one another, as new clauses could simply be added to the treaties that 
had already been agreed and that were still in effect without having to negotiate a whole new 
peace treaty.  
 
That treaties in the fifth century were expected to cement more stable relations through the 
creation and maintenance of a mutually acceptable status quo, rather than reinforce the 
military supremacy of one empire over the other, is apparent in the evolution of the language 
used to describe them. Treaties in the third and fourth centuries were usually labelled with 
militaristic terms similar to Vergil’s famous debellare superbos; 136  however, in the fifth 
century terms such as ‘peace’ and ‘agreement’ were increasingly used.137 This change in 
language is indicative of the fact treaties between the empires were taken increasingly 
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seriously by both sides, as seen in the unwillingness of either side to break them, even when 
an opportunity to overtake or outmanoeuvre their imperial rival arose. For example, when, 
in 451, the Persarmenians revolted from Sasanian rule and asked for Roman assistance the 
emperor Marcian refused and quickly sent an embassy to the Sasanian Shah, Yazdgard II, to 
assure him there would be no Roman interference.138 Likewise, when the Romans were at 
war with their Lazi allies in 456 the Sasanians refused Gobaz’s, king of the Lazi, request for 
them to accept his allegiance and therefore come under their protection.139 These examples, 
especially the first, underline the success of Roman-Sasanian treaties in the fifth century, such 
as 387, which sought to end side-switching among the empires’ allies. Evidently, although the 
desires of local frontier elites to switch sides still existed in the fifth century, in contrast 
imperial desire to exploit one anothers problems had been overcome by contemporary 
circumstances and the more resolute and flexible diplomatic treaties of the period. That 
neither side was willing to break these carefully negotiated treaties underlines how much 
imperial stability was needed in this period. Due to the threats on their other frontiers 
continued peace on the imperial frontier was more important than short-term gain or 
advantage.    
 
The evolution of peace treaties during the fifth century meant that Roman-Sasanian 
diplomacy was now capable of establishing and maintaining a stable imperial relationship. 
Treaties were more durable and resilient against the inherent tensions and changes that could 
quickly take place in the Roman-Sasanian relationship and within the Roman and Sasanian 
Empires themselves. They were undoubtedly done on more ‘equal terms’ than the peace 
treaties in previous centuries were existed merely to reinforce the short-term military 
dominance of one side against the other. 140 The inclusions of longer time limits and annexes 
makes it clear that the purpose of peace treaties in this period was to provide long-term 
stability, and not to reinforce short-term control or supremacy as they had been used 
previously.  
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Diplomatic Language and Ideology 
A major consequence of the changing nature of Roman-Sasanian relations in the fifth century 
and the increased importance and prevalence of diplomatic contact was the formation of an 
ideology based on cooperation and inter-dependency alongisde the growth of diplomatic 
language of legitimacy between the two empires. The hostile and antagonistic ideology, 
epitomised by the idea of the alter orbis, of the third and fourth centuries was steadily 
substituted by ideas of interdependence, typified by the principles of ‘fraternal cooperation’, 
brotherhood and a ‘family of kings’ between Roman and Sasanian rulers.141  
The ideological ideal of brotherhood between the Roman emperor and Sasanian Shah was a 
defining feature of diplomatic language between the two rulers. 142  Diplomatic 
correspondence between Roman emperors and Sasanians Shahs had long contained symbolic 
metaphors of ‘fraternal cooperation’ and the ‘family of kings’. For example, in letters 
dispatched between Constantine, Constantius and Shapur II they called each other 
‘brother’,143 while the traditional enquiry of asking about the ‘health of their brother’ became 
a traditional element in the receiving of envoys.144 In this regard, the tradition of sending an 
envoy to announce the accession of new emperors and Shahs can be seen as a way of 
welcoming the new ruler into the ‘family of kings’. The Sasanians took this idea even further, 
in their ideological worldview the Roman and Sasanian sovereigns were related genetically, 
not just symbolically, to one another.145  
At the start of the fifth century this familial diplomatic ideology became an important tool for 
reconciliation and stability. It was from the fifth century that the most famous example of the 
Roman and Sasanian sovereigns depicting their relationship as that of a father and son 
emanates. Procopius tells us that Arcadius, fearing for the future of his young son and heir, 
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Theodosius II, appointed Yazdgard I to act as his guardian in order to secure the succession.146 
Although the veracity and historicity of Yazdgard’s adoption of Theodosius has often been 
debated, the adoption still holds significant importance in understanding the ideology 
between the two empires in this period, regardless of whether one believes it true or false.147 
It highlights the underlying assumption that Roman emperor and Sasanian Shah were of equal 
rank and that, therefore, it was at least theoretically conceivable for them to be related 
through adoption or even marriage.148 Indeed, when viewed in the context of the wider 
‘cross-cultural diplomatic language’ with its emphasis on depicting the Roman and Sasanian 
Empires as the ‘two eyes’ of the civilisation and ideals of ‘fraternal cooperation’ and ‘family 
of kings’ such a symbolic ‘adoption’ does not seem so outlandish.149 Certainly, that Agathias, 
who was critical and disbelieving of the adoption, informs us that the story ‘was repeated by 
both the upper classes and the common people’ suggests that the Romans themselves did 
not find such an arrangement tremendously incomprehensible or beyond the realms of 
possibility. 150  Likewise, that Yazdgard’s adoption of Theodosius was also mentioned and 
discussed by Zonaras, Theophanes and Cedrenus further suggests that there may have been 
some truth, and that it was not just a literary tool or fantastical story of Procopius’.151 The fact 
that more contemporary sources such as Sozomen, Theodoret and Socrates do not mention 
the adoption has elsewhere been explained by the fact that these church historians were 
writing at a time when Constantinople was once more hostile to the Sasanians, following the 
outbreak of the war in 441, and that therefore they would not wish to promote the fact that 
a non-Christian Sasanian Shah had been the guardian of Theodosius in his youth.152     
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Indeed, there is evidence, mainly from eastern sources, which suggests that there was some 
truth in Yadgard’s adoption of Theodosius II. The Synodicon Orientale contains a letter from 
Yazdgard in response to Roman bishops who had spoken out on behalf of Christians in the 
Sasanian Empire in which the Shah claimed that ‘the East and West form one power under 
the rule of my authority’.153 Although this may have been a simple boast by Yazdgard, in the 
same regard as earlier Shahs’ demands towards ownership of Roman territory, when viewed 
through the prism of the adoption and Yazdgard’s otherwise cautious and peaceful policy 
towards the Roman Empire it could also suggest that he felt he had some level of authority in 
the Roman Empire, and undoubtedly acting as the young emperors’ guardian would have 
ensured he felt justified in this belief. Indeed, a Shah who had thus far purposefully followed 
a path of caution, stability and reconciliation with the Romans would not make such a 
potentially antagonistic remark if he did not believe it to some degree. Additionally, Moses of 
Chorene informs us that there was some peaceful Sasanian intervention and involvement on 
both sides of the imperial frontier in this period.154 That this was done during a period that 
Arcadius was suffering from illness and faced trouble in Constantinople from John Chrysostom 
can be argued for further evidence that there was some form of special cooperation between 
the two rulers that may well have led to, or have been part of, Yazdgard’s eventual adoption 
of Theodosius. Therefore, alongside the aforementioned ideological connections, this 
evidence of more practical Sasanian involvement in the Roman Empire suggests that the 
adoption was not merely a metaphorical story created by Procopius and that if it was indeed 
true, at some level, Yazdgard at least took his position as Theodosius’ guardian quite seriously, 
and this would have had important consequences for the peaceful relations in the fifth 
century.155 
Certainly, for the Sasanian Empire it was not unprecedented for a trusted ally to be entrusted 
with the guardianship of an heir to the throne; Bahrām V himself was sent to be raised and 
educated by the Nasrids at Hira when a young man.156 Likewise, the notion of some guardians 
being appointed for young emperors was not unheard of in the Roman Empire. For instance, 
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Rufinus had been appointed guardian of Arcadius in his own youth, and Stilicho also claimed 
guardianship over both Arcadius and Honorius at this time.157 There is also some Roman 
evidence that supports the adoption of Theodosius by Yazdgard, which focuses on the 
position of a Persian emissary, Antiochus, in the court of Arcadius and Theodosius.158 We are 
informed that this Antiochus was sent by Yazdgard in response to a request by Arcadius,159 
and that after Arcadius’ death he was responsible for ‘bringing up’ Theodosius and acting as 
his tutor.160 
Indeed, cooperation between the empires in the fifth century expanded to even more 
sensitive dynastic matters, as evident in the striking example of a Roman envoy, Constantius, 
helping to solve a dispute between Yazdgard I and his son Bahrām, the future Bahrām V.161 
Thus, showing that this cooperative ideal did not only exist in western Roman literary tradition 
and also suggesting that both were keen to ensure stability amongst in their neighbour as a 
means to achieve stability on the joint frontier itself.162  
Adopting an heir to the Roman throne would have appealed to Yazdgard for a variety of 
reasons. First, it would have added to his personal prestige and boosted his internal 
reputation as, as the guardian of the Roman emperor, he could claim he had authority of the 
Roman Empire itself. As such, it would provide him with the necessary reputation, in relation 
to supremacy over the Roman Empire, which was expected of a Sasanian Shah, which was 
otherwise lacking in a policy of peace with the western neighbour. Secondly, Yazdgard was 
acutely aware of the need for stable relations with his western neighbour in the wake of the 
Hunnic invasion of 395 and accepting Arcadius’ proposal would have been a sure way to 
ensure this stability.  
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The pressing need for détente in the fifth century saw the expansion of the familiar language 
and ideology between the rulers into a wider ideology of imperial interdependence. The first 
example of this came from the Breviarium of Festus in the later fourth century who described 
the Roman and Sasanian Empires as the ‘two mountains’ of the world.163 The fact that Festus 
was writing shortly after the treaty of 363 reveals once again how important this treaty was 
in the development of Roman-Sasanian relations in the later fourth and fifth centuries. Yet, 
Festus was only the first of many to promote this new idea of imperial interdependence, other 
historians soon added to it. A fifth-century letter from the Synodicon Orientale and 
Theophylact Simocatta described the empires in similar terms, as the ‘two shoulders’ of the 
civilised world and the ‘two eyes’ of civilisation, respectively.164 Likewise, Peter the Patrician 
compared the empires to ‘two lamps’ and stated that ‘like eyes, [the two empires] are 
adorned by each others’ light’ and that if one of these lights went out the other was doomed 
to also fail.165 He further stressed this interdependence by arguing that conflict between the 
two neighbours would now only led to their mutual destruction. Finally, Malalas viewed the 
Roman and Sasanian empires as the two centres of civilisation. 166  This ideal of 
interdependence was also indirectly highlighted by Priscus who, when commenting that he 
hoped Attila would attack the Sasanians instead of the Romans, informs that another Roman, 
Constantiolus, was quick argue that a crippled Sasanian Empire would be disastrous for 
Constantinople as it would dramatically alter the balance of power in the whole region to the 
detriment of the Roman Empire.167 Again, this confirms the realist importance of the balance 
of power in Roman-Sasanian relations, an importance that the Romans themselves were 
aware of.  
Although Theophylact Simocatta, Peter the Patrician and Malalas come from the sixth and 
seventh centuries, the peaceful fifth century, with its emphasis on stability, détente and even, 
at times, cooperation would have played a transformative role in how later writers thought 
about the imperial relationship. Thus, during and after the fifth century the Romans and 
Sasanians now also viewed themselves as partners in civilisation with their survival dependent 
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165 Pet. Pat. fr. 13-14. 
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on the survival of the other. Importantly, in this regard, in the Roman Empire in this period 
belonging to a specific cultural group, or having an identity tag, such as Barbarian, Greek, 
Roman, Christian or Pagan was fundamental in understanding your place in wider Roman 
society, therefore, the joint Roman and Sasanian identity of Civilised evidently created a sense 
of shared identity and joint destiny that was useful in cementing stronger diplomatic 
relations.168 Indeed, international relations theory argues that those states that are similar 
tend to gravitate towards one another for help and alliances.169 
The fifth-century ideology of imperial interdependence was in stark contrast to the earlier 
imperial ideologies in the third and fourth centuries that, as already seen, were thoroughly 
antagonistic and matched the realities of the relationship itself. Therefore, just as this earlier 
ideology was based on, and a result of, the unending conflict during at that time so too did 
the ideology of independence develop from the realities of the relationship in the fifth century 
period; the need, and the necessity of peace. Furthermore, the fact that Roman historians 
were willing to record and propagate this idea shows that it was not just the Sasanians who 
believed it as is sometimes claimed.170 Indeed, it has been stated elsewhere that inter-state 
diplomacy is the result of the recognition that the performance of one is of permanent 
consequence to the other.171  
Thus the realisation among Roman and Sasanian rulers in the fifth century that the changed 
and unique conditions of the fifth century meant that they needed imperial stability and 
détente to survive the threats on their other frontiers was likely the catalyst for the 
development of this new ideology of interdependence. 172  Certainly, that it has been 
acknowledged that interdependent language in diplomacy predominantly took place when 
either one empire or the other was in a weakened position, and therefore unable or unwilling 
to engage in competition and use antagonistic language towards the other, is revealing 
                                                          
168 Miles, 1999: 10. 
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worked to undermine this. 
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here. 173  Accordingly, that both used more conciliatory language in highlighting their 
interdependence at this time underlines the fact that both the Romans and Sasanians were 
in a weakened state in the fifth century, and that neither could afford to engage in imperial 
competition or ratchet up imperial tensions. Thus, ‘recourse to equal language [was] a sign of 
need’, the need in the fifth century being peace.174 
Indeed, when one compares the diplomatic language and ideology of the third, fourth and 
even sixth centuries, when the empires were in fierce competition with one another, with the 
fifth century there is a clear contrast for which the peace was more than likely responsible. 
For example, in the preceding and succeeding centuries diplomatic correspondence between 
the sovereigns was always tinged with a competitive edge; the rival rulers always 
endeavoured to promote their supremacy over the other. Indicative of this are the letters 
sent from Shapur II to Constantius in 358 and Kavād I to Justinian in 529:  
From Shapur, king of kings, partner of the stars, brother of the sun and moon, to my brother 
Constantius, greetings.175  
Koades [Kavād], Emperor of Emperors [King of kings], of the rising sun, to Flavius Justinian 
Caesar, of the setting moon.176  
In the ancient world the sun was regarded as the greater heavenly power than the moon,177 
hence, in styling themselves as the ‘sun’ in contrast to the Roman emperor as the ‘moon’ 
Shapur and Kavād were emphasising their superiority over their rival in symbolic terms. The 
Roman responses to these letters were equally symbolically competitive. Thus, it is clear that 
even in diplomatic contact between the empires in these centuries the emperors and Shahs 
always tried to reinforce and promote their pre-eminence. Unfortunately, there are no direct 
examples of fifth-century correspondence between the two rulers; however the letter sent 
from Kavād II to Heraclius, who enjoyed cordial relations, in 628 is informative: 
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From Kavād, king of kings to Heraclius the most clement Roman emperor, our brother. We 
send greatest greeting to the most clement Roman emperor, our brother.178 
In the struggle to secure his throne Kavād was desperate for Roman assistance, which is 
reflected in his communication with Heraclius here, in which there is no evidence of 
competition or rivalry, neither practical nor symbolic. Evidently, when both empires either 
needed or wanted peace competitive language was avoided in favour or more conciliatory 
language. Therefore, although there is no direct evidence of imperial communications in the 
fifth century it is safe to assume that since both the Romans and Sasanians needed peace at 
this time communications between the two rulers would have followed a similar formula as 
that between Kavād II and Heraclius, rather than the competitive tones found in the third, 
fourth and sixth centuries.179  
This is also evident in Roman depictions of Shahs during times of conflict. In the war-torn sixth 
century, and also the third and fourth centuries, Shahs were predominantly described as 
boastful and greedy.180 Whereas, in contrast, the peaceful fifth century Shah Yazdgard I, who 
was largely responsible for setting the foundations of the more stable relationship, was 
viewed with much more admiration.181  
The ideological contrast between the peaceful fifth century and competitive sixth century is 
further evident in Justin’s refusal to adopt a Sasanian heir to the throne at the start of the 
sixth century, as Yazdgard I had done for Theodosisus II at the start of the fifth century. 
Procopius tells us that, Ğāmāsp, the Shah in question, was faced with a similar dilemma to 
the one Arcadius had confronted at the start of the fifth century in 518; the survival and 
smooth succession of his heir, Khusro, to the throne. Therefore, following the example set by 
Arcadius he approached the Roman emperor, Justin I, and asked him to act as Khusro’s 
guardian in order to secure his succession: 
I [Kavād] ask of you a certain favour in return for this, which would bind together in kinship 
and in the good-will which would naturally spring from this relation not only ourselves but our 
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subjects, and which would be calculated to bring us to a satiety of the blessings of peace. My 
proposal, then, is this, that you should make my son [Khusro], who will be my successor to the 
throne, your adopted son.182  
In making this request Kavād stressed the importance of the family of kings ideal by suggesting 
that this adoption would strengthen the ‘kinship’ between the two rulers and empires which 
would then result in ‘the blessings of peace’. However, after much debate Justin refused to 
adopt Khusro in the terms asked by Kavād, as an equal, stating that he would only adopt the 
Sasanian heir in terms ‘befitting a barbarian’. Procopius suggests this refusal was due to the 
Roman fear that adopting Khusro on equal terms would give the Sasanian a legitimate claim 
to the Roman throne183; this fear ironically proves just how potent the ideal of Roman-
Sasanian ‘fraternal cooperation’ and a ‘family of kings’ could be under the right 
circumstances. More importantly however, the fact that this request had come with the 
promise of a cessation of hostilities is even more indicative of the changed priorities of the 
Roman Empire in the sixth century. Whereas, in the fifth century the Romans needed peace 
and were willing to make pragmatic and practical concessions in order to make this happen, 
in the sixth century they were evidently unwilling to make even a largely symbolic gesture for 
the promotion of peace. As such, it is clear that once the mediating threat of the Huns and 
Vandals in the fifth century had been removed the Romans no longer had the same desire or 
need to secure peace with their Sasanian neighbour. Indeed, even if the veracity of this is 
contested, just like the earlier Yazdgard-Theodosius example, it nevertheless shows that 
Procopius was aware of the changed nature of Roman-Sasanian relations in the fifth and sixth 
centuries. 
Consequently, when peace was not necessary, the neighbouring empire had no interest in 
helping to stabilise and secure the internal state of their imperial rival as they had when peace 
was necessary. Gaining an advantage, no matter how momentary, was once again all that 
mattered in the sixth century. Evidently the ideals of ‘fraternal cooperation’ and ‘family of 
kings’ only truly existed when peace was absolutely necessary.  
 
                                                          




Frontier Defence: Payments, Tribute or Subsidies? 
The most conspicuous aspect of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy in the fifth century was how little 
it focused on military concerns. After 363 military clauses were rare, no territory was gained 
or ceded by either side, and neither did any fortresses or cities change hands. Instead, when 
military matters were discussed they were primarily concerned with cooperation and frontier 
defence.  
The mountainous Caucasian frontier separated, and protected, the Roman and Sasanian 
Empires alike from the steppe tribes in the north and it was, therefore, on this frontier that 
imperial negotiation often concentrated. Only a few routes led through this frontier and into 
the empires, the most important of which were the Caucasian Gates; it was this route that 
the Huns took during their invasion of 395.184 Consequently, shared and often competing 
interest in the Caucasus was a major tradition of the Roman-Sasanian relationship. John Lydus 
provides a succinct analysis of the role played by the Caucasus in the fifth-century Roman-
Sasanian diplomatic relationship and its importance in defending both empires against Hunnic 
incursions: 
The Persians were not strong enough to protect their own and the previously Roman 
territory…In consequence then after the luckless reign of Jovian, talks took place between our 
hyparch Salutius and the most eminent Persians, and later with Yazdgard, to the effect that 
both states would share in the costs and establish a fortress at the described entrance [of the 
Caucasus] and set up a garrison in these places in order to stop the barbarians from pouring 
through.185   
Although John Lydus’ chronology in this account has been much debated, it is nevertheless 
still useful in highlighting the main aspects of imperial cooperation in the joint defence of this 
frontier in the fifth century.186 The historian’s assessment that it was the threat of the Huns 
that instigated imperial collaboration is pertinent and validates what has been claimed 
elsewhere in this study. Indeed, as seen already, the Hunnic raid of 395 that began in the 
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Caucasus made painfully clear the need to reinforce imperial defences in this frontier.187 An 
important consequence of this invasion, and one that is stressed here by John Lydus, was that 
it proved that neither the Romans nor the Sasanians were able to defend this vulnerable 
frontier sufficiently on their own.188  
Importantly, John Lydus also demonstrates that Roman cooperation predominantly took the 
form of financial contributions to the upkeep of the forts that protected the passes though 
the Caucasus. The use of payments increased in Later Roman diplomacy in terms of cost, 
duration and purpose.189 Once again, as in most aspects of Roman foreign relations there was 
a distinction between those paid to barbarian neighbours and those made to the Sasanian 
Empire. This distinction was undoubtedly a reflection of the overall difference in complexity 
in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy compared with other peoples. Whereas payments to the 
Sasanians were granted for very specific ventures, usually for mutual assistance, such as the 
defence of the Caucasian frontier, payments to Constantinople’s other neighbours were much 
more formulaic and generic. 190 Despite their rarity and exactness, Roman financial 
contributions to the Sasanians for frontier defence were the most contentious issue in 
Roman-Sasanian diplomacy throughout the fifth century. This contention was due to the 
ambiguity and political-ideological connotations that surrounded Roman diplomatic 
payments to foreign powers in late antiquity. They were open to interpretation and could be 
manipulated to suit all political agendas. Emperors viewed such payments as diplomatic 
subsidies or rewards to loyal allies, while, in contrast, his internal critics, opponents and 
                                                          
187 Proc. BP. 1.10.3-8. Greatrex (1999: 65) shows that the Sasanians frequently made use of the fearful memory 
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external recipients viewed them as either a degrading of Roman imperial prestige or sign of 
Roman subservience respectively.   
Although negotiations about Roman payments to the Sasanian Empire were always framed 
in the context of cooperation by both sides it has been argued that the Sasanian Shahs were 
primarily interested in extracting Roman wealth, for prestige and political advantage. 191 
Certainly, successive Shahs were eager to present Roman payments as tribute to their internal 
audience in order to claim that they had made the Roman emperor and empire their tributary, 
and in doing so strengthen their internal prestige and reputation.192 Sasanian exploitation of 
Roman financial contributions in this way was a direct consequence of the fifth-century 
imperial détente itself which denied Shahs the chance to win military renown and prestige 
through military victories over the Roman rival, which, as we have already seen, was a 
traditional element in the internal legitimacy of the Sasanian Shahs in the third and fourth 
centuries. Therefore, portraying Roman payments as tribute to their internal audience 
allowed them to advertise their supremacy over the western rival in a different way that did 
not risk the détente they needed. 
Conversely, as useful as portraying Roman payments for the defence of the Caucasian frontier 
as tribute was for the Sasanians it had damaging consequences for the internal position of the 
Roman emperors who granted them. Emperors who made payments to the Sasanians usually 
earned the ire and disdain of the subjects who saw it as insult to the dignity and prestige of 
the empire.193 To counter this Roman emperors frequently portrayed Shahs who asked for 
Roman financial contributions to their internal audience as bankrupt beggars pleading for 
Roman assistance, which was only agreed to out of their magnanimous ‘generosity’, and could 
therefore be presented as a sign of Roman superiority over the Shahs. 194  
This opposing rhetoric from both sides reveals the ideological battle that took place over the 
nature of subsidies. The Sasanian exploitation of Roman contributions to frontier defence in 
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this way and the political damage it could have explains why they were contentious and why 
Roman emperors were often reluctant to make such payments.195  
The divisive nature of subsidies meant that they were negotiated and agreed to in annexes of 
the treaties rather than integrated as full clauses. 196  Annexes were utilised for areas of 
imperial contact or concern that were ambiguous and difficult to control for both empires. 
Their use ensured that Roman refusals to make diplomatic payments were not perceived as 
a breaking of the wider treaty. 197   As such, annexes were useful in avoiding, or at least 
mitigating, the criticism that domestic affairs had been dictated by an external power.198 The 
inclusion of Roman contributions to frontier defence as an annexe rather than a specific 
clause allowed the emperors to argue that they were not obligatory but discretionary and, 
therefore, allowed them to refute the idea that they were tributaries of the Sasanian 
Empire.199 Certainly, the Sasanians never considered Roman failure to pay these subsidies as 
a breach of the treaties or the wider peace itself, although as seen in the outbreak of conflict 
in 442 Roman refusal could cause resentment. 200  Thus, when Kavād declared war after 
Anastasius’ refusal in 502 Procopius claimed, with some justification, that it was the 
Sasanians, not the Romans who broke the treaty.201  
 
However, to suggest that Sasanian demands for Roman payments were concerned exclusively 
with internal prestige and political needs disregards the economic and external problems, in 
the form of the Hephthalites, the Sasanian Empire faced in the fifth century. Certainly, John 
Lydus has already shown that the Sasanians were unable to defend the Caucasian frontier on 
their own, 202 while Procopius confirms the economic problems that confronted fifth-century 
Shahs: 
                                                          
195 Leo twice refused Sasanian requests for money (Priscus, fr. 41.1, 47; Joshua Stylites, 9-10). 
196 Blockley, 1992: 161. 
197 Blockley, 1992: 150. 
198 Men.Prot. fr. 6.1 2.398-407. 
199 Josh. Styl. 8; Priscus fr. 41.1.3-27. 
200 Ibid. 161. 
201 BP. 1.17.3 
202 John Lydus, De Mag. 3.52. 
154 
  
A little later Cabades [Kavād] was owing the king of the Ephthalitae [Hephthalites] a sum of 
money which he was not able to pay him, and he therefore requested the Roman emperor 
Anastasius to lend him this money.203    
This passage reveals that the Sasanians were struggling to fulfil all their own economic 
obligations and that this led them directly to request financial assistance from the Romans. 
Indeed, the costly construction of the Gorgan Wall, the successive failed military campaigns 
against the Hephthalites, as well as the resulting tribute they then had to pay to them, and 
the famine that struck during the reign of Peroz all weakened the economic power of the 
Sasanian Empire in this period. Thus, seen in the context of the wider fifth century, Roman 
financial assistance would have been highly valued and sought after by the Shahs.  
 
The consequences of the Hunnic threat and economic woes in motivating Sasanian requests 
and demands for Roman subsidies throughout the fifth century is further confirmed by 
Peroz’s demand in 464/5 that the Romans ‘supported them [the Sasanians] with money for 
the war against the so called Kidarite Huns [Hephthalites].’204 If Peroz had wanted Roman 
payments purely for his own internal prestige he would have surely continued to demand 
them in connection with the defence of the Caucasus frontier, which had a proven record of 
success in convincing the Romans to agree rather than demand them for a completely 
different reason.205 This real need for Roman financial assistance in defending against the 
Huns is further revealed by Kavād I’s offer to hand over an important Caucasian fort to 
Anastasius at the end of the fifth century.206 A Sasanian Shah, whose primary duty it was to 
expand the empire and defend territories already held, would not contemplate giving up such 
an important and strategic military asset, and in doing so lessen Sasanian dominance in 
Transcaucasia unless he really was lacking the economic and military power to maintain it 
adequately. These two examples thus suggest that Sasanian demands for Roman financial 
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assistance did have underlying economic motive, the impetus of which was provided by the 
threat of the Huns, both in the Caucasus and north-eastern frontier. 
Another argument given by those who believe Roman payments to the Sasanians had little to 
do with real economic need or considerations was that they were small in comparison to 
subsidies paid to other neighbours in this period.207 For instance, in 443 the Romans agreed 
to pay Attila an annual subsidy of 21,000 pounds of gold and a single payment of 6000 pounds 
of gold whereas Sasanian demands were usually a more modest 400 to 500 pounds of gold.208 
However, this disparity must be seen in the context of Constantinople’s respective 
relationship with Attila and the Sasanians. Payments made to the Sasanian Empire were 
willingly given for the purpose of mutually beneficial frontier defence, whereas payments to 
Attila were forced upon the Romans to purchase immunity from aggression and stave off 
attack from a barbarian leader who was endangering the survival of the empire itself. Thus, 
the amount paid to the Sasanians was more than enough for their purposes and they were 
still considerable amounts; 400 to 500 pounds of gold could pay the wages for troops 
sufficient to garrison the fortifications protecting the Caucasian passes.209  
Sasanian demands for smaller payments may also have derived from their need for continued 
détente with the Roman Empire in the fifth century. In Roman-Sasanian diplomacy making 
unacceptable demands of the other, knowing they would be forced to refuse, was a common 
ploy to make declaring war justifiable.210 As such, it could be suggested that the Sasanians 
only made demands for 400-500 pounds of gold as they did not want to anger the Romans to 
such an extent that it might have risked damaging the détente. In this regard, it is important 
to note that Roman payments to the Sasanian Empire in the sixth century, when both empires 
were once again more interested in competition than peace, increased exponentially. For 
example, Procopius informs us that in 532 Constantinople agreed to a payment of 11,000 
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pounds of gold and that likewise in 551 the Romans agreed to pay the Sasanians 2,600 pounds 
of gold.211 This therefore could suggest that, unlike in the fifth century when the Sasanians 
did not wish to anger the Romans and risk the peace, in the sixth century when the Roman 
and Sasanians were once again at war, and Justinian needed stability in Mesopotamia in order 
to pursue his western campaigns, the Sasanians were keen to exploit this for their own 
advantage. 
 
The nature of payments, as predominantly concerned with frontier defence against the Huns 
again reinforces the overall importance these other threats had in the fifth-century Roman-
Sasanian relationship. While, the subtle use of annexes that that allowed the Sasanians to ask 
or demand payments yet also ensured Roman refusal did not result in direct hostilities 




The steady development of imperial diplomacy in the later fourth and fifth centuries at the 
same time as the increasing danger of the Huns, Vandals and Hephthalites threatened the 
two empires on their other frontiers was no mere accident or coincidence, it was a necessary 
move that was prompted directly by the changing circumstances of the fifth century. 212 The 
development of imperial diplomacy in this period saw it move away from being merely 
another form of competition, to being able to act as a substitute and avenue for the creation 
of peace between the two empires in the fifth century. Importantly, the fact that it was only 
in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy that this change took place, and that in their diplomatic 
relations with their other barbarian neighbours the Romans still used diplomacy as just 
another form of warfare and means of domination, reinforces that this change was stimulated 
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by the political and military necessities both empires faced in the fifth century, rather than 
any general desire to become more peaceful states.213  Developments in the role of the 
magister officiorum, the sending of individual ambassadors in multiple embassies and the 
written recording of peace treaties gave fifth-century Roman-Sasanian diplomacy greater 
continuity and stability that was essential for any long-term détente or stability between 
them.   
The development of diplomacy over time throughout the fifth century reinforces that the 
détente itself was a process that was constantly adapted to overcome new obstacles and 
challenges as and when they arose. Likewise, the fact that these treaties were signed in order 
to allow the two empires to protect themselves from the more dangerous threats on their 
other frontiers shows that their own security was the primary motivation and thus the 
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 Third-Parties & Frontier Zones  
 
As the Roman-Sasanian competition increased in intensity and geographic extent in the third 
and fourth century different regions and frontier peoples were pulled deeper into the 
conflict.1 When imperial conflict in Mesopotamia ground to a stalemate in the fourth century 
both empires sought to win the loyalty of the local elites in the frontier zones of 
Transcaucasia, Armenia and Arabia in an order to tilt the overall balance of power in their 
favour.2  
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the imperial détente was that it took longer to 
implement in the frontier zones than in it did Mesopotamia, where the two empires faced 
each other directly. As already seen, the balance of power in Mesopotamia was stabilised 
relatively early in 363 whereas the settlements in Armenia and Arabia were not reached until 
387 and 422 respectively. Although the largest clashes between imperial armies 
predominantly took place in Mesopotamia it was imperial tension and suspicion in the 
frontier zones that usually instigated wider conflicts. As such, it is important to investigate 
why this was the case and to understand why these frontier zones so often acted as casus 
belli. 
The focus of this chapter will be Armenia and Arabia. These two geographically distant regions 
have been chosen for a number of reasons. First, they both feature extensively in the Roman 
and Sasanian sources, implying that the two empires themselves, or the historians of the two 
empires at least, regarded these regions as significant. Secondly, it was in these two frontier 
zones that larger wars and conflicts frequently erupted in the third and fourth centuries. 
Thirdly, the Armenian and Arab elites, the Armenian nahkharars and Arab tribal leaders, 
                                                          
1 Waltz (2008: 100-105) discusses the importance of frontier zones in realist interstate relations in bipolar 
systems, which is particularly relevant to this study, by stating that middle-states (such as frontier zones) could 
act with impunity because they were aware that their actions would have no measurable effect on the overall 
power of the two major states. Indeed, as shall be shown below, this was the case with the frontier Armenian 
and Arabian elites in the Roman-Sasanian relationship.  
2 Fisher, 2011: 30. 
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became third-parties in the Roman-Sasanian relationship to a much greater extent than Lazi 
or Tzani and were frequently able to exert their own ambitions and influence on the two more 
powerful imperial powers. For these reasons, in the search for peace in the fifth century 
securing a mutually acceptable détente in Armenia and Arabia was an intrinsically important 
and necessary step. 
 
Indirect Rule 
The frontier zones should not be seen as areas of strict military and territorial demarcation 
between the empires, as was the case in Mesopotamia, but rather as areas of varying and 
constantly fluctuating degrees of indirect rule.3 Therefore, it is important to stress that the 
empires competed to control the local powerful families and dynasties rather than specific 
territory. This contest for the loyalty of local Arab, Armenian, Lazi and Tzani elites affected 
the very nature of the imperial competition and presence in these regions; imperial authority 
was secured through indirect rule rather than direct domination. 
It was this indirect rule which made a diplomatic solution to imperial tensions in these regions 
so difficult. Indirect rule, with its inherent ambiguities and opacities, is never as clearly defined 
as strict territorial control. As such, unlike in Mesopotamia where the 363 treaty established 
a mutually acceptable balance of power relatively easily based on the control of specific 
territories and particular forts and cities such a settlement was simply not possible in these 
indirectly ruled frontier zones. The local frontier elites, with their own ambitions and needs, 
played too significant a role for this to happen. Indeed, the nature of indirect rule gave extra 
importance and influence to the local elites upon whom imperial authority rested which they 
could exploit to their own advantage. The competition for the loyalty of the self-serving local 
elites in Armenia and Arabia was a source of much antagonism and ambiguity that heightened 
                                                          
3 Indeed, local elites had always maintained a certain level of political autonomy in the frontier zones between 
the Roman Empire and its eastern neighbour, whether the Parthians or the Sasanians (Sommer, 2012: 241). In 
this regard, the question posed on the earlier position of buffer zones and frontier peoples between Roman and 
Parthian Empires is equally relevant for the later relationship between the Roman and Sasanian Empires; ‘The 
question is therefore not; was Palmyra a city belonging to the Roman Empire, but rather: how far did Roman 
influence and control reach Palmyra?’ (Sommer, 2005: 287). This can easily be rephrased to fit into the context 
of later Roman-Sasanian relations; the question is not therefore whether Armenia (or Arabia) was control by the 
Roman Empire (or the Sasanian Empire) but rather: how far did Roman (or Sasanian) influence and control reach 
Armenia (or Arabia). 
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mistrust and suspicion between the Romans and Sasanians. No lasting peace would have been 
possible while the two empires continued to compete, or were induced to compete by the 
frontier peoples, militarily, diplomatically or even culturally for supremacy over these 
strategically important lands. Equally, as we have already seen neither empire had the 
resources to become embroiled in conflict while they were so threatened by their respective 
Hunnic threats on their northern frontiers. This imperial distrust, the relative autonomy of 
Arab and Armenian elites and the fact that neither empire had full control ensured previous 
attempts to resolve tensions in these regions, which were based on territorial divisions, were 
doomed to fail. Consequently, solving these problems and reaching an accommodation that 
was able to overcome the difficulties inherent in competitive indirect rule was not only 
desirable but a necessity in the fifth century if the much needed peace was to be firmly 
established. The improvements in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy in the fifth century allowed the 
empires to find subtle and innovative solutions to the challenging conditions of these 
important frontier zones that had previously eluded them. 
 
In order to analyse how the Romans and Sasanians managed to resolve Armenia and Arabia 
as causes of conflict between them in 387 and 421 respectively it is important to investigate 
a variety of aspects of these frontier zones in relation to what made them so important to the 
relationship between the Roman and Sasanian Empires. Primarily, the geopolitical and 
strategic importance of Arabia and Armenia, the nature of the conflict between the Roman-
Sasanian conflict in these frontier zones, the ability of the local elites to act as ‘third-parties’, 
and manipulate the empires into confrontation and finally the ways in which the two powers 







3.1: Armenia and the Armenians 
 
The Contest for Control  
The geopolitical and strategic importance of Armenia ensured it always played a defining role 
in Roman-Sasanian relations. Indeed, it remained a major grievance and source of dispute 
between them from 244, when Philip the Arab was forced to renounce Roman control of 
Armenia, until the Arab conquests in the seventh century. Both sides wanted to dominate the 
region in order to strengthen their own position and advantage over the other. The strategic 
importance of Armenia, interposed as it was, and is, between the Near East and Middle-East 
was that it acted as a cross-roads between the east and west, simultaneously separating and 
connecting Greek poleis, Rome and Byzantium from the Achaemenid, Parthian and Sasanian 
Empires respectively in different stages of its history. Likewise, and arguably more important 
for Roman-Sasanian relations in the fifth century, it performed a similar role  in both 
separating and connecting the northern steppe nomads and the sedentary civilisations based 
in Mesopotamia. 4 Control of this important cross-roads provided many benefits and was 
constantly contested between the two empires. 
For the Romans control of Armenia granted them two key strategic advantages over their 
Sasanian rival. First, it acted as a buffer zone, protecting the richer provinces of Syria and 
Mesopotamia.5 Secondly, and more importantly, the region was frequently used as a staging 
post for Roman attacks on the Sasanian Empire. For the Sasanians then, control of Armenia 
was strategically important in their efforts to shut this Roman ‘corridor’ of attack.6 Certainly, 
when launching campaigns against their imperial rival the Romans always enlisted the help of 
their Armenian allies. For instance, the military assistance of the Armenian king was 
fundamental to Galerius’ victory in 298.7 Even more tellingly, in 363 Julian, convinced of the 
invincibility of the Roman army, refused all offers of assistance from his allies except from the 
                                                          
4 Russell, 2005: 25. Lang (1983: 505) supports this assessment saying that the Caucasus range had always 
separated the Eurasian Steppe form the more civilised centres in Mesopotamia and Anatolia. 
5 Poirot (2003: 1) confirms Armenia’s use as a buffer zone in Roman-Parthian relations, in which although it did 
not have the fundamentlal strategic importance as it did in Roman-Sasanian relations was still important. 
6 Lang, 1983: 518-9. 
7 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 128. 
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Armenian king, who he insisted played an important role.8 However, it did seem that the 
Sasanians were more aware of the region’s underlying military and strategic importance in 
the overall balance of power. They were quicker to realise that control of Armenia was the 
key to overpowering and outmanoeuvring their western rival. This is most evident in Shapur 
II’s decision to concentrate his military efforts on Armenia even after his victory over Julian 
left Roman Syria and Mesopotamia almost defenceless and anxiously awaiting Sasanian 
invasion.9 This concern with the position of Armenia was also confirmed by the Sasanian 
protocol wherein whenever a contingent of Armenian cavalry arrived at Ctesiphon they would 
be received by a delegate sent by the Shah who would enquire about the welfare and 
situation of Armenia.10 
 It can also be argued that Armenia held more political and ideological importance for the 
Sasanians then it did for the Romans. This political importance came from the fact that 
Armenia was ruled by a branch, and was the last refuge, of the Arsacid family, whom the 
Sasanians had overthrown during Ardashir’s initial rebellion in 224.11 The survival of a branch 
of the old ruling family was a threat to the Sasanians and a challenge to their legitimacy. 
Indeed, the Armenian Arsacids regarded the Sasanians as their sworn blood enemies.12 To 
counter this challenge it became an entrenched Sasanian policy to promote members of their 
dynasty, usually a son of the ruling Shah, to the Armenian throne, in a challenge to the Arsacid 
Armenian monarchy and in a bid to weaken their hold on the region and bind it close to 
Ctesiphon.13 This close connection between the Sasanian Shah and Armenian king, when he 
was elected by the Sasanians themselves of course, was confirmed by the fact that when 
invited to attend royal banquets the Armenian king shared the seat of the Shah.14  
Its position as a cross-road between the Roman and Sasanian Empires ensured it was 
important area in, and prospered from, east-west trade, evident in the fact that Artaxata was 
                                                          
8 Amm. Marc. 23.2.1. 
9 On the expected Sasanian attack on Roman Mesopotamia see: Zosimus (4.4.1) and Socrates (HE 4.2). On the 
fact that Shapur attacked Armenian instead see: Ammianus Marcellinus (27.12). Shapur II also used Armenia as 
a means of striking a blow against the Roman Empire (Lib. Or. 59.71-72; Eus. V .4.56). 
10 Chaumont, 1986. This is strikingly similar to the diplomatic protocol in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy which 
dictated that the Shahs asked Roman envoys about the health and well-being of the emperor. 
11 Agathangelos 18-20. 
12 Thomson, 2009: 157. 
13 SKZ § 18, 20. Here the son of Shapur I, Hormizd-Ardashir, is described as the ‘Great King of Armenia’. Garsoïan 
(2004: 73) also acknowledges this policy. 
14 Chaumont, 1986.  
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selected as one of only three official trade hubs between the two empires and the wealth of 
Dvin.15 Merchants travelled from all over the ancient world, from Persia, Syria and Palestine, 
to trade and exchange goods in Armenia.16 The region also benefited from plentiful and 
lucrative natural resources, the most famous of these were the Pharangion gold mines which 
were a huge source of wealth.17 The importance of Armenia’s economic resources in the 
imperial competition was evident in Kavād I’s insistence on these mines being returned to 
Sasanian jurisdiction during the negotiations of the Eternal Peace in 530/1. Human resources 
were equally considerable, Armenia was densely populated,18 and thus provided a ready 
supply of skilled soldiers that both Constantinople and Ctesiphon were keen to utilise and 
exploit for their own benefit.19  
Armenia was also the site of religious competition between the empires. Each empire tried to 
spread their respective Christian and Zoroastrian religions amongst the Armenians as a means 
of furthering their overall influence in the region. Indeed, Armenia was one of the few regions 
outside of Eran that the Sasanians attempted to forcefully impose Zoroastrianism.20 Moses of 
Chorene grants an insight into how religion both instigated and intensified imperial conflicts 
in Armenia; 
Remember the sworn agreement of your father Constantine, which was [made] to our king 
Tiridates; and do not give this country of yours over to the godless Persians, but assist us with 
your forces, in order to create as king the son of Tiridates, Khusro. For God has made you lord 
not only of Europe but also of the Midde-lands.21 
Although the veracity of Moses of Chorene is hotly debated, not least due to his bias towards 
the Armenian Bagratuni clan, he is still nevertheless a useful source of information. His use of 
Greek, Jewish and Syriac sources meant that he was the most well-informed of the early 
Armenian historians. 22  This ‘sworn agreement’ Moses mentions refers to the alliance 
                                                          
15 On Artaxata see: Menander Protector (fr. 6.1; CJ 4.63.4). On Dvin see: Procopius (BP. 2.25.1-3). In general see: 
Dignas & Winter (2007: 174). 
16 Malalas 18.63. The historian’s assessment is confirmed by the huge variety of coins found in the region 
(Chaumont, 1987: 433). 
17 Proc. BP. 1.15.26-9; Malalas 18.50-1; Strabo, Geography 11.14.9. 
18 Amm. Marc. 27.12.2-3. 
19 Dignas & Winter, 2007:174; Greatrex, 2005: 493. 
20 KKZ; SKZ § 17-18. 
21 3.5.  
22 Thomson, 2000: 662. 
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between the newly converted Constantine, and the Armenian king Tiridates, the first major 
political leader to officially convert to Christianity in 301, it underlines the idea of the Christian 
Roman Empire as protector of Christian Armenia.23 The letter itself, sent from Armenian 
bishops to Constantius, highlights that religious concerns quickly developed into a cause of 
conflict and hostility between the two empires in Armenia. Internal religious divisions and 
tensions in the region frequently resulted in the intervention or involvement of the imperial 
powers who viewed themselves as the ultimate protectors and guardians of Christianity and 
Zoroastrianism respectively. For example, in 365 Shapur II systematically sacked and 
destroyed major Christian towns and in 499 Yazdgard I began a policy of forced conversion to 
Zoroastrianism in Armenia.24 Likewise, Christian Armenians would attack Zoroastrians and 
Zoroastrian sites; they ‘uprooted the fire shrines’ and ‘killed the Magians’. 25  Thus, the 
religious history of Armenia during the Roman-Sasanian competition became one of forced 
conversions, deportations and martyrdoms which acted as a breeding ground of imperial 
hostilities. 
It was this combination of strategic, economic, political and religious considerations that 
stimulated imperial competition over Armenia. Control over this vital region pushed the 
empires into conflict in 296 and provoked Constantine’s for war in 337. 26  Both sides 
frequently justified military attacks and hostilities against one another by criticising their 
actions in Armenia. The first example of this came in 252 when Shapur I justified his attack 
against the Roman Empire by claiming the Romans had done ‘wrong to Armenia’.27 Likewise, 
in the protracted conflict between Shapur II and Constantius in the fourth century both 
legitimised their actions by citing Armenia. For example, Shapur defended his right to attack 
the Romans by claiming that ‘I owe it to myself to recover Armenia…which my grandfather 
[Narseh] was deprived by deliberate deceit’ while he himself was accused by the Romans of 
‘laying unlawful hands on Armenia’.28 Furthermore, even after the treaty of 363 had created 
a mutually acceptable settlement in the Mesopotamian frontier Armenia still caused, and was 
                                                          
23 On Tiridates’ conversion see: Agathangelos (877) and Epic Histories (3.21). Although Agathangelos’ claim to 
be a Roman scribe and eye-witness of the conversion has been doubted (Lang, 1978). 
24 Lang, 1983:520-1. 
25 Joshuan Stylites 21 (249.25-8). 
26 Barnes, 1985. 
27 SKZ § 4.5. 
28 Amm. Marc. 17.5.6, 26.4.5-6. 
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the site, of conflict as evident in Valens’ preparation of a campaign to win back Roman 
dominance in the region in the 360s and 370s.29 Whatever the exact reasons and justifications 
given by the Romans or Sasanians at different times, Armenia was undoubtedly a major and 




Despite this importance, however, Armenia, or more specifically the Armenians themselves, 
were a confusing and ambiguous presence to both the imperial powers and modern scholars 
alike. Tacitus, writing about the earlier Roman-Parthian relationship, remarked about the 
Armenians: 
They have been an ambiguous race from ancient times, both in the instincts of the people and 
in their country’s situation, since, extending a broad frontier along our provinces, they stretch 
deep into the Medes; they are interposed between and more often disaffected toward these 
greatest of empires, with hatred for the Romans and resentment of the Parthian.30  
Although writing in the first century Tacitus’ assessment is still pertinent to the fifth-century 
Roman-Sasanian relationship as the Armenians were still trapped between two larger powers 
both of whom sought to impose their own authority on Armenian lands; the fundamental 
situation of the Armenians did not change dramatically between the centuries. Likewise, that 
the Armenians were considered an ‘ambiguous race’ was as true in the fifth century as it was 
in the first. Indeed, even modern scholarship finds it difficult to penetrate Armenian 
ambiguity and establish a concrete definition of ancient Armenia was.31 This difficulty arises 
from competing ideas about how Armenia should be understood; whether as a precise 
geographical entity with clearly defined borders or rather more loosely as a specific ethnic 
group bonded together through shared cultural heritage, but not fully united fully either 
                                                          
29 Greatrex, 2000: 44. 
30 Annals 2.56. 
31 Highlighted by Dignas & Winter‘s (2007: 173) assertion that ‘it is not easy to say what exactly “Armenia” was’ 
and Greatrex’s (2005: 496) warning that caution is needed when speaking of Armenia 
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politically or geographically.32 As we shall see, this is not just a scholarly debate, Roman and 
Sasanian understanding of Armenia and the Armenians affected the success or failure of their 
diplomatic solutions in the region. Moreover, any attempted definition of Armenia was, and 
is, always liable to radical change due to date, context and perspective. As such, given that 
throughout late antiquity there were three differing perspectives, Roman, Sasanian and 
Armenian, and two different contexts, the imperial competition in the third and fourth 
centuries and the need for imperial détente in the fifth century, this ambiguity was 
compounded. Such uncertainty only furthered imperial suspicion and mistrust creating more 
sources of tension and conflict. 
 
Central to the Armenians as an ‘ambiguous race’, and also highlighted by Tacitus, was the 
aforementioned position of Armenia as a cross-road between the Roman west and the 
Sasanian east. This geographic ‘situation’ created a hybrid culture in Armenia that contained 
influences from its two larger imperial neighbours.33  
Armenia and Persia had been historically, geographically, politically and culturally connected 
since the time of the Achaemenid Empire, therefore, the Armenian nakharars in particular 
traditionally had closer ties with the Sasanian Empire than they did with the Romans. For 
example, Roman writers frequently describe the similarities in the dress and manners of the 
Armenian and Sasanian nobility.34 Furthermore, the socio-political situation in Armenia and 
the Sasanian Empire were also similar; both were dominated by great noble houses who held 
their position and wealth hereditarily. In this regard, there were also strong ties of kinship 
between the similar Armenian and Sasanian nobility due to frequent intermarriage between 
them. 35  Indeed, even the Christian Tiridates did not break all his connections with the 
Sasanian Empire, he remained in contact with prince Hormizd, even before his exile. 36 
                                                          
32 Thomson (2000: 662) wonders if Armenia was a strict geographical entity where were its actual borders and 
frontiers; if a people, what were the bonds that bonded them; religious, cultural or political. 
33 Lang (1983: 517) speaks of ‘hybrid manners and culture’. 
34 Strabo, Geography 11.14.5. 
35 Thomson, 2009: 157. 
36 Zos. 2.27. 
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Consequently, there was a strong sense of kinship and commonality between the Armenian 
and Sasanian elites throughout their history. 
However, this Sasanian cultural hegemony was increasingly challenged by Roman influence 
after the third century. In 301 Armenia, under Tiridates III (287-330), became the first state 
to officially embrace Christianity, therefore coupled with Constantine’s conversion in 312 and 
later establishment of Christianity as the religio franca of the Roman Empire a new powerful 
Christian connection between the Romans and Armenians was established. Thereafter, 
Roman emperors and Armenian kings viewed themselves as ‘dear brother[s]’, with ‘Christ the 
lord as the common denominator’ in the ‘steadfast friendship between the [Roman and 
Armenian] kingdoms’. 37  Likewise, official correspondence occasionally emphasised their 
shared religion.38 Furthermore, despite their occasional doctrinal debates there is equally 
evidence that friendly relations between Roman and Armenian bishops were still possible 
under the right circumstances.39 The Romans were quick to use this new religious connection 
to further their own political and cultural influence in the region, at the expense of the 
Sasanians.40  That this religious influence did result in political influence is highlighted by 
Moses of Chorene who relates that, even when the Armenians had become aggrieved by the 
actions and attitude of their king, Artashir, they rejected the idea of ‘hand[ing] him over to 
the lawless [Sasanians] to be derided and mocked’ and instead sent him to be judged by the 
Christian Roman emperor, Theodosius I.41 
Nevertheless, despite the cultural influences from the Roman and the Sasanian Empires the 
Armenians, especially the powerful nakharars, retained and maintained their own cultural 
identity, of which they were fiercely proud and protective. This native Armenian culture 
predominantly expressed Armenian identity in terms of conflict, particularly in the struggle to 
maintain its own distinct character,42 therefore, the imperial competition for both political 
                                                          
37 Agathangelos 877. 
38 Elishé 3.77 (in a letter to Theodosius II); Sebeos 46.151-2 (in a letter to Constans II). 
39 Firmus of Casaerea, Epistle 22. 
40 Garsoїan, 1997: 81; Ajdojsttz, 1970: 3. As Chaumount (1986: 427) makes clear, ‘Christianisation tended to 
strengthen Armenia’s link with the Roman Empire and to set back the Iranian cultural influence.’  
41 3.63. 
42 Russell, 2005: 49. Adontz (1979: 8) goes as far as to suggest that Armenian culture as a whole would be 
dramatically altered as a result of political domination by either empire. 
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and cultural domination of Armenia, and the nakharars resistance and exploitation of this, 
created the perfect environment for the formulation and strengthening of the native culture.  
This hotbed of cultural competition, rivalry and hybridity further complicated matters, 
causing ambiguity and misinterpretation in the policies and understanding of the imperial 
powers towards Armenia and the Armenians. It was because of this ambiguity and suspicion 
that the Romans believed the region was particularly vulnerable to Sasanian influence, 
believing that it ‘was always in a state of disorder, and for this reason an easy prey for the 
[Sasanians].’43 That they both had significant cultural influence in Armenian ensured that they 
felt they had vested interests in Armenia that they were not willing to see diminish to the 
advantage of their rival. It also affected the political outlook of the Armenians themselves, as 
nakharar loyalties, whether in support of one empire over the other, or even in more internal 
politics, were never consistent and always apt to quick and often dramatic change.44 This 
confusing and complicated situation increased the potential for conflict as both empires 
attempted to utilise their cultural influence to increase their political control.  
 
 
The Role and Influence of the Armenian Nakharars 
Towards a Definition of ‘Armenia’  
As already noted, there has been much debate about the nature of Armenia and how it should 
be understood. Having a clearly defined idea of what Armenia was is essential in 
understanding the role it played in Roman-Sasanian relations.45 As such, it will be argued here 
that Armenia should be regarded not as a geographically stable or politically cohesive whole 
but as a distinct ethnic group that was united by a shared cultural heritage and traditions that 
were separated into competing political centres; in the same circumstances as the Greek 
                                                          
43 Proc. BV. 1.1.16. 
44 Thomson, 2009: 156. 
45 The importance of which is seen by Garsoïan’s (1971) instructive and insightful attempt to ‘redefine’ what 
Armenia was in the fourth century. 
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poleis of the fourth and fifth centuries B.C.46 This analogy rests on the fiercely independent 
Armenian noble families, the nakharars, fulfilling the same role as the earlier autonomous 
poleis did in Greece. Certainly, like the Greek city-states, the fifty major nakharar clans, 
including the Mamikonean, Bagarunti, Artsauni, Guaramid, Chosroid and Kamsarakan, prized 
their autonomy and right to rule within their own territories independently, without 
interference from the Arsacid Kings, Romans or Sasanians, above all else. Also, similarly to the 
earlier Greek poleis, the Armenian noble clans competed fiercely with each other for 
supremacy and prestige. Indicative of this internal Armenian disunity was the fact that even 
the fifth-century Armenian historians were divided in their loyalty between the clans. For 
example, whereas Moses of Chorene was pro-Bagtrid his counter-part Lazar P’arpets’i 
supported their rivals, the Mamikonean.47   
The power and position of the clans rested fundamentally on their landed power and jealously 
guarded rights and privileges, the most important of which was autonomy in their own 
territories.48 Their territories were extensive, for example, the Mamikonean clan held sway 
over all the lands of Tao, Begrevand and Taron while the Bagratuni controlled vast Sper.49 The 
head of each clan (the tanuter) ruled their lands, in which they held judicial and administrative 
power, as virtual kings.50 Indeed, one contemporary Armenian remarked of the position of 
the tanuter in their lands that ‘every magnate was on his throne’.51 Armenia had been divided 
into several virtually independent kingdoms or principalities since the Seleucid period, 
therefore, by the time of the Roman-Sasanian relationship autonomy and hereditary rights 
were a deeply entrenched part of the nakharars’ mentality.52 The power and control of the 
nakharars over the lands they ruled was cemented by the fact that the vast majority of the 
Armenian population were peasants who owed military and labour services to them. 53 
Alongside this, the later development of the Armenian Church also deepened the political 
control and power of the nakharars, as bishoprics were established in correspondence with 
                                                          
46 Halsall (2007 :38) argues that ‘the only common factor in defining ethnicity is belief; in the reality of your 
group and the difference of others’, and indeed this belief in regarding themselves as distinct from both imperial 
powers was apparent in the actions of the nakharars during this period. 
47 Thomson, 2000: 662-3. 
48 Garsoïan, 2005; Thomson, 2009: 159. 
49 Thomson, 2009: 159. 
50 Garsoïan, 2004: 77. 
51 Epic Histories 4.2. 
52 Lang, 1983: 510. 
53 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 176. 
171 
  
the territorial divisions between the clans and the bishops themselves were largely anointed 
from the ranks of the different clans. Indeed, even the office of Catholicos, the leader of the 
Armenian Church, was reserved for the Pahlavuni clan until 439 as a hereditary right; thus 
showing that even Christianity could not escape nakharar domination.54   
Although the Arsacid kings were the nominal head of state in Armenia, they were not absolute 
monarchs in the same way as the Roman emperor or Sasanian Shah. Instead, their leadership 
was based more on hegemonic authority that was begrudgingly accepted and frequently 
challenged by the nakharars. This political system and the internal position of the kings was 
dependent upon negotiation and the granting of privileges and offices to the princes in 
exchange for their loyalty, which was perpetually tentative nevertheless. For example, the 
Mamikonean clan used their position, and the monarchy’s need for their loyalty, to obtain 
the rank of chief military officer (Sparapet) as a hereditary right of their family from the kings. 
Likewise, their chief rivals, the Bagratuni, were granted the office of the t’agakap, which gave 
them right to crown incoming kings, a very useful card to hold in the turbulent internal politics 
of Armenia. 55  The Mamikonean and Bagratuni monopoly of the most important offices 
enabled them to cement their supremacy and authority over other nakharars. Again this 
corresponds to the earlier Greek hegemonic institutions such as the Delian and 
Peloponnesian Leagues wherein the most powerful members exercised authority over the 
other smaller members. It is also illustrative that the Spartan and Athenian leaders of these 
leagues were able to establish firmer and more stringent control over their fellow poleis than 
the Arsacid kings were able to over their turbulent nakharars. Thus suggesting that, inter-
nakharar politics were even more unstable than that of the relations between different poleis 
in Classical Greece.56  
The mountainous and isolated geography and topography of Armenia aided the nakharars in 
defending and maintaining their autonomy and made it extremely difficult for foreign powers 
to fully conquer and militarily dominate the region as a whole; again the parallels with the 
Greek poleis in the fourth and fifth centuries are striking in this regard.57 Another parallel to 
                                                          
54 Thomson, 2009: 160. 
55 Thomson, 2009: 159; Lenski, 2002: 154.  
56 On the relationship between Greek poleis see: Hansen (2006: 127-131) and Low (2009) among many others. 
57 Thus the historical development of Armenia in this period supports Adontz’s (1970: 8) theory that physical 
environment and geographical setting determine the evolution of different nations and peoples. For further 
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the Greek poleis was Armenia’s political fragmentation, each individual nakharar was always 
concerned predominantly with their own success and position.58 Consequently, it is wrong to 
regard Armenia as politically united whole, and, as such, it is difficult, and usually incorrect, 
to make any generalisations about Armenian policy towards their imperial neighbours given 
that these nakharars rarely acted in unison and often rebelled against the authority of the 
Arsacid Armenian monarchy. The different, competing and fluctuating ambitions of the 
individual nakharars ensured that their foreign policies towards the Romans and Sasanians 
were also individual, competitive and fluctuating. 
 
There was one underlying element that united the otherwise disparate nakharars whatever 
their political differences, competing ambitions or even loyalties to the imperial powers, 
however; shared culture. This shared cultural heritage ensured that the competing nakharars 
felt ties of kinship with each other due to their shared Armenian culture. The bonds that 
connected this politically diverse ethnic group as Armenians were just as strong as those that 
created the sense of shared Hellenism in Classical Greece.59 The most important aspects of 
this shared culture in creating ties between the noble clans were language and religion. 
Shared language is arguably the strongest unifying force in creating a sense of shared identity 
in any group. The strongest historical example of this is once again the importance of Greek 
language in fomenting the development of a distinct Greek identity.60 Language as a collective 
and unifying force between the nakharars reached its zenith in the fifth century with the 
creation of the Armenian alphabet.61 The development of an independent Armenian alphabet 
was central to the strengthening of a distinct Armenian identity as it allowed the noble clans 
                                                          
details on the effect mountainous country can have on the development of societies, both internally and 
externally see: Jameson (1989: 13). 
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to communicate with one another in their own language rather than in that of the Romans or 
Sasanians.  
As already stated, Armenian cultural identity was at its most dynamic and forceful when it 
strove to protect its own distinct character from outside influences, therefore, in this regard, 
Tiridates II’s early conversion to Christianity in 301 was important. Similarly to the earlier 
Greek religion, this new shared Christianity created collective traditions and cooperative 
obligations between the competing nakharars. Conversion to Christianity had a two-fold 
effect: first, it bound the disparate and divided Armenians closer to each other, at least the 
majority in the western regions who did convert, and secondly, it distanced the Armenians 
from the Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire while also, especially after Constantine’s later 
conversion in 312, resulting in closer ties with the Roman Empire. Yet, the later development 
of the Armenian Church, headed by the Catholicos, helped to cement Armenian religious 
independence by distancing them from the influence of their Roman counterparts, thus 
ensuring they did not become religiously dominated by Constantinople. The aforementioned 
invention of the Armenian alphabet was again important in entrenching this distinct 
Armenian religious and cultural identity as it meant that Armenian bishops could debate 
doctrine with their counterparts in the Roman west as well as engage in religious discourse 
amongst themselves, insulated from Roman interference.  
 
Hence, Armenia is best understood, and was defined, by its nakharars who were politically 
separate and independent, with different and often competing ambitions and aspirations, 
yet, at the same time connected culturally. This definition of Armenia is also reinforced by the 
policies pursued by the imperial powers themselves in trying to dominate the region. From a 
Roman and Sasanian point of view Armenia existed as an arena of varying degrees of largely 
indirect rule. Central to this policy were the nakharars whose loyalty the empires competed 
over as means of extending their own influence in the region. 62  In such a culturally 
ambiguous, politically fluid and geographically isolated environment as Armenia the pursuit 
of indirect rule rather than direct rule, installed strictly by military domination, proved much 
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more effective. The more powerful, influential, or in strategic terms, more needed, a 
particular clan was, the more autonomy the imperial powers were willing to grant them in 
exchange for their loyalty. Yet, whenever the Romans or Sasanians gained a seemingly 
unassailable ascendancy over the other in Armenia and tried to bring their allies under 
increased direct control which was detrimental to the preservation of the nakharars’ 
autonomy they were quick to switch their allegiance to the other empire, who would promise 
to respect their independence. Therefore, the position of the Armenian nakharars in their 
relations with the Roman and Sasanian Empires was in a constant state of flux, wholly 
incompatible with stable peaceful relations. 
 
The Nakharars and the Imperial Patrons 
The nature of the imperial competition in Armenia and their pursuit of indirect rule meant 
that the nakharars were able to act as third-players in Roman-Sasanian relations, exploiting 
and manipulating the imperial rivalry for their own benefit. 
Corresponding to the definition of Armenia as defined primary by the autonomous nakharars 
rather than as a cohesive and united state, individual nakharars-Roman-Sasanian relations 
should equally be viewed independently. Each individual clan had different and often vastly 
contrasting foreign policies towards to two imperial powers. The social and political structure 
of the nakharars within internally divided Armenia granted them flexibility in their foreign 
relations.63 Their autonomy and flexibility permitted the division, or distribution, of individual 
clan members between multiple layers of loyalty between the two empires; as a way of 
hedging their bets. For example, during 450 the Mamikonean clan had one member of their 
family leading a rebellion in Persarmenia while simultaneously another kinsman was serving 
as a Roman general.64 For the clans this granted great political flexibility and manoeuvrability, 
limiting the risks of total defeat or imperial domination. However, from the Roman and 
Sasanian perspective this proved an insurmountable block to full control or annexation of 
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Armenia. While, the fact that there were fifty such clans gives an insight into how varied and 
complicated this competition for influence could be.  
 
Internal Armenian politics were dominated by the ceaseless tension between the monarchy 
and the nakharars; Arsacid control over their kingdom was never fully secure or stable.65 This 
tension was caused by the nakharars’ belief that their rights and privileges predated and 
superseded royal power and were therefore more sacrosanct. 66  The reticence of the 
nakharars to acknowledge the over-lordship of the Arsacid monarchy was shown in that they 
only reluctantly, and often by force, attended the royal court, despite the fact that the kings 
were forced by custom to seek the counsel of the nakharars on all important matters. 67 The 
relationship between the monarchy and the nakharars was based primarily on obligation and 
reward. Certainly, the fall of many Arsacid monarchs came as a direct result of losing the 
support of the nakharars who would often break into open revolt if they felt the king was not 
acting in their interest by protecting their rights or rewarding them sufficiently for their 
loyalty. Indeed, we have already seen that in order to win the support of the Mamikonean 
and Bagratuni clans the Arsacid kings were forced to grant them the important offices of the 
Sparapet and t’agakap. The Armenians had a special term to describe this type of 
relationship; carayut’iwn.68 
As confirmed by the Armenian historian Sebeos, who clearly states that the nakharars only 
served the Roman emperor or Sasanian Shah in return for riches, honours and other rewards, 
this carayut’iwn relationship was also at the heart of their relations with the two empires.69 
Thus, if the imperial powers wished to win the loyalty and support of the clans they had to 
pay for it.70 An important passage in Procopius’ De Aedificiis illuminates other aspects of 
nakharar-Roman relations in this regard, namely, the obligation of military service, bestowal 
of ritual symbols of office from the emperor and the promise of autonomy in their own 
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lands.71 Mutual commitments and reciprocal oaths were integral to these relations, as one 
side, the emperor or Shah, played the role of patron and protector while the other, the 
nakharars, fulfilled that of faithful and obedient client.  
Alongside rewarding those already in their service, the Romans and Sasanians both used a 
mixture of coercion and negotiation to try and entice other nakharars into allegiance with 
them.72 For example, we have already seen that in 299 Diocletian gave administrative control 
of the newly won regiones Transtigritanae to Armenian nobles in the hope of winning their 
continued loyalty. Likewise, the Roman general Sittas ‘attempted by all means of promises of 
many good things to win over some of the Armenians by persuasion and attach them to his 
cause’.73  Yet, it was the Sasanians, with their traditional cultural and political links with the 
Armenian nobility, who always seemed best able to gain nakharar support through diplomatic 
means.74  The Sasanian Empire was similarly feudal, and like Armenia was dominated by 
powerful aristocratic families with whom the Shahs had to negotiate loyalty with the promise 
of rewards or punishment. Thus the Sasanians had more experience in this type particular 
type of client-patron relationship and greater awareness of the ambitions and motivations of 
the nakharars. This deeper understanding is evident in the existence of the Rank List of the 
Armenian Magnates which was kept by the Sasanians to help keep track of the different 
nakharars.75  
 
Yet, if the Arsacid kings, as the nominal rulers of Armenia, had such difficulty in securing the 
long-term loyalty of the Armenian nobility it is easy to imagine the trouble the external Roman 
and Sasanian powers would have encountered. This is evident in the fact that the Romans 
eagerly attempted to make any agreement or treaty with individual nakharars extremely 
formal and durable by making ‘pledges in writing’ and oaths of loyalty which were recorded 
on ‘tablets’ and sealed.76 It was hoped formalising treaties in this way would make alliances 
with individual nakharars more robust and long-lasting. The difficulties faced by both empires 
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75 Garsoïan, 1984: 242. 
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177 
  
in this regard were exacerbated by the fact they were in direct competition with one another 
for the loyalty and allegiance of these important clans.  
The nakharars quickly realised that the rewards they could receive for their assistance from 
the Romans and Sasanians were even greater than those offered by the Arsacid monarchy, 
and they were even quicker to exploit this to their own advantage, by constantly switching 
their much-sought after allegiance, thus gaining from the pragmatic generosity of emperor 
and Shah alternately. It was the endemic imperial competition over Armenia in the third and 
fourth centuries, and the imperial need for strong allies to challenge one another, that made 
entering and leaving the service of the Roman emperor or Sasanian Shah a readily available 
option for the nakharars. 77  Neither side, no matter the previous actions of individual 
nakharars, could afford to turn them away. If a clan’s leader, tanuter, believed the emperor 
or Shah was not upholding their obligation in the carayut’iwn arrangement, or that they could 
gain more from the rival empire, they felt fully justified in switching their allegiance. This side-
switching was common, to the point of it becoming normality, as illustrated by the examples 
of Meruzan Arcruni78 and Atat Xoryoruni and Samuel Vahewni,79 all of whom switched their 
allegiances between the imperial powers when they felt more money, prestige or power was 
being offered by the other empire. Although Procopius believed that material benefit was the 
primary motivation for this, this was not the only incentive for such wavering loyalty. 80 As we 
have already seen, the nakharars were hugely protective of their hereditary rights and 
privileges. Therefore, confirmations, or even expansions, of these rights by the imperial 
powers also motivated this prevalent side-switching. Likewise, any threat to these rights and 
privileges from one imperial power, in an attempt to increase their own direct rule in the 
region, would send the nakharars hurriedly into the arms of the other empire.81 Therefore, 
for the nakharars keeping a destabilised equilibrium between the two imperial rivals and 
fomenting conflict between them was in their best interests. 
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Despite the constant switching of allegiances, throughout the third and fourth centuries 
neither empire could afford to stop trying to win to win the support of the nakharars and risk 
losing ground to their rival. Consequently, the Romans and Sasanians both poured vast 
resources into this competition, in order to win native loyalties and gain the upper hand in 
Armenia. However, this played directly into the hands of nakharars, who continually exploited 
the imperial competition for their own advantage.  This endemic switching of allegiance by 
the nakharars resulted in a balance of power within Armenia that was in a constant state of 
flux. The ability of the nakharars to easily manipulate and exploit the imperial competition 
was thus an important catalyst in Armenia remaining a casus belli. In order to overcome these 
tensions and establish the much needed détente in the fifth century the Romans and 
Sasanians had to control the clans by nullifying their independence and ability to easily switch 
allegiance; a flexible and mutually acceptable diplomatic solution was the only answer.  
 
 
The Diplomatic Solution: 387 – The Partition of Armenia 
Previous Roman-Sasanian attempts to reach a settlement in Armenian had always failed, 
usually because of their restrictive simplicity and one-sidedness. They were predominantly 
agreed as a result of military conflict, wherein the victorious empire would use their superior 
military position to try and cement their dominance in the region by forcing undesirable 
concessions from the other; as was the case in the treaties of 299 and 363. Third and fourth 
century treaties followed two rather limited and formulaic models; the complete surrender 
of all authority in Armenia by one empire, paving the way for its complete domination by the 
other, Roman suzerainty with a Roman nominee on throne or vice-versa with Sasanian 
suzerainty. However, the ability of the nakharars to exploit imperial competition made these 
solutions wholly incompatible with the social and political realities of Armenia itself, while 
equally, neither empire would be willing to completely abandon their position in the region.82 
Throughout the third and fourth centuries the desire for strategic advantage far outweighed 
the need for peaceful accommodation. However, the rising threats on the empires’ other 
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frontiers towards the end of the fourth century changed this, and both now realised they 
needed stability on the imperial frontier in order to combat these new threats. In this regard, 
the failure of either side to win indisputable military domination of the region alongside the 
ability of the nakharars to exploit and perpetuate imperial hostilities forced the Romans and 
Sasanians to acknowledge that there could be no long-term stability in Armenia without 
acknowledging one another’s interests. Certainly, Armenia was increasingly recognised as a 
source of conflict between them by the two empires themselves.83 Therefore, the Romans 
and Sasanians needed to develop an entirely new solution to the problem, one which would 
be mutually acceptable, while also simultaneously negating the possibility of any interference 
or obstruction from the nakharars. The difficulty of such a proposal was evident in the fact 
that negotiations for the treaty that managed to accomplish this complex feat, which was 
signed in 387, took almost six year to negotiate.84 
 
After the death of Manuel Mamikonean in 385, who had temporarily united the nakharars 
and pushed back against the Romans and Sasanians alike, Armenia and the noble clans were 
once more violently divided between pro-Roman and pro-Sasanian factions, each led by a 
different Arsacid King; Arsak IV and Khusro III, respectively.85 Yet, rather than be drawn into 
another conflict the two empires decided to exploit this situation for their own benefit. They 
agreed to divide Armenia between themselves according to this current division amongst the 
nakharars, represented by the two different Armenian kings.86 Thus, we are told that ‘[t]hey 
confirmed this plan and divided the country in two. The portion of the Persian side belonged 
to King [Khusro], and the portion on the [Roman] side belonged King [Arsak]’.87 
The partition, which was enshrined in the treaty of 387, was based on the cultural divide that 
had been expanding and deepening within Armenian society since Tiridates’ conversion in 
301 and the inherent political divides between the nakharars that were now crystallised by 
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the existence of two competing pro-Roman and pro-Sasanian groups.88 Thus, the basis of this 
partition was based not on land but on the spheres of cultural and political influence.89 It was 
hoped that since those nakharars who found themselves in either the new Roman or Sasanian 
sections were culturally and politically naturally more inclined to their new, now entrenched, 
imperial patrons there would be less potential for them to rebel or seek to change sides.90 
For instance, the clans in the new Roman sphere of influence, mainly those located in western 
Armenia and Akilisene, were highly Christianised and had long a historic tradition of Greco-
Roman influence.91 The Sasanians now held sway over the majority of the nakharars in east 
and south of Armenia and those in close proximity to the important regions of Iberia and 
Colchis, areas which had traditional cultural and political connections with Persia.92 That this 
was not a territorial divide is evident in the inclusion of a clause that dictated that the middle 
regions of Armenian, Basean, Bagravand and Taran, where no firm loyalty or preference for 
either empire was readily apparent, were not included in the partition.93  
The underlying aim of this treaty was therefore seemingly to provide a more stable balance 
of power in Armenia by neutralising the ability of the nakharars to switch sides. Thus, by 
dividing Armenia into two distinct spheres of influence the clans under Roman influence were 
isolated from the Sasanian Empire, and vice-versa. This separation was entrenched by a clause 
that forbade the empires from accepting the allegiance of a clan that belonged in other’s 
sphere of influence.94 That this clause was respected and upheld by the imperial powers is 
revealed by Lazar P’arpets’i and Joshua Stylites, both of whom describe occasions where 
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other shall not be received, but every means shall be used to place them, even against their will, in their hands 
of those from whom they have fled’. 
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Constantinople refused to become involved with nakharars in the Sasanian spheres despite 
direct appeals for Roman help.95 This stands in stark contrast to the earlier period, when for 
example Valens was more than willing to support Armenian nakharars in their conflict with 
Shapur II.96 The 387 agreement thus negated the ability of the clans to switch sides and 
destabilise the carefully negotiated Roman-Sasanian balance of power in Armenia and 
successfully neutralised them as a third-party and cause of conflict in the imperial 
relationship. Rather than being forced into a reactionary response by the nakharars, as was 
the case throughout the third and fourth centuries, the Romans and Sasanians in 387 had 
finally managed to pre-empt and outmanoeuvre them.  
The treaty of 387, and the subsequent partition of Armenia into Roman and Sasanian spheres, 
was an instrumental component in establishing peaceful relations between the two empires 
in the fifth century.97 It removed the most destructive grievance and source of conflict and 
since, unlike the previous treaties of 299 and 363, it respected and recognised the interests 
and concerns of both empires; it was able to produce a lasting and effective settlement. Given 
that both the Romans and Sasanians were long aware of Armenia as a source of conflict 
between them it may seem surprising that such a joint diplomatic solution was only 
considered at the close of the fourth century; however this is indicative of the internal 
problems in both empires at this time that forced imperial focus away from competition and 
towards needed accommodation.  
That it was the special circumstances, the shifting of priorities, both internal and external in 
the fifth century that pushed the two empires towards accommodation in Armenia is evident 
in the problems they both faced at this time. The Sasanian Empire was wracked by internal 
unrest, Ardashir II, Shapur III and Bahrām IV all had short and turbulent reigns and were forced 
to concentrate on their internal position while Theodosius himself had to confront the 
usurper Magnus Maximus in the west. 98  The success of the powerful nakharar Manuel 
Mamikonean, who rallied the other clans to his side and created a truly independent Armenia 
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by pushing out both the Romans and Sasanians, also undoubtedly motivated the new impetus 
for accommodation at the end of the fourth century.99  
 
 
The Aftermath of 387: Domination and Direct Rule 
The Epic Histories, by stating that the Romans and Sasanians agreed to ‘nibble away at [the 
nakharars], to impoverish them, to intervene and reduce them to submission’, reveals that 
they intended to use the 387 partition as a means to increase their direct control over 
Armenia by cementing their domination over the nakharars.100 This drive toward direct rule 
was only possible if each empire was wholly convinced that the other would not interfere in 
their sphere and that was granted by the 387 treaty. However, both still feared the ability of 
the nakharars to destabilise the détente in Armenia. For the Sasanians this fear is evident in 
their suspicion of any Armenian with strong connections to the Roman Empire; such people 
were always suspected of being Roman spies or malcontents.101 Thus, to further guarantee 
the separation of the nakharars in the two different imperial spheres, to isolate them from 
the court of the other and minimise the potential of side-switching a law was passed in 408 
that carefully controlled diplomatic travel in Armenia; any diplomat who broke these travel 
restrictions faced exiled and crippling fines.102 This law was then clearly designed to limit the 
chance of diplomatic dealings between Constantinople’s nakharars and Sasanian diplomats 
and the potential damaging consequences that could result from such meetings. The passing 
of this law can therefore be suggested as evidence of the Romans trying to further entrench 
the outcome of the 387 treaty with a move to cement its attempt to separate the nakharars 
and make their Armenian allies even more dependent upon them.  
Yet, for all the success the 387 partition and the subsequent law of 408 had in helping to 
establish peace between Constantinople and Ctesiphon it did not solve the Armenian 
question entirely as both powers continued to face difficulties in the region.103 The continuing 
                                                          
99 Epic Histories 5.39-43. 
100 6.1. 
101 Traina, 2009: 4. 
102 CJ. 4.63.4. 
103 Thomson, 2009: 157. 
183 
  
power of the nakharars within each individual sphere would not allow this, as the later 
entreaty by the Emperor Maurice (582-602) to his Sasanian counterpart shows: 
They are a perverse and disobedient race…they are between us and cause trouble. Now come, 
I shall gather mine and send them to Thrace; you gather yours and order them to be taken to 
the east. If they die, our enemies die, if they kill, they kill our enemies; but we shall live in 
peace. For if they remain in their own land we shall have no rest.104 
After recounting this tale Seboes, comments that, ‘[t]hey both agreed’. Sebeos was a Christian 
bishop who wrote in the tenth century and whose historical aim was to explain the Arab 
conquests over Christian lands, in this mission his primary focus was on the reign of Khusro II 
(590-628). Therefore, his history provides great insights into late Sasanian activities in the 
seventh century, particularly Khusro’s relations with Maurice. As such, his knowledge of 
Roman-Sasanian relations in Armenia at the turn of the seventh century, such as in the above 
passage, should be viewed with confidence.105 Importantly, the letter shows that after 387 
both leaders increasingly felt they now had full authority over the nakharars in their 
respective spheres. Furthermore, Maurice’s suggestion that deporting the Armenians 
themselves would help to solve tensions reinforces the idea that Armenia should be 
understood by, its people, primarily the nakharars, rather than as a strict geographical entity, 
and that the Romans and Sasanians were aware of their role in fomenting conflict between 
them. 
Central to increasing direct imperial rule in Armenia and part of the empires’ move to reduce 
the nakharars to submission was the abolition of the Arsacid monarchy that still remained 
intact in both the Roman and Sasanian spheres.106 Abolishing the monarchy would further 
isolate the clans and deepen their dependence on their new imperial patron, as loyalty to the 
emperor or Shah, depending on which side of the partition the individual nakharars were on 
after 387, would then be the only possible path to rewards, wealth and honours; thus further 
reducing their freedom of action and political flexibility. 
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In this regard, it is interesting to note that although it was the Sasanians who traditionally 
sought to overawe the Arsacids, whereas the Romans had supported them, it was in the 
Roman sphere that the monarchy was first abolished.107 This suggests that Roman support of 
the Arsacids in the third and fourth centuries was undertaken primarily to undermine the 
Sasanians. Indeed, once Roman-Sasanian competition in Armenia had been negated by the 
387 treaty the Romans lost little time in getting rid of the Arsacid monarchy. In 390 the pro-
Roman Arsak died, but, rather than nominate a successor the Romans instead installed a 
governor, the comes Armeniae, as the nominal ruler of Roman Armenia; thus stamping their 
full authority on the nakharars in their sphere of influence.   
It was not until 428 that the Sasanians were similarly able to achieve their long-term goal of 
abolishing the Arsacid monarchy. The support Khusro IV received from the nakharars initially 
prevented the Sasanians from getting rid of him; however, this support was quickly and 
irreversibly withdrawn when Khusro attempted to curb the traditional rights and privileges of 
the clans. 108  Furious with such an attack on their power the nakharars petitioned the 
Sasanians to remove him from the throne; a petition the Shah was happy to oblige. 
Unfortunately for the noble clans however, rather than nominate a new Arsacid monarch, the 
Sasanians chose instead to install a governor (marzban) upon them.109 Thus, the Sasanians, 
were able to use the nakharars’ ambitions against them. Certainly, Moses of Chorene 
believed that the nakharars had committed political suicide by supporting the abolition of 
their monarch.110 Nevertheless, the fact that the Sasanians had to wait until the nakharars 
withdrew their support of the king reveals the power and influence they still held.    
 
The abolishment of the Arsacid monarchy allowed the Romans and Sasanians to wield full 
administrative, political and military control over their respective spheres of Armenia; no 
longer was Armenia a buffer or periphery between the two imperial powers but it was now a 
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fully integrated part of both states.111 Indeed, parallel to the abolition and the restricting of 
the nakharars political manoeuvrability the Romans sought to integrate them fully into the 
imperial administration apparatus as a means of further asserting their domination over the 
clans. In this regard, soon after 387 the nakharars under Roman influence were obliged, just 
like the rest of the provincial elite, to offer the emperors aurum coronarium upon their 
ascension to the throne or after military triumphs. 112  This stronger direct control and 
absorption of the clans into regular imperial administration allowed the Romans to slowly 
challenge and eventually eradicate the hereditary aspects of the nakharars’ vested rights and 
privileges, thereby undermining the very legal and traditional foundations on which their 
power rested.113  
 
The initial division of Armenia into two distinct Roman and Sasanian spheres gave both 
empires the opportunity and framework to further their own direct control of these areas.  
The subsequent abolition of the Arsacid monarchy and continued neutralisation of the 
nakharars were essential in removing the Armenians as a third-party and cause of conflict in 
the Roman-Sasanian relationship. This policy of reducing the influence and power of the 
Armenian nakharars throughout the fifth century was instrumental in creating a more stable 
balance of power in Armenia and ensuring continued peace between Constantinople and 
Ctesiphon throughout the fifth century.114 
                                                          
111 In this regard, it is noteworthy that from 387 onwards the abolishment of the Arsacid monarchy, and indeed 
internal Armenian history, was only recorded by Armenian historians (Traina 1999, 2004). Thus suggesting that 
for the imperial powers the history of Armenia and the Armenians was no longer worth recording as they had 
been removed as major and independent players and it was now one in the same as their own. 
112 CTh.  12.13.6. 
113 This was finally achieved by Emperor Zeno, in retaliation for their support of the rebellion of the Magister 
Militum Per Orientem Illios in 484-88 (Proc. De. Aed. 3.1.17-18). The fact that they were able to offer the usurper 
such support shows there remained considerably intact up until this point. 
114 We must be careful not to over-emphasise this success and as it would be wrong to suggest that the power 
and influence of these clans were neutralised forever. Indeed, the nakharars still continued to be exempt from 
taxation and the billeting of military garrisons. The earlier mention entreaty of Maurice indicates a resurgence 
while Traina (2009: 5) argues that the traditional nakharars political and social structures outlived both the 
Roman and Sasanian Empires. 
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3.2: Arabia and the Arab Tribes 
 
The Contest for Control 
Throughout the ancient world the Arabs had been a permanent factor in east-west relations.1 
The Near East was permeated by the symbiotic and interdependent relationship between the 
cities, their settled urban populations, and Arab nomads, and this mutuality ensured that they 
were always an important consideration for the powerful and centralised imperial states in 
the region.2  Furthermore, nomadic Arab tribes were not just limited or secluded to the 
Arabian Peninsula but were spread throughout the Near East. Ammianus Marcellinus’ 
statement that they could be found in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine and the ‘lands of the 
Blemmyes’ and Nilus’ assertion that the Arabs ‘[inhabit] the desert from Arabia as far as 
Egypt’s Red Sea and the river Jordan’ confirms this.3  
Older imperial powers such as the Assyrians protected their frontiers by controlling Arab 
tribes indirectly; thus setting an early precedent for the later Roman and Sasanian policies.4 
Arabs and Persians had been historically intertwined since the time of the Achaemenid 
Empire who utilised the Arabs as military allies, and the Sasanians pursued similar alliances 
with their ancient neighbours.5 The Romans equally had a long history with the Arabs, who 
they predominantly utilised as military allies; the first systematic example of which was 
Marcus Aurelius’ relationship with the Thamud confederacy.6  
                                                          
1 They were not defined by obscure insignificance as has been previously claimed by scholars such as Kawar 
(1956: 181). 
2 Gichon, 1991: 321; Millar, 1993: 428; Donner, 1999: 24; Sommer, 2005: 289. John Cassian (Collationes 6.1) 
informs us that the Romans had two distinct designations for the settled Arab populations, the Arabes, and the 
nomadic tribes, the Saraceni. Trimingham (1979: 1) says that this division of the different types of Arabs could 
be further expanded upon by stating that these groups could be divided again into cultivators, peasants, 
townspeople, nomadic herdsmen and nomadic raiders. 
3  Amm. Marc.14.4.1-7; Conca 1983: 12 (Nilus 3.1). The geographic diffusion of the Arab tribes is also 
acknowledged by Strabo (Geog. 16.1.27-28) and Pliny (NH. 5.65, 6.144). 
4 For a more in-depth discussion on historical Arab-Persian links see: Bosworth (2000, 1983).  
5  Contact between the Arabs and Persians was ensured by the geopolitical situation both peoples found 
themselves in (Toral-Niehoff, 2013: 116; Hoyland, 2003: 13-35; Bosworth, 1983). The importance of the Arabs 
to the earlier Achaemenid Empire is revealed by their honour position in the sculptured reliefs at Persepolis 
(Schmidt, Persepolis II. 1969. Pp. 112) and is also commented on by Herodotus (3.5, 7.86-7). 
6 Fisher, 2008: 313; Sartre, 2005: 360. 
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In the early stages of the Roman-Sasanian relationship powerful client-cities such as Palmyra 
and Hatra straddled the imperial frontier, acting as buffer-zones between the empires.7 
During this period it was with these two important cities that the symbiotic relationship 
between the settled populations and the nomadic Arab tribes was most prevalent.8 Hatra and 
Palymra exercised political control over the nearby Arab tribes who, in return for the benefits 
offered by the city, such as wealth and honours, helped to protect the cities and guard their 
important trade routes. Yet, as the Roman-Sasanian competition intensified both sought to 
stamp their full authority on these important Arab cities in order to better secure the frontier 
against one another. Unlike the Parthian regna which granted Hatra a largely autonomous 
position the Sasanians imposed complete domination on their territory and wanted to fully 
incorporate the city into their empire; which they achieved with the city’s capture in 244.9 
The Roman destruction of Palmyra under Aurelian was also a consequence of the city’s 
defiance of Roman rule under Zenobia, who built an independent Palmyrene Empire out of 
Rome’s eastern provinces. 10  The elimination of these two cities, which had previously 
exercised political authority over the nomadic Arab tribes created a power vacuum in the 
region and had important consequences for Roman-Sasanian-Arab relations.  
With the destruction of Palmyra and Hatra the tribes became more fierce and independent.11 
The tribes no longer benefited from protecting these trade routes as there was no one to 
reward them for doing so. The Roman campaign against Arab tribes in 290 during the reign of 
Diocletian underlines the damage such independent tribes could do; a Roman emperor now 
found it necessary to attack them directly. 12  Furthermore, Diocletian’s reorganisation of 
frontier acknowledged the ferocity of the tribes with the abandonment of the most distant 
military outposts, namely Hegra, Dumat and al-Jandal.13  Indeed, even in the fourth century 
when the two empires had gained more control and influence over the Arab tribes in the 
                                                          
7 Trimingham, 1979: 21.  
8 For more information on the Arabs tribes’ relationships with Hatra and Palmyra see: Dirven (2013), Sommer 
(2003, 2004) and Smith (2013: 33-55). 
9Dio. 80.3.1-2; Dignas & Winter, 2007: 154; Wiesehöfer, 1982. Sommer (2004: 239) presents a model for the 
Parthian regna imperial structure of which Hatra was an important part. 
10 On the Palmyrene Empire see: SHA (Tyranni Triginta 15.1-4, Gall. 13.5) and Stoneman (1992). On Aurelian’s 
capture and destruction of the city see: Zosimus (1.61). 
11 Shahid, 1984a: 32; Dignas & Winter, 2007: 163-4.  
12 Millar, 1993:399. 
13 Sartre, 2005: 361. 
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region they were still a danger and menace towards the trade routes they had previously 
helped to protect and keep safe.14 
In response, the Romans and Sasanians increasingly sought to subsume the roles previously 
played by Hatra and Palmyra in order to exercise political authority and indirect control over 
the tribes. In this way they could redirect the ferocity of the Arabs away from themselves and 
towards imperial goals, predominantly against the rival empire. Although describing the 
position of the Arabs in earlier Roman-Parthian relations Strabo’s account is nevertheless 
illustrative of the newfound role they played in the Roman-Sasanian relationship in the fourth 
and fifth century: 
The Euphrates and the land beyond it constitute the boundary of the Parthian Empire. But the 
parts this side of the river by the Romans and the chieftains of the Arabians as far as Babylonia, 
some of the chieftains preferring to give ear to the Parthians and others to the Romans, to 
whom they are neighbours.15 
Thus, just as in Armenia, the two empires competed against one another for the loyalty of 
these frontier peoples who they used against one another in conflict and warfare; from the 
Roman perspective the Arabs increasingly resembled the western foederati. 16  After the 
destruction of Hatra and Palymra tribal identity became ever more important to the Arabs, 
they increasingly viewed themselves at the tribal level as a sirkat (confederation).17 Thus, it 
was at the tribal level that the empires interacted with the Arabs in the fourth and fifth 
centuries rather than the centralised powers of Palmyra and Hatra as they had before.18 As 
highlighted by Strabo, imperial control of the Arab tribes was indirect, rather than full direct 
domination, and once again this was as true in the fourth and fifth century as it was in the 
historians own time.19 Correspondingly, as the Romans and Sasanians increasingly replaced 
Hatra and Palmyra the Arab tribes accordingly became more dependent on their imperial 
                                                          
14 Hier. Vit.Malchi 4. 
15 Geog. 236-7. 
16 On Arab tribes being used to conduct raids against each other by the imperial rivals see: Malalas (18.32), 
Procopius (BP.1.17.43-5) Zachariah (Chron. 8.5a) and Theophanes (Chron. a.m. 6021). On the Roman Arab allies 
resembling foederatii see: Shahid (1962: 31); Sartre (2005: 358). 
17 Graf, 1978: 15. 
18 Shahid, 1984a: 31; Sartre, 2005: 358. 
19 Toral-Niehoff, 2013: 119. Although she does argue that in Sasanian-Arab relations this indirect rule was 
replaced by direct rule in the sixth century. 
189 
  
patrons for economic rewards and political stability. For example, the Nasrids wore a crown 
(tāj) that was bestowed on them by the Sasanian Shahs.20 
The imperial rivals utilised their Arab allies in a number of ways; frontier defence, protection 
of trade routes,21 in campaigns against one another,22 and in other major military campaigns; 
such varied use underlines how valuable the Arabs were as military allies for both empires. 23 
The Notitia Dignitatum, which reveals that the Roman army deployed a vast array of different 
Arab troops, such as mounted archers,24 camel cavalry25 and even infantry,26 reinforces this 
importance. Certainly, it was for their military prowess that the Arabs were most respected 
for by the Romans.27 The importance of the Arab tribes to the Sasanian Empire was evident 
in Yazdgard I’s decision to send his son, and heir, Bahrām V, to be raised and educated in al-
Hira at the court of the Nasrids.28  Likewise, at the start of the fifth century Yazdgard I 
attempted to use his Nasrid allies as a counter-weight to the Sasanian nobility. 29  This 
utilisation of Arab allies for military purposes would have been even more important in the 
fifth century when both imperial armies were already stretched in defending against the 
Huns, Vandals and Hephthalites. For these reasons the competition for the allegiance of the 
tribes was fiercely contested. Influence over the tribes and the military support they offered 
was vitally important in attempting to win supremacy in this frontier region.30  
 
This increased inter-connection between the imperial powers and the Arab tribes, alongside 
the knowledge that the tribes developed through interaction with outside states and foreign 
peoples, resulted in various tribes beginning to develop into larger confederations or 
groupings from the third century onwards.31 This growth strengthened the importance and 
                                                          
20 Tabarī 821, 858. 
21 Shahid, 1989: 478. 
22 Amm. Marc. 24.2.4; Proc. BP. 1.18.35-37. 
23 Zach. The Syriac Chronicle 228-229. 
24 Or. 32.28. 
25 Or. 34. 
26 Or. 37.34. 
27 Amm. Marc. 23.3.8; Proc. BP. 1.17.40-45; Evag. HE 4.12, 5.20. 
28 Tabarī 854-5. 
29 Rubin, 1986: 679.  
30 Indeed, Nappo (2009: 74) has claimed that by the sixth century Constantinople’s sole priority in Arabia was to 
gain the support of the tribes in their renewed war with the Sasanians. 
31 Fowden, 1993: 120. On the influence of outside forces affecting the development of the Arab tribes both 
culturally and politically see: Millar (1993: 399) and Trimingham (1979: 4) 
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negotiating power of the allied tribes when dealing with their imperial patrons. However, 
Arab power did not reach its apex until the seventh century and until then, especially in the 
fifth century, the Arabs remained military allies of the empires, whose prosperity was 
dependent upon the goodwill of their imperial patron.32 Indeed, in the Roman mind-set the 
Arabs did not have an independent existence and were regarded merely as another element 
of imperial machinery, as a tool in their frontier defence and in the competition with the 
Sasanian Empire. This was to have major consequences on the nature of the Roman-Sasanian 
frontier in Arabia and proved a major stumbling block in the search for peace between the 
two empires. 
 
This Roman perception of the Arab tribes as merely another part of imperial apparatus 
manifested itself in Roman attitudes to Arabia itself. They viewed the region as a strange and 
distant land, and in strategic terms as an unimportant backwater,33 with Procopius even 
stating that it was ‘completely destitute’.34 This perception was also shaped by the strategic 
reality of Arabia, where the main danger to the Roman Empire came from small-scale raids 
that, although could sometimes pose local problems, never threatened the overall strategic 
integrity of the empire.35 Roman disdain of this threat, and therefore arguably also of Arabia 
itself, was seen in the response of the magister militum per Orientem to the Governor of 
Phoenicia and Palestine’s pleas for help and reinforcement against the raids of the Arab 
Queen Mavia in 376, who was said to have ‘laughed at the appeal’.36 
In contrast, Arabia was of vital strategic importance to the Sasanian Empire.37 Their capital, 
Ctesiphon, the important city of Veh Ardashir and the agriculturally important south-west 
provinces of Mesopotamia, Fars and Khuzistan, were all within striking distance of northern 
                                                          
32 Fowden, 1993: 120; John. Eph. HE. 3.3.54. 
33 Proc. BP. 1.19.8-16; Malalas 16.5. Isaac (1992: 268) also supports this view as he states that Arabia was 
relatively strategically unimportant for the Roman Empire. 
34 Proc. BP. 1.19.6-8. 
35 Millar, 2006: 68. Indeed, Ammianus Marcellinus (e.g 14.4) only refers to small-scale Arab raids and never 
anything approaching a larger incursions or invasion. For further information on Arabs as a raiding threat rather 
than a serious military danger see: Isaac (1984). 
36 Soz. HE 6.38.3-4. 
37 SKZ § 1-3; Šahrestānīhā ī Ērānšahr 25, 25. 
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Arabia and thus susceptible to Arab raiding, especially those directed by the Romans.38 As 
such, the Sasanians concentrated substantial resources on protecting their interests and 
cementing their military presence in the region. This was done with the construction of a large 
defensive line that stretched from Hīt in the north to Basra in the south which consisted of 
small forts that protected the Sasanian communication network in the region and major 
fortifications and fortified cities which added sturdier protection against Arab raids. 39 
Furthermore, Shapur’s Ditch (Khandaq-ī Šapūr), a formidable defensive structure garrisoned 
by elite troops, the cataphractes (dosar shahbā), was constructed to add to the protection of 
the forts and cities themselves.40 Thus, the Arabian Peninsula, especially in the north and east, 
was a vital region of imperial defence for the Sasanians.  
  
Many of the important trade routes that connected the Roman west to the luxuries and spices 
of the east went through Arabia and, therefore, control of, or at least a dominant position in, 
the peninsula granted considerable economic benefits. Indeed, the wealth obtained from 
controlling the Arab tribes, which was essential in controlling and protecting these trade 
routes, was evident in the enviable prosperity of Hatra and Palmyra before their 
destruction.41 Thus, even more so than Armenia, Arabia was as an economic battle-ground 
throughout Roman-Sasanian relations in which each empire tried to monopolise control of 
the region’s economic resources and trade routes. The Romans long had a fascination with 
the riches of Arabia. In 25/6 BC the famous expedition of Aelius Gallus was launched to 
investigate the region and uncover its true economic value for possible Roman take-over or 
intervention. 42  Likewise, the second century annexation of the Nabataean kingdom was 
completed in the hope of monopolising and benefitting from control of the region’s valuable 
trade routes.43  
                                                          
38 Howard-Johnson, 2012: 94. Indeed, the Bundahishn (33.16) reveals the danger posed to Sasanian territories 
by hostile tribes. This is also confirmed by Farrok (2007: 198-9). 
39 Examples of the smaller forts have been uncovered at Ruda, Ukhaydir and Qusayr, while remains of one of the 
larger fortifications have been excavated at Qasr Yeng (Howard-Johnson, 2012: 97-98). 
40 Conrad, 2009: 185; Toral-Niehoff, 2013: 119. 
41 For Hatra’s wealth see: Strabo (Geog. 26.1.27). For Palmyra’s wealth see: Pliny (NH 5.88) and Gawlikowski 
(1996).  
42 Strabo Geog. 16.780-783; Pliny NH 6.32. The expedition itself quickly turned into a disaster for the Romans 
that resulted in a large loss of life and achieved little in the way of positive gains. 
43 On the Roman takeover of the Nabataean kingdom see: Dio (68.14.6). 
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Arabia was arguably one of the most economically important regions of the Sasanian Empire. 
Control of the north-east coastal regions of the Arabian peninsula allowed them access and 
domination of the Persian Gulf and its valuable trade routes to the wider world,44 and this in 
turn cemented the Sasanians’ position as the primary intermediary in east-west trade that 
was fundamental in their overall economic prosperity. 45  Indeed, it was the revenues 
generated from control of the Persian Gulf that provided the foundation of early Sasanian 
economic strength. Consequently, the Sasanians sought to further entrench their position in 
north-east Arabia to protect their economic interests in the Persian Gulf throughout their 
history. The economic importance of Arabia meant that it was gradually encircled and 
penetrated by the imperial powers; the Sasanians established trading posts in the Straits of 
Hormuz and Ayla while Roman merchants tried to utilise Arabia to bypass the Sasanian 
monopoly and custom dues on east-west trade.46  
 
Both empires were eager to assert their superiority in Arabia itself and over the Arabs tribes 
as means to protect themselves and increase the pressure on their rival. Despite the 
difference in importance with which the two empires viewed the strategic importance of 
Arabia, Roman interest was ironically augmented by its importance to the Sasanian Empire. 
Roman interference and involvement in a region that was strategically and economically vital 
to their rival would have caused trouble for the Sasanians and diverted their attention away 
from other regions where the Romans had more interest in themselves. Thus, Arabia, 
particularly in the north of the peninsula, was an important cause and zone of conflict 
throughout the Roman-Sasanian relationship; Arabia and the Arab tribes played an important 
role in the imperial competition, in both fomenting and taking part in conflicts. 
 
 
                                                          
44 SKZ (§1-3); Šahrestānīhā ī Ērānšahr (25, 52) both express the importance of the Persian Gulf to the Sasanian 
Empire. On the importance of the Persian Gulf to the Sasanian economy see: Wiesehöfer (2006: 191-197), 
Daryaee (2003) and Brosius (2006: 182-183). 
45 Piacentini, 1985: 59. 




Imperial Patrons and Dynastic Clients 
The Roman Arabian ‘Frontier’ 
The nature of the Roman Arabian frontier has become a major scholarly debate.47  Yet, 
analysing how this frontier functioned is integral to understanding the overall relationship 
between the Arabs and the imperial powers and also reconfirms the importance that imperial 
indirect control over the tribes and frontier had in this period. Indeed, it is prudent to 
emphasise here that during this period Arabia did not exist as a distinct geographical entity 
with clearly demarked and recognised boundaries but was a region made up of a large variety 
of different tribes of various sizes, each with their own claim to different lands; in that way it 
was similar to the situation of Armenia. It was largely because of these ambiguous conditions 
that Procopius remarked that it was impossible for the Roman emperors to ‘possess himself 
of any of the country’, emphasising the difficulty with which the empires had in dominating 
this region.48 
As a desert frontier the Arabian frontier was by necessity different to the more linear frontier 
defences of the Rhine, Danube and Hadrian’s Wall.49 A static fortified defensive line would 
simply not work in a desert environment where control of water supplies and transit routes 
were the main forms of defence.50 Certainly, no evidence of an extensive network of inter-
connected fortifications has been uncovered in the region.51 Likewise, there is no comparable 
                                                          
47 This debate has resulted in a variety of opinions; Bowersock (1976: 222) argues for the idea of defence-in-
depth, similar to that in Mesopotamia; Graf (1978: 20) focuses on the importance of the foederati, Mayerson 
(1986: 36) believes in an open frontier with little fortifications or military presence, while Parker (1987: 48) 
argues for a fortified frontier with the specific aim of deterring raids from the Arab tribes. It will be argued here 
that the nature of the frontier is likely to be found in a compromise between the models of Graf and Mayerson. 
Such debate has only been compounded by the lack of Roman sources that provide detailed information or 
insights about this frontier compared to the information that the likes of Ammianus Marcellinus (18.5.2) and 
Zosimus (3.14.1-2) provide on other sections of the Roman-Sasanian frontier. 
48 BP. 1.19.14-16. 
49 Breeze, 2011: 118. 
50 It was the need to control water supplies and transit routes that convinced Parker (1987: 48) that the frontier 
was based on the fortification of these sites to protect them from Arab raiders. However, Parker focuses on the 
use of Roman forts rather than the correct employment of foederati to protect this region. 
51  Graf (1978: 2) acknowledges that this may be due to the desert conditions which can be harmful to 
archaeological remains. However, previous Nabataean military outposts have been uncovered by archaeologists 
in the same region. Nevertheless, the preoccupation of identifying individual forts and military installations as 
an Arabian limes still pervades the study of this region and its frontier. This preoccupation is not just limited to 
the Arabian frontier and is evident in the various volumes of the Roman Frontier Studies. Bowersock (1976: 219) 
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evidence in Roman sources of a clearly demarked and fully recognised frontier being ‘pierced’ 
as Zosimus describes in regards to the Mesopotamian frontier.52 Rather, the sources that do 
comment on the Arabian frontier describe it as ‘frontier district’ that existed both inside and 
outside of the empire simultaneously.53  
Thus, Roman defensive strategy in Arabia must be understood not as a linear series of inter-
connected forts, but as an open frontier zone, with differing and fluctuating zones and 
degrees of Roman control, both direct and indirect.54 Roman troops were not capable of 
adequately defending an open frontier district of this type; indeed, in previous centuries they 
had proved themselves unable to defend against the raids of hostile Arab tribes.55 In contrast, 
the nomadic Arabs, who travelled widely across the fringes of the Roman eastern frontier, 
living neither fully inside nor outside the empire, were perfectly suited to this type of frontier 
defence.56 Accordingly, it was the Romans’ Arab allies, with whom they negotiated with for 
power and responsibility, and who were well used to fighting in the desert environment, that 
were charged with protecting this frontier against raids from independent tribes and 
Sasanian-allied Arabs alike.57 The defence of this open frontier zone therefore necessitated 
that the Romans cultivated a network of alliances with local Arab tribes who were each used 
to defend different sectors of the frontier.58 The tribes were utilised in a defence-in-depth 
approach with the establishment of an inner and outer shield of allied Arabs; with the outer 
shielded guarded by lesser tribes with lesser duties.59 This ensured that even if one tribe was 
defeated or defected there were others immediately ready to take their place. The 
                                                          
confirms this by explaining the difficulty of using the term limes about Arabian Frontier. It is this preoccupation 
which regularly clouds our understanding of the more important aspects of frontier defence such as the how 
and why in favour of the arguably less significant where. 
52 3.14.1-2. 
53 Pan. Lat. 6.(7)2; Soz. HE 4.15. 
54 Fisher (2013a: 2, 2011: 74) supports this model with his idea of ‘second circle’ frontier spaces which were 
areas in which Rome and their allies negotiated for power. Similarly, Isaac (1988: 133) refers to the Arabian 
frontier as a frontier district administered by a dux, although in late antiquity the dux was eventually replaced 
by an Arabian phylarch as the allies become increasing more important and formalised into the Roman military 
and administration. This model of a frontier zone without an extensive fortified line but rather a zone of political 
influence and military alliance did have previous exempla from the reign of Augustus and his policy with various 
German tribes (Graf, 1978: 4). 
55 Peters, 1978: 319. Proc. BP. 1.17.41 -2; Jerome PL. 22:col.1086. 
56 Fisher, 2011:29. Parker (1987:48) recognises the freedom of movement permitted along this frontier. 
57 Mayerson, 1989:76; Bowersock, 1986:35. On the dangers posed by hostile tribes, especially those allied to the 
Sasanian Empire see: Procopius (BP. 1.17.40-41), Rufinus (HE. 7.10) and Jerome (PL 22:col.1086). 
58 Proc. BP. 1.19.10, 1.20.10. 
59 Shahid, 1989: 479. 
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fundamental importance of the Arab tribes to frontier defence in Arabia is evident in the 
differences between Roman policies towards the tribes as foederatii compared with relations 
with Germanic foederatii in the west. Unlike those in the west, Arab allies were usually 
stationed in their home regions. This difference underlines the centrality of the allied tribes 
to Roman defence in this region and their utilisation of different tribes to defend the open 
frontier zone due to their native skill at defending such difficult terrain.  
There were two main reasons the Romans decided upon this frontier strategy in Arabia after 
the third century. First, their perception of Arabia as strategically unimportant meant that 
Constantinople would not have thought a strong permanent Roman military presence was 
necessary. Secondly, and importantly for the fifth-century Roman-Sasanian détente, it 
allowed them to redeploy their own military manpower elsewhere to frontiers they 
considered more important, such as the Danube and for the Vandal campaigns.60 Indeed, the 
abandonment of Roman military installations in the Arabian frontier such as Qasr Bshir and 
Yotvata in the fifth century further reveals the shifting of priorities away from the eastern 
frontiers in the fifth century, of which the Arabian frontier was a part.61  
 
Sasanian use of Arab allies in frontier defence was similar.62 The Shahs cultivated a close 
relationship with the Nasrid dynasty, whose powerbase was centred on al-Hira. 63  The 
Sasanians used their Nasrid allies to act as a protective shield ahead of their own fortifications 
against raids from other tribes, and thus add another layer of protection on this strategically 
vulnerable frontier.64  There was one major difference between the frontier strategies of 
Romans and Sasanians and their utilisation of the Arab tribes, however, whereas 
Constantinople used a variety of different tribes to defend different sections of the frontier 
Ctesiphon granted their Nasrid allies hegemony over all their other allied tribes.65 This made 
                                                          
60 For evidence that troops stationed on the Arabian frontier were routinely redeployed to other frontiers and 
for other military campaigns see Shahid (1989: 51). Who describes how the Salihids were redeployed from the 
Arab frontier to take part in Leo’s Vandal expedition of 468. 
61 Fisher, 2004: 50; Ball, 2000: 101; Shahid, 1989: 95. 
62 Lecker (2002: 109-115), Donner (1981: 44-48) and Kister (1968: 155-156) show that Sasanian policy in Arabia 
was built on indirect rule, through building alliances with local dynasties. 
63 Toral-Niehoff, 2013. 
64 Toral-Niehoff, 2013: 119; Tabarī 958 
65 Proc. BP. 1.17.40-41; Cyril of Scythopolis, Life of John the Hesyshast 13. 
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them a much more organised and coherent defensive shield with which to defend Sasanian 
interests in the region. Indeed, as we shall see, the greater efficiency of this system and use 
of their allies was evident in the later sixth-century Roman imitation of it, with the promotion 
of the Jafnids as the overal leader of Constantinople’s Arab allies.66   
 
Indirect Control and Imperial Competition 
The nature of the Roman frontier helps to explain why, despite Roman disdain for the 
strategic importance of Arabia, it was nevertheless a region of imperial conflict. The similar 
use of Arab allies in the frontier strategy of the Romans and Sasanians, intensified and 
escalated the importance of the local Arab tribes. Consequently, just like in Armenia, the 
loyalty of the local frontier peoples was highly sought after and competed over as a means to 
promote imperial authority and influence in the region.67 Although a sixth century example, 
this competition was exemplified by the Ramala conference (524) when Romans, Sasanians 
and even the Himyar and Ethiopians all solicited the aid of the Nasrid ruler al-Mundhir after 
the massacre of the Najrani Christians.68 Certainly, the open nature of the Arabian frontier 
itself facilitated such imperial competition, not only for the loyalty of the various Arab tribal 
powers and the indirect control this granted the imperial powers of them but also in the use 
of these allies against the imperial rival.69 Correspondingly, the Arabs, trapped as they were 
between the rivals, were increasingly forced to pick sides.70 Indeed, even after Constantine’s 
conversion religious neutrality was no longer even an option for the Arab tribes trapped in 
between the Roman and Sasanian Empires. 
In this competition for allies the Romans and Sasanians focused their negotiations and 
alliances on individual Arab leaders rather than the tribes as a whole. As such, imperial-Arab 
relations were highly personal, based fundamentally at the level of the emperor or Shah, as 
the imperial patron, and the Arab tribal chief, as the client. Two rulers and political leaders 
                                                          
66 BP. 1.17.40-41. 
67 Procopius (BP. 2.1.1-5) makes it clear that both empires used their Arab allies as a means to pursue their own 
military agendas and interests. Likewise, Photius (Bib. 3) relates that both empires tried to coax the allies of the 
other to change sides. 
68 Fowden, 1993: 119-20. 
69 Fisher (2013a: 7) agrees that imperial influence over Arabs tribes was based on indirect control. 
70 Shahid, 1984b: 13. 
197 
  
are more likely to share, in general terms at least, similar values, attitudes and ambitions as 
well as recognition of common interest, and from the perspective of the imperial patrons this 
made them easier to control.71 The imperial powers were better able to influence and exert 
pressure on individual leaders and families than they would have been able to if they were 
dealing with a centralised polity with strong political institutions.72 Such a focus on elite family 
dynasties is apparent in later Roman historiography which noticeably only describes 
individual rulers, such as Arethas and Alamoundaras, and not the wider tribal group. 73 
Likewise, even Syriac sources only speak of ‘Beth Harith’ or ‘Beth Mundhir’, ‘The House of 
Harith’ or ‘The House of Mundhir’, never the names of the clans themselves.74 
Arab leadership was highly personal, internal dominance was dependent upon possessing 
sufficient charisma, ability and reputation.75 Importantly, one of the ways in which a leader 
could prove he possessed these attributes was to maintain a close relationship with the 
Roman or Sasanian Empire. For an individual Arab leader, the patronage of either 
Constantinople or Ctesiphon provided them with the resources and prestige necessary to 
maintain their dominant internal position. It provided the leader with personal honours and 
titles, which granted political legitimacy and reputation, and also wealth, which could 
distributed amongst the leaders’ followers to cement their loyalty.76 As such, tribal leaders 
were always eager to endear themselves to the imperial powers through acts of loyalty or 
military service in the hopes of gaining these rewards. Indeed, similar to imperial-nakharar 
relations, the fundamental nature of imperial-Arab relations was based on service and 
reward.77  
Conversely, when imperial support was taken away the power and position of the individual 
leaders and their dynasties became extremely vulnerable. For example, even the Sasanians’ 
                                                          
71 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 169; Hoyland, 2009: 118; Shahid, 1989: 35. The Paikuli Inscription reveals that this was 
just as true for the Sasanians as it was for the Romans. Hence, it is correct to view the imperial allies in the level 
of individual leaders or dynasties rather than kingdoms, therefore, labels such as Jafnid and Nasrid which 
designate specific elite families are more appropriate than the more traditional terms of Lakhmid and Ghassanid, 
which suggest that the empires were dealing with coherent and centralised polities (Fisher, 2011).  
72  The Romans had a tradition of negotiating with individual leaders and dynasties rather than polities as 
apparent in their policies towards the Germanic tribes in the west. 
73 Proc. BP. 2.28.12-14. 
74 John Eph. HE 67.148. As pointed out by Hoyland (2009: 119). 
75 Lancaster & Lancaster, 2004: 35. 
76 Fisher, 2013b: 7. 
77 Malalas 18.35; Proc. BP. 2.19.15-18. As evident in the in the career of Mavia who Sozomen (HE 6.38) describes 
in terms reminiscent of a foederati. 
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powerful and long-lasting Nasrids allies crumbled when the Shahs removed their patronage.78 
This reliance on the imperial patron to maintain their internal position within the tribe 
granted the empires considerable influence and control over the Arab chief, which they 
exploited ruthlessly. 
However, Arabs clients were not utterly helpless or passive in their relationship with the 
imperial patrons or within the wider imperial competition. As emphasised by Joshua Stylites, 
‘to the Arabs of both sides this [Roman-Sasanian] war was a source of much profit, and they 
wrought their will on both kingdoms’. 79  The Arab ability to profit from the imperial 
competition is best evident in the career of Prince Imru’ulqais. Imru’ulqais left a grave 
inscription at al-Namāra in the Syrian frontier between the Roman and Sasanian Empires that 
dates from 328, and is thus the oldest uncovered Arabic inscription, that detailed the Arab 
leader’s achievements and successes.80 From Imru’ulqais’ inscription it is clear that the self-
proclaimed ‘King of all the Arabs’ switched his loyalty from the Sasanians to the Romans 
during the unstable reign of Bahrām III. This switch was likely caused by the internal problems 
Bahrām faced during his reign, which meant he was likely unable to provide the Arab leader 
with his expected rewards, and which Imru’ulqais needed to cement his own individual 
position within the tribe. Consequently, this would have encouraged Imru’ulqais to switch his 
allegiance to the Romans, who could provide him with these rewards.81  
The most important aspect of the Imru’ulqais’ career is that it highlights Arab willingness and 
ability to change allegiance to whichever empire was willing to reward them the most, or if 
they believed their loyalty was not being rewarded sufficiently by their current patron.82 That 
Arab tribal leaders were first and foremost concerned with their own position and success 
above any loyalty to either empire is evident in the trouble that could arise when the 
promised imperial payments were stopped or even reduced. For example, Libanius claims 
that Julian’s refusal to continue the traditional payments to allied tribes caused much 
                                                          
78 Fisher, 2011(b): 264. 
79 17. The fact that Joshua Stylites knew about this, even so far northward of Arabia, indicates just how important 
the Arab tribes had become in the overall Roman-Sasanian relationship. 
80 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 168; Bellamy, 1985: 31-52. 
81 For evidence of his earlier alliance to the Sasanians see: Tabarī 834. While the grave inscription itself shows 
his later pro-Roman stance (Bellamy, 1985: 31-51) 
82 Theo.Sim. 5.1.7-8, 5.13-14; Amm. Marc. 25.6.9-10. 
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resentment amongst that Arabs and that it was in fact a displeased Arab who eventually threw 
the spear that killed the emperor.83 
Other examples of Arab leaders changing sides included Aspebetos and Amorkesos. Like, 
Imru’ulqais, Amorkesos changed his allegiance from Ctesiphon to Constantinople. 84  Two 
reasons have been put forward as to why Amorkesos did this, first it has been claimed that 
he wanted to convert to Christianity, but his Sasanians patrons would not allow this. 85 
Secondly his dynasty, the Jafnids were known enemies of the Nasrids, and that, therefore, 
this conflict may have forced him to move on. This second reason was also likely linked to the 
third; Amorkesos’ lack of recognition by the Sasanians in terms of the rewards they granted 
him.86  
 
Arab side-switching was detrimental to stable imperial relations between the two empires as 
it created an unstable and fluctuating balance of power both in Arabia itself and in the wider 
Roman-Sasanian frontier. The imperial need for frontier allies together with the Arabs’ 
willingness to switch allegiance for their own benefit ensured both empires viewed the 
machinations of the other in this frontier with suspicion and were on constant alert against 
any collusion between their rival and local Arab tribes. Such an unstable political and 
diplomatic environment was a block to any attempt to establish an accommodation between 
the two imperial powers that needed to be removed in order for both empires to be able to 
fully focus on their more vulnerable and threatened frontiers elsewhere. If a mutually 
acceptable balance of power, which was necessary for the success of the wider détente, was 
to be established the Arabs ability to manipulate conflict and destabilise imperial relations 
had to be overcome. 
 
                                                          
83 Or. 24.6. 
84 Malchus, fr. 4.113. 
85 Mayerson, 1991: 291. Aspetos also changed his allegiance to Constantinople for religious reasons (Shahid, 
1989: 4). This further shows the importance of Christianity in the competition for allies and supremacy in Arabia 
between the two empires. 





One of the ways in which the Romans attempted to create stronger ties of loyalty and imperial 
control over their allies was through Christianity; they quickly recognised its usefulness in 
binding their tribal allies closer to them, both politically and culturally.87 Christianity provided 
Constantinople with the means to transform their previously ad-hoc relationship with the 
Arab tribes into something much deeper and more lasting.88  Certainly, the tribes which 
enjoyed the longest and most profitable relationship with the empire, the Salihids and Jafnids, 
were strongly Christian.89 Furthermore, due to the traditional negative association of the 
Arabs with barbarity, conversion to Christianity was essential in making the tribes more 
acceptable as allies.90 For example, upon the conversion of one tribe to Christianity Theodoret 
viewed them not as savage barbarians but recognised in them ‘an intelligence, lively and 
penetrating…and a judgement capable of discerning truth and refuting falsehood.’91 Likewise, 
the strong relationship between the Romans and the Salihids was based on shared faith in 
Christian Orthodoxy.92 The usefulness of Christianity in bolstering the relationship between 
the Roman imperial patron and the Arab clients is evident in the use of both Roman and Arab 
bishops in negotiations between Constantinople and their tribal allies.93 
The ecclesiastical hagiographer Cyril of Scythopolis informs us that Christianity was also used 
to win Arab allies away from the Sasanians; emperors often dispatched missionaries to entice 
Arab tribes to adopt Christianity and transfer their allegiance to Constantinople. 94  For 
instance, Cyril relates that the Arab leader Aspebetos only converted to Christianity after St 
Euthymius cured his son of an illness that a Zoroastrian magus had been unable to. 
                                                          
87 Soz. HE. 6.38.9; Evag. HE 5.7; Proc. BP. 1.12.2-4; De Aed. 3.7.6; Agath. 3.12.17.8. Fisher (2011a: 34) takes the 
arguably cynical view that Constantinople did this primary for political reasons and not for any feeling of 
religious missionary spirit. 
88 The Later Roman Empire made frequent use of Christianity to help create stronger links between itself and 
its allies (Ivanov, 2009: 307; Greatrex, 2005: 491). 
89 Indeed Constantinople’s initial alliance with the Salihid’s was based primarily on their conversion (Soz. HE 
6.38). On the importance of Christianity in strengthening ties in Roman-Arab alliances see: Procopius (De Aed. 
3.12.7-8), Evagrius (HE. 5.7) and Agathias (3.12.7-8). 
90 Indeed, previously Ammianus Marcellinus (14.4.1-4) had commented that they were ‘desirable neither as 
friends nor enemies’. Nilus (Narrationes 4.1-5) believed Christianity was the only thing that could save the Arabs 
from their barbarity. Procopius (BP. 1.15.22-5; 2.28.25-30) also highlights this. 
91 Curatio. 1. 250. 
92 Shahid, 1989:488; Trimingham, 1979: 179. 
93 Malchus fr. 2. 
94  V.Euth. 15. This tactic has also been noticed by Rubin (1986: 680). 
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Furthermore, many Arab bishops were involved in important Church synods, such as Antioch 
and Chalcedon in 341 and 451, respectively, alongside their Roman counterparts, thus proving 
that conversion brought the Arabs evermore into the wider Roman and Christian world. 95 
Conversely, the spread of Christianity amongst the Arab tribes was viewed with suspicion and 
contempt by the Sasanians. Indeed, Socrates tells use that tribes who converted to 
Christianity were ‘regarded with fear by the Persians’. 96  Conversion to Christianity 
automatically made tribes enemies of the Sasanian Empire, as Christianity was viewed strictly 
as a Roman religion.97  Such use of Christianity in encouraging allies to switch sides only 
aggravated the Sasanians more, creating greater hostility, and was one of the main factors in 
the outbreak of the first fifth-century Roman-Sasanian conflict in 421. 
Unfortunately, evidence for Sasanian attempts to convert their own Arab allies to 
Zoroastrianism is lacking.98 Yet despite this, it is important to note that although the Sasanians 
and their principal allies, the Nasrids, did not share a religious connection they nonetheless 
had arguably a better, more stable and long-lasting relationship than Rome did with any of 
her allies, even the Salihids and Jafnids.99  
However, just like in the political sphere, the Arabs tribes were not merely passive pawns to 
Roman religious domination and often used religion themselves as a means to pursue their 
own independent interests, both political and spiritual. Arab leaders were occasionally 
motivated to manipulate Roman susceptibility to Christian loyalty and brotherhood, and 
converted as a pragmatic measure, primarily in order to create the illusion of strong 
connections to Constantinople in order to either seek their patronage or increase existing 
rewards offered by the emperors.100 On the otherhand, even when Arab leaders seemed 
more sincere in their Christian belief this too could cause problems for the Romans. For 
                                                          
95 Soc. HE 3.25. For the identification of the three Arab bishops who attended Chalcedon in 451 see Trimingham 
(1979: 118). 
96 HE 6.38. 
97 Soz. HE 8.38. Indeed, even the loyal Nasrids, once their last king, Nu’mān b. al-Mundhir, had converted to 
Christianity were no longer considered trustworthy (Toral-Niehoff, 2013: 120). 
98 Through Conrad’s (2009: 186) argument that the Sasanians supported the spread of Nestorian Christianity, 
during the fifth century at least, and supported the Jewish Himyarites it would seem that the Sasanian Empire 
was actively engaged in trying to weakening the Roman religious hold on Arabia.  
99 Evident in the fact that although Rome’s principal allies changed throughout the fourth and sixth centuries the 
Sasanians remained in alliance with the Nasrids throughout this period and were rewarded with undaunted 
loyalty.   
100 Trimingham, 1979: 116. 
202 
  
example, in 376 the Arab tribal queen Mavia launched a devastating campaign against her 
Roman patron, not for conquest or glory but because of a doctrinal debate with 
Constantinople. Mavia rebelled in order to have her own bishop of choice, Moses, ordained 
as the spiritual leader of her people instead of the Arian bishop that Valens had forced upon 
them.101 The largely Monophysite Arabs were also willing to support their fellow doctrinal 
believers against persecution from the Roman emperors.102  
As such, Roman use of Christianity was not stable and reliable enough to create lasting 
dependency between themselves and their Arab allies, while it also only served to increased 
tension and suspicion with the Sasanian Empire. Thus, if the Arab tribes were to be brought 
under increased imperial control, as was necessary to create a more stable balance of power, 
a bilateral diplomatic solution, not unilaterally action, was needed. Just as in Armenia, joint 
imperial diplomatic action was the only means to prevent the manipulation and exploitation 
of Roman-Sasanian relations by a third-party. 
 
 
Diplomatic Solution: The War and the Peace Treaty of 421-2 
Throughout the third and fourth centuries the innate ambiguity and geographic diffusion of 
the Arabs ensured that the imperial neighbours found it difficult to account for them in peace 
treaties.103 Indeed, the geographic spread of the Arabs all across the Near East meant that it 
was impossible to come to a traditional territorial division involving the tribes as they were 
simply incompatible with this sort of settlement. This diplomatic difficulty was evident in the 
absence of any mention of the Arab allies at all from the treaties of this early period.  
                                                          
101 Rufinus HE 11.6; Soz. HE 6.38.1; Soc. HE. 4.36. This incident could suggest that Christianity was not the 
omnipotent link between Rome and its allies that it is sometimes overly portrayed as and could actually be 
equally divisive.  
102 Shahid, 1984b: 18. 
103 This ambiguity was caused by the many divisions within Arab society and the fact that it was in a constant 
state of transition and flux as commented upon by Trimingham (1979: 3) and Moorhead (2001: 195). Indeed, 
this ambiguity spawned the many different Roman terms used for the Arabs such as Sarakenoi, Skenitai, Scenitai, 
Scenitas, Arabes and Thamudenoi (Ptolemy, Geog. 6.7.21; 6.7.23, 6.7.4; SHA Aurel. 11.3; Fest. 3.16). 
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As such, that the 422 treaty dealt specifically with the Arab tribes shows that the Roman and 
Sasanians had finally recognised their overall importance in the imperial relationship, and that 
the needed stability on the eastern frontier could not be secured without addressing the Arab 
problem. This treaty was signed to end the conflict that broke out between the two empires 
in the year before in 421. The principal cause of this war was the Roman acceptance of 
Christian fugitives from the Sasanian Empire, especially from among Arab tribes allied to the 
Sasanians.104 Thus, the outbreak of this short conflict reinforces the culpability of the Arabs, 
and religion, as a cause of the conflict between the Romans and Sasanians.  
The main clause of this treaty tried to overcome the ability of the Arab tribes to exploit 
imperial relations by ensuring that ‘neither side would accept the Saracen [Arab] allies of the 
other’.105 It prohibited either empire from accepting the loyalty of a tribe that was already 
allied to the other.106  This agreement was essential in preventing the ambition and self-
interests of Arab leaders from instigating or intensifying imperial conflicts, as they had done 
in 421. Similarly to the earlier 387 treaty that dealt with the Armenian nakharars, the 422 
treaty outlawed side-switching amongst the Arab tribes and created two separate and distinct 
spheres of control based on influence and not land. The treaty of 422 was thus another 
important step in the creation of a mutually acceptable balance of power, it added further 
stability and reliability to the pre-existing status quo on the joint frontier. That the main flow 
in Arab side-switching was from the Ctesiphon to Constantinople underlines that Roman 
agreement to this clause was a major concession on their behalf. Therefore, the signing of 
this treaty shows a pragmatic desire to establish peace on the eastern frontier in the fifth 
century Constantinople was willing to lessen its advantage over the Sasanians in a region that 
was strategically unimportant to itself, but highly important to Ctesiphon, if it secured the 
wider détente that the Romans needed.107  
 
Yet, even this treaty, and the Roman-Sasanian desire to overcome Arab side-switching and 
the instability it caused was subject to the self-serving compulsion of each empire and their 
                                                          
104 Rubin, 2008: 641. 
105 Malchus fr. 1.4-7. 
106 Shahid, 1989: 36-37. 
107 This refutes the claim made by Rubin (1986: 677) that it was the Sasanians who were most interested in 
working towards peace in the fifth century. 
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neighbours in the search for their own security above all else. As was made clear by the 
aforementioned side-switching of Amorkesos, and the Roman acceptance of his allegiance 
even in the face of their treaty obligations to the Sasanian Empire. Amorkesos’ career is 
therefore yet another example of the benefits of viewing imperial relations in this period 
through the prism of political realism, and an example that deserves further explanation here. 
As already described, Amorkesos left Sasanian service because he was not receiving the 
rewards he needed, and believed he was due, in order to secure his own internal position as 
leader of his tribe. As a result, he led his tribe on an attack upon the wealthy Roman island of 
Iotabe in 473. The capture of this valuable commercial island gave the tribal leader access to 
the economic resources he needed to maintain his internal dominance. Although Amorkesos’ 
reasons for leaving Sasanian service and attacking Roman territory are easy to understand, 
Leos’ subsequent acceptance of his loyalty is harder to explain.108  However, there are a 
number of factors that explain this, and that were connected to the wider situation facing Leo 
and the Roman Empire in the fifth-century which, ironically, underline some of the constraints 
and factors that necessitated the détente with the Sasanian Empire. First, as already seen, 
Roman military attention was focused elsewhere, primarily in North Africa, and therefore Leo 
would have been unwilling to devote military resources needed to retake Iotabe by force.109 
Indeed, Roman troops had been redeployed away from the Arabian frontier, to take part in 
the Vandal campaign of 468, especially the Arab allied Salihid, who had previously been an 
important cog in Roman frontier defence in this region, and therefore Leo did not have the 
ready manpower to fight Amorkesos and win back the island.110 Secondly, and connected to 
the redeployment of the Salihids, Leo needed a new tribe to take over at least part of the role 
the Salihid had played in this frontier, and Amorkesos and his powerful tribe were willing to 
fulfil this role in exchange for rewards and payment.111 Thirdly, and finally, as John Lydus 
informed us, after Leo’s disastrous Vandal campaign in 468 the Roman Empire was almost 
bankrupted. As such, for these reasons, Leo was all but forced to accept Amorkesos’ loyalty 
and current lordship over Iotabe and at least still continue to receive some of the economic 
revenue from the island rather than to take a hostile attitude towards him and receive 
                                                          
108 Shahid’s (1989: 64-67) analysis of Amorkesos’ career is helpful in this regard. 
109 Indeed, as Fisher (2004) points out, it was not until Roman attention had shifted back to the eastern frontier 
in the sixth century that they launched to retake Iotabe. 
110 Shahid, 1989: 51. 
111 Blockley, 1992: 78. 
205 
  
nothing. In this regard, upon being accepted as Constantinople’s ally Amorkesos was charged 
with securing the trade routes that led from Southern Arabia to the Indian Ocean and 
Mediterranean Sea.112  
Nevertheless, despite the example of Amorkesos in general the diplomatic solution that the 
two empires implemented after the war of 421 held firm throughout the fifth century. The 
422 peace treaty ensured that the relationship between the empires and their Arab allies 
were much more stable and manageable which in turn resulted in a much more stable and 




Phylarch and Direct Control 
Soon after the treaty of 422 Constantinople reinforced their allies’ separation from the 
Sasanian Empire, and thus their potential for side-switching, by passing a law in 443 that made 
it legally forbidden for the annona to be stopped or withdrawn from Arab allies.113 That this 
was done can be seen as an attempt to overcome the traditional Arab temptation to switch 
sides by guaranteeing them the ready supply of rewards that was the foundation of their 
loyalty to the empire; if these rewards were never withdrawn or diminished they had no need 
to seek them from the Sasanians. The fact that this was now an official Roman law further 
shows that the Romans were trying to incorporate them fully into imperial administrative 
structure in order to assert more direct control over them, and also shows how important 
they were to frontier defence in this region, in that Constantinople could not risk angering or 
alienating them.   
Indeed, parallel to the creation of the separate Roman and Sasanian spheres of influence, the 
Romans sought to create deeper diplomatic and administrative ties with their Arab allies 
throughout the fifth century. In this regard, the office of the phylarch was established to 
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formalise relations between Constantinople and its allied Arab tribal leaders.114 The term 
phylarch first appeared as a neutral label to describe local Arab chiefs but quickly evolved in 
the fifth and sixth centuries to acquire official administrative and military significance within 
the Roman hierarchy on the Arabian frontier.115  
The development of the office of the phylarch into the official Roman administration was vital 
in integrating allied leaders directly into the Roman imperial apparatus.116 Formalising the 
relationship with the Arab allies in this way granted Constantinople greater control over their 
allies, it deepened their dependency on the Romans and thus ensured they were less likely to 
switch sides. During the fifth century this prestigious title was bestowed upon the leaders of 
the Salihid dynasty, who remained fiercely loyal and effective allies throughout this period.117  
However, the continued development and expansion of the phylarch, namely the promotion 
of one Arab ally as leader over all the others and the concentration of power on this one 
individual leader was to have damaging consequences on the delicate equilibrium and 
stability on the empires’ southern frontier in the sixth century. As Roman-Sasanian hostility 
reignited in the sixth century the Arab frontier became even more than before a major 
battleground between the two empires. In this battle the Sasanian allied Nasrids, who had 
long had the overwhelming patronage of the Shahs, were easily able to defeat the disparate 
and divided Roman Arab allies. Therefore, in response Justinian decided that the only way to 
combat the Sasanian advantage in Arabia was to imitate their policy and, thus, in 528 he 
created a chief phylarch from the Jafnid dynasty who were granted control and authority over 
the rest of Constantinople’s allied tribes. 118   
This was in stark contrast to the situation in the fifth century wherein, although the Salihid 
were the Romans’ chief allies, who were granted greater rewards and prestige, they were 
                                                          
114 Fisher, 2013(a): 7; Soz. HE 6.38.14-16. Sommer (2010a: 221) states that historically such ‘upgrading of a local 
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Arab ally would further reinforce the increasing importance that the Arabian frontier had in the Roman-Sasanian 
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115 Fisher, 2008: 315. 
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indigenous prefect’. 
117 Shahid, 1989: 497. 




never granted control over other allied tribes.119 The employment of many different tribes 
was much easier for the Romans to manage and maintain control over as they could balance 
the ambitions and powers of the individual tribes and their leaders against one another. In 
contrast, the increased rewards, influence and power granted to the Jafnid phylarch of the 
sixth century catalysed the transformation of politically weak peripheral groups into more 
cohesive and autonomous political entities, which allowed them to act more independently 
of Constantinople; the Romans had lost the direct control they had so carefully cultivated in 
the fifth century.120 In the long-term, growth in power and independent action among their 
allies was disastrous for the control and authority of the empires.121 Indeed, both the Jafnids 
and Nasrids alike started to represent themselves rather than simply being dictated to by their 
imperial patrons in diplomacy between the two empires.122 Correspondingly, the promotion 
of the Jafnids as a counterweight to the Nasrids and the many wars fought between them on 
behalf of the imperial powers created deep animosity between the two Arab dynasties. Most 
damagingly for the maintenance of stable Roman-Sasanian relations, this animosity 
increasingly led to the Arab rivals to launch military attacks against one another 
independently of their imperial patrons. 123 Such independent action on the behalf of the two 
empires’ primary allies in the region was detrimental to imperial stability; no longer was peace 
dependent solely on the wishes and needs of the Romans and Sasanians but was once again 
vulnerable to the ambitions of third-parties.   
Thus, the fifth century can be regarded as the sweet-spot for the position of the phylarch, 
from the Roman perspective at least. In contrast the sixth century, which once again 
witnessed the outbreak of war between Rome and the Sasanian rival, saw the Arab allies 
becoming increasingly politically self-conscious as independent action and attacks on the 
opposing power were once again desired and encouraged. 
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3.3: Conclusion    
Roman-Sasanian interactions and relations in the frontier zones of Armenia and Arabia, and 
the respective settlements of 387 and 422 underline the importance of the development of 
imperial diplomacy in the fifth century. Only the increased diplomatic sophistication and 
flexibility that developed in the fifth century, together with the enforced need for détente, 
was capable of creating and maintaining peace in these ambiguous and contested frontier 
zones. 
The situation in both Arabia and Armenia reinforces the notion that neither the Romans nor 
Sasanians could realistically expect to enforce accommodation through military conquest, 
especially in the fifth century when their military attention was focused elsewhere. Even in 
the unlikely event that one power did gain temporary military supremacy over the other the 
ability of the local elites, whether Arabian or Armenian, to act as third-parties and manipulate 
and exploit the imperial competition by switching sides, in order to maintain their autonomy 
and promote their individual ambitions, made any attempt at conquest unstable in the long 
term. Together with the ambiguity about who and what the Arabs and Armenians were, the 
uncertainty about their allegiance only furthered their role as a cause of conflict and mistrust 
between the empires.   
In both frontier zones the diplomatic solution was strikingly similar, with the empires agreeing 
to divide the contested regions into two distinct and separate spheres of control based on 
influence and loyalty of the native elites. The most important clause in the treaties was the 
prohibition of accepting any side-switching among the local elites by the imperial neighbours. 
These agreements were essential in denying Arab tribal leaders and Armenian nakharars the 
ability to manipulate imperial relations and disturb the balance of power. Furthermore, that 
these partitions guaranteed non-interference from the neighbouring empire allowed the 
Romans and Sasanians to pursue increased direct control in the respective spheres. This direct 
control ensured that the desires of the empires, which during the fifth century were for peace, 
were now the overwhelming factor in shaping imperial relations in these regions; they were 
no longer open to influence from the local elites. Thus, the 387 and 422 settlements were 
successful because they restricted and curtailed the political autonomy of local frontier elites. 
The willingness of the Romans and Sasanians to address the underlying causes of war in these 
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frontier zones and implement solutions that both were now increasingly aware of the need 
for a stable imperial frontier due to the threats each empire faced on their other frontiers; 
neither could afford to be distracted by other threats or risk overstretching their military 














Loyalty, Minorities and Mistrust 
 
In the ancient world religion was a ubiquitous presence that permeated every aspect of 
politics and society, it was not a divisible and separate entity as it is in the modern secular 
west. In its simplest form this is evident in ancient historiography that focused attention on 
divine portents and sought to explain military defeats and victories in relation to a leader’s, 
or peoples’, religious activity and piety.1 This ubiquity of religion increased further in late 
antiquity with the rise of monotheistic religions, principally Christianity and Zoroastrianism in 
the Roman and Sasanian Empire, respectively. More than ever before religion became 
inescapably involved and connected with every aspect of life in late antiquity, politically, 
culturally and socially.2  
In this regard, late antiquity saw the culmination of the wider process by which empire and 
monarchy were inexorably linked with belief in the One God. Unlike the dominant polytheistic 
paganisms of previous centuries monotheistic religions were less inclusive and multifarious, 
with much more universalistic aspirations.3 As such, the rise of monotheistic religions in both 
empires meant that the defining political-religious characteristic of late antiquity was the 
conviction that knowledge of the One God both justified imperial rule and made it more 
effective.4 In the Roman Empire imperial power and legitimacy was increasingly centred on 
Christianity, while Zoroastrianism fulfilled a similar role in the Sasanian Empire. Consequently, 
the increased ubiquity and importance of religion meant that it was now intrinsically involved 
                                                          
1 For example, Socrates (HE 7.23.9-12) described Theodosius II’s defeat over the western usurper John as a 
miraculous event and that the Hunnc leader Rua was killed by a thunderbolt and his army laid low by a plague 
that were both sent by God in answer to the emperor’s piety (7.3). 
2 On the increased importance, immediacy and ubiquity of religion in late antiquity see Cain and Lenski (2009) 
and Frakes et.al, (2010). 
3 Leppin, 2007: 98. 
4 Fowden, 1993: 5. 
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in both internal politics and external foreign relations; it was both affected by them and had 
an effect on them.    
The growth of religion as an important factor in political power and legitimacy also led to it 
having a corresponding importance in ideas of social identity. Indeed, Christian identity could 
not be fully understood unless it was viewed in the broader context of ethnic, cultural and 
political identity.5 In this regard, as the power and influence of the leading monotheistic 
religions grew, religion was regarded as the ultimate determining factor of loyalty and 
allegiance in the structure of society.6  Certainly, that religion was inexorably linked with 
political loyalty has already been seen in the relationships between the two empires and the 
Arabs and the Armenians in the important frontier zones between them.7 
The development and nature of the religion was thus, by its very ubiquity and indivisibility, 
destined to play an important role in Roman-Sasanian relations, especially as monotheistic 
Christianity and Zoroastrianism were the state sponsored religions of the Roman and Sasanian 
Empires respectively. Indeed, as shown elsewhere religion was an important consideration in 
imperial relations in the frontier zones and in the ideological competition between the 
empires. At the same time the later growth of independent Christian and Zoroastrian church 
hierarchies also meant that these new powerful religions could act upon their own ambitions 
and aspirations, separate from the political needs of the Roman emperor and Sasanian Shah.  
This ambiguous and multi-layered nature and characteristic of late antique religion gives an 
insight into why religion was such a cause of conflict and hostility between the Christian 
Roman Empire and the Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire, it was not something that either could 
easily control or regulate as it simultaneously existed both within and beyond imperial 
parameters. Therefore, it is important to analyse what effect religion as a wider entity had on 
Roman-Sasanian relations in the fifth century. In this regard, we will seek to analyse how the 
development of these religious ideals and their importance to both states affected how the 
two empires reacted to one another’s religion and fellow worshippers and how in the same 
                                                          
5 Schott, 2008: 4. 
6 This is revealed by the conversation between Shapur II and his Christian subject Pusai (Acts of Pusai AMS 2 
p.214). Diocletian’s insistence on persecuting and halting the spread of ‘Persian’ Manichaeism is another 
indicator of this (Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum 15.3.1-8). It is also for this reason that Brown (1969: 
98) suggests that religious persecutions above all reveal the fears and assumptions of the persecutors 
themselves rather than any political or social reality. 
7 Wiesehöfer (1993) has also recognised that this was the case in the Roman-Sasanian relationship. 
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regard these ideals and developments, together with the internal needs and desires of 
emperors and Shahs alike, finally led to conditions more favourable to the establishment of 
peace in the fifth century.  
 
As already emphasised, mistrust was a major stumbling block in peaceful relations between 
two polities. As such, in the Roman-Sasanian relationship the inherent mistrust between the 
two neighbours was amplified by the central role and ubiquity of Christianity and 
Zoroastrianism in each empire. Indeed, the effect of this mistrust amid the growing link 
between religious identity and political loyalty in late antiquity was evident even before 
Christianity became the religion of the Roman emperors, the effects of which would only have 
increased with Christianitys eventual promotion from Constantine onwards. For example, 
Diocletian’s Edict against the Manichaeans issued in 297 reveals the effect this religious 
mistrust had on the Roman-Sasanian relationship: 
The Manichaeans, about whom you reported to Our Serenity with much insight, as we have 
heard, have come into existence and entered our realm only recently from our enemy, the 
Persian people, just like new and unexpected portents, and they inflict harm on civilised 
states; and we have been afraid that, as tends to happen, by scandalous customs and the bad 
laws of the Persians over the course of time will try to infect people of a more innocent nature, 
modest and quiet Romans and our whole empire with their malign poison.8 
This edict, issued by Diocletian in response to the growth of Manichaeism in the Roman 
Empire at the end of the third century, emphasises the fundamental characteristic of the role 
religion played in Roman-Sasanian relations. It was not a strict competition between Roman 
Christianity and Sasanian Zoroastrianism that generated imperial mistrust and fostered 
imperial conflict but rather it was the expansion of foreign or rival religions in each empire 
that was believed to threaten their internal stability.9 Diocletian evidently believed the spread 
of this foreign ‘Persian’ religion would have had damaging consequences on the internal 
stability of the Roman Empire. Therefore, as shown by this extract, Manichaeism was 
                                                          
8 Collatio Legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum 15.3.1-8. Eusebius (HE. 7.31) described Manichaeism in a similar 
manner comparing it to a poisonous snake entering the Roman Empire from ‘barbarous’ Persia.  




persecuted in the Roman Empire due to its perceived link with the Sasanian neighbour, a link 
that existed only in Roman suspicions, in the belief that its continued existence would damage 
the loyalty of the Roman Empire.10  
Thus, the edict highlights the fears and suspicions that religious mistrust aggravated in 
Roman-Sasanian relations and the direct effect this had on the internal policies and concerns 
of the empires. Indeed, just as Diocletian was wary of the spread of Manichaeism in 297, the 
Shahs of the fourth centuries believed the spread of Christianity in their domain would equally 
have an insidious effect on the internal stability of their empire and loyalty of their subjects. 
As Christianity became increasingly linked with the Roman Empire the Shahs feared that the 
growth of their rival’s religion in their empire would led to the growth of fifth columns from 
amongst the adherents of the rival Roman religion, whose loyalty would be to their fellow 
worshippers across the imperial frontier, rather than the state in which they lived and owed 
political loyalty. This fear became a key factor in the religious sphere of the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship and ensured that religion was often the cause of imperial suspicion, mistrust and 
even conflict.  
Evidently, it was once again the internal concerns and political necessities of the Roman 
emperors and Sasanian Shahs that was the overriding impetus for the overall nature of 
Roman-Sasanian relations. If the fifth-century peace was to be maintained this internal 
religious mistrust and the resulting effect it could have on the imperial relationship itself 
needed to be overcome. This was especially true for the Sasanians, who as we have already 
seen, faced extensive internal turmoil in the fifth century. 
 
The Christian Roman Empire 
[Constantine] openly declared and confessed himself the servant and minister of the supreme 
King. And God forthwith rewarded him, by making him ruler and sovereign, and victorious to 
such a degree that he alone of all rulers pursued a continuous course of conquest, unsubdued 
and invincible, and through his trophies a greater ruler than tradition records ever to have 
been before. So dear was he to God, and so blessed; so pious and so fortunate in all he 
                                                          
10 Indeed, Manichaeism had no official connection with the Sasanian Empire in which it was also persecuted 
(Brown, 1969: 92). 
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undertook, that with the greatest facility he obtained authority over more nations than any 
who had preceded him.11 
This extract from the Vita Constantini by the emperor’s biographer, Eusebius, reveals that 
Constantine’s conversion to Christianity in 312 had a profound effect on the development of 
the Roman Empire. Eusebius, being both pro-Constantine and pro-Christian, had a clear bias 
in emphasising the importance of Christianity which ensures we must be careful when using 
his work in highlighting the effect Christianity had on the Roman Empire. Yet, it is nevertheless 
undeniably true that Constantine’s conversion and subsequent support of Christianity marked 
an important epoch in the nature and development of the Roman Empire. 12  Likewise, 
although the veracity of Eusebius’ work and his qualification to write the biography of an 
emperor who he had limited contact with has regularly been questioned, the fact that 
Constantine’s conversion had a dramatic effect on Roman imperial ideology cannot be 
questioned.13 Thus, as made clear by Eusebius here, the success of the emperors and the 
empire alike was now intrinsically linked with Christianity. Since the emperors were now 
thought to be ‘entrusted by god with his commission’ everything they did was thought to be 
influenced and affected by their relationship with God. 14  Over the course of the fourth 
century Christianity became increasingly firmly positioned at the heart of Roman imperial 
ideology. Thus, their legitimacy, military victories, imperial expansion and internal standing 
were all embedded and connected to the new official Christian religion 
In regards to their foreign relations the new centrality of Christianity created two underlying 
causes of tension with the empire’s neighbours, especially the Sasanian Empire. The first of 
these was the new Roman ideal of one god, one emperor and one empire that was linked to 
the new perceived role of religion in indicating loyalty and drove the Roman desire for internal 
religious and doctrinal uniformity as a means of cementing internal stability.15 Such religious 
unity could only be achieved through the weakening of other religions and the subsequent 
                                                          
11 VC. 1.6.  
12 On the importance of Christianity to the Roman state and the Roman emperors after Constantine see: 
Dvornik (1996); Odahl (2004) and Vivian (1987). 
13 For a more general survey on the veracity and authenticity of Eusebius see Cameron & Hall (1999) and Drake 
(1988). 
14 Proc. De. Aed. 2.6.6. This is no more evident than in Theodosius’ enforced penance to God by the bishop 
Ambrose after the massacre at Thessalonica in 390 (Ambrose, Letter 51.4, 6, 11, 13). 
15 Eus. VC. 1.5.24. 
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promotion of Christianity.16  Part of this entailed the attempted creation of an orthodox 
doctrine that would unite all Christians under the same banner. In this regard, successive 
emperors organised numerous church councils or synods, such as Nicaea in 325 and 
Chalcedon in 451 to overcome doctrinal debates and disputes. 17  However, the heated 
debates and animosity that arose in these councils only deepened the doctrinal divides and 
further entrenched the schisms between different Christian groups. Consequently different 
strands of Christian belief and doctrine such as Nestorianism, Arianism, and Monophysitism 
that were all deeply opposed to one another erupted throughout and beyond the Roman 
Empire.18 That these different creeds were opposed to the imperially sponsored orthodoxy 
that was established in Nicaea and later Chalcedon they were viewed as traitors to the ideal 
of one god, one emperor and one empire. Thus, Roman emperors and orthodox Christian 
leaders viewed them with utter enmity, as heresy deserving only persecution and eradication. 
Accordingly, in his Edict of Thessalonica (380) Theodosius I declared that ‘they shall be 
branded with the ignominious name of heretics and shall not presume to give their 
conventicles the name of churches. They will suffer in the first place the chastisement of the 
divine condemnation and in the second the punishment of our authority’.19 Although this 
particular example of persecution was limited to Constantinople and Theodosius himself was 
arguably more moderate than this proclamation suggests, it nevertheless highlights the 
perennial danger and potential harassment those identified as heretics suffered at the hands 
of imperial and orthodox authorities in this period.20  
These doctrinal schism and hatreds were not confined within the Roman Empire, however, 
and they soon began to affect the Romans’ relations with their neighbours. Indeed, Nestorius, 
a leading bishop during the reign of Theodosius II, linked the success of Constantinople’s 
foreign policy with the persecution of heresies. He told the emperor, ‘Give me, King, the earth 
purged of heretics, and I will give you heaven in return. Aid me in destroying heretics, and I 
                                                          
16 Soc. HE 7.19.5; Barnes, 1985: 130. 
17 Soc. HE 1.8; Soz. HE 1.19; Theodt. HE 1.6. 
18 For more information on these splits and disagreements, and how they fostered hatred and disdain between 
the different Christian groups see: Humfress (2007: 218-242), Ste. Croix (2006: 202-250) and Ehrman & Jacobs 
(2004: 115-227). 
19 CTh. 16.1.2. Edict of Thesalonica (ed. Bettenson, 2011: 22). 
20 For this more restricted understanding of the Edict of Thessalonica and Theodosius’ moderation see Hunt 
(2007), Errington (2006: 218) and Mclynn (2005: 79-88). 
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will assist you in vanquishing the Persians’.21  Roman loathing of the Arian Vandals reveals 
that they were particularly zealous when confronting neighbours who followed a Christian 
creed different to their own; they were not just savage barbarians but now also heretics, not 
just military enemies but religious enemies.22  Such spilling over of Christian schisms and 
hostilities into foreign relations was to have a profound effect on the religious relationship 
with the Sasanian Empire and its Christian population in the fifth century as the Church of the 
East began to develop its own distinct identity, independent of Roman Orthodoxy, as shall be 
seen below. 
The weakening of other religions predominantly took the form of persecutions against non-
Christian religions in the empire such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, paganism and 
Manichaeism. 23  Although Roman persecutions against Zoroastrians did not occur as 
frequently as those against paganism there is no doubt that they did take place. Indeed, 
Zoroastrian persecutions are mentioned by Priscus: 
The Romans, wishing to turn the Magi who had long lived in Roman territory from their 
ancestral customs, laws and forms of worship, harassed them and did not allow the fire, which 
they call unquenchable , to be kept always burning as the law requires.24 
Priscus’ statement that the motivation for this attack was the Roman desire to turn 
Zoroastrian worshippers against ‘their ancestral customs, laws and forms of worship’ 
underlines that the desire for internal religious uniformity was always the underlying impetus 
for religious persecutions in the Roman Empire. Later in this passage Priscus, who as we have 
already seen was generally well informed when it came to Constantinople’s diplomatic 
relations with neighbouring powers, relates that this Zoroastrian persecution brought about 
a direct response from the Sasanian Shah, Peroz, who complained bitterly about these attacks 
and demanded that they be stopped. This Sasanian reaction shows that, unlike the 
persecutions against Judaism and paganism, Roman attacks against Zoroastrians had direct 
consequences on the empire’s foreign relations. As the traditional patron of Zoroastrianism, 
as well as the pressure Zoroastrian Magians could exert on them in the interests of their 
                                                          
21 Soc. HE 7.29.5. 
22 Brown, 1969:98. 
23 On persecutions of Jews, Samaritans and pagans see: Novella 3. On persecutions of Manichaeism see: 
Novella 18, issued by Valentinian III.  
24 fr. 31. 
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religion, Sasanian Shahs were compelled to react to such Roman persecutions against their 
fellow believers. Thus, despite the fact that Roman persecutions of non-Christian religions 
were conducted predominantly for the internal political needs and concerns of the emperors 
they nevertheless still served to foment and escalate wider imperial hostilities.  
 
The second cause of tension Christianity instigated with the Sasanian Empire was a result of 
its proselytising nature that constantly sought to convert non-believers into believers. Indeed, 
this was a central tenet of the religion as revealed by the Christian Bible itself: 
All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go, therefore and make disciples 
of all nations.25 
Such biblical proclamations ensured that the Roman emperors after 312 felt they had a 
religious duty to convert other peoples to Christianity, even those beyond their own borders. 
Consequently, successive emperors sanctioned or even directly organised Christian missions 
to regions beyond their borders to try and convert the local populations.26 Likewise, emperors 
would often use military victories over their neighbours to enforce Christianity upon them.27 
For the Sasanians the spread of this perceived Roman religion caused contention as it often 
encroached into their territories or lands were they had traditionally held cultural and political 
influence, which was now challenged by Roman influence. However, the most important 
consequence of Christianity’s proselytising efforts on Roman-Sasanian relations was the 
subsequent moral obligation emperors, as the ‘bishop of those [Christians] outside [the 
Roman Empire]’ felt to protect these converts and their fellow Christians even beyond their 
own borders. 28  Indeed, from Constantine onwards Roman emperors used the status or 
position of Christians in foreign lands as a casus belli.29 
                                                          
25 Matt. 28.19-20. The gospels of Mark (16.15) and Luke (24.47) also contain similar passages. 
26 Ivanov, 2009. 
27  For example, Constantine insisted upon religious clauses in his treaties with the Goths in 332 and the 
Sarmatians in 334 that allowed him to claim that he had converted them to Christianity (Gelasius HE. 3.10.10).  
28 Eus. VC. 4.24; Whitby, 1988: 201; Odahl, 2004: 271. For more on the implications of this statement on Roman 
foreign relations see: Angelov (2014). 
29 One such example of this was Justinian’s re-conquest campaigns in the sixth century that were portrayed as a 




In the early years of the Christian Roman Empire this protective obligation principally took the 
form of military campaigns, particularly against the Sasanian Empire. 30  These religiously 
inspired campaigns were frequently targeted against the Sasanian Empire which had a 
substantial Christian population. It should come as no great surprise that it was Constantine 
who set the precedent for such religious wars. A letter sent from Constantine to Shapur II 
highlights the main aspects of Roman religiously inspired campaigns: 
You can imagine with what joy, I heard that also many fine areas of Persia are adorned with 
this group of people, I mean the Christians (for it is on their behalf that I am speaking), just as 
I desire. May many blessings be granted to you, and in equal amounts blessings to them, as 
they also belong to you; in this way the almighty Lord will be a father to you, merciful and 
benevolent. I now commend these to you, because you are so powerful, I place them in your 
care, because your piety is eminent. Love them according to your customary humanity; for by 
this expression of your faith you will procure an immeasurable gratification for yourself and 
for us.31 
Although the veracity of this letter has been questioned, as mere literary effect, it nevertheless reveals 
important aspects of the Roman-Sasanian relationship that stimulated Roman religiously inspired 
attacks against the Sasanian Empire.32 Namely, that there was a large Christian population in the 
Sasanian Empire and it also reinforces that the Roman emperors regarded themselves as the 
protectors of all Christians everywhere. Yet, most decisively Constantine’s veiled threat to Shapur that 
he commended him to look after the Christians in his realm shows that Sasanian persecutions of the 
Christians in their empire would bring about a Roman response. To reinforce this point, earlier in the 
same letter Constantine related to the Shah the humiliating defeat and death of Valerian that he 
described as a direct result of his Christian persecutions. This thinly veiled threat would have been 
easily recognised by Shapur; to persecute Christianity was to invite disaster. Unfortunately for the 
Christians in the Sasanian Empire, however, Shapur II and his successors were not overawed by such 
Roman threats. Importantly then, this letter also shows that Roman crusades were aimed at protecting 
Christians and Christianity, not eradicating Zoroastrianism. Thus, it further underlines that Roman-
                                                          
30 Augustine, Against Faustus 22.74-5; Barnes, 1985: 132; Blockley, 1992: 143; Holum, 1977; Lee, 2007: 205-210. 
31 Eus. VC. 4.13.  
32 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 216; Harries 2012: 177. Angelov (2014:2 91) argues that ‘nothing in the letter suggests 
that Constantine was threatening the Persians with war in defence of the Christians’; however, such a letter to 
Shapur would have undoubtedly meant to have served a purpose, and in relation to Constantine’s later 
preparation for a religiously inspired military campaigned against the Sasanians, its purpose must surely have 




Sasanian religious hostility did not result from a direct competition between Christianity and 
Zoroastrianism but was rather the consequence of the spread of what were perceived as foreign 
religions in the empires and the rulers own internal needs and concerns.   
 
Shortly after his letter to Shapur II in the late 330s Constantine began preparations for a 
military campaign against the Sasanian Empire, the motivation for which was the wish to be 
seen as the liberator of Christians suffering in the Sasanian Empire.33 Accordingly, unlike 
previous campaigns against the Sasanian rival this was to have a distinctly religious impetus. 
The emperor’s personal tent was to be constructed to resemble a church, he was to be 
accompanied by bishops, would carry a special bible with him throughout the campaign and 
he planned to be baptised in the river Jordan.34 Unfortunately for Constantine, however, he 
died in 337 before he could launch his crusade against the Sasanian Empire.35  
However, Constantine was not the only emperor who regarded the plight of Christians in the 
Sasanian Empire as a casus belli; Theodosius II launched a religiously motivated attack against 
the Sasanians in 421.36  The background to this war reinforces the claim that it was the 
existence of foreign religions in both empires that most inspired wars between the two 
empires. In 420 persecutions against Christians in the Sasanian Empire began in response to 
the Christian burning of a Zoroastrian fire temple. Upon his arrest the leader of this attack, 
the zealous bishop Abdas, was commanded to rebuild the fire temple. When the bishop 
subsequently refused the Zoroastrian Magians encouraged and pressured the then Shah, 
Yazdgard I, to respond to this attack against both his authority and Zoroastrianism itself with 
a large-scale persecution of Christianity.37 In a bid to escape the resulting persecutions many 
Christians fled to the Roman Empire where they begged Theodosius II, as the guardian of 
Christianity, not to ignore their suffering.38 As Theodosius’ internal legitimacy and reputation 
was founded on his Christian piety, even more so than many of his contemporaries, he could 
                                                          
33 Barnes, 1985: 126. However, as Constantine granted his nephew, Dalmatius, the title ‘King of Kings’ in the 
preparations of this campaign it is also likely that they was also a more political and dynastic element to this 
planned attacked (Harries, 2012: 186). 
34 Eus. VC. 4.56. 
35 Eus. VC. 4.60. 
36 Holum, 1977. 
37 Soc. HE 7.18.  
38 Augustine De civ. Dei. 18.52; Cyr.Scyth. Vit. Euthym. 10. 
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not be seen to refuse his follower Christians in their time of need or else his internal position 
may have been weakened.39 Thus, when Yazdgard’s successor, Bahrām V, demanded that 
these refugees be handed back the pious emperor proved himself ‘ready to do anything for 
the sake of Christianity and duly refused’, 40 and for this first time in the fifth century the 
Romans and Sasanians went to war.41  
Accordingly, in order to win God’s support for this campaign religious preparations were given 
just as much importance as military preparations in its planning. For example, a rich donation 
was made to the poor in Jerusalem, a golden cross was sent to Golgotha and a special solidus, 
the so-called ‘Long-Cross Solidus’, was minted and decorated with Christian symbolism.42 
However, this conflict came to an abrupt end when Attila once more began to attack the 
Romans across the Danube and forced the Romans to sue for peace, which the Sasanians 
were willing to grant. A peace treaty was quickly signed wherein both sides agreed to religious 
toleration throughout the territories.43 Nevertheless, the fact that Theodosius was willing to 
disturb the détente that he had until now he had carefully maintained in 422 underlines how 
much of a divisive issue religion was in the imperial relationship.  
 
Evidently, after Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, religion played a profound role in the 
political relationship between the imperial neighbours and would be a significant factor in 
maintenance of stable Roman-Sasanian relations in the fifth century. The effect Christianity 
had in foreign relations caused tension with Sasanian Empire. This was especially true when 
it was employed to strengthen Constantinople’s political and cultural ties with local elites in 
important frontier zones where the Sasanians were traditionally dominant, such as Armenia. 
Christianity allowed the Romans to penetrate Sasanian territory in a way that military force 
                                                          
39 There are numerous examples of Theodosius linking the military success and defence of the empire to his 
Christian piety. For example, when news of the defeat of the usurper John in the west reached Constantinople 
the emperor stood up in the middle of the Hippodrome, halted the races and declared; ‘Let us then, if you wish, 
set aside our enjoyment, go to church, and send up prayers of thanks to God, for his hand has killed the tyrant’ 
(Soc. HE 7.22-23.11). Likewise, when an earthquake struck Constantinople in 447 and took down sections of the 
Theodosian Walls that protected the city and left it vulnerable to Hunnic attack Theodosius led a barefoot 
procession to the Hebdomon, all the while praying for God to protect them (Malalas 14.22; Callinicus, Life of 
Hypatius 52). 
40 Soc. HE 7.17.3-6-8. 
41 Soc. HE 7.18.2. 
42 Holum, 1977: 163. 
43 Soc. HE 7.20.13; Soz. HE 9.3.3. 
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could not.44 Furthermore, the fact that the Roman Empire was willing to launch large-scale 
military campaigns against the Sasanians in order to protect Christians within their empire 




The Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire?45 
My son, religion and kingship are brothers who cannot do without each other, for religion is 
the foundation of kingship and kingship is religion’s protector. And that which does not have 
a foundation collapses and that which does not have a protector perishes.46 
Know that kingship and religion are twin brothers each one of which cannot do without its 
partner. For religion is the foundation of kingship, and kingship is the protector of religion. 
Kingship cannot do without its foundation and, and religion cannot do without its protector, 
for that which has no protector perishes and that which has no foundation collapses.47               
As these two passages make clear, Sasanian kingship and religion, Zoroastrianism, were 
interconnected and interdependent, both provided protection, legitimacy and support to the 
other. The fact that they are both held to be advice passed from the founder of the Sasanian 
Empire, Ardashir, to his successor, Shapur, indicates that this was especially true in the early 
period of the empire. Alongside these two sources, Agathias also informs us that the Sasanian 
Royal Annals spoke of Ardashir’s involvement in Zoroastrianism. 48  Indeed, as a newly 
established dynasty that had won its position through military revolt, the Sasanians needed 
to quickly establish their legitimacy and right to rule.49 As Herodotus informs us, ancient 
Iranian tradition, a tradition which was fundamentally important to the Sasanians, 
                                                          
44 Fowden, 1993:24. This was especially important at the end of the fourth and start of the fifth century when 
Roman military force was increasingly focused elsewhere. 
45 For a general survey on the Zoroastrian religion, with particular focus on the Sasanian period see: Boyce (1979, 
1996), Shaked (1994) and Rose (2011). 
46 Mas’ūdī, Murūg 1 § 568. In this passage the founder of the Sasanian Empire Ardashir is giving this advice to 
his successor Shapur I 
47 Will of Ardashšīr I (trans. Grignaschi 49). 
48 2.26.3. 




disapproved of changes in leadership simply for the sake of power. 50  Thus, this 
interconnection between their kingship and Zoroastrianism was a vital means of providing 
more meaningful and justifiable legitimacy than mere military victory; it allowed the Sasanian 
dynasty to claim that their right to rule was divinely ordained.  
Accordingly, to promote their legitimacy the early Shahs stressed their relationship with the 
Zoroastrian god, Ahura Maza, and their position as a ‘Mazda-worshipping’ monarchy through 
a variety of means.51 Foremost amongst these were the many rock reliefs commissioned by 
early Shahs.52 Ardashir was the first to celebrate his divinely ordained right to rule through 
rock reliefs that emphasised his personal relationship with Ahura Mazda, the principal 
Zoroastrian deity. For example, in the rock relief at Firuzabad that, he commissioned to 
celebrate his coronation, Ardashir is described as; ‘his Zoroastrian majesty…who is descended 
from the gods’.53 Likewise, in the rock relief celebrating his investiture at Naqš-I Rustam Ahura 
Mazda is centre stage as the god hands the ring of sovereignty to Ardashir.54 His successor 
Shapur I, evidently followed his father’s advice above, continued this tradition by declaring in 
his famous res gestae divi saporis that he owed all his military successes to the gods, who he 
was descended from (‘bay’) and whose ‘dastgerd’, or protégé, he was.55 Alongside rock reliefs 
Sasanian coinage was also used to spread the image of the Shahs as Mazda-worshippers and 
patrons of Zoroastrianism.56 Coins minted during the reigns of Ardashir I, Shapur I and their 
immediate successors contained depictions of Zoroastrian fire temples on their reverse.57 
Equally, the Shahs undertook vital services to the gods such as the establishment of fire-
temples and granted privileges to the Magians, all of which promoted Zoroastrianism in the 
empire and the Shahs’ role as its patron.58  
                                                          
50 As shown by the fact Cyrus the Great, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire, was legitimised by being 
portrayed as the grandson of the last Median King. Likewise, Darius was described to have been fighting against 
an illegitimate imposter rather than the real heir (1.107-8). In these two examples it was important that both 
Cyrus and Darius legitimised their actions with more than just a desire for power. 
51 This is a title that appears throughout Sasanian royal imagery. For a general survey on the importance of this 
religious element in Sasanian kingship see: Choksy (1988). 
52 On early Sasanian rock reliefs see Huff (2008). Wiesehöfer (1996) informs us that these royal inscriptions were 
usually set up at ‘sacred sites’ which would have granted their creators further legitimacy. 
53 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 134; Ghirshman, 1962: fig. 168. 
54 Ghirshman, 1962: fig. 168. 
55 SKZ § 51. On this definition of dastgerd see Henning (1958: 96). 
56 On early Sasanian coinage see Alram (2008). On Sasanian coinage in general see Schindel (2013). 
57 Ibid. 
58 Daryee, 2008(a): 71; SKZ § 18. 
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Therefore, although not a state religion in the same sense as Christianity was in the Roman 
Empire, Zoroastrianism was nevertheless a considerable force in the internal composition of 
the Sasanian Empire, especially in the third and fourth centuries.59 This royal patronage of 
Zoroastrianism and the close relationship between throne and altar also benefitted the 
Zoroastrian Magians. It ensured they held a powerful position within the empire that allowed 
them to exert pressure on the Shahs and influence foreign and internal religious policies. This 
Magian influence in the decision-making processes of the Sasanian Empire had important 
consequences on the development of the empire’s relationship with the Christian Roman 
Empire, as shall be explained below.  
 
Valiant king, the gods have given you your empire and success. They have no need of human 
honour; but if you convert to one religion all the nations and races of your empire, then the 
land of the Greeks [Romans] will also obediently submit to your rule.60     
This extract comes from The History of Vardan and the Armenian War by fifth century 
Armenian historian Elishé. Although his history primarily focuses on the Armenian revolt 
against the Sasanian Empire in 450 it does also contain useful information on Sasanian 
religious customs, particularly matters of Zoroastrian purity, and as such the above statement 
about Sasanian and Magian thoughts on religious uniformity should be regarded as 
accurate.61 This Magian statement to Yazdgard II is strikingly similar to Nestorius’ declaration 
to Theodosius II that was mentioned above. Thus, it is evident that, similarly to the one god, 
one emperor and one empire ideal in the Roman Empire, the Magians promoted the idea that 
internal unity, stability and military success could only be achievable through religious 
uniformity. This policy, or religious ideal, had obvious appeal to the Magians as its end result 
would be Zoroastrian ascendancy and supremacy throughout the Sasanian Empire. However, 
it also appealed to the Shahs politically and pragmatically as it promised internal unity and 
                                                          
59 Those who argue the case for the Zoroastrian state religion include: Garsoїan (1983: 585), Asmussen (1983: 
933), Daryaee (2008a: 69) and Williams (1996: 38). While those who argue against this are: Wiesehöfer (1996: 
214), Brosius (2006: 188), Gignoux (1984a: 80); Drijvers (2009: 444). Whereas, Dignas & Winter (2007: 212) state 
that although it was not a true state religion the Zoroastrian Church did share many hierarchical and structural 
similarities with the Christian Church. 
60 Elishé p. 6. 
61 For more information on Elishé see: Thomson (1998, 2001)   
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stability in a land that was recently ravaged by civil war and also guaranteed the support of 
the Magians. Accordingly, we are informed that: 
His Majesty, Ardashir, the king of kings, son of Pabag, acting on the just judgement of Tosar [a 
Magi], demanded that all those scattered teachings to be brought to court. Tosar assumed 
command; he selected those which were trustworthy, and left the rest out of the canon. And 
thus he decreed: From now on only those are true expositions of the Mazdean religion, for 
now there is no lack of information and knowledge concerning them.62 
Although the Dēnkard, from which this passage comes, has somewhat dubious reliability due 
to its heavy emphasis on myth it does nevertheless contain useful information on 
Zoroastrianism.63 Importantly for this passage, that its description of Ardashir’s attempt to 
introduce and implement a Zoroastrian orthodoxy is similar to the allusions made by the more 
reliable Elishé above on the importance of religious uniformity to the early Sasanians it has a 
greater degree of historical reliability than other sections of the Dēnkard. That this was one 
of Ardashir’s first religious acts upon ascending the throne reinforces the importance 
Zoroastrianism had to the early Shahs. Evidently, Ardashir believed that the creation of a 
unified Zoroastrian doctrine would reinforce the religion’s centrality in the empire and prove 
an even greater source of support.64 These two aspects of early Sasanian religious-imperial 
life further underscores the similarities between the two rival empires, as, as already 
witnessed, Christianity attempted the same things in the Roman Empire. Such similar aims 
and ambitions in two competing religions, as already revealed, created internal pressures for 
the two empires’ rulers. 
The idea of internal loyalty being linked with religious conformity and uniformity may well 
have been a superficial one, enforced only when the power of the Magians was ascendant, 
but it was nevertheless to have lasting consequences for Christians living within the Sasanian 
Empire, especially after the Roman Empire had become a Christian one. Also, the use of 
Zoroastrianism as a means to political legitimacy for the early Shahs could suggest that their 
adherence and loyalty to the religion was borne more out of political need rather than 
                                                          
62 Dēnkard ‘Acts of Religion’ (Shaki, 1981).  
63 For more information on the Dēnkard see: Shaki (1981) and Gignoux (1994). 
64 On the Sasanian Zoroastrian Orthodoxy see: Boyce (1996). 
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religious zealotry; this will look even more the case when we analysis the religious situation 
of the Sasanian Empire in the fifth century in more detail below.     
 
Christianity in the Sasanian Empire 
As shown above the religious-ideological ideal of the Sasanian Ērānšahr was centred on the 
idea of a well-ordered land of Persians with a shared Zoroastrian faith.65 However, the reality 
was quite different, the empire was in fact multi-ethnic and multi-religious with substantial 
Jewish, Christian, Hindi and Manichaean populations.66  
Around this time Christianity also spread in Persia for the following reasons. Between the 
Romans and Persians frequent embassies constantly take place…this is why Christianity 
spread among the Persians.67 
Shapur [II] built the city of Vēh Šāpūr, brought captives from various places and settled them 
there. He also had the idea of bringing thirty families apiece from each of the ethnic groups 
living in the cities beyond his realm, and settling them among the deported captives, so that 
through intermarriage the latter should become tied down by bonds of family and affection, 
thus making it less easy for them to slip away gradually into flight and return to the areas from 
which they had been deported. Such was Shapur’s crafty plan, but God in his mercy turned it 
to good use, for thanks to the intermarriage between the deported population and the native 
pagans, the latter were brought to knowledge of the [Christian] faith.68 
As these two passages reveal, a considerable portion of the Sasanian population was made 
up of Christians that continued to grow and mature throughout the centuries. Indeed, that 
these sources, one eastern and one western, agree with each other on the existence of a large 
Christian population provides further veracity that this was the case and it was not just a 
Roman or Christian idea or posturing. These sources show that the very nature of the Roman-
Sasanian relationship, with its continuous diplomatic and military contacts, was partly 
responsible for this growth and spread of Christianity in the Sasanian Empire.  
                                                          
65 Daryaee, 2010: 91. 
66 KKZ § 9-10. 
67 Soc. HE 7.1-20. 
68 Acts of Pusai AMS 2 p.209. 
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Importantly, for this growing Sasanian Christian population, beyond the borders of the Roman 
Empire Constantine’s conversion to Christianity had arguably its most profound effect within 
the Sasanian Empire, but rather than benefitting them it proved detrimental.69  The new 
identification of Christianity as the religion of the Roman emperors changed the attitude of 
the Shahs to their Christian subjects, who were now viewed as Roman auxiliary troops. It was 
for this reason that Christianity during and after the fifth century was regarded as a foreign 
religion, and therefore as having a subversive and destabilising effect on the Sasanian Empire. 
This change in the conditions of Sasanian Christians after 312 amid the idea that their religious 
identity affected their political loyalty is evident in the toleration Christianity enjoyed in the 
reigns of the early Shahs, from Ardashir to Hormizd II, before Constantine’s conversion, 
compared to their treatment after this date wherein they faced more frequent and fierce 
persecutions.70 Indeed, as shown by the passage from the Acts of Pusai above, before 312 
Shapur II himself, upon establishing forcibly deported Christians in his empire, kept them 
together, granted them freedom of worship and other privileges in order to keep them happy 
and loyal. Indeed, when Christianity was periodically persecuted in the Roman Empire pre-
conversion the Sasanians offered sanctuary to Christians as part of their wider conflict with 
the Roman rival, as a means to undermine the emperors, as was evident during the 
persecutions initiated by Valerian and the flight of the Nestorians to the Sasanian Empire.71 
Furthermore, the Middle-Persian word for Christians, tarsāgān, has positive connotations as 
it means ‘reverent ones’ or ‘God fearing ones’ and, therefore, suggests that Christianity was 
not inherently hated throughout the history of the Sasanian state, and that the Shahs’ later 
systematic persecution of it in the fourth century was driven by political needs and 
considerations.72  
As such, there were two principal conditions that inevitably led to persecution; tensions with 
the Roman Empire and the internal ambition and influence of the Zoroastrian Magians, both 
of which had important consequences for the Roman-Sasanian relationship.73 
                                                          
69 Hage, 1973; Decret, 1979. 
70 Asmussen, 1983: 936. Bahrām II was the only exception in this early period. This exception was due to the 
exceptional power amassed by the mowbed Kerdir during Bahrām II’s reign. 
71 Chronicle of Seert PO 4 pp.22-3, PO 4.220-1, Garsoïan, 1983: 570; Frye, 1981: 264.  
72 Daryaee, 2010: 91. 
73 Brock, 1982: 1-18; McDonough, 2006: 69. 
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As they worshipped the same god the Shahs believed Christians within their own empire were 
more likely to be loyal to the Roman emperor than they were to the Sasanian state, especially 
in times of war, highlighting the late antique belief that political loyalty was determined by 
religious identity.74 This view was propagated by the Magians who wished to see this rival 
religion chased out of the empire. They believed that the Christians could not be trusted 
because; ‘they hold the same faith as the Romans, and they are in entire agreement together: 
should a war interpose between the two empires these Christians will turn out to be defectors 
from our side in any fighting’75 and ‘although they [Christians] live in our land, they share the 
doctrine of Caesar our enemy’.76 Indicative of the suspicion of Christians’ political loyalty 
being affected by their shared religion with the Romans was Simeon’s, the leading bishop in 
the Sasanian Empire, refusal to levy the double tax mentioned above by Shapur II. Simeon’s 
refusal to pay these taxes were seen as a result of his Christian loyalty to Constantinople, as 
seen by the Shah’s resultant exclamation; ‘Simeon wants to make his people rebel against my 
kingdom and convert them into servants of Caesar, their coreligionist’.77 Thus, the loyalty of 
Christians within their empire was questioned by the Shahs, who viewed them with mistrust 
and as a potential Roman ‘fifth-column’ in their empire.78 This suspicion was partly justified 
by the actions and beliefs of some Christians, as evident from the writings of Aphrahat which 
suggest that many Christians did hope and pray for a Roman victory of the Sasanian Shah.79 
Indeed, it must also be remembered that in his letter to Shapur II Constantine actively linked 
the Sasanian Christians to himself and the Roman Empire, thus initiating Christianity as a 
political factor in the imperial relationship.  
Accordingly, some Sasanian officials and Magians believed the only way to counter this was 
to convert the Christians to Zoroastrianism, as made clear by Lazar P’arpets’i: 
                                                          
74 Brock, 1982: 5. 
75 Acts of Peroz AMS 4 p.258-9. This speech was given by the Magian Mihrshabur during the trial of Peroz in 422. 
76 Maryrologium of Mar Simon, Acta martyrum et sanctorum 2.135-6 (ed. Bedjan 2 135-6). 
77 Acts of Simeon (ed. Kmosko B. 4). 
78 Barnes, 1985: 136. 
79  Aphrahat, Demonstrations 5.2. For more detail and discussion on Aphrahat and the implications of his 
Demonstrations see: Barnes (1985). 
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If you [the Shahs] were to render them [the Christians] familiar with our religion…they would 
love you and the land of the Aryans and would reject and draw away from the [Roman] 
emperor and his religion and his empire.80 
The primary method that they believed would secure this conversion was persecution. 
Indeed, as shown by an important Zoroastrian inscription persecutions became an important 
tool of the Magians in their attempts to eradicate other religions and ensure their position as 
the overwhelming and predominant religion of the Sasanian Empire: 
And the false doctrine of the Ahreman and the dēws [demons] disappeared from the empire 
and were expelled. And the Jews, Buddhists, Brahmans [Hindi], Nazarenes, Christians, 
Baptists and Manichaeans were broken up, and their idols were destroyed and the dwellings 
of the dēws were annihilated and turned into places and seats of the gods.81  
This celebration of persecutions against the other religions of the Sasanian Empire comes 
from the biographical inscription of the mowbed, Kerdir, the most powerful Zoroastrian 
Magian in the third century, at Naqsh-e Rajab. 82 Kerdir’s inscription is an important source of 
information on Zoroastrianism within the Sasanian Empire as it provides direct insight into 
how its chief priest wished both himself and his religion to be viewed; however, as with all 
forms of personal aggrandisement caution most be used when analysing this inscription.83 It 
highlights the first danger to Christians within the Sasanian Empire; the internal ambitions 
and influence of Zoroastrianism and its Magians.84 As a monotheistic religion with universal 
aspirations Zoroastrianism viewed Christianity, and all other religions, as a direct challenge to 
its position.85 As celebrated by Kerdir in his inscription, this fear and desire for supremacy 
often resulted in persecutions of other religions, Christianity among them. Indeed, the 
Magians promoted the idea that toleration of the Christians would anger the true Zoroastrian 
god.86 Persecutions were most prevalent when the Magians were at their most powerful and 
                                                          
80 43. 
81 KKZ § 9-10. 
82 Certainly, Kerdir presented himself as the most powerful at any rate (KKZ § 8-9). Indeed, the mere fact that he 
was permitted to inscribe his biography in stone is testament to his power as this was normally a prerogative 
reserved solely for royalty (Daryaee, 2008b: 75). 
83 For more on the usefulness and considerations of the Kerdir’s inscription as a both a source of information 
and historical statement see: Dignas & Winter (2007: 213-16) and Mackenzie (1989: 35-72). 
84 Daryaee, 2010: 94. 
85 Fowden, 1993: 31-35. 
86 Lazar P’arpets’i 42-4.87. 
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able to exert pressure and influence on the Shahs in demanding action against rival faiths, as 
evident in the fact that the persecutions mentioned above were organised during the height 
of Kerdir’s power. The danger this posed to other religions is evident in the efficiency with 
which the Magians attacked the Manichaean faith in the third century.87 The correlation 
between Magian ascendance and religious persecutions was again evident during the reign 
of Bahrām V when the Magians, having regained the initiative, were able to induce the new 
Shah to initiate attacks against the Christians.  
In contrast, when the Shahs’ internal position was secure they often sought to protect their 
Christian subjects from the zeal of the Magians.88 Indeed, Yazdgard I was widely criticised in 
eastern sources for his toleration of Christians and Jews, earning the epitaph the ‘sinner’ 
(Ramšahr). 89  The fact then, that Shahs were willing to offer protection to the Christian 
population when they were able, and when it would prove beneficial, once again reinforces 
the notion that they were more interested in political interests such as stimulating internal 
stability rather than simply zealously promoting Zoroastrian religious uniformity.90 Similarly, 
when it benefitted the internal infrastructure of the empire to utilise the skills of the 
Christians the Shahs were eager to offer their patronage, privileges and sanctuary as 
incentives for their loyalty. This policy was evident in the social and religious policies of Shapur 
I and II.91 Thus, the eventual separation between religion and kingship that was so central to 
the early Shahs that occurred in the fifth century, allowed the Shahs to distance themselves 
from the religious machinations and prejudices of the Zoroastrian Church, as shall be 
explained below. Indeed, the motivation behind the Magians’ move for a more independent 
and organised Zoroastrian Church in the late fourth and fifth centuries may have been due 
the Shahs’ willingness to tolerate other religions which was unacceptable to them. 
 
                                                          
87 Hutter, 1993; Scott, 1989. 
88 Brock, 1982: 6. 
89 Chronicle of Seert 1.205-7. 
90 This is also supported by the fact that even Shapur II, who as we have already seen, stressed his connections 
with Zoroastrianism for political purposes, predominantly legitimacy, courted Mani, the spiritual leader of 
Manichaeism, for a time. If Shapur was truly dedicated to Zoroastrianism itself he would surely not have done 
this (Kreyenbroek, 2008). 
91 For the position of Christians during the reign of Shapur I see:  Elishé (3.18).  For the position of Christians 
under the reign of Shapur II see: Chronicle of Seert (½ 261, 11. 3.). 
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As already highlighted, in late antiquity religion was regarded as the underlying factor in 
determining political loyalty, and this fact was to have severe repercussions for Christians 
living in the Sasanian Empire, 92 as shown by the Martyrologium of Mar Simon: 
Shapur [II] found an opportunity, after the death of the blessed Constantine, emperor of the 
Romans died, to pick a quarrel with his sons, because they were young, and [so] he was 
continually going up to raid the lands of the Romans. And for this reason he was especially 
stirring hatred against the servants of God who were in the territory under his dominion, and 
he was longing and scheming to find a pretext for the persecution of the faithful. And he 
contrived a stratagem to crush with a double levy all the Christians who were in the dominion 
of the Persians.93     
This passage, describing the beginning of the long and bitter conflict between Shapur II and 
Constantius II, underlines that conflicts with the Roman Empire frequently led to persecutions 
of Christianity within the Sasanian Empire.94 Shapur seemingly believed that attacking the 
Roman Empire and persecuting Christianity were two sides of the same coin. Indeed, the 
similar actions of successive Shahs in the fourth century suggests that they increasingly 
believed that military campaigns against their Roman rival could not succeed without also 
attacking the Roman religion within their own territory. Consequently, Sasanian persecutions 
of Christianity usually ran parallel to imperial conflicts.95 Likewise, Shapur II’s decision to 
antagonise the sons of Constantine by attacking the ‘servants of God who were in [his] 
territory’ suggests that he was aware that the position of Christians even beyond their own 
borders was considered a cause of war by the Roman emperors and a useful way of instigating 
conflict. Furthermore, the connection between conflicts with the Roman Empire and Christian 
persecutions can also be suggested to highlight the overriding political concern of the Shahs, 
internal stability, as the persecution of their Christian population was a guaranteed method 
                                                          
92 McDonough (2006: 68) argues that persecutions took place predominantly with the pragmatic aim of 
centralisation and an attempt to redress the anxieties about the loyalty of minorities, not as straightforward 
attempts to forcibly convert them to Zoroastrianism. This view is also supported by Nöldeke (1979: 114), Frye 
(1983: 320) and Neusner (1983: 915). 
93 Martyrologium of Mar Simon, Acta martyrum et sanctorum (ed. P. Bedjan 2 135-6). 
94 Indeed, the long conflict between Shapur II and the Roman Empire led to forty years of almost continually 
Christian persecution (Dignas & Winter, 2007: 220). 
95 Bahrām V’s short-lived war of 421 was yet another example of this (Soc. HE 7.18). 
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of winning the support of the Magians, whose support would have been essential during 
campaigns against the Roman rival. 
 
Evidently, as long as internal order and external security were not threatened minority 
religions were tolerated and allowed to prosper, but if they caused any disorder internal or 
damage to the empire persecutions were always the likely result.96 Thus, it was the internal 
concerns and fears of the Shahs that resulted in Christian persecutions. Indeed, as we have 
seen the legitimacy and position of the Shahs of all periods was linked to internal stability and 
loyalty.97 In this regard, if the Magians, a considerable support to the Shahs and influential in 
the internal balance of power, pressured the Shahs to launch persecutions they were all but 
forced to do so unless the Magians withdrew their support. However, it was Christianity’s link 
with the Roman Empire and Roman Emperors after 312 which generated the most mistrust 
and occasional hostility from the royal government. This situation led to a political paradox 
that suggested peace could not be established until Christian persecutions were brought to 
an end, but persecutions were unlikely to end until peace was established. Hence, it would 
take a unique set of circumstances and subtle political and religious manoeuvrings to 
overcome this. These unique circumstances began to take root in the fifth century as the 
military focus of the empires shifted elsewhere and, as shall be seen below, the traditional 
interconnection between Sasanian kingship and Zoroastrianism began to diminish in the fifth 
century. If the perceived loyalty to Constantinople and Sasanian dependence on the Magians 
for internal support could be removed or disproved, Christians would come under less 
scrutiny and likely suffer less persecutions and this in turn would help to defuse any religious 
antagonism with the ‘protector’ of all Christians in Constantinople. Fortunately for the 
Christians, and for the maintenance of the Roman-Sasanian détente, these two changes did 
take, and were interconnected, in the fifth century.                                                       
 
 
                                                          
96 Daryaee, 2008a: 97. 
97 Evident in the fact that Yazdgard I had coins minted that proclaimed him as he ‘who maintains peace in his 
dominion’ or Ramšahr (Daryaee, 2008b: 21). 
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Sasanian Christianity and the Epoch of the Fifth Century 
Sasanian kingship was not static or unchanging and this meant that, despite the early 
importance of Zoroastrianism, its relationship with the religion developed over time, adapting 
and reacting to political changes and circumstances.98 The importance Zoroastrianism had in 
both kingship and state in the third and even fourth centuries was in no way guaranteed to 
still exist in fifth century, and indeed it did not. Arguably the biggest change in the relationship 
between Sasanian kingship and Zoroastrianism took place towards the end of the fourth 
century as the traditional alliance between throne and altar diminished.99 The impetus for 
this change was the crystallisation of a Zoroastrian church hierarchy that enabled the Magians 
to become a more independent institution within the state. 100  The rise of this more 
independent Zoroastrian Church meant that the Magians’ were no longer reliant on the Shahs 
for their power and influence. Indeed, in the early third and fourth centuries even powerful 
mowbeds such as Kerdir still owed their position to the patronage of the Shahs.101 
The main consequence of the strengthened organisation and independence of the 
Zoroastrian Church and the loosening of its ties with the Shahs was that in the fifth century 
the Shahs were no longer regarded as the ultimate patron of Zoroastrianism, nor were they 
any longer viewed as being descended from the gods. They were now simply regarded as 
secular rulers who happened to be a ‘Mazda-worshipper’.102 This change is evident in the 
terminology used to describe Shahs after the fourth century: in the third and fourth centuries 
they had used the title ‘bay’, with its aforementioned religions connotations; however, in the 
fifth century and beyond this was increasingly replaced by the more secular ‘xwadāy’ 
designation.103 This resulted in a weakening of the internal strength of the monarchy in the 
face of a more assertive, independent and ambitious Zoroastrian clergy, the results of which 
have already been noted in the increased internal turmoil of the fifth century. This new 
relationship between the Shahs and Zoroastrianism was more apparant than in the reign of 
                                                          
98 Daryaee (2008b: 60) rightly points out that the concept of kingship in the third century was totally different 
to that of the sixth century. 
99 Choksy, 1988: 49-52. 
100 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 214; Daryaee, 2008a: 21. 
101 KKZ § 8-9. 
102 Daryaee, 2008a: 21.  
103 Daryaee, 2008b: 63. This term has similar conations to the term xvarna discussed by Dignas & Winter (2007: 
234) which refers to a Shah’s ‘royal radiance’ or ‘royal majesty’.   
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Yazdgard I, who, at the beginning of the fifth century, ordered the execution of Magians who 
had angered him, a move which his earlier predecessors in the third century would never have 
risked.104 Thus, although damaging, this development nevertheless also gave the Shahs more 
scope for flexible action in their religious policies; it forced the Shahs to look elsewhere within 
their empire for alternative sources of internal support 
 
In the Shahs’ search for other sources of internal support, the growth of Christianity at the 
end of the fourth and into the fifth century into a large and influential religion which was at 
times able to challenge the traditional supremacy of Zoroastrianism provided an important 
opportunity. Indeed, despite the persecutions and suspicions of the fourth century, by the 
fifth century Christianity had become a large and well-established religion within the Sasanian 
Empire, with six metropolitan sees and over thirty bishoprics by 410.105 This expansion of 
Christianity had a drastic effect on how Shahs went about achieving internal stability, 
especially in relation to the turmoil caused by their traditional support in Zoroastrianism and 
the nobility. Throughout the fifth century successive Shahs, from Yazdgard I onwards, became 
directly involved with the Christians in their empire in order to establish greater ties of loyalty 
between them and the throne, in the hope of utilising them as an alternative, or 
counterweight, to the Magians who had turned into a source of internal instability, in the 
same way Yazdgard hoped to counter the power of the nobles with the Nasrids, as mentioned 
earlier. Equally, the Sasanian Christians displayed a willingness to prove their loyalty to the 
empire and the Shahs, undoubtedly motivated by their desire to avoid persecution and attack. 
This bilateral enthusiasm for accommodation between the Christians and the Shahs 
culminated in royally organised Christian councils, or synods, throughout the fifth century 
that paved the way to closer ties and trust between the Shahs and the Christians, by 
distancing Sasanian Christianity from Roman Christianity; thus circumventing the idea that 
they were politically linked by a shared religious belief. Indeed, as we have already seen, one 
way to placate mistrust and foster more reliable relations between two different parties is 
                                                          
104 Soc. HE 8.7.9. 
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through constant signalling. The actions of both the Shahs and the Christians in the fifth 
century is a prime example of this. 
The first of these official synods was organised by Yazdgard I in 410 at Seleucia-Ctesiphon, the 
outcome of which is described below: 
In the eleventh year of the reign of Yazdgard, king of kings, victorious. After peace and 
tranquillity were restored to the Lord, [this king] gave freedom and rest to the congregations 
of Christ and allowed the servants of God to exalt Christ publically in their body, either with 
their death, or during their life, he drew aside the storm of persecution of all of the flocks of 
Christ, indeed, he ordered in all his empire that the temples destroyed by his fathers might be 
magnificently reconstructed in his own time; that those who had been tested for God who 
had suffered prisons and tortures, should go in liberty; that the priests, the chiefs, together 
with all the holy order should circulate with complete freedom and without fear.106 
This description of the council’s decisions comes from the Synodicon Orientale, a collection of 
letters and correspondence from the Church of the East, the primary Christian institution in 
the Sasanian Empire, dating predominantly from the fifth century. As such, on matters 
concerning Sasanian Christianity in this period it offers a direct and unique insight. From this 
description of the agreement it is justifiable to compare it to the Edict of Milan, signed in 313 
that declared religious toleration throughout the Roman Empire.107  Christians were now 
permitted to worship publically, Yazdgard allowed the restoration of churches and freed 
imprisoned bishops and, perhaps most importantly, Yazdgard agreed to enforce the decisions 
of this synod, thus showing that Christianity was now officially part of the Sasanian state 
again, under the Shahs protection and authority.108 This synod also witnessed the creation of 
a new hierarchical organisation of the Church of the East with its own ecclesiastical laws, 
independent from its Roman counterpart, that was authorised through the joint agreement 
of the bishops and Shah.109 This gave both internal stability and external protection to the 
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newly created Church of the East. In return, the Church of the East swore its total allegiance 
to the Sasanian throne.  
Socrates stated that Yazdgard was prompted to organise the 410 synod and grant Christianity 
toleration by the Roman ambassador, and Christian bishop, Marutha; however this claim was 
likely due to a desire to attribute this as a Christian or Roman victory on behalf of the 
historian’s patron, Theodosius II. 110  Indeed, this Roman-Christian desire to portray this 
advancement of Christianity in the Sasanian Empire as a victory of the true religion is further 
evident in the fact that Roman historians subsequently began to claim that Yazdgard himself 
had converted to Christianity.111 More likely, Yazdgard’s decision to support Christianity at 
this time was due to his own aforementioned internal needs and concerns. Nevertheless, the 
reign of Yazdgard and the 410 synod can quite rightly be seen as a harbinger of a shift in the 
nature of Sasanian Christianity.   
Yet, despite the success of the 410 Synod it was not enough to protect the Christians against 
the wrath and power of the Magians. Nor was the creation of the Church of the East and its 
deepened links with the Sasanian throne enough to stop the Romans, under Theodosius II, 
once more coming to the aid of Christians when they once again faced persecution in Sasanian 
territory in 421/2, and declaring war on the Sasanian Empire, and thus once again causing 
Sasanian suspicion about where the Christians’ loyalties laid.112 Therefore, in response to the 
causes of these persecutions and the resultant war with Constantinople, additional synods 
were convened to reinforce the loyalty and obedience of the Christians to the Sasanian throne 
and also to further sever the ties between the Church of the East and the Roman Church 
authorities and emperor.  
The most important of these was the 424 synod that annulled the traditional right of appeal 
Sasanian bishops had to the Patriarch of Antioch and made the Catholicos of the Church of 
the East responsible only to God. 113 This decision made the Church of the East a completely 
                                                          
110 HE 7.1-20. McDonough (2008a: 87) and Dignas & Winter (2007: 223) also argue that Marutha was responsible 
for this. 
111 Soc. HE 7.8.1-3. 
112 Luther (2014: 191) has also claimed that such internal religious tensions possibly caused an earlier imperial 
conflict in 416/17. Although the existence of this conflict has not yet been conclusively agreed upon and Luther 
himself admits it would have been a much shorter and more localised conflict that even those in 421/2 and 441. 
113 Syn. Or. p.296; Asmussen, 1983: 341. 
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independent entity separate from Roman interference and the influence of the Patriarch of 
Antioch and severed all official ties between the Roman emperors, Roman Christian authority 
and the Sasanian Christians.114 That the 424 synod came relatively soon after the end of the 
421 war with Constantinople suggests that it was organised in direct response to the cause of 
the persecutions which led to the war with Constantinople. 
Next, in 484 at the Beth Lapat synod the Metropolitan of Nisibis, Barsauma, persuaded his 
fellow Christians to adopt a different form of Christological confession than that used in the 
Roman Empire. He explained the necessity of such a move to Shah Balās; ‘unless the 
confession of Christians in your territory is made different from that in Greek [Roman] 
territory, their affection and loyalty towards you will not be firmly fixed’.115 This speech to 
Balās confirms that Christian leaders realised it was important for their safety and toleration 
in the Sasanian Empire to create a distinct and separate identity from the Christians in the 
Roman Empire. Therefore, it was also in this synod that the Church of the East declared its 
allegiance to the Nestorian creed.116 This decision to adhere to what the Romans considered 
to be a heretical doctrine created a lasting divide with the Orthodox Roman Christian 
authorities and the emperors. Consequently, the Magians were no longer able to so easily 
charge the Christians as sharing the same faith as the Shahs’ greatest rival and questioning 
their loyalty as they had done throughout the fourth century. Likewise, the Roman emperors 
no longer viewed themselves as the protectors of Christians within the Sasanian Empire as 
they were now considered heretics and traitors to the faith. As such, the Roman emperors 
were no longer willing to launch attacks against the Sasanian Empire to protect heretics who 
had purposefully disavowed the true Christian faith and Nicene Creed. The 484 synod was 
thus important in both the Roman-Sasanian religious relationship and in the relationship 
between the Church of the East and the Sasanian state.  
Balāš (484-488), yet another fifth century Shah who had trouble with the nobility and 
Magians, called the last synod of the fifth century in 486 during which the right to marry was 
granted to all ranks of the Christian clergy.117 This made Christianity much more acceptable 
to Persian cultural traditions than celibacy which they abhorred. This was a major concession 
                                                          
114 Dignas & Winter, 2007: 223. 
115 Barhebraeus, Chronicon Ecclesiasitcum 3.65. 
116 Brosius, 2006: 193; Wiesehöfer, 1996: 204. 
117 Brock, 1982: 4. On Balāš’ internal troubles see Joshua Stylites (18-19). 
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and change on behalf of the Christians to show themselves as Persian.118 The 486 synod 
therefore reinforces the willingness for accommodation between the Shahs and their 
Christian subjects, both wanted to cement the ties of loyalty and acceptance between them, 
in order to better their own position within the empire. 
As a result of these synods, from the fifth century onwards Christians, in particular leading 
bishops such as the Catholicos, became trusted allies and advisors of the Sasanian Shahs. Fifth 
and sixth century sources increasingly record the presence of bishops at the courts of the 
Shahs and refer to them as ‘friends of the king’.119 Indicative of the new importance and 
acceptance of Christians at the Sasanian courts was the fact that all four of the major 
diplomatic exchanges with the Roman Empire during Yazdgard I’s reign were conducted by 
Christian bishops.120 Alongside the growing importance of bishops in diplomacy Christians 
were also increasingly trusted with domestic responsibilities. For example the Catholicos Ahaī 
was sent to investigate and report on piracy in the important province of Fars.121 The fact that 
Christian bishops were trusted with leading such important political and diplomatic missions, 
especially as envoys to the Roman Empire, clearly reveals that during the fifth century they 
were no longer considered Roman spies or a Roman ‘fifth-column’, but instead now acted as 
alternatives to the Magians, and could be relied upon to uphold the interests of the Sasanian 
Empire. Furthermore, that Sasanian kingship was no longer rooted to a strict alliance with 
Zoroastrianism, by the fifth century the Shahs viewed themselves as kings of both 
Zoroastrians and non-Zoroastrians alike. The state sponsored synods of the fifth century 
ensured that the Christian problem was no longer an imperial problem but a problem solely 
for the Zoroastrian Church.122 The separation of the Church of the East from the Roman 
Christian authorities that was orchestrated and cemented by the fifth century synods was 
instrumental in this development, and this separation was equally instrumental in the 
peaceful relations between the two empires in the same period by circumventing a tradition 
source of conflict and suspicion between them. The effect of these fifth century synods in 
establishing Sasanian Christianity as a distinct entity, different and independent of Roman 
                                                          
118 Ibid 9. 
119 Chronicle of Seert 1.69, 1.71. 
120 McDonough, 2008a: 88. Predominantly Marutha. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Evident in the fact that post-fifth century accounts, principally the Syriac martyrologies, it is usually individual 
Magians who insisted on putting Christians to death, not the Shah (Daryaee, 2010: 95). 
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Christianity was arguably most evident in the historical recording of the seventh century 
Sasanian conquests of large swathes of the Roman territory, that rather than reading as 
unabashed anti-Christian were instead anti-Chalcedonian.123 
 
Although these synods were primarily organised to strengthen the ties of loyalty and dispel 
the antagonism between the Shahs and the Christians, that would allow the Shahs to utilise 
them as an alternative and counterweight to the power of the Zoroastrian Magians, they also 
had important consequences on the Roman-Sasanian relationship. From the first synod in 410 
to the last in 486 Christian attempts to become more acceptable to the Sasanian Shahs 
correspondingly distanced them from the Roman emperors. This growing distance between 
the Nestorian Church of the East and the Orthodox Roman emperors ensured that 
Constantinople was less and less likely to launch military campaigns against the Sasanian 
Empire in order to protect them. This is evident in that the persecutions during the reigns of 
Yazdgard II and Peroz, unlike the persecutions of 421, did not result in Roman retaliation or 





The pragmatic nature of the religious policies of the Shahs has repeatedly been stressed 
throughout this chapter and their fifth-century religious policy, emphasised by the 410, 424, 
484 and 486 synods, was no different in that respect. Accommodation with the Christian 
population was a political necessity due to the internal instability of the Sasanian Empire in 
the fifth century that granted the Shahs of the fifth century three important benefits. First, it 
gave them patronage over the talented leaders of the Church of the East and created a 
relationship of obligation between bishops and Shahs. Secondly, it enabled Christianity to act 
as a counterweight and alternative to the power and ambitions of the Zoroastrian Magians. 
                                                          
123 Chron. Pasch. p.728; Theoph. Chron. a.m. 6106. Fowden (1993: 35) also notices this, although he does state 
that the difference between anti-Christian and anti-Chalcedonian feeling is sometime ambiguous. 
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Thirdly, and most importantly for the fifth-century Roman-Sasanian peace, it separated 
Sasanian Christianity from its traditional link with the Roman Empire and ensured that the 
Romans, who viewed all opposing Christian creeds as heresy, would no longer be willing to 
launch crusades or attacks against the Sasanian Empire on behalf of the Christians living there. 
This third factor then was important in the establishment and maintenance of peace between 
the two imperial rivals in the fifth century as it overcame yet another potential casus belli 
between them. Importantly, the removal of religion as a cause of war between 
Constantinople and Ctesiphon was thus linked more to the overriding need for security, the 
internal security of the Shahs, that is stressed by political realism, more so than any other 
development. This therefore once agains reinforces the usefulness of understanding the fifth-





This thesis has investigated the Roman-Sasanian relationship in the fifth century in an attempt 
to understand the reasons for, and the nature of, the peace between the two empires in this 
period. A holistic approach was taken in order to analyse the imperial relationship as an 
integral part of the wider late antique world, not as something distinct and separate. This 
ensured that equal focus was given to both the need for peace, due to changes beyond 
imperial borders and the changed internal conditions of both empires (Chapter I), and also on 
how it was established and maintained (Chapters 2 and 3). This approach allowed us to 
identify, and then analyse, the different motivations that stimulated and necessitated peace 
between the two empires in this period, as well as the obstacles which needed to be 
overcome for this peace to take place. 
 
The Changing Relationship 
Chapter 1 analysed the development of the Roman-Sasanian relationship in the longue durée, 
by comparing the priorities of the two empires in the third and fourth centuries with those in 
the fifth century.  
In the third and fourth centuries the Roman and Sasanian Empires were firmly focused on 
competition with one another. A variety of political, religious, strategic and ideological 
concerns were all seen to have stimulated and necessitated imperial conflict. Just as peace 
eventually became necessary to the survival of the two empires in the fifth century, during 
the third and fourth centuries conflict with the other was necessary for the success and 
prosperity of the empires as a whole, and also for the internal position of the emperors and 
Shahs. By investigating the causes of these earlier wars the obstacles that needed to be 
overcome in the fifth century for the détente to be established were ascertained. In this 
regard, the traditional Roman-Sasanian casus belli were identified as, the fluctuating balance 
of power in the Mesopotamian frontier, the side-switching of the Armenian nakharars and 
Arab tribes, conflicting and antagonistic ideologies, religious suspicions and the need for 
internal legitimacy and stability.  
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In the second part of this chapter (Chapter 1.2) the role the aggressive and dangerous Huns, 
Vandals and Hephthalites, as well as increased internal instability in the Sasanian Empire, 
played in forcing a shift in the imperial and military priorities of both empires in the fifth 
century was analysed. The effect that the emergence of these new barbarian powers had on 
the geopolitical condition of the late antique world was the underlying motivation for imperial 
peace. By analysing imperial resources, especially of the East Roman Empire after 395, it was 
shown that the neither Constantinople nor Ctesiphion had the military power or economic 
resources to fight multiple wars on different frontiers simultaneously and, consequently, they 
were forced to decide carefully where and when to deploy their resources in response to the 
most pressing threats. Accordingly, their focus shifted towards the new barbarian threats that 
posed a much more immediate and direct danger than the imperial rivalry, which by the end 
of the fourth century had stagnated into the competition for the control of individual frontier 
cities or forts. Thus, because of their limited resources, and need to avoid imperial-
overstretch, the Romans and Sasanians soon realised the need for a détente with one 
another, in order to focus their attentions elsewhere.1 Certainly, the Roman redeployment of 
troops from the mobile field armies from their eastern frontier, as emphasised by the Notitia 
Dignitatum, together with the joint 442 agreement not to construct new fortifications on the 
imperial frontier and the deterioration of existing fortifications on this frontier does support 
the idea of a mutual Roman and Sasanian shift away from the imperial competition and 
frontier.2  
 
The Establishment of Peace 
Chapter 2 and 3 investigated how the two empires managed to overcome the traditional 
casus belli between them.  
The creation of a more sophisticated and adaptive diplomatic relationship in the late fourth 
and fifth centuries was central to the establishment and maintenance of the Roman-Sasanian 
peace in the fifth century. The key developments in Roman-Sasanian diplomacy during this 
                                                          
1 Indeed, in his theory of imperial overstretch, which bears many paralells with the situation facing the Romans 
and Sasanians in the fifth centuy, Münkler (2007:112-15) argues that the avoidance of imperial overstretch was 
synonymous with withdrawal from frontiers, and the potential of overstretch was mainly a danger when an 
empire’s resources were running low.  
2 On the deterioration of eastern fortifications in this period see: Blockley (1992:108). 
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period included the formalisation of diplomatic protocols, the increased prominence of the 
magister officiorum, the creation of a corps of translators, the use of experienced 
ambassadors, regular diplomatic contact and the inclusion of time-limits for treaties. The fact 
that the majority of these developments were unique to Roman-Sasanian diplomacy 
underlines that it was only in this relationship that long-term stability and constancy was both 
needed and desired, they were designed for the specific needs of the Roman-Sasanian 
relationship in the fifth century, not for any wider desire for more peaceful relations with the 
empires’ neighbours as a whole. As a result, unlike imperial diplomacy in the third and fourth 
centuries, which was both fundamentally and structurally reactive and ad-hoc, Roman-
Sasanian diplomacy in the fifth century was much more preemptive and important in its own 
right. Imperial diplomacy became a real and viable alternative to warfare. Furthermore, the 
diplomatic language and rituals that resulted from this improved imperial diplomacy helped 
to generate a new ideology of interdependence that provided an alternative to the 
entrenched ideology of conflict that had previously existed.  
Chapter 3 analysed the nature of the Armenian and Arabian frontier zones as causes of 
Roman-Sasanian conflict, primarily in regard to the role the Armenian nakharars and Arab 
tribes played as third-parties in both fomenting and exploiting imperial conflict. It was shown 
that, due to the ability of the local frontier elites to easily switch allegiance between the two 
empires, the imperial balance of power in these regions was in a constant state of flux; 
conductive only to warfare and suspicion, not peace. Therefore, to overcome this, and 
provide the stability that both needed, the Romans and Sasanians embarked upon a new and 
innovative solution that was based on diplomatic negotiation and flexibility. Rather than 
attempt to divide the frontier zones between them territorially, which they had attempted to 
do in the past and which had always failed, they instead decided to divide these regions into 
distinct spheres of influence, based upon the loyalties of the different local elites themselves. 
Key to this decision was the agreement that both sides would not to accept the allegiance of 
an Armenian nakharar or Arabian tribe that belonged in the other’s sphere, no matter what 
short-term advantage it might give them.  
Such subtle solutions to the problems of these frontier zones would not have been possible if 





Religion was ubiquitous in the late antique world, especially in the imperial relationship 
wherein two official ‘state’ religions came face-to-face for the first time. As such, Chapter 3 
investigated the effect Christianity and Zoroastrianism had on the establishment of peace in 
the fifth century. 
Although the existence of two competing monotheistic religions in the Roman and Sasanian 
Empires undoubtedly added yet another layer of suspicion between them, it is important to 
stress that direct Christian-Zoroastrian competition was not the underlying impetus behind 
most religiously motivated conflicts and hostilities between the two empires. Rather, it was 
the position of Christians in the Sasanian Empire, who the Shahs believed were more likely to 
be politically loyal to the Christian Roman Empire than the Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire due 
to the fact they shared the same religious belief. Thus, the steady development of the 
independent Church of the East, from 410 onwards, as a distinct entity separate from the 
Roman Christian authorities was instrumental in allaying the suspicions of the Shahs. The fact 
that the new royally supported Church of the East had different practices and traditions than 
Roman orthodoxy meant that Roman emperors increasingly viewed Sasanian Christians as 
heretics and consequently were no longer inclined to launch military campaigns against the 
Sasanian Empire to ‘save’ them, as they had done previously.  
This separation between the Church of the East and Roman Orthodoxy ensured that religion 
caused less hostility and suspicion than it had done in previous centuries. 
    
Holistic Connections and the Roman-Sasanian Peace: Political Pragmatism and Necessity  
As stated at the outset, the fifth century relationship and the unique period of sustained 
Roman-Sasanian peace can only be truly understood if all aspects of the late antique world, 
and the internal developments of the two empires themselves, are viewed together. 
Therefore, although these inter-connections have been highlighted throughout the 
investigation, it is important to describe them in more detail now in order to reinforce what 
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has been stated as the primary motivations of the fifth-century Roman-Sasanian peace 
throughout this work; namely the emergence of the new barbarian powers and the empires’ 
own individual interests. 
For example, from the Sasanian perspective the increased threat of the Hephthalites in the 
fifth century and the successive defeats they suffered at their hands made the Shahs more 
vulnerable to internal unrest. Military success and reputation was a central factor of a Shah’s 
legitimacy, therefore, these defeats damaged this legitimacy and open him up to internal 
intrigue and attack. In this regard, the Shahs’ failures against the Hephthalites allowed the 
other powerful internal groups within the empire, namely the nobility and the Zoroastrian 
Magians to challenge them. This forced the Shahs to create stronger ties of loyalty and 
support with other important groups with their empire as alternative sources of support and 
as political counter-weights to the Magians and nobles; chief amongst these alternative 
sources of support was the Sasanian Christians.  Thus, the Shahs’ desire to further secure their 
own position against the internal instability of the fifth century led to an accommodation with 
their Christians subjects that resulted in the creation of the Church of the East. This 
reconciliation between the Shahs and their Christian subjects meant that they were no longer 
viewed with suspicion, as a Roman fifth-column, and suffered fewer persecutions, which in 
turn meant that the Romans were less likely to launch military campaigns to protect them. 
Thus, the internal needs and pragmatic decisions of the Shahs in the fifth century played an 
important role n the Roman-Sasanian peace. Evidently, the Sasanian Shahs did not organise 
ecclesiastical synods and sponsor the Church of the East in the fifth century in the clear 
knowledge that it would engender better relations with the Roman Empire but rather because 
it was in their own internal interests to do so 
Similarly, the need to defend their imperilled north-eastern frontier against the Hephthalites, 
and the sheer amount of economic and military resources this required meant that the 
Sasanians needed peace on their other frontiers, principally in the west with the Roman 
Empire in order to avoid becoming overstretched. The need for peace with the Romans 
consequently forced the Sasanians to be more pragmatic and adaptive in their diplomatic 
dealings with Constantinople in order to create stability on the imperial frontier that they 
needed to face the Hephthalites in the north-east. This need for pragmatism and adaptability 
in turn stimulated the development of Roman-Sasanian diplomacy in the fifth century, as the 
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more reactive and limited diplomacy of the third and fourth centuries, which was 
incompatible with the creation and maintenance a mutually acceptable balance of power, 
was slowly replaced by a more adaptive and sophisticated diplomatic relationship.    
 
These interconnections, and the consequences they had on other developments elsewhere, 
also supports the realist understanding of international relations, that every state always acts 
first and foremost in its own interests and towards its on security. That the Roman-Sasanian 
settlements in the frontier zones of Arabia and Armenia in the fifth century were driven by 
their own individual interests and concerns confirms this. Both empires wanted better control 
over their allies, to protect their own empire against external threats, including the 
neighbouring empire, and to increase their direct control over these regions in order to better 
benefit from the strategic and material benefits they granted, they did not necessarily want 
to help the other to do the same. Indeed, the realist ideal can also be seen in the actions of 
the non-imperial powers in this period. For example, the Huns, Vandals and Hephthalites did 
not attack the Roman and Sasanian Empires simply because they were savage barbarians but 
because it was in their own interests to do so, either in the protection and expansion of their 
own territory or because their own internal political considerations made it necessary to do 
so. Likewise, even the Armenian nakharars and Arabian tribal leaders who operated at a 
smaller level than both the empires and the barbarian powers always acted in their own 
interests. These frontier elites did not consistently switch sides between the two empires 
merely to cause trouble for their imperial neighbours but because this was the best means 
available to them to advance their own power and position. This realist focus on pragmatism 
and individual ambition was likewise true for the internal power groups within individual 
states as shown by the actions of the Sasanian nobility, Magians and even the Shahs, all of 
who primarily acted in their own interest even when this went against what was best for the 
empire as a whole.      
 
Importantly, from this understanding of the fifth-century détente the two short wars that 
were fought between the empires in 421 and 441 do not appear as anomalies, or signs that 
one empire or the other wanted peace more than the other, but rather they reinforce the 
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point that it was political necessity that dictated the foreign relations of the Roman and 
Sasanian Empire.3 
Certainly, the 421 war that broke out during the reigns Theodosius II and Yazdgard I broke out 
due to the internal pressures both rulers faced; pressures that could only be alleviated by 
pursuing policies that led to war with one another. From Yazdgard’s, and his successor 
Bahrām V’s, perspective the war was a result of their need to appease the Zoroastrian 
Magians, who, as we have seen, could cause trouble for Shahs when antagonised. After 
bishop Abdas and his followers destroyed the Zoroastrian fire temple the Magians put so 
much pressure on Yazdgard to retaliate against the Christians in the Sasanian Empire that he 
was eventually forced to do so, despite the anger this would cause in Constantinople and the 
damage it would do to the cautious relationship Yazdgard had up, until this point, carefully 
pursued with the Roman Empire. Theodosius was also forced to pursue policies that led to 
outbreak of war in 421 due to his own internal concerns. Throughout his reign Theodosius 
had based his legitimacy and right to rule on his Christian piety, consequently, when the 
Sasanian Christians fled to the Roman Empire seeking sanctuary Theodosius was forced to 
accept them, despite the fact that Bahrām had already warned this would lead to war.  
Likewise, the Roman breaking of the 422 treaty by accepting the loyalty of the Arab tribal 
leader Amorkesos, as described earlier, similarly reinforces the primacy of self-interest in 
dictating the actions of the all the major players in the late antique world.4 
Therefore, just as political necessity forced the two empires into peace for the vast majority 
of the fifth century, internal needs also caused these two small-scale wars in the same way. 
The fact that political necessity and their leaders’ own individual security were the underlying 
factors in the Roman-Sasanian peace, and that because of this wars such as those in 421 and 
441 did take place, also reinforces the argument that the establishment and maintenance of 
peace was an on-going process that adapted and responded to changes as and when they 
arose throughout the fifth century. As such, the fifth-century peace must be seen as the 
consequence of a series of interconnected events, political needs and pragmatic decisions, 
not as the result of single treaty or event. Likewise, there was also no underlying or coherent 
                                                          
3 For example, Rubin (1986) argued that it was the Sasanians, not the Romans, who desired peace, however, as 
seen in this study both needed peace as much as each other. 
4 See p.201-3 for more details. 
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desire for a more peaceful relationship on behalf of the two empires, rather it was the result 
of self-interest and necessity. Certainly, the fact that once the unique conditions of the fifth 
century changed, or were overcome, the traditional imperial competition and conflict 
resumed in the sixth century reinforces this and underlines that the fifth-century peace 
should be understood more as an enforced cease-fire rather than the sudden development 
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